﻿<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="../StyleSheet/rss.xsl"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Corporate &amp; Securities Law Community Corporate Law</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/corpsec</link><description>Corporate &amp; Securities Law Community</description><copyright>http://www.lexisnexis.com/terms/copyright.aspx</copyright><atom:link href="http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/corpsec/Rss.aspx?id=470" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Human Behavior vs. Corporate Behavior</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/21/human-behavior-vs-corporate-behavior.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/21/human-behavior-vs-corporate-behavior.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_FreedomOfSpeech.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:4px;margin-bottom:4px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A few years ago -- around the time of the &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.ragm.com/blog/Citizens-United-as-a-pivotal-event-of-2010"&gt;2010
Citizens United decision&lt;/a&gt; -- I was thinking about &amp;quot;corporate
citizenship&amp;quot; and corporate &amp;quot;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.ragm.com/library/Free-Speech-for-Corporations"&gt;speech&lt;/a&gt;.&amp;quot;&amp;nbsp;
These ideas don&amp;#39;t make sense to me. Corporations are a legal construct --
something made by humans -- and yet we&amp;#39;ve given them human rights, as it
were.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then I started to compare &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.ragm.com/library/Corporate-State"&gt;human behavior to corporate
behavior&lt;/a</description><author>ragm@ragm.com (Robert AG Monks)</author><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 11:52:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>A Short Paper You Must Read About Board-Level Corporate Risk Management – NACD Advisory Council on Risk Oversight </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/21/a-short-paper-you-must-read-about-board-level-corporate-risk-management-nacd-advisory-council-on-risk-oversight.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/21/a-short-paper-you-must-read-about-board-level-corporate-risk-management-nacd-advisory-council-on-risk-oversight.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_RiskManagement.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:4px;margin-bottom:4px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;If you are interested in the process of board oversight
over corporate risk management, here is &lt;a href="http://www.nacdonline.org/files/AC%20on%20Risk%20Oversight%20Summary_Final.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;a short paper that you must read&lt;/a&gt; from the National
Association of Corporate Directors. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, let me sincerely compliment the NACD for
discussing this topic and making portions of the discussions available for
reading and comment.&amp;nbsp; Whether you agree or disagree with portions of the
paper and the discussions therein, making the paper available&amp;nbsp;demonstrates
an effort at leadership which I believe is often lacking at professional
organizations.&lt;/p&gt;</description><author>tateatty@yahoo.com (Dave Tate)</author><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 10:13:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Prior to Derivative Suit, Shareholder Demand Must Clearly Identify Wrong and Demand Action</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/20/prior-to-derivative-suit-shareholder-demand-must-clearly-identify-wrong-and-demand-action.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/20/prior-to-derivative-suit-shareholder-demand-must-clearly-identify-wrong-and-demand-action.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_CorporateManagement.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:4px;margin-bottom:4px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;A shareholder acting on behalf of a corporation may bring
a &amp;quot;derivative suit&amp;quot; against corporate directors and management for &lt;a href="http://www.berliklaw.com/lawyer-attorney-1477730.html" target="_blank"&gt;fraud&lt;/a&gt;,
mismanagement, self-dealing or dishonesty. Before bringing such a suit, the
shareholder must make a written demand that clearly identifies the alleged
wrong and demands the corporation take action to redress it. A court will
examine a complaint and a written demand to insure that they are sufficiently
connected. A Norfolk Circuit Court recently addressed the sufficiency of a
demand letter in &lt;a href="http://www.virginiabusinesslitigationlawyer</description><author>info@berliklaw.com (Lee Berlik)</author><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 15:47:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>D&amp;O Insurance: Untimely Notice Precludes Coverage </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/20/d-amp-o-insurance-untimely-notice-precludes-coverage.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/20/d-amp-o-insurance-untimely-notice-precludes-coverage.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_MissouriFlag.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:4px;margin-bottom:4px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a May 16, 2013 decision (&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://clients.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/secure.pdf"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;),
