

A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of


TERRORISM

**Special Studies,
1996–2001**

Fourth Supplement

A UPA Collection

from



The Special Studies Series

Terrorism


**Special Studies,
1996–2001**

Fourth Supplement

**Edited by
Robert E. Lester**

**Guide Compiled by
Martin Schipper**

A UPA Collection from



4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Terrorism, special studies, 1996–2001 [microform] : fourth supplement / edited by Robert E. Lester.

microfilm reels.

Summary: Reproduces federally commissioned research studies from leading public and private policy research facilities on the facts, causes, and political implications of terrorism.

Accompanied by a printed guide compiled by Martin Paul Schipper, entitled: A guide to the microfilm edition of Terrorism, special studies, 1996–2001.

ISBN 1-55655-923-2

1. Terrorism—United States. 2. Terrorism—Government policy—United States.
3. National security—United States. I. Lester, Robert. II. Schipper, Martin Paul. III.
Title: Guide to the microfilm edition of Terrorism, special studies, 1996–2001.

HV6432

303.6'25'0973—dc21

2002027455

CIP

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SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

No single organization can provide the background information, the wide range of current data, and the crucial analyses that are required by the executive departments of the federal government on complex and volatile issues. When there can be little margin of error concerning the facts and recommendations being given to key officials, executive departments depend upon an elite group of private and governmental organizations—“think tanks”—for special studies of the highest caliber.

The authors of these special studies are associated with many of the finest research facilities in the United States, including the Army War College, the National Defense University, the Army Command and General Staff College, and major programs at Harvard, Georgetown, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of California at Davis.

Described below are several of the federal government agencies and organizations, U.S. military educational institutions, and quasi-government and nongovernment think tanks identified in this publication.

U.S. Federal Government Agencies and Organizations

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), located in Atlanta, Georgia, is an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The mission of the CDC is to promote health and quality of life by preventing and controlling disease, injury, and disability. Divisions of the CDC include: National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities; National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion; National Center for Environmental Health; National Center for Health Statistics; National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention; National Center for Infectious Diseases; National Center for Injury Prevention and Control; National Immunization Program; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Epidemiology Program Office; Public Health Practice Program Office; and the Office of the Director.

Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the keystone of the U.S. intelligence community. Its mission consists of supporting the president, the National Security Council, and all who make and execute U.S. national security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security. It also conducts counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the president.

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee

This committee was established by Congress in 1994 under the National Defense Authorization Act. The committee was ordered to review activities and programs related to countering the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Members of the committee include the secretaries of defense and energy, the director of central intelligence, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Department of Defense

Established in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a designated combat support agency and the senior military intelligence component of the intelligence community. DIA's primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence to the U.S. armed forces. Intelligence support for operational forces encompasses a number of areas and challenges. Key areas of emphasis include targeting and battle damage assessment, weapons proliferation, warning of impending crises, support to peacekeeping operations, maintenance of databases on foreign military organizations and their equipment, and, as necessary, support to UN operations and U.S. allies.

In addition to providing intelligence to military forces, DIA also provides information to policy makers in the Department of Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DIA plays a key role in providing information on foreign weapons systems to U.S. weapons planners and the weapons acquisition community. In carrying out these missions, DIA coordinates and synthesizes military intelligence analysis for defense officials and military commanders worldwide, working in concert with the intelligence components of the military services and the U.S. unified commands.

Defense Technical Information Center

The Defense Technical Information Center, located in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is responsible for providing information storage and retrieval capabilities to the Department of Defense.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created by President Jimmy Carter in 1979. It oversees federal efforts to respond to both natural and other disasters. In its disaster response efforts, FEMA works with local emergency management agencies, other federal agencies, and the American Red Cross.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration

The U.S. Fire Administration is part of FEMA. Its mission is to limit the loss of human life as well as the economic costs from fire and related emergencies. The U.S. Fire Administration was established by the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act in 1974.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consists of the chairman, the vice chairman, the chief of staff of the army, the chief of naval operations, the chief of staff of the air force, and the commandant of the Marine Corps. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff is the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. Since the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has also been identified as the senior ranking member of the armed forces.

Library of Congress, Federal Research Division

Since 1948, the Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress's principal fee-based research service, has provided U.S. government agencies with the research and analysis needed to carry out their national and international missions.

Using the collections of the Library of Congress, the research staff of the Federal Research Division provides the information in formats based on specific agency requirements. The Federal Research Division provides federal agencies access to millions of books, newspapers, journals, maps, microforms, and other special format materials; materials in many languages; many current periodicals, of which almost half are in foreign languages; computer records in a variety of databases, including both English and foreign-language information; and comprehensive coverage of legal, scientific, technical, historical, cultural, political, sociological, economic, and numerous other fields of research.

National Commission on Terrorism

The National Commission on Terrorism was created by Congress in 1998 following the attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa. The commission was ordered to review the counterterrorism policies of the United States, particularly focusing on the prevention and punishment of terrorist acts.

Office of Homeland Security, The White House

The Office of Homeland Security was created in October 2001 by President George W. Bush following the events of September 11, 2001. The office is charged with creating and implementing a comprehensive plan to protect the United States from terrorist attacks.

President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure

This commission was created by President Bill Clinton in 1996 by Executive Order 13010. The primary objective of the commission was to protect the national infrastructure from physical and cyber attacks. Critical infrastructure includes telecommunications, electric power systems, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, government services, emergency services, and water supply systems.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service

The Agricultural Research Service is the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) central research agency. The major focus of the research carried out by the Agricultural Research Service involves agriculture, nutrition, technology, and the environment.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is charged with protecting the animal and plant resources of the United States. This entails

monitoring agricultural pests and diseases, overseeing trade issues pertaining to animal and plant health, and ensuring the humane care and treatment of animals.

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is part of the Technology Administration within the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST works with U.S. businesses to develop and use new technologies, and it also distributes information pertaining to measurements and standards.

U.S. Department of Defense

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) grew out of the War Department, which dated from 1789. In 1947 the U.S. Congress passed the National Security Act, establishing a National Military Establishment and providing for a cabinet-level secretary of defense. In 1949, the National Security Act was amended to create the DoD, thereby consolidating all of the armed forces of the United States into a single department. Today, the responsibilities of the DoD include prosecuting wars, humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, evacuations, and homeland security.

U.S. Department of Defense, Advanced Research Projects Agency

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is a separately organized agency within the DoD under a director appointed by the secretary of defense. The agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the director of defense research and engineering (DDRE), engages in advanced basic and applied research and development projects essential to the DoD; conducts prototype projects that embody technology that may be incorporated into joint programs, programs in support of deployed U.S. forces, or selected military department (army, navy, and air force) programs; and, on request, assists the military departments in their research and development efforts.

In this regard, the agency arranges, manages, and directs the performance of work connected with assigned advanced projects by the military departments, other government agencies, individuals, private business entities, and educational or research institutions, as appropriate; recommends through the DDRE to the secretary of defense assignment of advanced projects to the agency; keeps the DDRE, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and other DoD agencies informed on significant new developments and technological advances within assigned projects; and performs other such functions as the secretary of defense or the DDRE may assign.

U.S. Department of Energy

The origins of the Department of Energy (DOE) can be traced to the Manhattan Project and the race to develop the atomic bomb during World War II. In 1942, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan Engineer District to manage the project. Following the war, Congress engaged in a vigorous and contentious debate over civilian versus military control of the atom. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 settled the debate by creating the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which took over the Manhattan Engineer District's sprawling scientific and industrial complex.

The AEC was specifically established to maintain civilian government control over the field of atomic research and development. During the early cold war years, the commission focused on designing and producing nuclear weapons and developing nuclear reactors for naval propulsion. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ended exclusive government use of the atom and began the growth of the commercial nuclear power industry, giving the AEC authority to regulate the new industry. In response to changing needs in the 1970s, the AEC was abolished and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 created two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Agency to regulate the nuclear power industry and the Energy Research and Development Administration to manage the nuclear weapon, naval reactor, and energy development programs.

The extended energy crisis of the 1970s soon demonstrated the need for unified energy organization and planning, however. The Department of Energy Organization Act brought the federal government's agencies and programs into a single agency. The DOE, activated on October 1, 1977, assumed the responsibilities of the Federal Energy Administration, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Federal Power Commission, and parts and programs of several other agencies.

The DOE provided the framework for a comprehensive and balanced national energy plan by coordinating and administering the energy functions of the federal government. The department undertook responsibility for long-term, high-risk research and development of energy technology, federal power marketing, energy conservation, the nuclear weapons program, energy regulatory programs, and a central energy data collection and analysis program.

Over its two-decade history, the DOE has shifted its emphasis and focus as the needs of the nation have changed. During the late 1970s, the department emphasized energy development and regulation. In the 1980s, nuclear weapons research, development, and production took a priority. Since the end of the cold war, the department has focused on environmental cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex, nonproliferation and stewardship of the nuclear stockpile, energy efficiency and conservation, and technology transfer and industrial competitiveness.

The DOE contributes to the future of the nation by ensuring U.S. energy security, maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, cleaning up the environment from the legacy of the cold war, and developing innovations in science and technology.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead government agency for protecting the health of all Americans and for providing essential human services. Among the key programs and initiatives of the department are Medicare and Medicaid, assistance to low-income families, health services for Native Americans, and combating infectious diseases. The agencies of HHS include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Food and Drug Administration, National Institutes of Health, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and Administration for Children and Families.

U.S. Department of Justice

The central mission of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is to enforce the laws of the United States, to prevent and control crime, to seek the punishment of criminals, and to administer the nation's immigration laws. Among the components of

the DOJ are the Civil Rights Division, Criminal Division, Community Relations Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Attorney General, U.S. attorneys, and U.S. marshals.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is part of the DOJ and is charged with investigating all crimes that have not been assigned by Congress to another federal agency. The primary categories of investigations carried out by the FBI involve civil rights, counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, organized crime and drugs, violent crimes, and financial crimes. The FBI also works in cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Within the executive branch of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of State is the lead foreign affairs agency. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for protecting the people, information, and property of the United States, particularly the safety of all U.S. personnel working in U.S. diplomatic missions throughout the world. Within the United States, the bureau is also responsible for protecting the secretary of state, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and foreign dignitaries below the head of state level who are visiting the United States.

U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs

The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) within the U.S. Department of State provides information to international audiences, including the media, government officials, opinion leaders, and the general public, in more than 140 countries. The IIP was created from the U.S. Information Agency in 1999.

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is responsible for working with foreign governments to combat terrorist threats and activities.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control

Of all the federal departments and agencies, the Department of the Treasury has the broadest responsibilities for shaping the national economy. The four basic functions of the department are: formulating and recommending economic, financial, tax, and fiscal policies; serving as financial agent for the U.S. government; enforcing the law with regard to the economy; and manufacturing coins and currency.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control assists U.S. foreign policy aims by controlling assets in the United States of designated countries and the flow of funds and trade to those countries.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established by President Richard Nixon in July 1970 amidst a growing public awareness of the importance of cleaner air, water, and land. The EPA's chief mission is to protect the natural environment and the health of the American public.

U.S. General Accounting Office

The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the investigative arm of the Congress and is charged with examining all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds. GAO was established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to independently audit government agencies. Over the years, Congress has expanded GAO's audit authority, added new responsibilities and duties, and strengthened GAO's ability to perform independently.

U.S. Institute of Peace

Established in 1984, the United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Free from political pressures, the institute is able to assist the executive branch, Congress, and others with nonpartisan research, analysis, and information.

The institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including grants, fellowships, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The institute's board of directors is appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

The White House

The White House, or the Executive Office of the President, includes the Council of Economic Advisors, National Security Council, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Office of Management and Budget, National Economic Council, White House Military Office, and Council on Environmental Quality.

U.S. Military Educational Institutions and Organizations

Air Command and Staff College

The Air Command and Staff College prepares its graduates for careers involving aerospace operations. The school dates back to 1931 when it was formed as the Air Corps Tactical School; it was renamed in 1954. Students at the college take a ten-month curriculum that focuses on aerospace history and operations and an understanding of the core values of the U.S. Air Force.

Air Force Institute of Technology

The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) traces its roots to the early days of powered flight when it was apparent that the progress of military aviation depended upon special education in this new science. AFIT's graduates have made valuable contributions to national security in the fields of engineering, science, technology, medicine, logistics, and management.

Air Force Research Laboratory

The Air Force Research Laboratory conducts research aimed at finding new technologies for U.S. aerospace forces.

Air War College

The mission of the Air War College is to educate senior officers to lead at the strategic level in the employment of air and space forces, including joint operations, in support of national security.

Armed Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School

The Joint and Combined Staff Officer School is part of the Armed Forces Staff College within the National Defense University. The curriculum teaches students about joint military operations and war fighting.

Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University

The Center for Counterproliferation Research is part of the National Defense University. The center conducts research pertaining to U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies and programs. Research regarding nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is also performed at the center.

National Defense University

The mission of the National Defense University (NDU) is to ensure excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of national security.

The NDU consists of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. The NDU prepares selected commissioned officers and civilian officials from the DoD, Department of State, and other agencies of the government for command, management, and staff responsibilities in a multinational, intergovernmental, or joint national security setting. The curriculum emphasizes the development and implementation of national security strategy and military strategy, mobilization, acquisition, management of resources, information and information technology for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. In addition to mission-specific education, the colleges emphasize developing executive skills and improving competencies. The NDU faculty and students conduct short-range and long-range studies of national security policy, military strategy, the allocation and management of resources for national security, and civil-military affairs. A goal of university research is to create a national repository of expertise on mobilization, military strategy, and joint or combined policy and plans.

Naval Postgraduate School

The Naval Postgraduate School, located in Monterey, California, is an academic institution with an emphasis on study and research programs relevant to the navy's interests, as well as to the interests of the other arms of the DoD.

Students come from all service branches of the U.S. defense community, as well as from the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the services of more than twenty-five allied nations. The school provides more than forty programs of study, ranging from the traditional engineering and physical sciences to the rapidly evolving space science programs. The faculty, the majority of whom are civilians, are drawn from a broad range of educational institutions.

Naval War College

The Naval War College prepares its students by providing them with a professional naval education, based on a clear understanding of the fundamental principles that have governed national security affairs in peace and in war throughout history.

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in command, staff, and management

positions in naval, joint, and combined environments; to provide a sound understanding of military strategy and operational art; to instill joint attitudes and perspectives; and to serve as a center for research and war gaming that will develop advanced strategic, war fighting, and campaign concepts for future employment of maritime, joint, and combined forces.

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) traces its origin to the establishment in 1947 of the Advanced Studies Group by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, then chief of staff. The initial mission of this group was to develop concepts of national security in light of the revolution in warfare brought about with the onset of the atomic age.

When the Army War College was reestablished in 1950, an Advanced Studies Group was chartered to consider strategy and land power. The group evolved into the Advanced Studies and Doctrine Division within the faculty of the college. As part of an army-wide reorganization in 1962, the division became the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies, addressing strategic questions as well as those of organizing, equipping, and preparing the army to fight. The mission became exclusively strategic in 1971, and the institute received its present name.

Another army reorganization in 1973 brought both the U.S. Army War College and SSI under the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, and SSI became a War College department. SSI continues to provide an analytical capability within the army to address strategic and other issues to support army participation in national security policy formulation.

USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy

Created in 1992, the U.S. Air Force's Institute for National Security Studies is part of the U.S. Air Force Academy. The research conducted at the institute centers on the air force's role in U.S. national security.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

The mission of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is to educate leaders in the values and practice of the profession of arms, to act as the executive agent for the army's Leader Development Program, to develop doctrine that guides the army, and to promote and support the advancement of military art and science. CGSC training, education, and professional military excellence prepare officers for wartime duties.

U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command conducts research regarding medical, chemical, and biological defense. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) is located in Fort Detrick, Maryland, where it conducts research regarding infectious diseases. The goal of the research is to develop vaccines and other treatments for such diseases. The facilities at the institute also allow for the study of highly hazardous viruses.

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

The U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is part of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. One of its primary functions is to serve as a safe location for chemical weapons storage and demilitarization. This command also conducts research into biological and chemical weapons as well as on emergency preparedness and response.

U.S. Army War College

The mission of the United States Army War College (USAWC) is to prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students about the employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs that benefit the USAWC, the U.S. Army, and the nation.

Quasi- and Nongovernmental Think Tanks and Consulting Corporations; Foreign Organizations with Official U.S. Governmental Representation

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

This panel, also known as the Gilmore Commission, was created by the National Defense Authorization Act. The primary focus of the panel was to examine the capability of the United States to respond to terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. Panel members included federal, state, and local government officials.

ANSER Institute of Homeland Security

The ANSER Institute of Homeland Security, a nonprofit research institute, was established in 1958. Since 1976 the institute has been based in Arlington, Virginia, but it also has offices in Colorado; Newport News, Virginia; West Virginia; and Massachusetts. The company works with federal agencies on aerospace science and technology issues.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

The Kennedy School of Government was established in 1978 when the school's Institute of Politics and Master in Public Policy Program were brought together. Its predecessor institutions date back to 1936 when the School of Public Administration was founded at Harvard University. The mission of the school is to strengthen democratic governance by training students for public leadership and to deal with public policy problems. The school offers master's programs in public policy and public administration and Ph.D. programs in public policy, health policy, social policy, and political economy and the government. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs is the main location within the Kennedy School of Government for the study of international security affairs, science and technology policy, environmental and resource issues, and conflict studies.

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001, New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services

The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001 (Core Capacity Project) is a collaborative activity supported by the CDC, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, and the National Association of County and City Health Officials. The project was designed to identify and define the core capacities needed in state and local public health agencies to prepare for and respond to a public health emergency caused by bioterrorism; determine priorities among these capacities that need to be addressed to improve the immediate response to a bioterrorist act; and reach consensus on these capacities from key stakeholders (public health, hospitals, nongovernmental partners, other federal agencies) to ensure success in implementation. The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services provides programs and services in order to protect and preserve the health of the citizens of New Jersey.

Cato Institute

The Cato Institute, founded in 1977, is a nonprofit public policy research foundation. The philosophy advocated by the Cato Institute involves limited government, individual liberty, and free markets. The institute publishes books, monographs, briefing papers, and other studies on all aspects of public policy.

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute

The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, located in Alexandria, Virginia, is a nonprofit organization whose primary goal is the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. The institute conducts seminars and promotes education on this issue. It also publishes books, special reports, and other papers pertaining to chemical and biological weapons and other global security issues.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government of the United Kingdom

The Foreign & Commonwealth Office is the government department of the United Kingdom responsible for international relations. Among the services provided by the office are advising British travelers, issuing visas, and promoting trade and investing opportunities in other nations.

Georgetown University Law Center

The Georgetown University Law Center, established in 1870, prepares students for a wide variety of legal careers. It offers a Juris Doctor degree, a Master of Laws program, and a doctoral program.

The Heritage Foundation, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies

The Heritage Foundation is a conservative think tank that advocates public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, and a strong national defense. The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies publishes papers and conducts seminars, lectures, and debates on foreign policy, defense, and international politics and economics.

Her Majesty's Government

Her Majesty's Government is the official title for the government of the United Kingdom, indicating the sovereign position held by England's royal family.

House of Commons

The House of Commons is part of the Parliament, the chief legislative body of the United Kingdom.

Institute for Defense Analyses

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), located in Alexandria, Virginia, is a federally funded organization that advises the secretary of defense, Joint Staff, and defense agencies on issues related to national security. Research units at the institute include computer and software engineering; cost analysis and research; joint advanced war fighting; operational evaluation; science and technology; simulation; strategy, forces, and resources; and system evaluation.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, was established as an organization under the United Nations in 1957. IAEA serves as a central forum for cooperation between governments regarding the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational research organization that aims to prevent and contain conflict. The reports produced by the organization are distributed to government officials and officials in international organizations in order to increase understanding of various conflicts. ICG has field offices in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, Latin America, and the Middle East.

The Johns Hopkins University, The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine is one of the leading medical schools in the United States. In addition to providing medical education to students, physicians, and scientists, the school is also involved in biomedical research and patient care. The School of Medicine is associated with three acute care hospitals in the Baltimore area: The Johns Hopkins Hospital, Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, and Howard County General Hospital. The School of Medicine receives a substantial amount of research funding from the federal government. Among the main areas of study are AIDS, genetics, cancer, neuroscience, and biomedical engineering.

Kansas City, Missouri, Health Department

The Kansas City, Missouri, Health Department provides programs and services in order to protect and preserve the health of the citizens of Kansas City.

Monterey Institute of International Studies

The Monterey Institute for International Studies, located in Monterey, California, offers graduate professional education as well as programs for advanced undergraduate students. There are four graduate schools at the institute: the Graduate School of International Policy Studies, the Graduate School of Translation

and Interpretation, the Fisher Graduate School of International Business, and the Graduate School of Language and Educational Linguistics. There are also three research centers: the Center for East Asian Studies, the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Research and education at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies is aimed at curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

National Defence Research Establishment, Stockholm, Sweden

The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment is part of the Ministry of Defence. Its research serves the Swedish Armed Forces, Defence Materiel Administration, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, and defense industry. The primary research areas of the organization are defense and security policy, operational analysis and simulation, weapons of mass destruction, surveillance, command and control, combat, electronic warfare, vehicles, and civil applications such as emergency planning and the impact of defense systems on the environment.

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment

The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment conducts research for the Norwegian armed forces and for political leaders. The major areas of research involve strategic analysis, cost analysis, command and control systems, sensors and weapons systems, weapons of mass destruction, and electric warfare.

Nuclear Control Institute

The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), located in Washington, D.C., is an independent advocacy and research center focused on combating nuclear proliferation. The institute monitors nuclear activities throughout the world and seeks to reverse the growth of nuclear arms. The institute is particularly concerned with eliminating plutonium and enriched uranium from civilian nuclear power and research programs.

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, based in Arlington, Virginia, is a nonprofit public policy research institute specializing in studies on terrorism, emerging threats and opportunities, national health policies, science and technology forecasting, and national security. The institute works closely with other research institutes, as well as with the federal government, academia, and industry.

RAND Corporation

RAND (an acronym for research and development) is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. From its inception in the days following World War II, RAND has focused on the nation's most pressing policy problems, particularly on national security.

In the 1960s, RAND began addressing major problems of domestic policy as well. Today, RAND researchers operate on a broad front, assisting public policy makers at all levels, private sector leaders in many industries, and the public at large in efforts to strengthen the nation's economy, maintain its security, and improve its quality of life. They do so by analyzing choices and developments in many areas, including national defense, education and training, health care, criminal and civil

justice, labor and population, science and technology, community development, international relations, and regional studies.

RAND was created at the urging of its original sponsor, the air force (then the Army Air Forces). Today, its activities are supported by a wide range of sources. U.S. government agencies provide the largest share of support, while charitable foundations, private sector firms, individuals, and earnings from RAND's endowment fund furnish a steadily growing proportion.

Transportation Research Board

The Transportation Research Board, a unit of the National Research Council, conducts research on improvements in all aspects of transportation. The board publishes papers and reports, hosts an annual meeting for transportation professionals, and conducts research at the request of federal government agencies and the U.S. Congress.

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences

The Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) is located in Bethesda, Maryland. The university was created by Congress in 1972 as a result of the Health Professions Revitalization Act of 1972. Studies at USUHS are devoted to military medicine as well as public health. The university serves both the DoD and the U.S. Public Health Service.

United Nations

The United Nations (UN) was created in October 1945 by fifty-one countries committed to international cooperation and collective security. As of 2002, 189 countries are UN members. When countries become members of the UN, they must accept the obligations of the UN charter. According to its charter, the UN has four main purposes: to maintain international peace and security, to promote friendly relations between nations, to promote international cooperation and human rights, and to be a center for international relations. The UN consists of six major components: the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, Secretariat, and International Court of Justice. All of these components are based at the UN headquarters in New York, except the International Court of Justice, which is located in The Hague, the Netherlands.

University of California, Davis, Section of Microbiology

The Section of Microbiology at the University of California at Davis is one of five sections in the school's Division of Biological Sciences. The Section of Microbiology was named in 1992 when the Division of Biological Sciences was reorganized. The study of microbiology at the University of California at Davis dates back to 1952 when the College of Letters and Science was established. The section offers both a master's of science degree and a Ph.D. program in microbiology.

SOURCE NOTE

This microform collection includes materials filmed from selected holdings of a variety of U.S. government departments and agencies, U.S. military academies and advanced training schools, and several “think tanks” that provided research commentary and analyses under contract to the federal government.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The documents in this microform collection consist of studies that became available during the period 1995 to 2001 from a variety of sources, including U.S. executive branch departments, agencies, and commissions; U.S. military educational institutions and organizations; and U.S. government contracts to universities, corporations, and “think tanks.”

ABBREVIATIONS

The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this guide.

APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
APIC	Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASTHO	Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
AT/FP	Department of Defense Antiterrorism/Force Protection
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CB	chemical and biological
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CI	critical infrastructure
CICTE	Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
CJCS	chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONPLAN	United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan
COTS	commercial off the shelf
CPRC	Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
CT	counterterrorism
CTPTCT	Counter-Terrorism Program Coordination Team
CWIRP	Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program
DoD	Defense Department, U.S.
DOE	Energy Department, U.S.
DOJ	Justice Department, U.S.
DOS	State Department, U.S.

DPP	Domestic Preparedness Program
DS/DSS/ITA	Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
EOC	Emergency Operation Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA	Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOA1	Division of Defense Analysis
GAO	U.S. Government Accounting Office
HHS	Health and Human Services Department, U.S.
IA	information assurance
ICS	Incident Command System
IO	information operations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRP	Improved Response Program
IS	information security
IT	information technology
ITOC	international terrorism and organized crime
LEPC	local emergency planning committee
MCDRT	Mass Casualty Decontamination Research Team
MIOP	military instrument of power
MIST	man in simulant testing
NACCHO	National Association of County and City Health Officials
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBC/M	nuclear, biological, and chemical/missile
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
NLD	Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act
OAS	Organization of American States

OCA	off-site consequence analysis
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPA	Oil Pollution Act
OSC	on-scene coordinator
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PKK	Kurdistan Worker Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POW	prisoner of war
R&D	research and development
RAID	Rapid Assessment Initial Detection
RDD	radiological dispersion device
RMP	risk management plans
SBCCOM	U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
UN	United Nations
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAMRIID	U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
VA	Veterans Affairs Department
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

REEL INDEX

The following is a guide to the documents in this microfilm edition. The four-digit number on the far left is the frame number at which a particular document begins. This is followed by the document title, the originating institution and author, the date of the document, and the total number of pages in the document. A brief abstract drawn from the document follows.

Reel 1

Frame No.

- 0001 **1995**
Information Age Terrorism: Toward Cyberterror.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Matthew J. Littleton. December 1995. 139pp.
The growing ubiquity of computers and their associated networks is propelling the world into the information age. Computers may revolutionize terrorism in the same manner that they have revolutionized everyday life. Terrorism in the information age will consist of conventional terrorism, in which classic weapons (explosives, guns, etc.) will destroy property and kill victims in the physical world; technoterrorism, in which classic weapons will be used to destroy infrastructure targets and cause a disruption in cyberspace; and cyberterrorism, where new weapons (malicious software, electromagnetic, and microwave weapons) will operate to destroy data in cyberspace to cause a disruption in the physical world. The advent of cyberterrorism may force a shift in the definition of terrorism to include disruption and violence in cyberspace in the same manner as physical destruction and violence. Through the use of new technology, terrorist groups may have fewer members, yet still have a global reach. The increasing power of computers may lower the threshold of state sponsorship to a point where poor states can become sponsors and rich states are no longer necessary for terrorist groups to carry out complex attacks. This thesis explores the shift toward information warfare across the conflict spectrum and its implication for terrorism.
- 0140 **1996**
Biological Warfare: A Nation at Risk—A Time to Act.
National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Richard Danzig. January 1996. 5pp.
This paper examines the danger of biological warfare. The author urges continued focus on potential future enemies' strategies and resources, U.S. blind spots, and the characteristics and associated risks of different biological weapons. The author urges the establishment of a new mindset that will identify personnel, focus on antibiotics, develop and acquire masks, acquire state of the art detectors, focus on intelligence, and strengthen coordination among agencies.

- 0145 **Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. March 1996. 23pp.
The intelligence community believes that the threat of terrorism within the United States has increased. Although no specific aviation threat is known, experts believe that aviation is likely to remain an attractive target for terrorists. According to the FBI, terrorist attacks could come from groups that are difficult to infiltrate and control. Information was uncovered in January 1995 about plans by such a group for multiple attacks on specific U.S. flights in Asia. Narcotics trafficking is a continuing concern. While cocaine has been the primary threat since 1985, heroin is becoming more of a threat. The intelligence community believes traffickers are presently most active on the Southwest border of the United States and use vehicles such as cars, trucks, and tractor-trailers carrying containers to smuggle narcotics. To counter these threats, the FAA and Customs have developed strategies that rely on intelligence information; various procedures, such as profiling and targeting high-risk shipments for examination; and technologies.
- 0168 **Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995.**
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. April 1996. 55pp.
Acts of international terrorism in fifty-one countries in 1995 continued to threaten civil society and peacemaking, including the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, while international cooperation to combat terrorism intensified. Terrorists failed to achieve ultimate political goals, as in the past, but they continued to cause major political, psychological, and economic damage. Lethal acts of international terrorism and the number of deaths declined in 1995, but a gas attack in Japan raised the spectre of mass casualties by chemical terrorism.
- 0223 **Cyber Troops and Net War. The Profession of Arms in the Information Age.**
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Arsenio T. Gumahad II. April 1, 1996. 65pp.
Information is emerging as the catalyst for a major change. It is redefining wealth and power in modern postindustrial societies. This paper discusses the societal, political, and economic ramifications of this unprecedented technological growth. The military faces the newest revolution in military affairs as it enters the twenty-first century. The military is affected internally as it evaluates its continuing role in the new age. Both the quality of its personnel and its organizational structure are affected to a degree. The external threats are examined and a future military doctrine that accounts for information as a dominant instrument in future wars is discussed.
- 0288 **Information Security. Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Accounting and Information Management Division, Washington, D.C. May 1996. 45pp.
In view of the increasing threat of unauthorized intrusions into DoD computer systems, this report examines the extent to which DoD computer systems are being attacked, the actual and potential damage to DoD information and systems, and the challenges DoD is facing in securing sensitive information. The report identifies

opportunities and makes recommendations to the secretary of defense to improve the department's efforts to counter attacks on its computer systems.

- 0333 **Information Security. Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Accounting and Information Management Division, Washington, D.C. Jack L. Brock Jr. May 22, 1996. 8pp
This document presents testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, by the director, defense information and financial management systems, Accounting and Information Management Division. Computer security is difficult but necessary. Defense systems are under attack, including those at the air force's Rome Laboratory. Damages are costly and security concerns are great.
- 0341 **Aviation Security. Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Keith O. Fultz. August 1, 1996. 14pp.
The 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which killed 270 people, and the more recent, but as yet unexplained, explosion aboard TWA Flight 800 have shaken the public's confidence in the safety and the security of air travel. GAO testified that the threat of terrorism against the United States has increased and that aviation is and will remain an attractive target for terrorists. Although the FAA has mandated additional security procedures as the threat of terrorism has changed, domestic and international aviation systems remain vulnerable.
- 0355 **Reexamining the Legislative Restrictions on the Domestic Use of the United States Military to Combat Domestic Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Troy A. Johnson. September 1996. 98pp.
This thesis is an attempt to compare the current legislative and military posture of the United States, in its effort to deal with a potentially growing terrorist threat, with that of Great Britain. The introductory chapter presents the argument that the United States may learn valuable lessons by examining the British response to domestic terrorism. The second chapter takes a historical look at the development of U.S. legislation that defined the president's authority to call forth the militia and federal troops for domestic use. The third chapter examines the British use of emergency legislation as well as their decision to employ the army to curtail domestic terrorism posed by the Irish Republican Army when local police efforts failed. The fourth chapter concludes with a discussion on current U.S. legislation dealing with domestic terrorism and on lessons the United States may learn from the British experience as the United States continuously adjusts to a changing domestic security environment.
- 0453 **DoD Combating Terrorism Program.**
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. September 15, 1996. 15pp.
This DoD directive updates policies and responsibilities for the Combating Terrorism Program pursuant to the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism. The directive assigns responsibility for the protection of personnel and their families. The directive reauthorizes procedures, establishes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal adviser and focal point responsible to the

secretary of defense for all force protection issues for the department, and expands the responsibilities of the combatant commanders to ensure the force protection of all department activities in their geographic area of responsibility.

- 0468 **Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. September 1996. 29pp.
The ability to detect explosives is increasingly important to U.S. national security. Explosives are the terrorist's weapon of choice. Their use against commercial aircraft has led to loss of lives and weakened confidence in the security of air travel. Likewise, narcotics trafficking ruins lives, drains billions of dollars from the economy, and spawns violence that threatens U.S. communities. This report discusses funding for explosives and narcotics detection technologies, the characteristics and limitations of available and planned technologies, and deployment of technologies in the United States and foreign countries.
- 0497 **Aviation Security. Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Keith O. Fultz. September 11, 1996. 15pp.
This document presents testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives by the assistant comptroller general, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. The testimony identifies steps that need to be taken to protect the flying public from the activities of terrorists. It discusses the threat to aviation from attacks by terrorists, the aviation security system and vulnerabilities that exist within it, the availability and limitations of explosives detection technology and other methods to address the threat, and efforts underway to improve aviation security.
- 0512 **Aviation Security. Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Keith O. Fultz. September 19, 1996. 14pp.
This document presents testimony before the Committee on Science, House of Representatives by the assistant comptroller general, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. The testimony identifies steps that need to be taken to protect the flying public from the activities of terrorists and the role of technology in improving aviation security. It discusses the aviation security system and vulnerabilities that exist within it, the availability and limitations of explosives detection technology and other methods to address the threat, and efforts underway to improve aviation security.
- 0526 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.**
United Nations, New York, New York. Pascaline Boum. December 4, 1996. 17pp.
The report of the Sixth Committee concerns measures and testimony before the General Assembly concerning international terrorism and measures to eliminate it.

- 0543 **Personal Protection Against Terrorism: The Missing Link in United States Army Force Protection.**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thomas E. Bryant. December 20, 1996. 65pp.
This monograph investigates a gap in U.S. Army doctrine on the prevention of terrorist attacks. First the monograph shows that the goals, organization, and tactics of terrorists are a formidable threat to the army. Second, it uses case studies from Great Britain and France to show that well-trained and dedicated terrorists can bypass heightened security and that terrorism is difficult, if not impossible, to deter at the time and point of attack. Third, it uses case studies from Beirut and Saudi Arabia to show how U.S. policy can be affected by terrorism and to find what measures could have been implemented by military commanders to deter those attacks. This monograph notes that in both Beirut and Saudi Arabia, terrorist activity indicators were spotted prior to these attacks but were neither recognized nor reported.
- 0608 **Terrorism in the United States 1996.**
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, Washington, D.C. 1996. 28pp.
This report by the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment Unit, National Security Division chronicles the results of the FBI counterterrorism efforts. Major trends and accomplishments in counterterrorism are presented, as well as the number of terrorist incidents and preventions. A current threat assessment and discussion of topical issues are also included. In addition, the report provides an overview of FBI responsibilities in the area of terrorism.
- 0636 **1997 Report to Congress on Response to Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.**
The White House, Washington, D.C. January 1, 1997. 28pp.
This report under the National Defense Authorization Act assesses the capabilities of the federal government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD and to support state and local prevention and response efforts. As a result of recent events, significant threats over the past few years, and the increased availability and proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical materials, there is an increasing concern for the potential of terrorist incidents occurring in the United States involving WMD.
- 0664 **Terrorism and U.S. Policy: Problems in Definition and Response.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Martha K. Jordan. March 1997. 39pp.
This thesis studies current definitions of terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism policy, identifies possible shortcomings, and proposes solutions. The author discovers basic problems, not only with adequately defining terrorism but also with U.S. government response to one particular form of terrorism—state-sponsored international terrorism. These problems stem from lack of a coordinated, clear definition of state-sponsored international terrorism between U.S. agencies and failure to attack the appropriate center of gravity of state-sponsored terrorist organization. The author proposes a new definition of state-sponsored international

terrorism, which is more specific and lends itself to clearer policy development; furthermore, our counterterrorism policy should place more emphasis on targeting the sponsoring state, rather than peripheral elements of state-sponsored terrorist groups.

0703 **Terrorist Vulnerability: Failure of Policy?**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Timothy E. Spaeth. March 1997. 38pp.

The deployment of U.S. armed forces to areas of unrest exposes them to possible attack from hostile states and nonstate actors. U.S. forces represent American interests and provide an opportunity for an adversary to attempt to influence U.S. policy or political opinion through violence or threat of violence. The focus of this thesis is on the threat of terrorist bomb attacks against U.S. forces abroad. When it comes to protecting deployed U.S. military forces against terrorism, is force protection provided sufficient priority under U.S. security policies and guidance? The suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 are used as case studies to illustrate the similarities and differences of the findings, recommendations, and force protection guidance resulting from each of two mass-casualty bombings, thirteen years apart. There does not appear to be a united effort among the armed forces to protect themselves against terrorist attack. This requires the creation of a true joint doctrine leading to better training, education, and resources to protect deployed U.S. forces and deter terrorism.

0741 **Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Mark S. McAlpine. March 1997. 45pp.

Terrorism poses a growing threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies. The political, economic, and informational instruments of power play primary roles in addressing and eliminating the root causes behind terrorism attacks, but the military instrument will prevent some attacks and retaliate for others. Air and space power is one of the primary components of the military instrument in the battle against terrorism. This thesis begins with an overview of U.S. national and DoD counterterrorist policies, performs a systems model analysis of a terrorist organization to better understand targeting of the same, reviews current air and space power counterterrorism capabilities, and concludes with recommendations for future ones.

0786 **The DTIC Review. Terrorism, Peacekeeping, and Operations Other Than War.**

Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Christian M. Cupp and Phyllis Levine. March 1997. 260pp.

Stability of many regions around the world is in question and requires U.S. intervention in time of crisis. Because the United States is the world's accepted preeminent power, American military strength and leadership are essential around the globe. The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of WMD, terrorism, international crimes, and drugs. Dangers and emerging threats are here at home as well as in the rest of the world. The need for an active American effort and continued peace enforcement operations has increased. The Clinton administration recognizes new and old security challenges facing America in this new international context. The selected documents and

bibliography are a representation of the information available on terrorism and peacekeeping from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) collection.

Reel 2

- 0001 **1997 cont.**
Aviation Safety and Security. Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. March 5, 1997. 10pp.
This document presents testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate by the associate director, transportation issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. The testimony presents views on the recommendations contained in a report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. The commission's fifty-seven recommendations broadly cover safety, security, air traffic control, and disaster response.
- 0011 **Aviation Security: Posting Notices at Domestic Airports.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. March 25, 1997. 15pp.
This is a report to U.S. Senator Ron Wyden by the associate director, transportation issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. The report examines the FAA and the bases for security assessments at foreign and domestic airports and how they differ. The report further examines the views and opinions of the aviation community, industry, government, and consumer groups on a policy that would require the FAA to post public notices in domestic airports about security risks at other domestic airports.
- 0026 **The American Dilemma: Freedoms or Security.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Judith L. Gentner. March 28, 1997. 36pp.
The United States is hampered by its ideal of freedom in restraining terrorists and preventing terrorist acts. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was an attempt to protect its citizens and provide a strong new law to combat terrorism while maintaining traditional freedoms. Law enforcement agencies and President Clinton, however, assert that the law is not strong enough. Civil libertarians and some congressional leaders claim legislation of additional governmental powers would sacrifice civil rights. This thesis explores the American debate over this controversial law and argues that a more commonsense approach to the dilemma would have yielded stronger legislation. The analysis projects future trends of terrorism to determine if current legislation is sufficient in view of some disturbing trends.

- 0062 **Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996.**
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. April 1997. 63pp.
This report of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism provides a worldwide summary of terrorist acts in 1996, by continent and country thereunder. The report outlines U.S. rules for handling terrorist incidents. Appendices include a chronological list of terrorist acts, background information on terrorist groups, and a statistical review of international terrorist incidents.
- 0125 **Fire Department Response to Biological Threat at B'nai B'rith Headquarters, Washington, D.C.**
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, Washington, D.C. April 1997. 48pp.
This is report 114 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./Tri Data Corporation under contract to the U.S. Fire Administration, FEMA. The report chronicles multiple agency response to a suspected biological agent delivered to a District of Columbia office building through the mail. The report examines local response and lessons learned from the incident.
- 0173 **Terror vs. Terror: Effects of Military Retaliation on Terrorism.**
National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Brittain P. Mallow. 1997. 35pp.
This thesis uses psychological evaluations to proscribe military retaliation to terrorism. The author feels retaliation presents substantial risks beyond its failure to deter. Force protection, dangers of escalatory violence, and risks of condemnation by the world community accompany the use of retaliation. These risks, combined with retaliation's questionable viability as a deterrent, make it a difficult policy choice.
- 0208 **Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. April 1997. 41pp.
This is a report to Congressmen Benjamin A. Gilman and Lee H. Hamilton of the House Committee on International Relations. The report examines how the U.S. government is organized to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics. The report discusses the roles, responsibilities, and authority of agencies that establish policy, provide funds or oversee funding requests, and develop explosives and narcotics detection technologies; mechanisms used to coordinate the joint development of technologies; and efforts to strengthen detection technology development.
- 0249 **Terrorism: National Security and Strategy and a Local Threat Response.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Philip M. Dehennis. May 20, 1997. 33pp.
Countering terrorism is included as part of the national security strategy. This study examines terrorism as a security issue and proposes policy perspectives to help deter, mitigate, and respond to a potential act. Included in the paper is an overview of current policy and the evolution of terrorism and national security.

- 0282 **Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. May 1, 1997. 10pp.
This is a report to Representative Frank Wolf, Subcommittee on Transportation, House Committee on Appropriations by the associate director, transportation issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. The report examines the FAA's recent expenditures on advanced security devices at U.S. airports. The report looks at how the FAA is determining which explosives detection devices to purchase and the extent to which the purchase and deployment of these devices is adhering to its Acquisition Management System, which governs major capital procurements.
- 0292 **Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, 1996.**
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Washington, D.C. July 1997. 35pp.
This report by the State Department, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis is intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the spectrum of political violence that American citizens and interests have encountered abroad during 1996. In addition to examining terrorism-related acts, this study also includes other instances of violence affecting Americans. This chronology is designed to encompass major anti-United States incidents in 1996. Unfortunately, to keep this publication at the unclassified level, some incidents are omitted due to the sensitive nature of the information associated with them. The selection of incidents used in this study was based on the following criteria: lethality, substantial property damage, use of unusual tactics or weapons, and perceptibility of targets as U.S. or representative of U.S. interests.
- 0327 **Combating Terrorism. Status of DoD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. July 1997. 38pp.
This is a report to Representative Ike Skelton and Senator John Glenn by Mark E. Gebicke, director, military operations and capabilities issues. The report examines the DoD's efforts to protect U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. The report addresses measures taken at overseas U.S. bases to enhance the security of deployed personnel and recent DoD initiatives to improve its antiterrorism program.
- 0365 **Conference on Countering Biological Terrorism: Strategic Firepower in the Hands of Many?**
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. August 1997. 129pp.
This document consists of proceedings from a conference on combating biological terrorism. Topics covered include The Emerging Threat Environment; Policy and Technical Aspects of the Biological Terrorist Threat; Countering Terrorist Groups: Discussion of the Dynamics of Terrorists Groups, Intelligence Indicators and Warning, and Terrorist Group Suppression; Countering Emerging Infectious Diseases; Consequence Management: Overcoming the Consequences of Bioterrorism: The Federal Plan, Medical Treatment Capabilities, Military Support to Civil Authorities, and an Assessment; Advanced Countermeasures: Discussion of Medical and Non-medical Countermeasures to Biological Agent Dissemination; and The Way Ahead—Experts' Comments.

0494 **Combating Terrorism. Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. September 1997. 108pp.

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, focusing on federal agencies' programs and activities to: (1) prevent and deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats and incidents; and (3) manage the consequences of a terrorist act, especially involving WMD.

0602 **Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.**

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. October 8, 1997. 3pp.

The secretary of state has designated thirty groups as foreign terrorist organizations. Her action sends a powerful signal that the United States will not tolerate support for international terrorism. The secretary acted under the authority provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, with the concurrence of the attorney general and the secretary of the treasury.

0605 **Combating Terrorism. Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Mark E. Gebicke. October 28, 1997. 11pp.

In preparing a July 1997 report on DoD efforts to protect U.S. forces overseas from terrorist attacks, GAO visited overseas locations where U.S. forces are considered to be at high risk of attack, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This testimony is based on the results of those visits and related work with the U.S. military. GAO provides a brief overview and discusses in greater detail the following three issues: (1) the environment that U.S. forces abroad are facing, including the terrorist threat and the relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the measures DoD has taken to improve security for personnel stationed in the countries GAO visited; and (3) DoD's initiatives to strengthen its overall force protection program.

0616 **EPA's Involvement in Counter-Terrorism.**

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. November 1997. 15pp.

This presentation concerns the on-scene coordinator's (OSC) role in the National Response System of the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) Domestic Preparedness Training Program. The general OSC role is to provide technical advice to the FBI on-scene commander, assist in the conduct of scientific and technical assessments, make recommendations for the deployment of response assets, and assist the FBI in working with state and local responders.

0631 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.**

United Nations, New York, New York. Ghassan Obeid. November 25, 1997. 19pp.

This is the report of the Sixth Committee on a draft international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings. The Working Group held seventeen meetings, from September 22 to October 3. The representatives of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Algeria, New Zealand, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Canada, Lebanon, Japan, India, Turkey, and Jamaica made

statements. The representative of China did not participate in the decision and made a statement in explanation of China's position.

0650 **Combating Terrorism. Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, National Security and International Affairs Division, D.C. December 1997. 39pp.

The amount of federal money being spent on programs to combat terrorism is unknown and difficult to determine. Precisely identifying and tracking spending on antiterrorist efforts governmentwide is difficult for several reasons, including the lack of a uniform definition of terrorism and the inclusion of these expenditures within larger categories that do not readily allow separation. As a result, no governmentwide spending priorities for combating terrorism have been set, and no federal entity exists to channel resources where they are most needed and to prevent wasteful spending resulting from unnecessary duplication of effort. The Government Performance and Results Act can provide guidance and opportunities for the many federal agencies involved in the crosscutting program to combat terrorism to (1) develop coordinated goals, objectives, and performance measures and (2) enhance the management of individual agency and overall federal efforts to combat terrorism.

0689 **Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 10th Anniversary Issue.**

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Washington, D.C. 1997. 71pp.

This report by the State Department, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis is intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the spectrum of political violence that American citizens and interests have encountered abroad during 1997. In addition to examining terrorism-related acts, this study also includes other instances of violence affecting Americans. This chronology is designed to encompass major anti-United States incidents in 1997. Unfortunately, to keep this publication at the unclassified level, some incidents are omitted due to the sensitive nature of the information associated with them. The selection of incidents used in this study was based on the following criteria: lethality, substantial property damage, use of unusual tactics or weapons, and perceptibility of targets as U.S. or representative of U.S. interests.

0760 **Terrorism in the United States 1997.**

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, Washington, D.C. 1997. 28pp.

Domestic terrorism investigations are conducted in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines for General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. These guidelines set forth the predication threshold and limits for investigations of U.S. persons who reside in the United States, who are not acting on behalf of a foreign power, and who may be conducting criminal activities in support of terrorist objectives. International terrorism investigations are conducted in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations.

- 0788 **Common Defense Against Uncommon Threats: The Federal Role in Critical Infrastructure Protection. Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure.**
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure, [Washington, D.C.]. 1997. 25pp.
This report reviews changes in the U.S. defense posture after the collapse of the cold war, including early warning, cyber threats, the nature of organized attacks in the information age, deterrence, bureaucratic responsibility, asymmetric challenges, cyber geography, domestic roles and missions, a new defense mission, and core competencies of the DoD. Recommendations concern roles and missions, information sharing, tactical and strategic warning, risk management processes, core competencies, defense organizational structure, new definitions, Critical Asset Assurance Program, DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection Working Group, and Education and Awareness. Conclusions concern the use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) systems and liaison with Justice Department (DOJ), law enforcement, and public/private sector coordination.
- 0813 **Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism.**
Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C. Annabelle Boyd and John P. Sullivan. 1997. 83pp.
This synthesis provides information on the current practices of transit agencies to prevent and respond to terrorism and acts of extreme violence. It integrates information gathered from surveys, site visits, and telephone interviews with personnel from transit police and security departments, local police agencies, transit authorities, and federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In addition, to provide a useful perspective on mass transit preparedness, this synthesis contrasts transit perspectives to those of general service police through a review of relevant literature. Since 1993, mass transit systems and infrastructure in the United States have figured prominently in four acts of terrorism and extreme violence. The Long Island Rail Road shootings, the World Trade Center bombing (which destroyed sections in the primary New York terminus of the bi-state Port Authority Trans-Hudson commuter system), the sabotage induced derailment of Amtrak's *Sunset Limited* in Arizona, and the Fulton Street firebombings succinctly demonstrate the vulnerability of the U.S. transportation infrastructure to acts of terrorism and extreme violence. Combined, these acts resulted in fourteen fatalities and more than one thousand injuries. Internationally, the vulnerability of public transportation agencies is even more pronounced. Over the last two years, foreign transit agencies experienced the devastating consequences of terrorist acts. Bombings of the Paris Metro by Islamist militants resulted in hundreds of casualties, system disruption, and declines in ridership. Sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system marked the first time chemical or biological weapons have been deployed on a large scale by terrorists.
- 0896 **1998
Overview: Counter-Terrorism Status Report.**
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. February 1998. 17pp.
This presentation summarizes the EPA's role in counterterrorism activities. Items concern past, present, and future activities of the EPA.

- 0913 **EPA's Role in Counter-Terrorism Activities.**
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. February 1998. 2pp.
The EPA is preparing for and will respond to terrorist threats from WMD, weapons or devices that are intended, or have the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people, through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; or radiation or radioactivity. Because of its inherent role in protecting human health and the environment from possible harmful effects of certain chemical, biological, and nuclear materials, EPA is actively involved in counterterrorism planning and response efforts.
- 0915 **Terrorist Threat to United States Military Bases—Are We on the Verge of Another Pearl Harbor?**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. John F. Carter. February 13, 1998. 24pp.
Each year the list of terrorist activities worldwide grows at a frightening rate. Not only are these terrorist acts occurring in countries that have traditionally been plagued by such activity, but they have begun filtering into our own borders. Although the number of terrorist attacks has actually declined slightly in recent years, the number of deaths and injuries has steadily increased. This is largely due to the increased severity of terrorist attacks. The U.S. military is certainly not immune to these cowardly acts. The Beirut bombing and Khobar Towers bombing, two well-known terrorist attacks on U.S. forces, have claimed the lives of hundreds of our military men and women. Even with these events etched into our collective memory, we continue to believe that terrorist acts are not likely to happen on our military bases stateside. This unhealthy lack of concern over a real terrorist threat creates a weakness in security that could be exploited by international as well as domestic terrorists. This paper seeks to raise the level of consciousness among all military and civilian personnel who serve and work on bases within our nation's borders. It also offers recommendations to be incorporated into the DoD structure to ensure not only that personnel awareness of the terrorist threat is increased but that our capabilities to combat terrorism are developed to a higher level of security.
- 0939 **EPA Counter-Terrorism (CT) Strategy, Work Plan, and Executive Summary.**
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. Jim Makris. March 4, 1998. 27pp.
The EPA issued this guidance in an effort to take full advantage of the expertise of existing agency emergency response programs' (i.e., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and Oil Pollution Act (OPA)) experience to develop a comprehensive strategy on the reduction of domestic terrorist activity threats. The guidance provides readers with long- and short-term goals and objectives of the agency Counter-Terrorism Program Coordination Team (CTPCT) and outlines a fiscal year 1998 program plan for the project.
- 0966 **The Caspian Sea Region: A Look at Future U.S. and Allied Military Missions.**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Jon E. Chicky. March 11, 1998. 41pp.
The Caspian Sea is rapidly becoming a region of increased attention to both U.S. civilian and military policy makers and planners. The region's large amounts of oil and gas reserves will allow the United States and its allies to diversify their sources

of oil imports and therefore reduce the dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The Caspian, however, is an inland sea and the export of the resources to markets is of critical concern. The pipelines required to transport the oil and gas will need to traverse a region complete with internal and external animosities, border disputes, and regional powers competing with one another for influence and control over the Caspian and its resources. Entering the so-called "New Great Game" are the United States and the other Western nations. The United States has increasingly become more attuned to the Caspian and all the problems and issues connected to it. The United States supports its own Caspian pipeline route proposal, has become more involved in solving the regional disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, and through the Partnership for Peace program, has increased U.S. and NATO military influence in the region. Given this background, the United States and its allies may have to conduct military operations to secure their investments of capital and influence in the region as well as to resolve or prevent disputes among the Caspian states and the regional powers as Caspian oil reaches full production in the next ten to fifteen years. The missions of peace operations, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and possibly others await U.S. and NATO forces in the twenty-first century.

- 1007 **Advanced Technology to Counter Biological Terrorism.**
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. David W. Siegrist. March 18, 1998. 20pp.

The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies study of countering biological terrorism concluded in a conference held in August 1997. It was considered that WMD were a grave threat to the United States. Of the various WMD, biological agents seemed to be the most likely to be accessible to terrorists, and potentially one of the most devastating. Additionally, there was concern that the United States was not as prepared as it should be to combat the threat.

Reel 3

- 0001 **1998 cont.**
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. April 1998. 75pp.
- This report of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism provides a worldwide summary of terrorist acts in 1996, by continent and country thereunder. The report outlines U.S. rules for handling terrorist incidents. Appendices include a chronological a list of terrorist acts, background information on terrorist groups, and a statistical review of international terrorist incidents.

- 0076 **Security of the Western Hemisphere.**
National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Max G. Manwaring. April 1998. 6pp.
- International terrorism and organized crime (ITOC) are engaged in what the OAS has recently defined as "grave common crime." ITOC are powerful enough to destabilize, challenge, and destroy targeted societies and states. The increasing influence and power of ITOC are generating transnational threats. The threat posed by ITOC is too great and too complex for civilian institutions to confront by

themselves. The military could and should assist in internal protection missions if its operational role is carefully limited by a legal democratic regime. Today's security requirements call for a coordinated and cooperative application of not only all national civilian and military resources but also those of a variety of international and functional organizations. Because success against ITOC requires close unilateral and multilateral coordination, the responsibility should devolve to the OAS.

0082 **Combating Terrorism. Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. April 1998. 39pp.

The United States is spending billions of dollars each year to combat terrorism, with few guarantees that federal funds are being channeled to the right programs or in the right amounts. Threat and risk assessments could help better target these funds, set priorities, and avoid duplication of effort. The government also needs improved coordination among federal, state, and local agencies. Disagreement exists in the intelligence and scientific communities over the nature of the terrorist threat, particularly the potential for terrorist incidents involving WMD. Although conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists, the likelihood that they may use chemical and biological weapons may increase during the coming decade, according to intelligence agencies. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see *Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues*, by Richard Davis (Reel 3, Frame 0456).

0121 **Superterrorism and the Military Instrument of Power.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. John B. Stubbs. April 1998. 42pp.

This paper examines "superterrorism" as a fundamentally new threat to U.S. national security that requires reexamination of U.S. policy for using the military instrument of power (MIOP). Examining superterrorism using contemporary war theory can provide guidance in developing a new national security strategy to counter the threat.

0163 **The Threat of Intentional Oil Spills to Desalination Plants in the Middle East a U.S. Security Threat.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. James E. Lovell. April 1998. 44pp.

During the Gulf War, Iraq physically destroyed Kuwaiti desalination plants while it occupied the country. Iraq also conducted what was arguably the largest act of environmental terrorism in recent memory by releasing millions of gallons of oil into the sea, thereby threatening more desalination plants and other facilities in the region. The Institute for National Security Studies recognized the potential for this to happen again and listed this subject as one of their potential research topics for 1998. Specifically, what is the present vulnerability of Middle East desalination plants to potential acts of environmental terrorism in the form of oil spills, and what can the DoD do to help?

- 0207 **From Beirut to Khobar Towers: Improving the Combating Terrorism Program.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. John J. Ziegler III. April 1998. 49pp.

Once again the specter of terrorism was thrust to the center of attention. The June 25, 1996, terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, resulting in the death of nineteen airmen, shook Pentagon halls. Yet only thirteen years earlier, a suicide car bomber killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut, Lebanon. Can the United States effectively protect its forces against terrorism? This report investigates the Beirut bombing and the Khobar Towers attack to critically examine the recommendations for the improvement of DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security missions in combating terrorism.

- 0256 **Preemption and Retribution: Precision-Guided Munitions to Counter Terrorist Threats.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Roger F. Seidel. April 1, 1998. 34pp.

The development of the second generation of precision-guided munitions and stealth technology provides the United States National Command Authorities with a military option for prevention of and retribution for state-sponsored terrorist activities. This study examines the current U.S. policy on terrorism, explores the ways in which the United States has employed elements of national power against terrorist organizations, and determines whether the development of precision-guided munitions affords the United States leadership with effective means to conduct preemptive and retributive operations against these terrorist organizations.

- 0290 **Terrorism: Analyzing the Threat.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bryon J. Young. April 6, 1998. 28pp.

This paper examines the nature of the terrorist threat by analyzing terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist groups. It seeks to describe underlying characteristics of terrorist groups and the acts they commit. Once these characteristics have been established, the paper offers suggestions for counterterrorist strategies and assesses the potential effectiveness of these strategies in specific case examples in the Middle East.

- 0318 **More Than Combating Terrorism: The Force Security Concept and the Role of Intelligence.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Jeffrey M. Rote. April 6, 1998. 51pp.

Significant enhancements to DoD force protection programs have occurred since the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing, but serious shortfalls remain. Differing definitions of force protection and the scope of the threat have caused confusion and have hampered the development of intelligence support efforts. DoD force protection programs are too narrowly defined, and intelligence support is fractured and uneven. Current efforts focus on the terrorist threat, and most programs have overlooked other significant risks. Force protection doctrine must be clarified, and the full range of security risks must be recognized. Defense intelligence must leverage emerging analytical and production technologies to provide timely, accessible, and integrated assessments of the entire threat environment.

- 0369 **Cyber-Terrorism: Modem Mayhem.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Kenneth C. White. April 14, 1998. 38pp.
America can no longer rely on broad oceans and a strong military to protect its homefront. The arrival of the information age has created a new menace: cyberterrorism. This threat recognizes no boundaries, requires minimal resources to mount an attack, and leaves no human footprint at ground zero. This study addresses technology, identification procedures, and legal ambiguity as major issues for countering cyberterrorism as an emerging challenge to U.S. national security. As America's reliance on computer technology increases, so does its vulnerability to cyber attacks.
- 0407 **Seminar on Cyber-Terrorism and Information Warfare: Threats and Responses.**
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. April 16, 1998. 49pp.
Cosponsored by The Terrorism Studies Program at George Washington University and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, this seminar examines cyberterrorism and the federal response. Participants include academic and current and former federal officials.
- 0456 **Combating Terrorism. Observations on Crosscutting Issues.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Richard Davis. April 23, 1998. 9pp.
The United States is spending billions of dollars each year to combat terrorism, with few guarantees that federal funds are being channeled to the right programs or in the right amounts. Threat and risk assessments could help better target these funds, set priorities, and avoid duplication of effort. The government also needs improved coordination among federal, state, and local agencies. Disagreement exists in the intelligence and scientific communities over the nature of the terrorist threat, particularly the potential for terrorist incidents involving WMD. Although conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists, the likelihood that they may use chemical and biological weapons may increase during the coming decade, according to intelligence agencies.
- 0465 **Aviation Security. Progress Being Made, But Long-Term Attention Is Needed.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Keith O. Fultz. May 14, 1998. 10pp.
In recent years, GAO and others have reported on vulnerabilities plaguing the nation's aviation system, the availability and limitations of explosives detection technologies used at airports, and efforts underway to improve aviation security. Terrorism was initially considered a possible cause of the 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800 and helped focus national attention on the system's vulnerabilities. President Clinton formed the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security following the crash, and later congressional hearings highlighted continuing weaknesses in the U.S. aviation security system. Although terrorism has since been ruled out as a factor in the crash of TWA Flight 800, ensuing studies found that weaknesses persist. The FAA, other government agencies, and the aviation industry are now implementing thirty-one of the commission's recommendations on aviation security. Some of these recommendations are similar to legislative mandates that Congress enacted under the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of

1996. This report provides information on (1) the tracking, monitoring, and coordinating activities undertaken by the agencies responsible for implementing the commission's recommendations and (2) FAA's progress in implementing eight of these recommendations, five of which are similar to mandates contained in the Reauthorization Act of 1996.

0475

Counterterrorism and Operational Art.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Christopher M. Hickey. May 21, 1998. 62pp.

Can operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, be useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism? Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action. In conventional conflict, operational art enables a commander to best use resources to accomplish his strategic objective. In the same respect, countering terrorism, which is beyond the capabilities of a single agency in the federal government, requires the most efficient use of limited resources to accomplish a strategic objective. This monograph investigates whether operational art is useful in countering terrorism.

0537

FOA Report on Terrorism.

National Defense Research Establishment, Stockholm, Sweden. Gunnar Jervas, ed. June 1998. 259pp.

When traditional military threats began to fade away, the project "Broader Threats" started at the Division of Defense Analysis (FOA1). After having carried out studies on ethnic-national conflicts and environmental problems as a source of conflict, Jervas initiated this study on terrorism about a year ago. This study focuses on different kinds of terrorism and its means and presence in the parts of the world that directly or indirectly might affect Sweden. Since it is a policy study, it also contains a discussion of future prospects and suggestions for handling terrorism threats. The report deals with matters that are only partially studied, which means that the conclusions drawn and recommendations given are to be looked upon as preliminary results.

0796

EPA's Emergency Response Organizational Structure.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. June 15, 1998. 24pp.

This summary of the EPA's Emergency Response Organizational Structure was made for the Israeli Defense Agency. EPA and U.S. governmentwide plans and directives clarify EPA's specific roles and responsibilities concerning protection of human health and the environment.

0820

Seminar on Emerging Threats of Biological Terrorism: Recent Developments.

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. June 16, 1998. 45pp.

The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in accordance with its mission to raise public awareness about important policy issues, hosted a conference with The George Washington University Terrorism Studies Program to address the threat presented by biological terrorism. A diverse group of experts presented their perspectives on biological warfare, bacterial and viral threats, emergency planning, and countermeasures. The seminar included assessments of both conventional and unconventional terrorist threats, as well as national, regional, and global counterterrorism strategies.

- 0865 **Special Briefing on Terrorism: Current and Future Trends.**
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. August 28, 1998. 18pp.
This special briefing was cosponsored by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the Terrorism Studies Program at George Washington University. Current and Future Trends summarizes terrorist activities around the world.
- 0883 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Secretary-General.**
United Nations, New York, New York. August 31, 1998. 17pp.
The report of Secretary-General Kofi Annan was prepared to follow closely the implementation of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and to submit an annual report on the implementation of paragraph 10 of that declaration. In paragraph 10 of the declaration, the General Assembly requests the secretary-general to assist in the implementation of the declaration by taking, within existing resources, the following practical measures to enhance international cooperation: “(a) a collection of data on the status and implementation of existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements relating to international terrorism, including information on incidents caused by international terrorism and criminal prosecutions and sentencing, based on information received from the depositaries of those agreements and from Member States; (b) a compendium of national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, based on information received from Member States; (c) an analytical review of existing international legal instruments relating to international terrorism, in order to assist States in identifying aspects of this matter that have not been covered by such instruments and could be addressed to develop further a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism; (d) a review of existing possibilities within the United Nations system for assisting States in organizing workshops and training courses on combating crimes connected with international terrorism.”
- 0900 **Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat.**
The Johns Hopkins University, The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland. D. A. Henderson. September 1998. 5pp.
The threat of bioterrorism, long ignored and denied, has heightened over the past few years. Recent events in Iraq, Japan, and Russia cast an ominous shadow. Two candidate agents are of special concern—smallpox and anthrax. The magnitude of the problems and the gravity of the scenarios associated with release of these organisms have been vividly portrayed by two epidemics of smallpox in Europe during the 1970s and by an accidental release of aerosolized anthrax from a Russian bioweapons facility in 1979. Efforts in the United States to deal with possible incidents involving bioweapons in the civilian sector have only recently begun and have made only limited progress. Only with substantial additional resources at the federal, state, and local levels can a credible and meaningful response be mounted. For longer-term solutions, the medical community must educate both the public and policy makers about bioterrorism and build a global consensus condemning its use.

- 0905 **Bibliography on Future Trends in Terrorism.**
Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Washington, D.C. LaVerle Berry, Glenn Curtis, and Rex Hudson. September 1998. 150pp.
This product was prepared by the staff of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an interagency agreement with the sponsoring U.S. government agency. This bibliography provides annotations on future trends in terrorism from open-source literature published between 1996 and mid-1998. The dominant trend discussed in this literature is the increasing likelihood that terrorists will use WMD, particularly against the United States. Accordingly, many of the 295 monographs and journal articles surveyed in this bibliography discuss the potential threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism and the countermeasures that need to be implemented in responding to these threats. A number of other articles discuss the emerging threat of computer or cyberterrorism and the potential threat to the United States' information technology (IT)-based infrastructure. Many articles discuss new technologies to counter more conventional terrorist threats, such as detecting bombs at airports.

Reel 4

- 0001 **1998 cont.**
British Intelligence and the IRA: The Secret War in Northern Ireland, 1969–1988.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Mark L. Bowlin. September 1998. 174pp.
The British Army was sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 as a peacekeeping force between the Catholic and Protestant communities. Against a backdrop of sectarian violence, emerging paramilitary organizations began to contest British authority throughout the province. The British peace operations then evolved into counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. As the mission of the British Security Forces changed, the role of British intelligence became increasingly important. This thesis is a history of British intelligence operations against the IRA from 1969 to 1988. It critically examines the role of the British intelligence community in Northern Ireland and focuses on the major intelligence agencies that participated in the war against the IRA. The tradecraft of British intelligence is analyzed, particularly the use of informers as the primary vehicle of information about the IRA. Four representative operations conducted by British intelligence are presented as historical case studies and illustrate covert intelligence collection, propaganda operations, clandestine penetration, and the involvement of intelligence in so-called "shoot-to-kill" incidents. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the uneasy relationship between Britain's aggressive intelligence community and the democracy that it serves.
- 0175 **Combating Terrorism. Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Preparedness Program.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Richard Davis. October 2, 1998. 14pp.
This testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives by the director, national security analysis, National Security and

International Affairs Division, discusses work and observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP) and related issues. This interagency program, led by the DoD, provides training and equipment intended to better prepare selected cities to manage the consequences of a possible attack by terrorists using WMD. A report on these matters is expected within the next few weeks. It is worth noting that very recently, under a National Security Council initiative, DoD, DOJ, and other agency officials have been considering transferring lead responsibility for the NLD DPP from DoD to DOJ. Program objectives and costs, the training DoD is providing to local emergency response personnel, issues identified on program structure and design, the equipment segment of DoD's program, and interagency coordination of this and other related programs are discussed in the hearing. Observations about the congressional committee structure for oversight of counterterrorism and other crosscutting issues also surface.

0189

The Increasing Threat of Contemporary Terrorism.

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. October 7, 1998. 7pp.

The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies hosted a congressional breakfast meeting sponsored by Representative Curt Weldon on October 7, 1998, to address the issue of "The Increasing Threat of Biological Terrorism." A diverse and distinguished panel of speakers presented their perspectives on the threats of contemporary terrorism and the ever-increasing need to coordinate an effective consequence management system domestically and internationally.

0196

Institutionalizing State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Decade of Violence in Argentine Terrorism; Revolution and Military Reaction, 1970–1979.

Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Wayne Peter Magnusson. October 27, 1998. 130pp.

This thesis examines the institutionalization of violence in the history of the Republic of Argentina and pays special attention to the institutional terrorism of the decade of the 1970s. The history of Argentina shows that legalized violence has always been a method of gaining and maintaining political power in this nation. In the mid-1970s, Argentina's coercive forces responded to the most dangerous terrorist threat in its history with its own brand of institutionalized state-sponsored terror. The conflict between terrorist forces and the Argentine military and police forces, known as the "Dirty War," resulted in the "disappearance" of between 8,000 and 30,000 persons. Subsequent investigations revealed thousands of accounts of brutal murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and illegal detention, perpetrated by the legal coercive forces. Some of the top military and police leaders were convicted in federal court and served prison sentences until their pardon and release in 1991. This thesis first examines Argentina's history of violence and military elitism, then takes a closer look at the terrorist threat of the early 1970s and the military response from 1975 to 1979. It ends by addressing the accountability and judgment of the military officers responsible for human rights abuses and recent efforts for reconciliation in Argentina.

0326 **Combating Terrorism. FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FY's 1995–98).**

U.S. General Accounting Office, General Government Division, Washington, D.C. November 1998. 47pp.

The amount of funds allocated and obligated by the FBI for counterterrorism-related activities more than doubled in fiscal years 1995 through 1998—from \$256 million to \$581 million. During this period, Congress directed or provided guidance to the FBI on the use of about one-quarter of these funds, and the FBI has generally followed this direction in obligating the money. Although neither GAO nor the FBI could precisely determine the amount of overall funds allocated and obligated by the FBI to carry out its counterterrorism mission, the FBI and the DOJ have several efforts underway to better identify resources used by the FBI for counterterrorism-related activities. These include efforts to (1) specifically track certain counterterrorism funds; (2) calculate the overall amount of funds associated with counterterrorism-related activities, including shared costs; and (3) link the allocation of budget resources to annual and strategic plans, including specific counterterrorism-related performance measures. In addition, the FBI and the DOJ plan to develop a methodology for reporting the full cost of program activities in compliance with established managerial cost-accounting standards.

0373 **Combating Terrorism. Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. November 1998. 51pp.

The training and equipment that the DoD is providing to cities through the DPP have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological weapons. In designing the training and equipment program, DoD chose 120 cities solely on the basis of population. The decision resulted in fourteen clusters of forty-four cities within thirty miles of at least one other city selected. By dealing directly with cities, DoD did not build upon the states' existing emergency management and training structure. Had it used existing structures, such as counties, response regions, mutual aid agreements, or other similar arrangements that reflect how emergency response is actually organized, DoD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations than now planned, at less cost. DoD's loan of equipment in support of the training program has frustrated and confused local officials. DoD has established a five-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision of about \$300,000 worth of equipment to each city. This agreement restricts the use of the equipment to training and requires the cities to maintain, repair, and replace the equipment, even though DoD program officials intended the loans to be permanent and will allow the use of equipment for operational purposes. The interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program. Local officials in most of the cities GAO visited raised concerns that many training, equipment, and consequence management programs are evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism.

- 0424 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.**
United Nations, New York, New York. Rytis Pauluaskas. November 27, 1998. 5pp.
This is the report of the Sixth Committee. After the adoption of the draft resolution, the representatives of Pakistan, Syria, Sweden, and Iraq made statements in explanation of their governments' positions. The Sixth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution: Measures to eliminate international terrorism.
- 0429 **Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy Issues: Case Studies of Thailand and Indonesia.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. George R. McDonald II. December 1998. 100pp.
The end of the cold war has brought about a decrease in global tensions while regional disorder has increased. In particular, Southeast Asia has become an area of regional economic and political instability. As a result, the possibility of an increase in terrorism, separatist violence, ethnic disputes, and strained regional relations takes on greater significance, both for U.S. foreign policy and regional Southeast Asian relations. The main purpose of this thesis is to examine political terrorism in Southeast Asia, with particular attention to terrorism conducted by separatist groups in Thailand and Indonesia. Secondly, this paper will discuss what actions are needed to contain political terrorism in the region. Additionally, this paper will examine U.S. government antiterrorist/counterterrorist policy and its effects on political terrorism in the region. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate that the growing threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia can no longer be addressed unilaterally and that ASEAN can use U.S. policy and global initiatives as guidelines for greater cooperation.
- 0529 **Mobile Agent Security.**
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland. 1998. 43pp.
Mobile agent technology offers a new computing paradigm in which a program, in the form of a software agent, can suspend its execution on a host computer, transfer itself to another agent-enabled host on the network, and resume execution on the new host. The use of mobile code has a history dating back to the 1960s. Today's agent incarnations can be characterized in a number of ways, ranging from simple distributed objects to highly organized software with imbedded intelligence. As the sophistication of mobile software has increased over time, so too have the associated threats to security. This report provides an overview of the range of threats to security and security concerns facing the designers of agent platforms and agent-based applications. The report also identifies generic security objectives and a range of measures for countering the identified threats and fulfilling these security objectives.
- 0572 **Countermeasures for Mobile Agent Security.**
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland. Wayne A. Jansen. 1998. 15pp.
Security is an important issue for the widespread deployment of applications based on software agent technology. It is generally agreed that without the proper countermeasures in place, use of agent-based applications will be severely impeded. Not all applications require the same set of countermeasures, however,

nor can they depend entirely on the agent system to provide them. Instead, countermeasures are applied commensurate with the anticipated threat profile and intended security objectives for the application. While countermeasures typically include any action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces the vulnerability of a threat to a system, our focus here is specifically on technical mechanisms, as opposed to procedural or nontechnical measures. Such countermeasures can be integrated directly into an agent system or incorporated into the design of an agent to supplement the capabilities of an underlying agent system. This paper gives an overview of the threats associated with software agent systems and their technical countermeasures, including the strengths and weaknesses of the techniques involved. Emphasis is on mobile software agents, since they typically face a more severe set of threats than do static agents and, therefore, demand more rigorous countermeasures.

0587

Terrorism in the United States 1998.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, Washington, D.C. 1998. 29pp.

Domestic terrorism investigations are conducted in accordance with the Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. These guidelines set forth the predication threshold and limits for investigations of U.S. persons who reside in the United States, who are not acting on behalf of a foreign power and who may be conducting criminal activities in support of terrorist objectives. International terrorism investigations are conducted in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations. These guidelines set forth the predication level and limits for investigating U.S. persons or foreign nationals in the United States who are targeting national security interests on behalf of a foreign power. Although various executive orders, presidential decision directives, and congressional statutes address the issue of terrorism, no single federal law specifically makes terrorism a crime. Terrorists are arrested and convicted under existing criminal statutes. All suspected terrorists placed under arrest are provided access to legal counsel and normal judicial procedure, including Fifth Amendment guarantees. There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as "...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). The FBI further describes terrorism as either domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist organization.

0616

Political Violence Against Americans.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Washington, D.C. 1998. 53pp.

Political Violence Against Americans, formerly Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, is produced by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA) to provide readers with a comprehensive picture of the spectrum of political violence that American citizens and interests have encountered abroad on an annual basis. This publication encompasses major anti-United States incidents; however, some incidents are

omitted due to the sensitive information associated with them. Incidents for this study were selected based upon lethality, substantial property damage, use of unusual tactics or weapons, and perceptibility of targets as U.S. or representative of U.S. interests. The policy of the U.S. government is that no double standard will exist regarding the dissemination of threat information that may affect U.S. citizens. U.S. government employees may not benefit from possession of information that may apply equally to the American public but is not available to them. The U.S. government maintains information on threats to Americans overseas—from terrorism, crime, or health hazards—and makes this information available to all those affected.

1999

0669 **Inventory of State and Local Law Enforcement Technology Needs to Combat Terrorism.**

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C. January 1999. 6pp.

This inventory of state and local law enforcement agencies from the fifty states and the District of Columbia is being used to determine the technologies needed by these agencies to combat terrorism. The inventory, conducted through interviews and focus groups involving state and local law enforcement officers and others who coordinate agency responses to terrorist incidents, is the first phase in a two-phase project sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Recognizing the need to identify, document, and respond to shortfalls in state and local capabilities to combat terrorism, Congress, through the 1996 Act, charged NIJ with determining state and local law enforcement technology needs for handling terrorist activities and with developing technological solutions to respond to those needs. Participants in the project provided researchers with a firsthand perspective of the recent acts of terrorism within the United States, such as the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, that have focused attention on the ability of law enforcement to manage these incidents and investigate individuals and groups suspected of planning or executing terrorist acts. Of particular concern is the gap between technologies available to and used by law enforcement—especially state and local agencies—and the advanced technologies used by persons and groups planning terrorist acts.

0675 **Combating Domestic Terrorism: A Strategic Approach for the Twenty-First Century.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Leo A. Brownyard. January 8, 1999. 26pp.

This paper will examine the current U.S. strategic approach to combating domestic terrorism and explore potential recommendations for deterring and defeating it in the twenty-first century. In order to reach sound, strategic recommendations for combating terrorism, the author begins with some background on terrorism, reviews the various definitions written by the DoD and other agencies, describes current U.S. policies toward combating terrorism, offers an evaluation of prospective measures in the form of pros and cons, and makes seven recommendations for implementation.

- 0701 **Combating Domestic Terrorism: Our National Security Priority?**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Terry L. Quarles. February 1, 1999. 35pp.
This project focuses on terrorists, American military and civilian efforts to counter terrorist activities, and U.S. preparedness for terrorist threats in hopes of answering the question: "Is the United States really where it needs to be, and if not what must it do to get there?" The author urges adoption of an effective counterterrorism policy that addresses both offensive and defensive measures. He suggests a positive, proactive, and comprehensive program that identifies terrorist organizations and their threat capability, prevents them from committing attacks if possible, and yet allows a response in a prepared manner once an attack has occurred.
- 0736 **The Real Cost of "Engagement."**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Gina M. Grosso. February 5, 1999. 20pp.
This paper analyzes the terrorist bombings in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. Tactical warning regarding the strike was not available in either of the bombings. Given the complex nature of terrorist organizations, a warning order this specific will most likely never be available; therefore, the chain of command must figure out how to protect their forces without it. In both bombings U.S. forces were located in urban areas, which are much more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given the disruption to the mission and the cost of moving forces, it is much wiser to place forces in more isolated locations that are less susceptible to standoff bombs, even if the security environment at the time seems benign. When the security environment in a theatre declines is when the forces will be most vulnerable to terrorist attack. As the security situation declines, the chain of command must be more vigilant.
- 0756 **Information Assurance—the Achilles' Heel of Joint Vision 2010.**
Armed Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Brad Ashley, Sam Cox, Ron Stimeare, and Tim Dean. February 3, 1999. 12pp.
This paper discusses Joint Vision 2010, information operation/information assurance, the cyber threat, three information assurance examples, and findings from recent studies. The report makes specific recommendations on what the DoD should do to remedy this Achilles' heel and make Joint Vision 2010 a viable concept.
- 0768 **The Changing Face of Terrorism.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Jeffrey F. Johns. March 10, 1999. 37pp.
As the twentieth century draws to a close, the United States faces an unprecedented and increasingly dangerous threat from asymmetrical organizations. These groups have the potential to inflict unprecedented damage to U.S. citizens, property, and vital interests. The threat of terrorist violence is not a new phenomenon; however, as we enter into the new millennium, the threat from this enemy will become significantly more deadly. As the global strategic environment has changed since the end of the cold war, the nature of asymmetrical threats, terrorism in particular, has changed just as dramatically. History provides a

foundation to examine this change, predict future trends, and identify the new breed of terrorism and the terrorists that will threaten U.S. security and interests.

0805 **Combating Terrorism. Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Henry L. Hinton Jr. March 11, 1999. 15pp.

Although key federal agencies spent about \$6.7 billion in fiscal year 1997 on unclassified activities and programs to combat terrorism, a December 1997 GAO report found that precise funding information was unavailable. That report resulted in legislation requiring OMB to establish a system for collecting and reporting information on agencies' spending and budgets for combating terrorism. OMB's most recent report identified \$10 billion set aside in the fiscal year 2000 budget for programs to combat terrorism. This testimony (1) briefly discusses the foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat as GAO understands it from intelligence analyses, (2) provides overall observations on program growth and other issues raised by GAO's work in this area, and (3) examines steps that the executive branch has taken to improve crosscutting management and coordination and provides preliminary observations on the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports to Congress on governmentwide spending and budgeting to combat terrorism.

0820 **Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Henry L. Hinton Jr. March 16, 1999. 10pp.

The mass casualties resulting from a terrorist attack using biological weapons to spread anthrax, smallpox, and other deadly diseases could potentially overwhelm the U.S. health care system. This testimony focuses on federal efforts to invest in medical countermeasures and preparedness initiatives, one of the few areas in which national security and public health issues clearly intersect. GAO briefly discusses intelligence agencies' judgments about the terrorist threat, highlights the importance and benefits of threat assessments to provide a sound basis for targeting the nation's investment in combating terrorism, provides preliminary observations on the science behind the biological and chemical terrorist threat, and provides observations on public health initiatives that deal with a new national pharmaceutical stockpile and the basis for selecting items to research, produce, procure, and stockpile for civilian defense against terrorism.

0830 **Future Terrorism in the United States: Implications for the USAF.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Stephen N. Paar. March 22, 1999. 36pp.

The 1995 Khobar Towers bombing and recent embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania illustrate the threat faced by Americans, and in particular U.S. military personnel, as a result of terrorist activity. These incidents stimulated renewed attention, literature, and efforts concerning the protection of U.S. persons overseas. Unfortunately, until recently, much less attention has been paid to terrorist threats faced inside the United States. With a few notable exceptions (World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, etc.), the United States has been largely immune from terrorism on its soil. A premise of this research project is that the immunity will end in the future, sooner rather than later.

- 0866 **Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998.**
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. 1999. 97pp.
The cowardly and deadly bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 were powerful reminders that the threat of international terrorism still confronts the world. These attacks contributed to a record-high number of casualties during 1998: more than seven hundred people died and almost six thousand were wounded. It is essential that all law-abiding nations redouble their efforts to contain this global threat and save lives. Despite the embassy bombings, the number of international terrorist attacks actually fell again in 1998, continuing a downward trend that began several years ago. There were no acts of international terrorism in the United States last year. This decrease in international terrorism both at home and abroad reflects the diplomatic and law enforcement progress we have made in discrediting terrorist groups and making it harder for them to operate. It also reflects the improved political climate that has diminished terrorist activity in recent years in various parts of the world. The United States is engaged in a long-term effort against international terrorism to protect lives and hold terrorists accountable, using the full range of tools at its disposal, including diplomacy backed by the use of force when necessary, as well as law enforcement and economic measures. The United States has developed a counterterrorism policy that has served it well over the years and was advanced aggressively during 1998.
- 0963 **Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. Testing Status and Views on Operational Viability of Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Technology.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, General Government Division, Washington, D.C. April 1999. 19pp.
In recent years, the federal government has spent considerable sums to develop technologies capable of detecting explosives and narcotics. Along with X-ray and other nonintrusive inspection systems, one type of technology under development is a pulsed fast neutron analysis inspection system, which is designed to automatically detect and measure the presence of specific substances, such as cocaine, by exposing their constituent chemical elements to short bursts of subatomic particles called neutrons. This report discusses (1) the status of plans for field testing a pulsed fast neutron analysis inspection system for counterterrorism and counterdrug purposes and (2) the views of federal agencies and vendors on the operational viability of such a system.
- 0982 **Terrorism Incident Annex. Federal Response Plan.**
U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, Environmental Protection Agency, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, [Washington, D.C.]. April 1999. 16pp.
The Federal Response Plan—the mechanism by which FEMA coordinates federal disaster relief support to states and localities—and its Terrorism Incident Annex provide the context and framework for DoD and army roles in responses to WMD terrorism. These documents establish the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of various federal players in response to a catastrophic terrorist incident. The Terrorism Incident Annex envisions a possible flow from “crisis management” activities to “consequence management” activities in acts of WMD terrorism. Crisis

management is defined by the FBI as “measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.” Consequence management is defined by FEMA as “measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.” Most of the responsibility for public safety in the event of chemical or biological terrorism lies with HHS, which develops its own plan that may include threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, epidemiological investigation, hazard detection and reduction, decontamination, public health support, medical support, and pharmaceutical support operations.

Reel 5

- 0001 **1999 cont.**
Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Lansing E. Dickinson. April 1999. 73pp.
Terrorist use of WMD threatens Americans and our armed forces every day. The only means to counter the United States for many nations and groups are nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The terrorist use of WMD is no longer a question of “if” they will be used but “when” they will be used. This paper examines the U.S. military capability to counter terrorist use of WMD.
- 0074 **Conflict in the 21st Century: Counterstrategies for the WMD Terrorist.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Linda E. Torrens. April 1999. 52pp.
For years, the U.S. military has prepared to fight against opponents armed with nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities. These WMD in the hands of traditional, state actors have been at the forefront of U.S. defense planning. This paper examines the WMD terrorist threat and addresses counterstrategies for reducing the risk. Conclusions include a need for heightened awareness of the threat. Recommendations include strengthening domestic and international controls and legal structures regarding WMD materials, using diplomatic pressure and economic means to deter or reduce the likelihood of WMD terrorism, and improving defensive and responsive capabilities.
- 0126 **The Prospects for International Terrorist Groups Employing Chemical Weapons.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Danny W. Webb. April 1999. 58pp.
There has been much discussion and debate among security analysts, scholars, and politicians about the possible use of WMD. This paper examines the prospects for international terrorist groups employing chemical weapons. Specifically, it argues that terrorists have the capabilities to employ chemical weapons but will be constrained from using them.

- 0184 **Radiological Weapons of Terror.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Scott M. Nicholson and Darren D. Medlin. April 1999. 62pp.
Recent presidential speeches have highlighted the threat posed by chemical and biological terrorism, but what about the first leg of the NBC triad? This paper examines the potential threat to U.S. interests from radiological weapons of terror, including both nuclear weapons and radiological dispersion devices (RDDs), devices that intentionally use radiation to harm. The paper concludes that a radiological terrorist attack will probably occur in the future and offers some recommendations for dealing with this eventuality.
- 0246 **The Scourge of Terrorism: Theater of Conflict Moves to Africa.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Matthew S. Chuma. April 1, 1999. 36pp.
In the late 1980s, most of the people of Africa associated terrorism with the PLO, IRA, and "Carlos the Jackal," the legendary hero of most terrorists. Africans were least concerned with what they perceived as Palestinian-Israeli-European-American conflict. Beginning with the hijacking of a Lufthansa flight from Greece to Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976, followed by the revengeful bombing of Nairobi's Norfolk Hotel on December 3, 1976, and most recently with the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, terrorists have finally shifted their theater of war to Africa. The aim of this paper is to critically analyze the term terrorism as viewed by a cross section of the international community.
- 0282 **DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.**
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. April 13, 1999. 29pp.
This directive changes the name of the DoD Combating Terrorism Program to the DoD AT/FP Program; establishes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal adviser and focal point responsible to the secretary of defense for DoD AT/FP issues; and defines the AT/FP responsibilities of the military departments, combatant commanders in chief, and defense agencies for DoD activities in their respective organizations.
- 0311 **Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: A Template for Healthcare Facilities.**
APIC Bioterrorism Task Force. CDC Hospital Infections Program Bioterrorism Working Group. Judith F. English, Mae Y. Cundiff, John D. Malone, Jeanne A. Pfeiffer, Michael Bell, Lynn Steele, and J. Michael Miller. April 13, 1999. 34pp.
The Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC) recognizes the importance of awareness and preparation for bioterrorism on the part of healthcare facilities. In cooperation with the CDC, APIC offers this Bioterrorism Readiness Plan to serve as a reference document and initial template to facilitate preparation of bioterrorism readiness plans for individual institutions.
- 0345 **Combating Terrorism. Use of National Guard Response Teams is Unclear.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. May 1999. 48pp.
DoD recently approved the creation of ten National Guard response teams to help state and local authorities deal with terrorist attacks involving WMD. GAO found differing views on the role and use of these response teams and their place in state and federal plans to respond to WMD. Army officials believe that the teams can be

a valuable asset to federal authorities. They also believe that the teams will be a critical part of the state and local response. Officials with the FBI and FEMA, which are responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist attacks, do not see a role for the teams in the federal response, however. Instead, they foresee the National Guard providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Many state, local, and federal groups can do the work that the teams would perform. For example, more than six hundred state and local hazardous materials teams in the United States deal with incidents involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. GAO's discussions with state, local, and federal officials and its own analysis finds several concerns that can affect the teams' abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities. These concerns center on recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. This testimony summarizes GAO's June 1999 report.

0393 **Combating Terrorism. Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. May 1999. 26pp.

During the past three years, federal agencies have conducted several successful interagency operations overseas, including some in which suspected terrorists have been returned to the United States to stand trial. Some agencies have also deployed personnel and equipment to prepare for special events, such as the Atlanta Olympic Games. Federal agencies have not completed interagency guidance or resolved command and control issues, however. To improve their response to terrorist attacks, federal agencies have conducted more than two hundred exercises, half of which included three or more federal agencies. Agencies' operations mentioned in this report include DoD, DOE, FBI, FEMA, and others. Establishing a process to record the lessons learned from counterterrorism operations and exercises would be beneficial and could improve future efforts.

0419 **Vital Interests, Virtual Threats: Reconciling International Law with Information Warfare and United States Security.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Karl J. Shawhan. May 1999. 96pp.

The dominance of the U.S. military means that traditional threats, short of WMD, currently pose little risk to U.S. sovereignty. Nontraditional threats, however, pose asymmetric dilemmas for the United States. The increased U.S. military and economic reliance on information systems introduces new vulnerabilities not adequately protected by traditional kinetic force arms. Additionally, international law does not adequately provide response mechanisms for the United States in case of a computer network attack. The United States needs to establish policy directives and diplomatic initiatives to secure its information sovereignty for the future. This thesis examines the history of technology and sovereignty, which reveals a model for the evolution of international law.

0515 **Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism.**

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; Director of Central Intelligence, Langley, Virginia; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. May 1999. 14pp.

The report includes information on the latest technology, capabilities, shortfalls, and inferred vulnerabilities of U.S. counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts for the potential proliferant or terrorist. Organizationally, the deputy secretary of defense has been designated by the secretary of defense to perform the duties of CPRC chairman, and the assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear and chemical and biological defense programs has been designated by Congress as CPRC executive secretary. The CPRC Standing Committee, established in 1996, meets regularly and is actively working to perform the duties and implement the recommendations of the CPRC.

0529 **Special Report. How Terrorism Ends.**

United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. May 25, 1999. 11pp.

In an attempt to better understand what governmental actions can hasten the end of political violence, on April 12, 1999, the United States Institute of Peace, together with the British-based Airey Neave Trust, convened a working group meeting on the subject "How Terrorism Ends." The workshop began with an overview of the problem followed by three case studies: the IRA, the PLO, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

0540 **Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc?**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Anthony H. Cordesman. May 31, 1999. 231pp.

There is no doubt that the Middle East can present significant potential threats to the West. The author of this monograph examines these threats in order to put them into perspective—to distinguish between "crying wolf" and "crying havoc." After thorough analysis, he contends that the problems caused by narcotics and organized crime, immigration, terrorism, and WMD do not as yet require draconian action by the Western nations. He asserts, however, that if the threats of Middle Eastern terrorism and proliferation were to be combined into super-terrorism, the result would create a new form of asymmetric warfare, for which the West is singularly ill-prepared.

0771 **United States Air Force Security Forces in an Era of Terrorist Threats.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Michael D. Bean. June 1999. 74pp.

While the U.S. Air Force must still support national security objectives around the globe, it now must rely more upon temporary basing to augment the decreased permanent presence overseas. Temporary bases provide the commander with the ability to accomplish a given mission but can also increase vulnerability to terrorist attack. On June 25, 1996, one terrorist bomb, which killed nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, once again leveled the military playing field for U.S. adversaries and the perception of U.S. power. The air force quickly realized that its security force was not adequately trained or equipped to protect deployed

assets from such attacks. This study examines the role of air force security in the present terrorist threat environment.

- 0845 **Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study.**
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs–Bureau of Justice Assistance, Washington, D.C. and Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Academy, Emmitsburg, Maryland. June 1999. 109pp.
Designed by the Office of Justice Programs–Bureau of Justice Assistance and the U.S. Fire Administration–National Fire Academy, this ten-hour self-paced course is designed to provide the basic awareness training to prepare first responders to respond to incidents of terrorism safely and effectively. Students who successfully complete the exam will be eligible for a National Fire Academy certificate of training. The audience for this self-study includes fire, emergency medical, hazmat, incident command, and law enforcement responders.
- 0954 **Combating Terrorism. Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. June 1999. 57pp.
Terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and abroad underscore the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. U.S. policy and implementation guidelines call for robust, tailored, and rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct well-coordinated and highly integrated operations. Federal agencies enhance their ability to respond to terrorist attacks by conducting exercises that train key personnel and test response teams. GAO recently briefed congressional staff on the numbers, the scenarios, and the participants involved in federal counterterrorism exercises done from June 1995 to June 1998. This report summarizes those briefings.

Reel 6

- 0001 **1999 cont.**
Combating Terrorism. Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs.
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. June 1999. 24pp.
The DoD and others are authorized to provide training, equipment, and advice to civilian emergency response personnel to help them respond to a possible terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. GAO reported last year that some local jurisdictions were buying equipment without the benefit of formal threat and risk assessments based on valid threat data. In the absence of defined requirements, this report determines the potential cost of equipping and maintaining the capability of cities to respond to a terrorist incident involving WMD. GAO (1) provides the views of federal, state, and local officials on equipment that they believed would be needed to respond to such an incident and (2) determines the potential procurement and sustainment costs of these items.

- 0025 **Responding to the Threat of Cyberterrorism Through Information Assurance.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Joel G. Ogren and James R. Langevin. June 1999. 89pp.

The number of people connecting to the Internet is growing at an astounding rate: estimates range from 100 percent to 400 percent over the next five years. This unprecedented level of interconnectedness has brought with it the specter of a new threat: cyberterrorism. This thesis examines the impact of this threat on the critical infrastructure of the United States, specifically focusing on DoD issues and the national information infrastructure.

- 0114 **Combating Terrorism. Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Mark E. Gebicke. June 9, 1999. 19pp.

The president's budget request for fiscal year 2000 includes about \$10 billion to combat terrorism. About \$1.4 billion of that amount was earmarked for dealing with WMD, according to the OMB. This testimony focuses on three issues. First, GAO briefly describes the foreign- and domestic-origin terrorism threats, as it understands them from intelligence analyses, and discusses issues surrounding the emerging threat of terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Second, GAO discusses the growth in federal programs to train and equip local "first responders"—police, fire, and emergency medical services—and the expansion of federal response teams to deal with terrorist attacks involving WMD. Finally, GAO discusses efforts to better manage the federal response to terrorism and opportunities for additional focus and direction.

- 0133 **Combating Terrorism. Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Mark E. Gebicke. June 23, 1999. 14pp.

The DoD recently approved the creation of ten National Guard response teams to help state and local authorities deal with terrorist attacks involving WMD. GAO found differing views on the role and the use of these response teams and their place in state and federal plans to respond to WMD. Army officials believe that the teams can be a valuable asset to federal authorities. Officials with the FBI and FEMA, which are responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist attacks, do not see a role for the teams in the federal response, however. Instead, they foresee the National Guard providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Many state, local, and federal groups can do the work that the teams would perform. This testimony summarizes GAO's June 1999 report.

- 0147 **Emerging Infectious Diseases. Tracking Trends and Analyzing New and Emerging Infectious Disease Issues Around the World.**

National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. July–August 1999. 117pp.

On February 16–17, 1999, in Arlington, Virginia, 950 public health officials, physicians, and other medical personnel, along with government, military, and intelligence experts, gathered for the first National Symposium on Medical and Public Health Response to Bioterrorism.

0264 **Chemical and Biological Defense. Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. August 1999. 17pp.

Since the Persian Gulf War, Congress has raised concerns about the adequacy of the technology used by the military to detect, identify, prepare for, and protect troops against chemical and biological weapons. Federal research and development efforts to produce nonmedical chemical and biological defense technology have expanded considerably in recent years. President Clinton's fiscal year 2000 budget request includes more than \$10 billion to combat terrorism, according to the White House. Nearly \$1.4 billion is earmarked for programs targeting terrorist threats from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons—an amount that exceeds the funding for military programs to counter chemical and biological threats. This report examines the coordination of federal research and development efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to chemical and biological defense. GAO identifies federal programs that conduct nonmedical chemical and biological defense-related research and development and describes the existing mechanisms for coordinating these programs.

0281 **Information Assurance and Information Technology: Training, Certification, and Personnel Management in the Department of Defense.**

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. August 27, 1999. 142pp.

The DoD's war fighting capability and the security of its information infrastructure are at great risk from attacks by foreign intelligence organizations, cyberterrorists, and the incompetence of some of its own users. Just as dangerous is the shortage of adequately trained and managed IT professionals, particularly in the area of information assurance (IA). The shortage of trained technicians is also critical in other parts of the public sector and in the private sector as well. In 1998, the deputy director of defense tasked the assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence and the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness to establish an Information Technology and Information Assurance Human Resources Integrated Process Team. In less than six months, the team developed a set of recommendations, projected results if the recommendations were implemented, cost estimates, and a five-year time line.

0423 **The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?**

Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Washington, D.C. Rex A. Hudson. September 1999. 149pp.

This study focuses on the types of individuals and groups that are prone to terrorism, in an effort to improve U.S. counterterrorist methods and policies. The emergence of amorphous and largely unknown terrorist individuals and groups operating independently (freelancers) and the new recruitment patterns of some groups, which recruit suicide commandos, female and child terrorists, and scientists capable of developing WMD, provide a measure of urgency to increasing our understanding of the psychological and sociological dynamics of terrorist groups and individuals. The approach used in this study is twofold. First, the study examines the relevant literature and assesses the current knowledge of the subject. Second, the study seeks to develop psychological and sociological profiles of

terrorist individuals and selected groups to use as case studies in assessing trends, motivations, and actions that might deter such behavior, as well as reveal vulnerabilities that would aid in combating terrorist groups and individuals.

0572 **Combating Terrorism. Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. September 1999. 35pp.

Since the Persian Gulf War, Congress has raised concerns about the adequacy of the technology used by the military to detect, identify, prepare for, and protect troops against chemical and biological weapons. Federal research and development efforts to produce nonmedical chemical and biological defense technology have expanded considerably in recent years. The president's fiscal year 2000 budget request includes more than \$10 billion to combat terrorism, according to the White House. Nearly \$1.4 billion is earmarked for programs targeting terrorist threats from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons—an amount that exceeds the funding for military programs to counter chemical and biological threats. This report examines the coordination of federal research and development efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to chemical and biological defense. GAO identifies federal programs that conduct nonmedical chemical and biological defense-related research and development and describes the existing mechanisms for coordinating these programs.

0607 **The Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Lansing E. Dickinson. September 1999. 60pp.

Terrorist use of WMD threatens Americans and U.S. armed forces every day. The only means to counter the United States for many nations and groups is with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Terrorist use of WMD is no longer a question of "if" they will be used but "when" they will be used. This paper examines the U.S. military capability to counter terrorist use of WMD.

0667 **Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Dianne Leigh Sumner. September 1999. 101pp.

Russia militarily invaded Chechnya in December 1994 expecting to easily suppress the separatist uprising in the region. The Russian army was unprepared and had greatly underestimated the Chechen forces under the command of former Soviet Air Force General Jokhar Dudayev and his motivated field commanders with recent war experience in Afghanistan, Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan. When Russian forces began to gain a decided advantage (due to overwhelming firepower and numeric superiority) between February and June of 1995 and began to attack the last Chechen strongholds deep in the southern mountains, Chechen tactics changed. The June hostage raid, led by Chechen Commander Shamil Basayev, against Russian civilians in the town of Budennovsk marked the beginning of a successful campaign of terrorism by Chechen combatants that had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. The Budennovsk episode, which resulted in a short-lived cease-fire, was followed by a series of more varied terrorist attacks between June 1995 and January 1996. These attacks were successful in swaying public opinion

against the war effort, created widespread fear among the Russian population well beyond the borders of Chechnya, and ultimately led to Chechnya's victory over Russia.

0768

Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.

United Nations, New York, New York. September 3, 1999. 27pp.

This report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 50/53 of December 11, 1995, entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism." Items include data on the status and implementation of existing multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements relating to international terrorism, including information on incidents caused by international terrorism and criminal prosecutions and sentencing, based on information received from the depositaries of those agreements and from member states; national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, based on information received from member states; international legal instruments relating to international terrorism, to assist states in identifying aspects of this matter that have not been covered by such instruments and could be addressed to develop further a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism; and possibilities within the UN system for assisting states in organizing workshops and training courses on combating crimes connected with international terrorism. Sections II, III, and IV of the present report contain information about measures taken at the national and international levels, based on materials transmitted by governments and the international organizations and other bodies. Section V deals with the matter of publishing a compendium of national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

0795

Counter-Terrorism: National Priorities and the Federal Plan of Action.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. Ken Stroeck. September 22, 1999. 70pp.

This report of the 1999 Region III Chemical Emergency Preparedness & Prevention Conference concerns the CT timeline of the national CT Program in the DPP. CT activities of the DOJ/FBI, FEMA, HHS, DoD, DoE, and EPA are reviewed. Recommendations are established in the report. Lists of available grant programs under the NLD Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (1996), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (1995) include crisis management and consequence management activities.

0865

Combating Terrorism. Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Washington, D.C. October 1999. 27pp.

The ability of the United States to effectively respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological weapons is compromised by poor management controls and the lack of items on a list of required inventory. For example, GAO's review of stockpiles maintained by the Veterans Affairs Department (VA) found overages and shortages of more than 12 percent within this list. The underlying cause of these problems is federal agency lag in implementing basic internal controls to help ensure that all medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are current, accounted for,

and ready for use. The stakes will be even higher in the future as the CDC establishes the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program, which will set aside large quantities of antidotes and other medical supplies to be used in the event of domestic chemical and biological attacks. Although CDC is still in the early stages of developing this program, its current plan lacks comprehensive internal controls that would prevent the types of problems that GAO found at other agencies.

0892 **Food Safety. Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. October 1999. 11pp.

Are federal food safety regulatory agencies prepared to respond to acts or threats of deliberate food contamination, including those by terrorists? The agencies primarily responsible are the Food Safety and Inspection Service and the Food and Drug Administration. Deliberate contamination of food with a biological agent has rarely occurred in the United States. GAO identified two acts since 1984, however, which produced short-term illnesses among more than 750 people but no deaths. In addition, from 1995 through 1999, the federal agencies reported three threats—two were hoaxes and the other is still under investigation. This report describes the plans and procedures that federal agencies have in place to cope with threats and acts of deliberate food contamination with a biological agent.

0903 **An Analytical Framework for the Study of Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare.**

Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, Kjeller, Norway. Lia Brynjar and Annika S. Hansen. October 3, 1999. 49pp.

This study outlines a theoretical framework for the study of terrorism and asymmetric threats. It identifies key research issues and presents a general model of analysis. Recognizing the need to analyze both the changing context and new trends, this study focuses on the following areas: globalization and its implementations for the context in which terrorism develops; new patterns of terrorism, including new motivations and an increased willingness to employ new means, such as WMD; and the possible implications of the use of force in international PSOs (peace operation exercises) and the future role of NATO in combating asymmetric threats.

0952 **Human Rights and Terrorism.**

United Nations, New York, New York. October 6, 1999. 2pp.

This report of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan concerns fifty-fourth session agenda item 116(b): human rights questions including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the secretary-general to seek the views of member states on the implications of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, for the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and to submit a report on the subject to the assembly at its fifty-fourth session. The present report, submitted pursuant to the above-mentioned request, indicates, in summary fashion, the content of the replies received from the governments that responded to a note verbale dated August 16, 1999, namely, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Nepal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

0954

Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. October 8, 1999. 36pp.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright designated twenty-eight organizations as foreign terrorist organizations. Of these, twenty-seven were redesignations, organizations placed on the list two years ago and remaining on the list. Redesignation is a positive act and represents a decision by the secretary of state that the organization still meets the criteria specified in law. In the absence of action by the secretary, the organization would be removed from the list. Three organizations were dropped from the list because they no longer meet the criteria. One organization was added to the list because it now meets the criteria. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 authorizes the secretary of state to make these designations every two years. The secretary of state may add organizations to the list at any time. Al-Qaida, led by Osama bin Ladin, was added because it is responsible for several major terrorist attacks, including the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.

0990

Combating Terrorism. Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism.

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Henry L. Hinton Jr. October 20, 1999. 8pp.

Without substantial backing from a state sponsor, most terrorists would have to overcome significant technical hurdles to produce and release chemical and biological weapons capable of killing or injuring large numbers of people. According to experts GAO consulted, except for toxic industrial chemicals, such as chlorine, specialized knowledge is needed in the manufacturing process and in improvising an effective delivery system for most chemical and nearly all biological weapons. Moreover, some of the components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of biological agents are difficult to obtain. Finally, terrorists would face other obstacles in carrying out a successful attack, from unfavorable weather conditions to personal safety risks. The president's fiscal year 2000 budget proposes \$10 billion for counterterrorism programs—an increase of more than \$3 billion over the amount requested for fiscal year 1999. To determine whether the government is spending enough on counterterrorism and spending this money on the most appropriate programs, policy makers need the best estimates of the specific threats facing the United States. The intelligence community has recently produced estimates of terrorist threats from abroad involving chemical and biological weapons. GAO recommends that the FBI prepare comparable estimates for domestic threats.

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- 0001 **1999 cont.**
Report of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to the General Assembly.
Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, Miami, Florida. November 19, 1999. 45pp.
Through resolution “Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism,” the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth regular session, created CICTE and approved the CICTE Statute. It also requested that the Permanent Council make the necessary arrangements to hold the first regular session of CICTE during the second half of 1999 and accepted the offer by the U.S. government to host that meeting in Miami, Florida.
- 0046 **Cyberterror. Prospects and Implications.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Bill Nelson, Rodney Choi, Michael Iacobucci, Mark Mitchell, and Greg Gagnon. December 1999. 141pp.
This white paper begins the process of articulating the demand side of cyberterror. In so doing, it provides some guidance for setting intelligence-gathering strategy. Armed with useful hypotheses about the conditions under which terrorists might seek to acquire or develop their capabilities for mass disruption, the intelligence community may be able to provide at least some degree of early warning of this emerging threat. Based on the analysis that forms another part of this study, cyberterror is at best only an emerging threat, one far less dire than is suggested by others’ assessments of this phenomenon.
- 0187 **Military Responses to State-Sponsored Terrorism: Re-thinking Deterrence and Coercion Theory.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Timothy E. Bellon. December 1999. 178pp.
The face of conflict is changing. The breakup of the former Soviet Union has changed the balance of power from a bipolar world to a unipolar one. This change in the world’s power structure has presented the United States with new challenges. The purpose of this thesis is to explore one of these challenges, state-sponsored terrorism, and the range of military responses that might be used to deter states from sponsoring terrorism or coercing states into ceasing their sponsorship. This thesis uses conventional deterrence and coercion theory, as well as comparative case studies, to analyze the utility of deterrence and coercion against state-sponsored terrorism. In doing so, a framework that can be applied to state sponsors of terrorism was developed to determine if a strategy of deterrence or coercion could alter a state’s behavior. The findings of this thesis suggest that a determined coercive strategy is more likely to work against state-sponsored terrorism than a strategy of deterrence. Finally, the thesis provides a model, a taxonomy of coercion that recommends using lethal and nonlethal options in overt and covert operations as the means to modify the behavior of states that sponsor terrorism.

- 0365 **Flexibility of the Incident Command System to Respond to Domestic Terrorism.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Gerald T. Favero. December 1999. 71pp.
This thesis argues that the current Incident Command System (ICS) is inadequate for activating the National Guard Military Support Detachment—Rapid Assessment Initial Detection (RAID) Teams, which are vital for responding to domestic terrorism. The current ICS does not allow first responders to contact National Guard units directly during a WMD incident. First responders must send a request via their Emergency Operation Center (EOC), through the state Emergency Management Division, to the state governor’s office for approval. The governor can then activate the National Guard to respond to the incident. This process is unnecessarily time-consuming. Serious jurisdictional issues and “turf wars” may emerge between first responders and RAID teams, at precisely the time when close coordination is most necessary. RAID teams should be recognized as operational units and given the ability to initiate their response plan upon receipt of an alert from the local EOC. With the approval of the RAID team’s higher headquarters they may then deploy. Appendix A provides a guide to suggested changes in existing regulations. This thesis also proposes changes in education and training that should help alleviate other problems associated with rapid response, including the risk of jurisdictional conflicts and “Good Samaritan” casualties.
- 0436 **U.S. Terrorism Policy Towards Sudan: Blinded by Islamic Fundamentalism.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Robert A. Harris. December 1999. 70pp.
Sudan is currently ruled by a government put in place by a 1989 military coup, which overthrew a democratically elected government. The United States considers Sudan an Islamic fundamentalist regime because National Islamic Front members hold key positions in the government. In 1993 the United States imposed unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against Sudan for allegedly harboring terrorist organizations. This thesis assesses U.S. policy toward Sudan with respect to terrorism. It reviews current policies and argues that key strategic interests are being neglected. The United States tends to equate Islamic fundamentalism with its more radical element terrorism, which significantly influences U.S. policy toward Sudan. Currently the terrorism policy of the United States is based on countering state-sponsored terrorism while the more significant threat is from a new breed of well-funded terrorists who operate independently of states. Instead of isolating Sudan for harboring such individuals, the United States should take advantage of Sudan’s influence with loosely knit Islamic groups. America’s inability to effectively deal with the evolving terrorism threat, as reflected in its policy toward Sudan, represents a serious vacuum in its ability to provide for its national security.
- 0506 **First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.**
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, [Washington, D.C.]. December 15, 1999. 122pp.
Many government officials and concerned citizens believe that “it is not a question of *if*, but *when*” an incident will occur that involves the use by a terrorist of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon—a so-called

WMD—that is designed, is intended, or has the capability to cause “mass destruction” or “mass casualties.” In recent years, some have depicted terrorist incidents causing catastrophic loss of life and extensive structural and environmental damage as not only possible but probable. Such depictions do not accurately portray the full range of terrorist threats. While such a devastating event is within the realm of possibility, the first annual report to the president and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction delves into a broad range of issues, chronicles actual terrorist attacks, considers potential terrorist incidents, and attempts to answer the fundamental questions of who, what, and why, and accordingly begins to consider what must be done to prepare for the when.

0628 **Terrorism in the United States 1999.**

U.S. Department of Justice, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Counterterrorism Division, Washington, D.C. 1999. 68pp.

This special retrospective issue of *Terrorism in the United States* provides both a summary of terrorism-related activity in 1999 and a broad overview of U.S.-based terrorism during the past three decades. It discusses notable cases, trends, emerging threats, and the development of the FBI response to terrorism during the past thirty years. Appendices summarize terrorist incidents in the United States during the past decade and provide background information on currently designated foreign terrorist organizations and terrorist renditions (1987–1999), as well as a series of graphs depicting terrorist-related activity in the United States during the past two decades. The year 1999 was marked by an increasing focus on the threat of terrorism in the United States.

0696 **Project MEGIDDO.**

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. 1999. 32pp.

For over four thousand years, Megiddo, a hill in northern Israel, has been the site of many battles. Ancient cities were established there to serve as a fortress on the plain of Jezreel to guard a mountain pass. As Megiddo was built and rebuilt, one city upon the other, a mound or hill was formed. The Hebrew word “Armageddon” means “hill of Megiddo.” In English, the word has come to represent battle itself. The last book in the New Testament of the Bible designates Armageddon as the assembly point in the apocalyptic setting of God’s final and conclusive battle against evil. The name “Megiddo” is an apt title for a project that analyzes those who believe the year 2000 will usher in the end of the world and who are willing to perpetrate acts of violence to bring that end about.

0728 **Blueprint for the National Domestic Preparedness Office.**

National Domestic Preparedness Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 1999. 37pp.

In the first minutes following a terrorist incident involving WMD, the critical response will come from the state and local first responder communities. These first minutes can mean the difference between life and death. Federal agencies recognize that the response to bioterrorism will be qualitatively different from a chemical event and will first and foremost involve the public health and medical communities. While certain jurisdictions are currently well trained and equipped to respond to a WMD incident, others are not. The nation’s capability to respond to a WMD act of

terrorism will depend on the smallest as well as the largest cities possessing essential plans, training, and equipment. An effective response will require coordinated planning, training, equipping, and exercising on the part of all agencies involved, federal, state, and local. This document puts forth a “blueprint” for the National Domestic Preparedness Office—a single coordinating office and information clearinghouse for federal assistance programs—to better prepare state and local officials to respond to WMD acts of terrorism within the United States.

2000

0765

Guidelines for Mass Casualty Decontamination During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident.

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. William A. Lake, Paul D. Fedele, and Stephen M. Marshall. January 2000. 56pp.

The fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 104-201, September 23, 1996), commonly called the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, funded the U.S. Domestic Preparedness initiative. Under this initiative, the DoD was charged with enhancing the capability of federal, state, and local emergency responders in incidents involving nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. The U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, was assigned the mission of developing an Improved Response Program (IRP) to identify problems and develop solutions to the tasks associated with responding to such incidents. The Chemical IRP was established to deal specifically with terrorists using chemical weapons. A Mass Casualty Decontamination Research Team (MCDRT) was formed by SBCCOM under the Chemical IRP in February 1998 to address specific technical and operational issues associated with the performance of mass casualty decontamination after a terrorist incident involving chemical WMD.

0821

Compendium of Weapons of Mass Destruction Courses Sponsored by the Federal Government.

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. 2000. 136pp.

This compendium of courses was compiled to inform state and local agencies of federal training that is available in the area of WMD. These courses are all available to state and local responders. Terrorist incidents involving WMD pose a growing threat to the security of the United States. The training program is intended to “train the trainers” and to be in the form of modules, which can be tailored to meet the specific training needs of individual cities and can be readily integrated into the existing emergency responder training programs at the state and local level.

0957

Contagious Disease Dynamics for Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism Casualty Assessments.

Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. John N. Bombardt Jr. February 2000. 39pp.

This investigation focuses on the spread of a contagious disease subsequent to the military employment of a biological weapon or an act of bioterrorism. Of particular interest are expected or average time histories of four cohorts: susceptible individuals, exposed and infected (incubating) individuals, infectious (contagious) individuals, and removed (noncontagious, alive, or dead) individuals. The objective

SEIR curves characterize health care and mortuary service needs as functions of time for a known disease, for given initial conditions, and for an average time-varying rate of disease transmission. Such a disease transmission rate is a key predictive tool and is obtainable from a Monte Carlo analysis of historical outbreak data. Recently published epidemiological data for the 1995 Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreak in Kitwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, serves as an excellent vehicle to demonstrate the overall semi-empirical SEIR model.

0996

Military Threats and Security Challenges Through 2015.

Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Thomas R. Wilson. February 2, 2000. 25pp.

This report to Congress was made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The dynamic change and uncertainty that characterized the 1990s will likely continue through 2015 because the basic engines of turmoil remain largely in place. The volatile mix of global political, economic, social, technological, and military conditions will continue to bring great stress to the international order. While no Soviet-like military competitor will emerge during this timeframe, the combined impact of numerous local, regional, and transnational challenges presents a formidable obstacle to our strategic vision. Most adversaries will attempt to avoid directly confronting the U.S. military on our terms, choosing instead to pursue a variety of asymmetric means that undermine our power, leadership, and influence. Strategic nuclear threats will endure through this timeframe, but the mix of adversary strategic doctrines and capabilities will complicate deterrence planning. China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq will maintain relatively large and well-equipped militaries, which could pose a significant challenge under the right operational conditions.

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2000 cont.

Combating Terrorism. Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training.

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. March 2000. 45pp.

The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 and the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, along with the release of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway in 1995, have heightened concerns about terrorism in the United States. Local emergency responders, such as firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical personnel, will be the first to respond to a terrorist incident. DoD, DOJ, and FEMA are the principal federal organizations that provide WMD training to these first responders. Federal training programs on WMD are poorly coordinated, resulting in inefficiencies in the federal effort and concerns in the first responder communities. Efforts are underway to improve the federal government's role in WMD training, but actions are needed to eliminate duplicative training and improve the efficiency of programs offered by DoD and DOJ.

- 0046 **State Department. Overseas Emergency Security Program Progressing, But Costs Are Increasing.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Benjamin F. Nelson. March 2000. 22pp.
In the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, Congress provided the State Department with \$1.5 billion in emergency supplemental funding to strengthen security worldwide. GAO found that State has made progress in implementing the program funded by the emergency supplemental appropriation. State has reestablished embassy operations in interim office buildings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and signed a contract to build new embassy compounds. Projects to relocate several other embassies and consulates are also underway. The costs to build new embassies in Uganda, Croatia, and Qatar are about \$45 million higher than originally estimated, however, mainly because of upgraded security requirements. State has also made progress in implementing many of its planned security upgrades, including enhancing vehicle inspection and security guard programs, hiring additional special agents and other security staff, and instituting a new surveillance detection program designed to identify hostile surveillance activities and potential attackers. Major construction upgrades to strengthen security at more than one hundred posts are over budget and behind schedule, however, according to State.
- 0068 **State Department. Progress and Challenges in Addressing Management Issues.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Benjamin F. Nelson. March 8, 2000. 12pp.
The State Department—the lead agency for advancing and protecting U.S. interests abroad—maintains a worldwide network of operations at more than 250 locations overseas to support its mission and those of thirty-five other U.S. agencies. A substantial share of the department’s \$3 billion annual budget goes to support these operations, which range from providing security for more than fifty thousand State Department and other U.S. agency personnel to finding suitable housing for American employees and their families. This testimony focuses on the management challenges that State faces in improving its operations in the following four areas: improving the security of U.S. personnel and facilities overseas in a cost-effective and timely manner, determining the right size and location of the U.S. overseas presence to improve the efficiency of operations, upgrading information and financial management systems to further strengthen communications and accountability, and improving performance planning to better achieve mission objectives.
- 0080 **Combating Terrorism. Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies are Poorly Managed.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Washington, D.C. Cynthia A. Bascetta. March 8, 2000. 4pp.
This testimony draws on a recent GAO report on the management of federal medical stockpiles that would be used to treat civilians in a chemical or biological terrorist attack. GAO highlights the problems that it found with the management of the stockpiles, discusses the results of its actual count of stockpiled supplies, and provides information on the progress made since GAO’s last report was issued.

- 0084 **Combating Biological Terrorism: Is Department of Defense Prepared to Support U.S. Government Interagency Quarantine Operations.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Michael E. Stout. March 17, 2000. 24pp.
The threat of biological terrorism, long ignored and denied, has heightened over the past few years as illustrated by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in the Tokyo subway system. Many experts in the field of combating terrorism state that it is not “if” but “when” a terrorist will detonate a biological weapon in the United States. If this is the case, is DoD prepared to support the U.S. government’s interagency effort to establish, maintain, and enforce a quarantine operation? Specifically, is current DoD doctrine, policy, and interagency infrastructure adequate to respond to an incident of biological terrorism (to support quarantine operations) in a major U.S. metropolitan city?
- 0108 **Chemical and Biological Defense. Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Kwai-Cheung Chan. March 22, 2000. 14pp.
In the 1990s, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings has prompted Congress and federal agencies to launch new programs or expand existing ones to address these threats. Overall funding in these areas has risen significantly since 1996. Today, several civilian and military agencies are conducting research and development to counter these threats. Without effective coordination among the different agencies, however, their efforts might be unnecessarily duplicated and important questions may be overlooked. This testimony identifies similarities among nonmedical research and development programs and explains how coordination mechanisms could effectively address potential duplication, research gaps, and opportunities for collaboration. GAO focuses on the following four programs: (1) DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program, (2) the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Biological Warfare Defense Program, (3) DOE’s Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, and (4) the Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by an interagency working group.
- 0122 **Statement. Department of Defense and Combating Terrorism.**
U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Brian Sheridan. March 24, 2000. 6pp.
This report consists of testimony to provide an update, from a policy and operational perspective, on the way that DoD has organized itself to support the U.S. government’s combating terrorism mission. DoD has made substantial progress, but terrorism will remain a continuing challenge in a volatile and violent world. DoD’s program to combat terrorism is part of a coordinated U.S. government interagency team response.
- 0128 **Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999.**
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. April 2000. 135pp.
The U.S. government continues its commitment to use all tools necessary—including international diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence collection and

sharing, and military force—to counter current terrorist threats and hold terrorists accountable for past actions. Terrorists seek refuge in “swamps,” where government control is weak or governments are sympathetic. The State Department seeks to drain these swamps. Through international and domestic legislation and strengthened law enforcement, the United States seeks to limit the room in which terrorists can move, plan, raise funds, and operate and to eliminate terrorist safe havens, dry up their sources of revenue, break up their cells, disrupt their movements, and criminalize their behavior. The State Department works closely with other countries to increase international political will to limit all aspects of terrorists’ efforts. U.S. counterterrorist policies are tailored to combat what the government believes to be the shifting trends in terrorism.

0263 **Cyberterrorism and Computer Crimes: Issues Surrounding the Establishment of an International Legal Regime.**

USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado. Richard W. Aldrich. April 2000. 89pp.

This paper assesses some of the preliminary legal issues surrounding the establishment of international agreements covering information warfare, information terrorism, and cybercrime. Warfare, terrorism, and crime committed with the use of information systems and tools portend an ominous threat to the increasingly information-based economies of the world’s leading countries. The United States, with its highly networked infrastructure, is perhaps both the most powerful and the most vulnerable. While existing treaties and statutes may be capable of pulling select cybercrimes within their ambit, there is little uniform treatment for these crimes. Thus, a new cybercrime treaty could help provide the basis for criminalizing the vast array of cyber offenses that do not cleanly fit within traditional crimes. A new treaty would also aid extraditions by overcoming the dual criminality problem. Even more importantly, this treaty could establish agreed principles of enforcement jurisdiction to enable law enforcement to more quickly, easily, and legally obtain the evidence necessary for the prosecution of cybercrimes and information terrorism.

0352 **Combating Terrorism. How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. April 2000. 27pp.

The federal government spent about \$10 billion last year to combat terrorism. More than forty federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have a role in fighting terrorism. Some members of Congress have questioned who is in charge of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, how the federal government is organized to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, and how resources are being allocated. This report provides information on how other governments are organized to combat terrorism and how they allocate their resources. GAO focuses on Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom.

0379 **Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism.**

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; Director of Central Intelligence, Langley, Virginia; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. April 2000. 16pp.

Congress established, in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the CPRC to review activities and programs related to countering proliferation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOE, U.S. intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The high-level national commitment to counter proliferation threats is reflected in the CPRC's membership. The CPRC is chartered to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental activities and programs to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC WMD and their means of delivery. In the 1997 NDAA, Congress broadened the CPRC's responsibilities and specified that the CPRC also review activities and programs of the CPRC—represented organizations related to countering paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. The findings and recommendations of the CPRC's annual review for 2000 are presented in this, its seventh annual report to Congress.

