Following
the deaths of his elderly parents, Schneller filed a federal action against
medical providers, the genesis of claim being the medical and legal services
rendered to his parents during the last months of their lives. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331, Schneller asserted federal question jurisdiction based on:
- the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of
1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14401, et seq.
- the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.,
and Medical Requirements for Skilled Nursing Facilities, 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 et
seq.; and
- the
Civil Rights Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and Schneller sought review.
The Third
Circuit held that the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act did not provide
a basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In support of
jurisdiction, Schneller argued that defendants had misapplied funds
appropriated by Congress, in violation of the Act, for the purpose of assisting
in causing the death of his mother by euthanasia, mercy killing and assisted
suicide. The court held that even if Schneller's claims had a basis in fact,
there was nothing in the Act's structure or language, either expressly or implicitly,
that showed any Congressional intent to establish a private cause of action.
Regarding Schneller's
second basis for jurisdiction, the court held that:
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act is a statute enforceable only by the Attorney General and, by delegation,
the Department of Justice. There is no basis for civil liability arising out of
this statute. Schneller's claims under 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.10, 483.13, 483.15, and
483.25 do not provide a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 because they
merely set forth the requirements that a facility must meet in order to qualify
to participate in Medicare and Medicaid; they do not confer a private cause of
action.
(citations
omitted)
Finally,
the court held that Schneller's civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, and 1986 contemplated a private cause of action and therefore conferred
subject matter jurisdiction on the court. However, the court rejected the §
1983 claim because Schneller failed to demonstrate that the alleged violations
were committed by a person acting under color of state law. Schneller conceded
that there were no state actors of any clearly defined sort. However, he argued
that the private hospital defendants were state actors because they received
public monies and tax benefits, they were subject to state and federal
regulation, and their actions were so entwined with governmental policies as to
become state action within the Civil Rights Act. In rejecting this argument,
the court held that Schneller had not demonstrated a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
latter's action could be fairly treated as that of the State itself.
As for the §§
1985, 1986 claims, the court held that:
Schneller's § 1985 claim could not survive
dismissal because he has not set out sufficient facts to show that a racial or
other class-based invidious discriminatory animus lay behind the appellees'
alleged actions and that the alleged coconspirators "intended to deprive
the victim of a right guaranteed by the Constitution against private
impairment." Schneller cannot state a § 1986 claim because a § 1985
violation is a pre-requisite.
(citations
omitted)
Lexis.com subscribers can view the enhanced version of Schneller
v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14966 (3d Cir. Pa. July 20,
2010)
Non-subscribers can use lexisOne's Free Case Law search to view the
free, un-enhanced version of Schneller
v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14966 (3d Cir. Pa. July 20,
2010)