Litigation Resource Community | LexisNexis
Featured Content
  • LITIGATION BLOG
  • People Are Concerned About Privacy — But What Kind Of Privacy? (Part 4)

04/01/2010 03:46:00 PM EST

People Are Concerned About Privacy — But What Kind Of Privacy? (Part 4)

Posted by

Steve C. Posner

In late March 2010, differences between European and American privacy law again hit the press. Such differences have been highlighted several times since 9/11, perhaps most publicly during the SWIFT imbroglio of 2005, when the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that international financial transaction clearing house to give it access to transactions in violation of the European Union Constitution.  Privacy of air traveler information has also long been an area of conflict between Europe and the U.S.

This time, it concerned Facebook, the social networking site, which allows users to upload personal information about people who are not registered on that site.  This is an especially sensitive issue for not only the European Union, but for member countries such as Switzerland, which has especially strong privacy laws, and Italy, where Google officials were criminally convicted after a video was found to have been illegally posted by a user.

Coming on the heels of the U.S. Justice Department's March 8 disclosure[1] that its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section monitors people on social networking sites-not just criminals, but witnesses and experts[2]-and that DOJ agents may assume false identities for that purpose in violation of such sites' terms of service, the Facebook issue caused a media storm so powerful that it briefly eclipsed the blogosphere's discussion of medical privacy.[3]

So what are the fundamental differences in the American and European approaches to privacy law?  Can they be resolved?  According to the Congressional Research Service,

The [commercially-] related issue of data privacy rights has also been a source of some friction. While the EU supports strict legal regulations on gathering consumer's personal data, the United States has advocated a self-regulated approach. Controversy emerged when the EU in 1995 adopted a directive forbidding the export of personal information outside EU member states unless the privacy laws in the country to which the information is to be received are deemed "adequate" by the EU. The fact that this list of countries did not include the United States, combined with the need for U.S. companies to be able to move date from Europe to the United States, prompted the creation of the "Safe Harbor" agreement of 2000. This mechanism allows U.S. companies within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission to comply with the EU Directive if they enroll with the Commerce Department, publicize that they will comply with the safe harbor rules, and recertify their compliance annually. As of December 2005, 837 U.S. companies were certified to the safe harbor program.[4]

The Safe Harbor Agreement ("SFA") referred to in the quotation above attempts to reconcile the European and American positions on privacy.  According to Jesse Sowell of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Sowell suggests that fundamental tension is between the American preference of economic efficiency and free information flow, and the European concern for individual privacy rights.   While the American privacy model is "normatively liberal" or "reactive," Europe's is "socially protective" and "proactive,"[5]  Under the SFA, European privacy practices are to be governed by "data authorities," while American practices are to be subject to "self-regulation enforced by market and reputation."[6]  offers three possibilities:

  • Privacy policies will comply with the intentions of the European model and the SFA;
  • Privacy policies won't comply with the intentions of the European model and the SFA; or
  • Privacy policies will comply with the black letter of the SFA but not its intent, making the SFA an "empty formalism."

Which is more desirable, the American or European model?  The answer partly depends on the value individuals place on their personal information.  Sowell points out that the contract between individuals and Internet providers is that individuals provide personal information in exchange for the providers' services.[7]  However, he says, the contract is not fair, because providers don't disclose what they do with the personal information, and have superior bargaining power, so that individuals can neither fairly bargain nor verify if the trade is in their interests.

Then too, one's answer may depend on whose ox is being gored.  The American model exalts the free flow of information-about other people.  The case law databases are full of lawsuits over allegedly confidential information.  And when CNET.com published an article disclosing some of Google chairman Eric Schmidt's personal information in July 2005,[8] CNN reported that Google had blackballed CNET reporters for a year.

What do you think?  Please let me know.


[1] Available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetworking.pdf.  The document was disclosed pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

[2] DoJ's preferred site for identifying experts is LinkedIn.com

[3] Neilsen's Blogpulse, Mar. 27, 2010.

[4] Raymond J. Ahearn, U.S.-European Union Trade Relations:  Issues and Policy Challenges, a Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, Order Code IB10087 (updated Jan. 26, 2006) at 11.  

[5] Jesse Sowell, "The Efficacy of the U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement," available at http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/Talks/0518-f2fLightiningTalk-js/pres1.pdf.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Elinor Mills, "Google Balances Privacy, Reach," CNET News (July 14, 2005), available at http://news.cnet.com/Google-balances-privacy,-reach/2100-1032_3-5787483.html.

 


 
Similar Content

News

Blogs

Podcasts

Videocasts

Emerging Issues

E-Discovery

Verdicts & Settlements

Legal Technology

Free Downloads

Product Update

Tort & Personal Injury Treatises

    Add a Comment

    (required)  
    (optional)
    (required)  
    Enter the Image Code: