Make More Rain : policies/ procedures, alternative billing

Reward Attorneys for the Commoditization of Reproducible Work

Admin — Tue, 15 Jan 2008 08:04:35 GMT

A friend of mine practices in firm that specializes primarily in transactional work. Much of the work is billed flat fee but they still track their time so the firm can determine profitability. Recorded time is set against an attorney's budgeted hours for the year so that they are credited for their flat fee work. My friend lamented associates padding their worked hours for flat fee work so they make their budget numbers. In this case, padding hours doesn't affect clients since the fee is pre-set but it does affect reporting of profitability.

Aric Press, Editor-In-Chief of The American Lawyer, wrote in the December, 2007, In-House article that 2008 may well be the year when clients start to demand alternative fee arrangements:

One of the unintended consequences of electronic billing is that clients can now easily compute and compare the cost of tasks. Soon there may be other technological threats based on knowledge management that can convert once complex acts of lawyering into rather commoditized routines.

I have been pretty adamant in my defense of the billable hour. That doesn't mean that I am against alternative fee arrangements when the use of them will improve the efficiency of the firm and thus increase profits. Recording time, regardless of fee arrangement, is still a good idea. However, sometimes it just makes more sense to bill using fixed fees for certain tasks.

Why not take advantage of this and place an internal value on the task as well? You can do this by determining the time it takes to perform the task, then mark it up to the market price (perhaps based on the hourly rate times the time it should take to perform it). When a task is routine, standardization gives firms opportunities that can revolutionize a firm's business model. Not only will attorneys have a value based on their billable hour, but certain repetitive and reproducible tasks can be valued as well. Your firm will diversify its product offerings to clients, giving them more options for services and giving you more options to strengthen the client relationship. You could ostensibly set a price list for legal products - in effect competing with the emerging online forms market.

In the example of my friend's firm, creating a standard task that is reproducible and given a proper value reduces the inaccuracies in reporting due to "padding time" by associates trying to make their numbers. In the example of the firm whose client has already placed billing guidelines on a firm, this has the equal benefit of both providing cost certainty to the client and saving the attorney from repetitive time entry.

There is also the benefit to the general practice firm. The firm can market package transaction services at a set rate, and tack on billable hours beyond the scope of the repetitive (and priced) task. Sound a bit like value-billing?

How would this work? For transactional work, it would be as simple as setting a value upon a routine task, such as creating a will. For a simple will, attorneys will determine what the variables are, determine what it has cost in the past, agree upon an acceptable price based on market acceptance and variables, then price it.

In a litigation matter, it is no different. Many firms are already required to provide budgets based on tasks for the benefit of client cost allocation. Each task that the firm performs can be priced. Litigators can anticipate the course of the suit and determine a cost for the entire matter. There should be a value placed upon every legal task, whether it be writing a status letter, reviewing a file, etc. The price can take into consideration variance in time it takes for different attorneys to perform the task. That is up to the firm to decide.

By standardizing the value of certain tasks, it also opens another opportunity for building firm expertise: giving royalties to attorneys who create reproducible work product. Firms spend years building up forms. Forms are rarely created again - they are typically modified. Yet no one gets credit for creating the forms.

By giving an attorney a royalty for a form, you encourage expertise to be passed on to the rest of the firm. You can position attorneys who have a talent for researching and integrating current law into forms as work product creators and attorneys who are better at managing relationships and matters representing clients. Both have value. Both can be compensated based on the work they perform. Form writers would receive a percentage of the cost of the task as a royalty for a certain time period whenever their form is used. Just as you should place a time limit on origination credit, you should only provide royalties on forms for a certain time.

How can this be advantageous to the firm? Several ways:

It encourages information sharing within the firm.
It compensates those who provide value to others in the firm.
It can further a strategy of increasing leverage by giving credit to partners while reducing their billable hours.
It transfers the wealth of knowledge gained at the firm's expense back to the firm.
It can aid the strategy of succession planning by providing a route to semi-retirement while ensuring that the firm maintain its areas of specialization.
It allows partners to spend more time on what they excel in most: rainmakers focused on marketing efforts and strategic planning and grinders developing work product.
It gives firms an opportunity to give associates responsibilities that will benefit the firm as well as the associate.

Of course, with any change in policy, there are uncertainties that have to be addressed. For example, what if another attorney within the firm finds a problematic provision in the form and proposes to change a few clauses? What if the attorney proposes an entirely new form? Although in theory it would be a good thing to have several different forms from which to choose, logistically it may make more sense for your firm to settle on a preferred form from which attorneys may receive a royalty. That along with determination of the royalty percentage is sure to provide lively discussion in the partner meeting.