Eastern District of Missouri Magistrate Judge &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://judgepedia.org/index.php/Terry_I._Adelman"&gt;Terry Adelman&lt;/a&gt;,
applying Missouri law, determined that the failure of an insured under a
management liability insurance policy to provide timely notice of claim
precluded coverage under the policy, even in the absence of a showing of
prejudice to the insurer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Background&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/i&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On December 28, 2007, Secure Energy&amp;#39;s Board of Directors
received a demand from Michael</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 11:07:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Federal Court to Rule On Challenge to Use of Former Officer's Interview Statements in Corporate Internal Investigation</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/14/federal-court-to-rule-on-challenge-to-use-of-former-officer-s-interview-statements-in-corporate-internal-investigation.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/14/federal-court-to-rule-on-challenge-to-use-of-former-officer-s-interview-statements-in-corporate-internal-investigation.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Investigation2.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:4px;margin-bottom:4px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;by Robert N. Rapp&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In cases whether allegedly
incriminating statements given in the course of interviews during an internal
investigation conducted by the Audit Committee with the assistance of outside
counsel and forensic accountants should be admitted as evidence against a
person in his upcoming trial. Such ruling may significantly impact internal
investigations conducted by public companies into potential wrongdoing or
issues raised in government investigations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Excerpt:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a criminal case alleging
multimillion-dollar securities and accounting fraud brought against the former
Executive Vice President of Sales of Carter&amp;#39;s</description><author>LexisNexisCorporateBusinessLaw@lnstaff.com (Corporate and Securities Law Community Staff)</author><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 08:15:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Delaware Court of Chancery Declines to Enjoin Acquisition of Plains Exploration and Production Co.</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/13/chancery-declines-to-enjoin-acquisition-of-plains-exploration-and-production-co.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/13/chancery-declines-to-enjoin-acquisition-of-plains-exploration-and-production-co.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.release.allnet.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/DelawareCourtofChancerySeal.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin:8px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=189160"&gt;&lt;i&gt;In Re
Plains Exploration &amp;amp; Production Company Stockholder Litigation&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;,
Cons., C.A. No. 8090-VCN (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) [&lt;a href="http://www.lexis.com/xlink?showcidslinks=on&amp;amp;ORIGINATION_CODE=00210&amp;amp;searchtype=get&amp;amp;search=2013%20Del.%20Ch.%20LEXIS%20118" target="_blank"&gt;an enhanced version of this opinion is available to lexis.com
subscribers&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Issues Addressed&lt;/span&gt;:
Were &lt;i&gt;Revlon&lt;/i&gt; duties of the board breached due to the absence of a special
committee and pre-market check in connection with the sale of the company, and
(ii) were disclosure obligations</description><author>FPileggi@eckertseamans.com (Francis G.X. Pileggi)</author><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 11:54:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Management Liability Insurance for Law Firms and the Dewey &amp; LeBoeuf Bankruptcy </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/06/management-liability-insurance-for-law-firms-and-the-dewey-amp-leboeuf-bankruptcy.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/05/06/management-liability-insurance-for-law-firms-and-the-dewey-amp-leboeuf-bankruptcy.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Split_2800_Horizontal_2900_.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;The collapse of the venerable Dewey &amp;amp; LeBoeuf law
firm is a cautionary tale from which observers have drawn many lessons,
including cautions about the perils associated with large law firm mergers and
the challenges associated with various forms of law firm partner compensation.
