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12/13/2010 11:36:00 AM EST

Free Download: The Business Strategies ("White Knight") Immunity in the Delaware Court of Chancery

Corporate takeover litigation provided the historical predicate for the business strategies immunity, also sometimes called the "white knight" privilege or business-strategies privilege. The doctrine first arose out of the efforts of target corporations to shield from discovery information pertaining to potential responses to hostile takeover bids, in particular alternative transactions under discussion with friendly third-party bidders, or so-called white knights. The doctrine soon expanded to protect, in appropriate circumstances, a wide range of time-sensitive information in the takeover context, including certain financial information; strategies, defenses, and alternate transactions under consideration by the target;1 and even certain counterdefensive measures being considered by the hostile bidder. Although the Delaware case law regarding the business-strategies immunity is nearly all unreported, much in the form of oral rulings from the bench, the basic parameters of the immunity are now well established.

As an initial matter, it should be emphasized that the business-strategies doctrine is not technically an evidentiary privilege in the same sense as the attorney-client privilege. Rather, the doctrine is in the nature of a qualified immunity from discovery, more closely akin to the work product doctrine. Although many of the early decisions were silent on the source of the Court of Chancery's authority to promulgate an immunity for business-strategy information, it is now clear that the doctrine arises under the discretionary authority vested in the court by Chancery Court Rule 26(c), which authorizes the court to enter protective orders as "justice requires" to protect parties from undue prejudice.2 In this regard, the business-strategies doctrine envisions a balancing test under which the court is called upon to evaluate and weigh the competing legitimate interests of the parties as well as those of the target corporation's shareholders. [footnotes omitted]

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This excerpt was taken from Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery (by Michael Pittenger and Donald Wolfe), which has been recognized by Truth on the Market as one of the top ten corporate law works for the practitioner. Subscribers to lexis.com may access the treatise online. Non-subscribers may purchase the treatise from the LexisNexis Store.

Because it is the corporate domicile of choice in the United States, Delaware produces and implements the substantive laws governing internal affairs for most of our nation's corporations - large and small. As a result, most battles concerning the application of those laws are waged in Delaware courts. In Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery, you'll profit from the singular insight and firsthand experience of two of the court's leading practitioners. You'll quickly find out why the Court of Chancery is to corporate litigation what the Delaware General Corporation Law is to the nation's corporate community. And most important, you'll learn about numerous topics never before explored in such a comprehensive manner.


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