01/26/2011 10:37:00 AM EST
Merrill Settles SEC Claims

Merrill Lynch resolved claims that it misused customer
order information, charged certain customers undisclosed trading fees and
failed to maintain proper records. The firm consented to the entry of a cease
and desist order and agreed to pay a $10 million civil penalty. In the
Matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-14204.
The Order for Proceedings alleges violations of three
Sections of the Exchange Act: 1) Section 15(c)(1)(A) for effected transactions
in a manipulative or deceptive manner; 2) Section 15(g) for failing to
establish written procedures to reasonably prevent the misuse of material
non-public information; and 3) Section 17(a) for failing to make records of
certain terms and conditions of customer orders.
The conduct on which the Order is based occurred from
2002 through 2007 and centers on three types of transactions. The first concerned
the use of certain customer order information by the firm's Equity Strategy
Desk. That Desk began operations in February 2003 and continued through 2005.
It traded securities for the benefit of the firm and had authority over $1
billion in capital.

Merrill told customers that information regarding their
orders and business affairs would be kept confidential. This point was
confirmed by its Guidelines for Business Conduct published on the firm website.
Contrary to those representations, in certain instances the firm's market
making desk shared institutional customer order information with its
proprietary trading desk. The Order cites several instances where institutional
customer order information was used by the firm's proprietary trading desk to trade
in securities. While the Order states that there were "other instances," there
is no indication regarding the number of instances when this occurred or the
magnitude of the difficulty.
The second involved improper mark-up and mark-down
charges. During the time period Merrill operated one of the largest NASDAQ
market making operations in the world. Its institutional and high net worth
customer orders for NASDAQ securities were, for the most part, executed on an
agency basis through a computer system. The firm also executed orders on a
principal basis through its market making desk.
During the time period Merrill had agreements with
certain institutional and high net worth customers to only charge an agreed
upon commission for executing riskless principal trades. Nevertheless, in
certain instances the firm charged these customers an undisclosed mark-up and
mark-down. The Order cited several examples which occurred between 2002 and
2006 while noting that there were "other instances." There is no indication of
the magnitude of the difficulty.
Finally, in some instances during the time period Merrill
agreed to guarantee a customer a specific per-share execution price or a price
tied to an agreed upon benchmark. Usually the firm made these agreements orally
and in many instances failed to record them in writing as required by Section
17(a)(1). As a result of this conduct Merrill violated not only the Sections
cited above but it also failed to reasonably supervise persons subject to its
supervision as required by Section 15(b)(4)(E). It failed to reasonably
supervise traders associated with its proprietary trading desk and its NASDAQ
market making operations with a view to detecting and preventing violations of
the Exchange Act
The Commission's press release regarding the case notes
that the settlement reflects the cooperation of Merrill after its acquisition
by Bank of America.
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