The firm&amp;#39;s failure and the claims that have subsequently arisen against the
firm&amp;#39;s former managers also highlight important &amp;nbsp;issues surrounding
management liability insurance for law firms.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As discussed &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dewey_%26_LeBoeuf"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, the Dewey &amp;amp;
LeBoeuf firm was the result of a 2007 merger between</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 15:36:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Foley &amp; Lardner: Most Favored Nation ("MFN") Pricing Draws Scrutiny as Potential Anticompetitive Practice</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/30/most-favored-nation-quot-mfn-quot-pricing-draws-scrutiny-as-potential-anticompetitive-practice.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/30/most-favored-nation-quot-mfn-quot-pricing-draws-scrutiny-as-potential-anticompetitive-practice.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_PriceTag_2800_Discount_2900_.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;An interesting and growing debate in the antitrust arena
is whether most favored nation (&amp;quot;MFN&amp;quot;) pricing provisions are pro-competitive
or anticompetitive. For many years, MFN provisions have been considered a
fairly noncontroversial contract term included by purchasers in an attempt to
assure that other buyers do not receive a more favorable price. But not all
agree that MFNs result in lower prices, including some economists and, more
importantly, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (&amp;quot;DOJ&amp;quot;). The DOJ not
only has expressed potential concerns about MFN clauses but also has filed
several antitrust actions alleging that particular</description><author>FoleyandLardner@placeholder.com (Foley &amp; Lardner LLP)</author><pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2013 10:59:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Attorney/Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine Again Addressed by Delaware Court of Chancery</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/26/attorney-client-privilege-and-work-product-doctrine-again-addressed-by-chancery.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/26/attorney-client-privilege-and-work-product-doctrine-again-addressed-by-chancery.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/DelawareCourtofChancerySeal.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin:8px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=188310"&gt;&lt;i&gt;AM General
Holdings LLC v. The Renco Group, Inc&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;., C.A. No. 7639-VCN (Del. Ch.
April 18, 2013). A prior Chancery decision in this case was highlighted on
these pages&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2013/01/articles/chancery-court-updates/agmnt-to-satisfy-irreparable-harm-element-for-pi/"&gt;
at this link.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Issue Addressed&lt;/span&gt;:&amp;nbsp;
Whether the attorney/client privilege and the work product doctrine are
defenses to a motion to compel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Short Answer&lt;/span&gt;:
&amp;nbsp;They can be.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style</description><author>FPileggi@eckertseamans.com (Francis G.X. Pileggi)</author><pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2013 12:57:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Statistical Programs Under Antitrust Scrutiny </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/26/statistical-programs-under-antitrust-scrutiny.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/26/statistical-programs-under-antitrust-scrutiny.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Statistics.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Information exchanges, such as statistical programs, drew
considerable attention at the marquee Spring Meeting of the American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law this month. Two cases merit consideration
because there was no evidence in either case that the information exchanges
lead to price fixing or anticompetitive effects, but government prosecutors
used the information exchanges to support price fixing charges. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The takeaway for those of us that counsel or review
information exchanges is the need for a broader, and more measured evaluation
of the context in which the information exchanges will occur, coupled with an
increased need to articulate</description><author>Keller.Heckman@placeholder.com (Keller and Heckman LLP)</author><pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2013 12:03:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>D&amp;O Insurance to Fund Entire "Largest Ever" $139 Million News Corp. Derivative Suit Settlement </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/24/d-amp-o-insurance-to-fund-entire-quot-largest-ever-quot-139-million-news-corp-derivative-suit-settlement.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/24/d-amp-o-insurance-to-fund-entire-quot-largest-ever-quot-139-million-news-corp-derivative-suit-settlement.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Money_2800_OneDollar_2900_.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In what the plaintiffs&amp;#39; lawyers claim to be the largest
derivative lawsuit settlement ever, the parties to the News Corp. shareholder
derivative litigation have agreed to settle the consolidated cases for $139
million. The company also agreed to tighten oversight of the company&amp;#39;s
operations and to establish a whistleblower hotline, as well as other corporate
therapeutics. The cash portion of the settlement is to be funded entirely by
D&amp;amp;O insurance. The settlement is subject to court approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The parties&amp;#39; April 17, 2013 memorandum of understanding
regarding the settlement can be found &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.newscorpderivativesettlement</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2013 10:35:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Scott London Subverted Sarbanes-Oxley: Big Four Mock Audit Partner Rotation</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/23/scott-london-subverted-sarbanes-oxley-big-four-mock-audit-partner-rotation.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/23/scott-london-subverted-sarbanes-oxley-big-four-mock-audit-partner-rotation.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images/ContentImage_2D00_Galaxy.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;The earth rotates around the sun. Galaxy Doppler shifts
are almost always redshifts. The further away the galaxy the faster it is
receding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#39;m learning a lot in my first class, Cosmology, in the &lt;a href="https://grahamschool.uchicago.edu/content/master-liberal-arts" target="_blank"&gt;University of Chicago Masters in Liberal Arts Program&lt;/a&gt;. The
universe has order. There&amp;#39;s synchronicity and &lt;a href="http://www.kavlifoundation.org/frontiers-theoretical-physics" target="_blank"&gt;&amp;quot;smoothness&amp;quot;&lt;/a&gt; to where it is and how it came to be that
scientists have a hard time explaining.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Such laws rarely seem to apply very well to human nature.
Where did earthbound humans part ways</description><author>retheauditors@gmail.com (Francine McKenna)</author><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 16:40:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Chancery Addresses “At Issue” Exception to Attorney/Client Privilege</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/17/chancery-addresses-at-issue-exception-to-attorney-client-privilege.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/17/chancery-addresses-at-issue-exception-to-attorney-client-privilege.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/DelawareCourtofChancerySeal.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin:8px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=188030"&gt;&lt;i&gt;In re
Comverge, Inc., Shareholders Litigation&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, C.A. No. 7368-VCP (Del. Ch.
April 10, 2013) [&lt;a href="http://www.lexis.com/xlink?showcidslinks=on&amp;amp;ORIGINATION_CODE=00237&amp;amp;searchtype=get&amp;amp;search=2013%20Del.%20Ch.%20LEXIS%2092" target="_blank"&gt;an enhanced version of this opinion is available to lexis.com
subscribers&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Issue Presented&lt;/span&gt;:
Whether the attorney-client privilege was a defense to a motion to compel
documents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Short Answer&lt;/span&gt;:&amp;nbsp;
Yes, under the circumstances of this case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration</description><author>FPileggi@eckertseamans.com (Francis G.X. Pileggi)</author><pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2013 14:29:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>D&amp;O Insurance: Fourth Circuit Affirms That Convicted Exec Must Repay Insurer for Defense Expenses </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/15/d-amp-o-insurance-fourth-circuit-affirms-that-convicted-exec-must-repay-insurer-for-defense-expenses.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/15/d-amp-o-insurance-fourth-circuit-affirms-that-convicted-exec-must-repay-insurer-for-defense-expenses.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Gavel2.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;Lee Farkas, the criminally convicted former Chairman and
majority shareholder of &amp;nbsp;the defunct &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor,_Bean_%26_Whitaker"&gt;Taylor Bean and
Whitaker Mortgage Corporation&lt;/a&gt;,&amp;nbsp;must repay the nearly $1 million in
defense fees the company&amp;#39;s D&amp;amp;O insurer had advanced on his behalf,
according to an April 11, 2013 Fourth Circuit opinion. The terse three-page
appellate opinion adopts the ruling of the lower court, holding that Farkas&amp;#39;s
criminal conviction triggered the D&amp;amp;O insurance policy&amp;#39;s &amp;quot;in fact&amp;quot; conduct
exclusions which in turn triggered the insurer&amp;#39;s right to recoup the defense
fees</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 11:28:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>JPMorgan Chase, And Dimon, Starting To Sweat About Everything</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/12/jpmorgan-chase-and-dimon-starting-to-sweat-about-everything.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/12/jpmorgan-chase-and-dimon-starting-to-sweat-about-everything.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/ContentImage_2D00_JamieDimon.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;I put two new columns up at Forbes recently that talk
about JPMorgan, PwC, Senator Levin&amp;#39;s &amp;quot;Whale&amp;quot; hearings, and all the other stuff
JPMorgan and Jamie Dimon are really worried about. &amp;nbsp;The &lt;i&gt;New York Times &lt;/i&gt;had
an interesting scoop about JPMorgan and Deloitte and the foreclosure reviews
that I followed up on, too, in &lt;a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2013/04/01/jpmorgan-chase-still-haunted-by-foreclosure-reviews-and-more/" target="_blank"&gt;&amp;quot;JPMorgan Chase Still Haunted By Foreclosure Reviews, And
More&amp;quot;.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Update April 4: &lt;/b&gt;The
GAO has now issued its report on the regulators and their use of the
third</description><author>retheauditors@gmail.com (Francine McKenna)</author><pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 16:39:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Default Fiduciary Duties Coming for Delaware LLCs</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/12/default-fiduciary-duties-coming-for-delaware-llcs.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/12/default-fiduciary-duties-coming-for-delaware-llcs.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/ContentImage_2D00_DelawareFlag.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;There has been a &lt;a href="http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2012/12/lining-up-like-jets-and-sharks.html" target="_self"&gt;back and forth between the Chancery Court and the Delaware
Supreme Court&lt;/a&gt; about whether there are default fiduciary duties for LLCs.
&amp;nbsp;The Chancery Court takes the position that there are default fiduciary
duties, though you may contract around them. &amp;nbsp;The Supreme Court on the
other hand take a more extreme, contractualist position. &amp;nbsp;The Chief
Justice&amp;#39;s position is that there are no default duties because the LLC form is
a creature of contract. &amp;nbsp;If parties to an LLC have not contracted for
fiduciary duties, then</description><author>bjmquinn@bc.edu (Brian JM Quinn)</author><pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 16:24:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Supreme Court Reverses Chancery on Collateral Estoppel/Demand Futility and Section 220 Issues</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/11/supreme-court-reverses-chancery-on-collateral-estoppel-demand-futility-and-section-220-issues.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/11/supreme-court-reverses-chancery-on-collateral-estoppel-demand-futility-and-section-220-issues.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/ContentImage_2D00_DelawareFlag.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=187720"&gt;Pyott v.
Louisiana Municipal Police Employees&amp;#39; Retirement System,&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;No.
380, 2012 (Del. Supr., April 4, 2013) [&lt;a href="http://www.lexis.com/xlink?showcidslinks=on&amp;amp;ORIGINATION_CODE=00237&amp;amp;searchtype=get&amp;amp;search=2013%20Del.%20LEXIS%20179" target="_blank"&gt;an enhanced version of this opinion is available to lexis.com
subscribers&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Issues Addressed&lt;/span&gt;:&amp;nbsp;
(1) Whether or not a prior ruling by a California court dismissing a derivative
suit served as a bar to subsequent Delaware derivative</description><author>FPileggi@eckertseamans.com (Francis G.X. Pileggi)</author><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 14:25:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Delaware Supreme Court Blasts Chancery Court's Controversial Refusal to Recognize California Court Judgment </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/08/delaware-supreme-court-blasts-chancery-court-s-controversial-refusal-to-recognize-california-court-judgment.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/08/delaware-supreme-court-blasts-chancery-court-s-controversial-refusal-to-recognize-california-court-judgment.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Corporate+_2600_+Securities+LC/ContentImage_2D00_DelawareFlag.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;One of the more vexing litigation problems to emerge
recently has been the proliferation of multi-jurisdiction litigation, where
corporate defendants are forced to litigate essentially the same claim in
multiple courts at the same time. This problem is a particular issue in the
context of M&amp;amp;A litigation, although not contained to those kinds of lawsuits.
In the midst of what has become essentially a jurisdictional competition,
Delaware&amp;#39;s courts have tried to establish themselves as the preferred and
presumptive court for corporate litigation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As discussed &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/06/articles/shareholders-derivative</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Mon, 08 Apr 2013 15:35:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Final Approval of $2.4B Settlement Granted in Bank of America Securities Suit </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/08/final-approval-of-2-4b-settlement-granted-in-bank-of-america-securities-suit.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/08/final-approval-of-2-4b-settlement-granted-in-bank-of-america-securities-suit.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_BankOfAmerica.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;NEW YORK - (Mealey&amp;#39;s) A federal judge in New York on Apr.
5 granted final approval of a $2.4 billion settlement between shareholders and
Bank of America Corp. (BoA) to settle claims that it and certain of its
executive officers and directors misrepresented the company&amp;#39;s business and
financial condition, as well as the business and financial condition of
Merrill, Lynch &amp;amp; Co. Inc. prior to BoA&amp;#39;s acquisition of Merrill (&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;In
re:&amp;nbsp; Bank of America Corp. Securities, Derivative, and ERISA Litigation&lt;/span&gt;,
No. 09-MDL-2058, S.D. N.Y.; See October 2012, Page 4).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to a media relations source at shareholder</description><author>timothy.raub@lexisnexis.com (Timothy Raub)</author><pubDate>Mon, 08 Apr 2013 12:48:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Comcast v. Behrend Sets a Higher Bar for Class Certification</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/02/comcast-v-behrend-sets-a-higher-bar-for-class-certification.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/02/comcast-v-behrend-sets-a-higher-bar-for-class-certification.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/LegalBusiness/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images/ContentImage_5F00_SupremeCourt-_2800_4_2900_.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;by &lt;a href="http://www.sheppardmullin.com/jdriscoll" target="_blank"&gt;Jennifer
Driscoll-Chippendale&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On March 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court continued its
recent trend of imposing more stringent standards for class certification in &lt;i&gt;Comcast
Corporation v. Behrend&lt;/i&gt;, 569 U.S. ___ (2013) &lt;a href="http://www.lexis.com/xlink?showcidslinks=on&amp;amp;ORIGINATION_CODE=00210&amp;amp;searchtype=get&amp;amp;search=2013%20U.S.%20LEXIS%202544"&gt;[lexis.com
subscribers may access the opinion]&lt;/a&gt;. At issue was whether the proponents of
certification satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), which requires
that &amp;quot;questions of law or fact common to class members predominate</description><author>SheppardMullinRichterHampton2@placeholder.com (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &amp; Hampton LLP)</author><pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2013 16:13:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Business Succession Planning</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/02/business-succession-planning.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/02/business-succession-planning.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Handover.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;by Vance E.