Whatever direction your firm goes when applying new policies, it should conform with a universal requirement of periodic measurement and adjustment.

Cotterman: In Defense of "Lockstep" Compensation System

Admin — Mon, 14 Jan 2008 08:00:18 GMT

Many, including myself, have for several reasons (in my case, personal experience), railed against lockstep compensation as a debilitating agent to per partner income and the ability to keep top attorneys. I have seen the internal griping, the uncomfortable situations, and the inevitable loss of talent because of the appearance of unfair distribution of compensation based on a lockstep system.

James Cotterman, however, in an January 3rd post, argues "[t]he success or failure of any compensation system is not simply inherent within the structure of the program." He defends the lockstep compensation system - with a caveat:

[A] pure lock-step program largely requires the firm to assess a senior associate’s ability to progress as a partner over the remainder of his/her career. Essentially you are making some thirty or more years of future compensation decisions at one time. Such an assessment requires much more careful attention to the qualities of being a partner. And such attention is rare.

Among the benefits of lockstep compensation plans:

1. It supports a single firm philosophy.
2. There is little internal competition.
3. Leadership has more time to lead without the annual compensation ritual.
4. Non-traditional roles and new postings are more easily undertaken.

1. It supports a single firm philosophy.
I agree and disagree. It should support the single firm philosophy in that it treats all partners more or less the same. However, I don't assume a single-firm philosophy requires socialistic tendencies. In fact, such tendencies in a market system don't work well and can lead to a split up of the single firm. Also, the system in many ways requires trust within the firm that everyone will do their part. As David Maister has aptly noted, attorneys aren't big on trusting each other. In declaring that law firms are unmanageable professional entities, Maister wrote:

Recently, I was advising a firm on its compensation system. They didn’t like my recommendations. Finally, one of the partners said, “David, all your recommendations are based on the assumption that we trust each other and trust our executive or compensation committees. We don’t. Give us a system that doesn’t require us to trust each other!”

2. There is little internal competition.
Little internal competition should help foster trust and teamwork. Experience tells me that little internal competition fosters laziness. Distrust is a problem but competition is not. Measurement improves performance. However, if you don't care that you are being measured, then you won't excel. Incentives to reach goals fosters competition and that isn't a bad thing. If you incent properly (ie factor "firm citizenship" into your compensation system), teamwork will be rewarded.

3. Leadership has more time to lead without the annual compensation ritual.
There is no question that compensation discussions are a large source of discontent and delay in implementing strategic plans. If all partners agree to a compensation plan that is not going to change, that would be a great thing. Do I believe that is possible? Perhaps, if, as Cotterman notes, firms give more attention to the qualities of being a partner - ie, they are consensus-builders in the Henry Clay mold and can make "some thirty or more years of future compensation decisions at one time".

4. Non-traditional roles and new postings are more easily undertaken.
If compensation isn't affected, attorneys should be more willing to take on roles that otherwise would affect their ability to maintain their income.

Cotterman discusses two main arguments against lockstep compensation:

1. There is no accountability.
2. Stars are not specifically recognized monetarily (at least not instantly).

I made both of those arguments above in disagreeing in part to the arguments for lockstep compensation. Without measurement, there is no accountability. Without accountability, internal strife erupts and your star attorneys walk. So I don't disagree a bit to either argument.

Cotterman notes that some of the most prestigious and profitable firms in New York and the UK use lockstep compensation. This is proof enough that the system can work. However, I would argue (as he does) that a commitment to the mangement of the firm and a single-firm philosophy is critical to it success. The challenge for small and mid-size law firms is to create an environment that fosters teamwork and manageability. For the lockstep compensation to work, firms need their own Henry Clay who can effectively communicate the philosophy that supports the system and the consensus-building qualities to bring others to agreement.

That said, even Clay couldn't ultimately prevent the Civil War. I'm still against lockstep compensation. However, for those who want a guide on how to make it work (as it certainly can work, I am just not a proponent of it), read his article here.

Client Checks Belong in the Law Firm Bank Account

Admin — Wed, 24 May 2006 17:08:00 GMT

I’m a bit surprised by the need to mention this, but checks need to be deposited every single day. Even better, use a lock box so that client payments go directly to the bank. If checks are mailed to the law firm, the person that restrictively endorses the checks and makes up the deposit should not have accounting responsibilities for the clients' accounts.

Juris Client Services team reports that they still run into situations where checks are accumulated and deposited only one or two times per week. We also run into situations of weak internal controls where the law firm's accounting person handles it all.

Cash is a wasting asset; it belongs in the bank. And cash (including checks) is a temptation that needs to be safeguarded through appropriate internal controls.

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