Antonacci&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Introduction&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The transition of a family owned or closely-held business
is an important event for families. In a prior article, we covered the issues
that a business owner faces in general in preparing a succession plan. This
article will address specific issues that arise when some but not all of the
owner&amp;#39;s children are actively involved in the family business.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Transitioning a Family Business to Children -
Overview&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many family business owners are fortunate to have one or
more children work in the business</description><author>McNees@placeholder.com (McNees Wallace &amp; Nurick LLC)</author><pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2013 15:46:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Big News: Consolidated LIBOR-Scandal Antitrust and RICO Claims Dismissed </title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/01/big-news-consolidated-libor-scandal-antitrust-and-rico-claims-dismissed.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/04/01/big-news-consolidated-libor-scandal-antitrust-and-rico-claims-dismissed.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Gavel2.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;On March 29, 2013, in a ruling that she acknowledged some
might find to be &amp;quot;unexpected&amp;quot; in light of the substantial regulatory fines and
penalties that some of the defendants have paid, Southern District of New York &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naomi_Reice_Buchwald"&gt;Naomi Reice Buchwald&lt;/a&gt;
granted the defendants&amp;#39; motions to dismiss the antitrust and RICO claims in the
consolidated LIBOR-based antitrust litigation. Judge Buchwald also dismissed
the plaintiffs&amp;#39; state law claims and some of the plaintiffs&amp;#39; commodities
manipulation claims. However, she denied the defendants&amp;#39; motions to dismiss at
least a portion of the plaintiffs&amp;#39;</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2013 12:17:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Mutual Fund Directors in the Hot Seat?</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/03/28/mutual-fund-directors-in-the-hot-seat.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/03/28/mutual-fund-directors-in-the-hot-seat.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_HotSeat.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;Mutual fund directors have been attacked before. For
example, in his &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf"&gt;2002
letter to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,&lt;/a&gt; Berkshire chairman Warren
Buffett took a detour in an essay about corporate governance to express
concerns about mutual fund directors. He noted that mutual fund directors
effectively have only two &amp;quot;important duties&amp;quot;; to pick the fund manager and to
negotiate the manager&amp;#39;s fee. The record of mutual fund managers pursuing either
goal has been &amp;quot;absolutely pathetic.&amp;quot; The manager selection process for far too
many funds has become a &amp;quot;zombie-like process</description><author>klacroix@oakbridgeins.com (Kevin M. LaCroix)</author><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 17:04:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>Delaware Affirms That Reverse Triangular Mergers Do Not Trigger Contract Clauses Generally Prohibiting Assignment</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/03/28/delaware-affirms-that-reverse-triangular-mergers-do-not-trigger-contract-clauses-generally-prohibiting-assignment.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/03/28/delaware-affirms-that-reverse-triangular-mergers-do-not-trigger-contract-clauses-generally-prohibiting-assignment.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images.Miscellaneous+Images/ContentImage_2D00_Triangle.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;by &lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.dlapiper.com/ed_batts"&gt;Ed Batts &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Negotiation fatigue is an age-old problem in completing
any contract - and often, whether fair or not, the further back in the document
the clause is positioned, the greater the fatigue. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A choice-of-law provision, which decides which
jurisdiction&amp;#39;s law shall govern the contract, is almost always near the last
clause in a contract.&amp;nbsp; How often have dueling sets of lawyers (and more
frequently, frazzled and puzzled clients who simply want a contract done before
the end of the quarter) exhausted themselves on other provisions, only to trade
away choice of law for a perceived gain</description><author>DLAPiper@placeholder.com (DLA Piper)</author><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 15:58:00 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>High Court: Class Certification in Antitrust Case Was Improper</title><link>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/03/27/high-court-class-certification-in-antitrust-case-was-improper.aspx</link><guid>http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2013/03/27/high-court-class-certification-in-antitrust-case-was-improper.aspx</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LEGALBUSINESS/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.SiteFiles/Images/ContentImage_5F00_Supreme-Court-_2800_3_2900_.jpg" style="max-width:550px;border:0;float:left;margin-top:6px;margin-bottom:6px;margin-left:12px;margin-right:12px;" border="0" alt="" /&gt;WASHINGTON, D.C. - (Mealey&amp;#39;s) The U.S. Supreme Court
today ruled 5-4 that a district court may not certify a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) without resolving whether the class
has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that
the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a classwide basis (&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;Comcast
Corporation, et al. v. Caroline Behrend, et al.&lt;/span&gt;, No. 11-864, U.S. Sup.; See
November 2012) &lt;b&gt;(lexis.com subscribers may &lt;a href="http://www.lexis.com/xlink?showcidslinks=on&amp;amp;ORIGINATION_CODE=00209&amp;amp;searchtype=bo&amp;amp;search=number%2811-864%29&amp;amp;source=CRTFLS;BRIEFS" target</description><author>joan.grossman@lexisnexis.com (Joan Grossman)</author><pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2013 14:39:00 -0400</pubDate></item></channel></rss>