0395 **Aum Shinrikyo and Weapons of Mass Destruction. A Case Study.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Neal A. Clinehens. April 2000. 40pp.

Terrorist attacks by domestic groups are a potential threat to the American public. The devastation of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is an example of an effective attack by a domestic group using only conventional weapons. In 1995, the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo set a precedent by conducting an effective domestic terrorist attack using chemical weapons against commuters in the Tokyo subway system. An examination and analysis of the environment in which the cult operated, the cult itself, and the attacks it committed using WMD provides U.S. authorities with lessons they can apply to improve efforts designed to reduce the probability that WMD attacks ever occur on U.S. soil. This paper examines the phenomenon of Aum Shinrikyo. Part 1 presents a general description of the WMD problem that confronts us today, explains the significance of the problem, and outlines the limitations of the study. Part 2 describes the origin, development, and characteristics of Aum Shinrikyo to provide a basis for analysis in following chapters. Part 3 describes several WMD attacks committed by the cult, including the Tokyo subway attack. Part 4 is an analysis of the political and cultural elements affecting the environment in which the cult operated and an examination of specific and relevant characteristics of the cult itself. All combine to contribute to the formulation of detection and prevention efforts designed to identify and preempt domestic WMD threats. Part 5 presents overall conclusions and recommends areas of further research.

0435 **Combating Terrorism. Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Norman J. Rabkin. April 6, 2000. 14pp.

One of the major shortcomings in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the lack of linkage among the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources. Improvements are also needed in intergovernmental relations at the federal, state, and local levels. The reality is that the federal government cannot respond on its

own to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The Gilmore Panel, which issued its first report last year, found many of the same problems that GAO has cited, including the need for (1) more rigorous analyses of the threat, (2) better management of federal programs, (3) stronger coordination with state and local officials, and (4) a national strategy to combat terrorism.

0449 **Aviation Security. Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security System.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. April 6, 2000. 17pp.
This testimony discusses the FAA's efforts to implement and improve security in the air traffic control computer systems and airport passenger screening checkpoint areas. GAO's testimony is based on earlier reports on computer security and on ongoing work in this area. GAO identifies security problems in both the air traffic control computer systems and the performance of checkpoint screeners.

0466 **Should the United States Adopt a More Aggressive Strategy to Combat International Terrorism?**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. R. Bruce Haverty. April 10, 2000. 46pp.
This paper examines whether or not the United States should adopt a more aggressive strategy to combat international terrorism. Although the United States has been virtually immune from international terrorist attacks on the homeland, the recent attack on the USS *Cole* and the 1998 American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania have served as stark reminders that terrorism is a very real threat to U.S. citizens at home and abroad. This paper highlights the level of public concern over the terrorist threat and examines past terrorist attack trends against U.S. interests. The paper then discusses possible reasons terrorists attack U.S. interests. Given the terrorist attack trends and possible reasons terrorists attack U.S. interests, the paper offers a critique of the current U.S. policy for combating terrorism and concludes that the United States is not using all the means available to it to combat terrorism and should adopt more proactive policy options.

0512 **Terrorism in Turkey.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Yuksel Oztekin. April 17, 2000. 31pp.
Turkey has been fighting against the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) since 1985. The purpose of this study is to define the PKK, to explain origin of the Kurdish citizen, to define differences between the PKK and the Kurdish citizen and to examine solutions to this problem within the frame of democratic rule.

0543 **Department of Justice Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet.**
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. April 18, 2000. 49pp.
On August 5, 1999, the president signed into law the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act. This legislation requires the president to announce on or before August 5, 2000, regulations concerning public access to information describing the worst possible impact that the release of toxic or flammable chemicals from a facility could have on the nearby populace and

environment. This data, called off-site consequence analysis (OCA) information, is contained in risk management plans (RMPs). Approximately fifteen thousand chemical facilities throughout the United States have submitted RMPs to the EPA. The statute requires that the regulations be based on an assessment of whether release of OCA information would reduce the risk of accidental releases of chemicals from facilities.

0592

Agriculture, Biological Weapons and Terrorism.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Office of the Coordinator, Washington, D.C. April 21, 2000. 35pp.

This is a report by the Agricultural Research Service. The United States has no stated policy on retribution of an attack with a biological weapon on an agricultural sector. This presentation concludes that biological attack is quite plausible, agents for such attack are readily available, economic consequences are significant, and public confidence in government could be shattered.

0627

Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Atlanta, Georgia. April 21, 2000. 20pp.

The U.S. national civilian vulnerability to the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents has been highlighted by recognition of substantial biological weapons programs and arsenals in foreign countries, attempts to acquire or possess biological agents by militants, and high-profile terrorist attacks. Evaluation of this vulnerability has focused on the role public health will have in detecting and managing the probable covert biological terrorist incident with the realization that the U.S. local, state, and federal infrastructure is already strained as a result of other important public health problems. In partnership with representatives for local and state health professional associations, CDC has developed a strategic plan to address the deliberate dissemination of biological or chemical agents.

0647

Britain and the Fight Against International Terrorism.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Focus International, London, U.K. May 2000. 11pp.

Acts of international terrorism represent a threat to the lives and well-being of ordinary people worldwide. They also directly challenge the authority of democratically elected governments to manage their countries' affairs peacefully, according to the rule of law and internationally accepted fundamental principles of human rights. Britain, like many other countries, has much experience in dealing with the threats posed by terrorism. The threat from terrorism is changing: in previous decades, the primary risk came from established groups with a clear political objective and, frequently, a state sponsor. Today, the motivation of international terrorists is more diffuse, and their funding and logistic support may come mainly from private fund-raising of various kinds.

- 0658 **Combating Terrorism. Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and Intelligence Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Norman J. Rabkin. May 4, 2000. 6pp.
GAO believes that H.R. 4210—the Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000—will address the fragmentation and duplication that GAO and others have found in programs to combat terrorism. The bill will create a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to centralize leadership and coordination of federal programs to help state and local governments prepare for terrorist incidents involving WMD. The duties of the new office, however, as described in the bill, may overlap with some duties of the newly created National Domestic Preparedness Office. In GAO’s view, success in achieving the bill’s goals depends on the ability of the office head to build consensus among the involved agencies. Also, the new office may take some time to accomplish objectives presented in the bill.
- 0664 **National Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Initiative.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program, Atlanta, Georgia. May 8, 2000. 16pp.
As part of the HHS 1999 Bioterrorism Initiative, the CDC was designated to lead an effort working with governmental and nongovernmental partners to upgrade the nation’s public health capacity to respond to bioterrorism and establish a Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program. Critical to success of the Bioterrorism Initiative is assurance that this capacity is developed at federal, state, and local levels.
- 0680 **Can Force Protection and Theater Engagement Plans Peacefully Co-Exist in Countries with a High Terrorist Threat?**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. John P. Nolan. May 16, 2000. 25pp.
Based on President Bush’s inauguration speech, the strategy of engagement will continue to be the foundation of U.S. foreign policy as it is enunciated in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Since national policies have not fundamentally changed with a new administration, it is incumbent on the military to adapt force protection procedures to permit the military to achieve successful engagement with high terrorist threat countries, thereby meeting the goals of the Unified Commander’s Theater Engagement Plan. The terrorist attack on the USS *Cole* was yet another “defining moment” in the three successful terrorist attacks on U.S. military targets that started with the Beirut marine barracks, terrorist attack in 1983 and continued with the Khobar Towers air force facility terrorist attack in 1996, which brought the policy of engagement to the nation’s attention and generated an increased demand for force protection.
- 0705 **Homeland Defense and Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Are National Guard Civil Support Teams a Necessary Asset or Duplication of Effort?**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Kevin R. McBride. May 16, 2000. 24pp.
The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing maximized America’s awareness of its vulnerability to terrorist activities and erased the nation’s sense of security that terrorist attacks could not occur within the United States. As a result, the possibility of such bombings, to include WMD, could no longer be ignored. In May 1998,

President Clinton established policy and assigned responsibilities for responding to homeland attacks. This paper examines the necessity of a continued need for the National Guard Civil Support Teams and explains how the teams fit into federal, state, and local response plans.

0729

Agricultural Biological Warfare: An Overview.

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, Virginia. Jonathan Ban. June 2000. 8pp.

Given the tremendous economic, political, and strategic value of U.S. agricultural resources, the Washington policy community has been slow to realize their vulnerability to attack by an antagonistic state, economic or agricultural competitor, or terrorist, especially with biological weapons. With the myriad of activities currently taking place to bolster counterterrorism and strengthen critical infrastructure protection, it would be a shame to underestimate the value of securing or the need to better secure the nation's agricultural resources. In the rush to protect the American people and the country's critical infrastructure from the threat of terrorism, however, the vulnerability of the nation's agricultural resources has been largely overlooked. Yet, historically, anti-animal and antiplant biological warfare has been a substantial component of many state biological warfare programs. There is also some evidence that nonstate actors may be willing to attack agricultural resources.

0737

Combating Terrorism. Action Taken But Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas.

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. July 2000. 40pp.

Overall, military forces stationed overseas are better protected today, and commanders are better able to determine their vulnerability to terrorist attacks, than they were when GAO last reported in 1997. Significant security and procedural antiterrorism/force protection problems persist at many installations, however. For example, some installations have not developed plans to deal with terrorist attacks, others have no way to stop unauthorized vehicles from entering the installation, and none of the installations have a comprehensive way to share solutions to common problems with other installations. Limited antiterrorism funding and trained staff have affected the commanders' ability to correct known vulnerabilities. Some overseas commands have repeatedly received less than half of the funding that they believe is necessary to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities. Although Congress requires DoD to provide information on proposed antiterrorist/force protection funding and projects, it does not require information on projects that still need funding.

0777

Defusing Terrorism at Ground Zero: Why a New U.S. Policy Is Needed for Afghanistan.

Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. James Phillips. July 12, 2000. 20pp.

The August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by Osama bin Laden's Afghanistan-based terrorist network make it impossible for American foreign policy to continue to ignore Afghanistan. Yet as the world's leading exporter of terrorism, Islamic revolution, and opium, Afghanistan still does not receive the attention it should. The United States needs to develop a coherent

long-term policy for building a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, which will no longer serve as a haven for international terrorists, drug smugglers, and Islamic revolutionaries.

- 0797 **Planning for Bioterrorism. Behavioral and Mental Health Responses to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Mass Disruption.**
Department of Psychiatry, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland. July 2000. 192pp.
This monograph includes an edited transcript and an executive summary from the conference, Planning for Bioterrorism: Behavioral and Mental Health Responses to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Mass Disruption. This conference addressed the history, nature, and threat of biological agents. The behavioral implications of illness, disease, prevention, and vaccination were noted. Community and individual responses to potential bioterrorist events were described. Future approaches to the management and treatment of behavioral and mental health issues following exposure to biological agents and bioterrorism were discussed. The conference concluded with recommendations for policy, communication, education and training, and research.
- 0989 **Combating Terrorism. Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Norman J. Rabkin. July 26, 2000. 12pp.
To develop sound programs to combat terrorism, the United States must have a thorough understanding of the terrorist threat. U.S. intelligence agencies track and analyze terrorist threats, including the use of CBRN weapons. A threat and risk assessment can be used to develop a nationwide strategy and guide resource investments. Officials in five foreign countries GAO visited—Canada, the United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, and France—said that because of limited resources, they make funding decisions for programs to combat terrorism on the likelihood of terrorist activity, not on the countries’ overall vulnerabilities.
- 1001 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.**
United Nations, New York, New York. July 26, 2000. 26pp.
This report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was prepared pursuant to a General Assembly resolution entitled: “Measures to eliminate international terrorism.” The report includes measures taken at the national and international levels regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism and information on incidents caused by international terrorism, information received from member states and information received from international organizations, international legal instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism, status of international conventions pertaining to international terrorism, information on workshops and training courses on combating crimes connected with international terrorism, and publication of a compendium of national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

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0001

Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.

National Commission on Terrorism, Washington, D.C. August 2, 2000. 70pp.

International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America. This threat was underscored by the December 1999 arrests in Jordan and at the U.S./Canadian border of foreign nationals who were allegedly planning to attack crowded millennium celebrations. Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United States. This change makes terrorist attacks more difficult to detect and prevent. Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat requires significant increase of U.S. efforts. The government must immediately take steps to reinvigorate the collection of intelligence about terrorists' plans, use all available legal avenues to disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities and private sources of support, convince other nations to cease all support for terrorists, and ensure that federal, state, and local officials are prepared for attacks that may result in mass casualties.

0071

Aviation Security. Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in Carriage of Weapons Regulations.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. September 2000. 44pp.

The number of law enforcement officers who fly while armed is unknown because neither the FAA nor airlines systematically collect this information. Recognizing that weapons legally carried onto aircraft by law enforcement officers may present a threat to safety, FAA has proposed changes to strengthen regulations. GAO found the following weaknesses in the proposed changes: (1) no safeguards exist to help ensure that firearms are removed from an aircraft when law enforcement officers deplane; (2) federal law enforcement officers are not required to document their need to fly; (3) law enforcement officers who inform the airline that they will be armed are not required to have their carry-on luggage screened; and (4) no procedure exists for verifying the credentials of law enforcement officers flying while armed. FAA is working with the law enforcement community and with airlines to implement a secure memory card system to better verify law enforcement officers' identities. The Transportation Department, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, and the Fraternal Order of Police did not entirely agree with GAO's recommendations.

0115

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response. A National Public Health Training Plan.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. September 7, 2000. 8pp.

This proposal outlines the implementation of a national training plan for bioterrorism preparedness. The plan incorporates recommendations from the CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Strategic and FY00 Operational Plans, the POST TOPOFF ACTION PLAN, the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Strategic Plan for Public Health Workforce Development, and findings from

discussions with external partners. In partnership with representatives from local and state health departments, other federal agencies, and medical and public health professional associations, CDC has developed a strategic plan to address the deliberate dissemination of biological or chemical agents. The plan contains recommendations to reduce U.S. vulnerability to biological and chemical terrorism-preparedness planning, detection and surveillance, laboratory analysis, emergency response, and communication systems. Training, research, and strengthening partnerships are considered integral components for achieving these recommendations.

0123 **Improving Local and State Agency Response to Terrorist Incidents Involving Biological Weapons: Interim Planning Guide Prepared in Response to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program by the Department of Defense.**

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. September 12, 2000. 29pp.

In the late 1990s, American citizens have been forced to realize that terrorism is a real threat to our national soil and is not limited to overseas incidents. Because of terrorist acts, such as the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings, domestic terrorism is increasingly on Americans' minds. Terrorist activities are no longer limited to detonating conventional bombs, however. The threat of biological terrorism has become a growing concern since 1993.

0152 **No Information to Link Irish Terrorist Organizations to International Narcotics Trafficking.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Office of Special Investigations, Washington, D.C. September 29, 2000. 5pp.

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Irish terrorist organizations, focusing on their passive engagement in international narcotics trafficking. GAO noted that: (1) Irish and British law enforcement officials provided no information that Irish terrorist organizations are engaged in international narcotics trafficking; (2) however, some Loyalist and Republican terrorist organizations are engaged in street-level narcotics, dealing in such drugs as heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, and cannabis; and (3) Irish police officials believe that shootings of major drug dealers in Belfast and Dublin were related to in-country conflicts and not international narcotics trafficking.

0157 **Bioterrorism: Homeland Defense: The Next Steps. An Executive Summary of the RAND Symposium Proceedings.**

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Maurice Eisenstein and Brian K. Houghton. October 2000. 44pp.

For many years, the United States has been concerned about domestic acts of terrorism using conventional weapons and explosives. More recently, these concerns have grown to include other WMD, particularly use by terrorists of chemical and biological weapons. Recent independent assessments have concluded that as a nation the United States is ill-prepared to deal with such events. This symposium, focusing on the Los Angeles, California, area, was held to help remedy that situation by seeking to identify the elements of an integrated homeland defense against bioterrorism, identifying critical gaps in current federal, state, and local government policies, programs, and capabilities; and offering

suggestions on how a relatively cost-effective homeland defense program might be achieved.

0201 **Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture.**

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Anne Kohnen. October 2000. 52pp.

The threat of biological weapons is usually associated with terrible outbreaks of human illness. Receiving substantially less attention from the media, however, is the fact that biological weapons can also be used against agricultural targets as strategic economic weapons. Agriculture accounts for about 13 percent of the United States' annual gross domestic product. In 1996 U.S. cash receipts for livestock, poultry, and crops totaled more than \$200 billion. An attack on agriculture could have enormous economic consequences.

0253 **Responding to Terrorism Victims. Oklahoma City and Beyond.**

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Victims of Crime, Washington, D.C. October 2000. 54pp.

The effect of the Oklahoma City bombing, which caused mass casualties and injuries, was far reaching—extending well beyond the borders of Oklahoma into the rest of the nation. In recent years, the federal government has been called upon to play a larger role in mitigating and responding to all types of human-caused violent events and disasters. Federal responsibility ranges from immediate disaster relief to long-term assistance that helps communities recover from devastating events. Moreover, because terrorist acts are federal crimes, investigated and prosecuted by federal law enforcement officials, federal criminal justice agencies have statutory responsibilities related to victims' rights and services in connection with terrorism criminal cases. This range of responsibilities raises the issue of the federal government's preparedness to respond to acts of terrorism and the resulting emotional and psychological impacts. Lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing response provide a foundation for recommendations to improve planning for services to victims of terrorism in the future, keeping in mind that planning must be flexible to meet the unique circumstances involved in each incident.

0307 **Israel's Preparedness for High Consequence Terrorism.**

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Ariel Merari. October 2000. 57pp.

Since its creation in 1948, Israel has had to contend with the constant threat of terrorism. To meet this challenge, Israel has created and maintained an elaborate counterterrorism system. Much of the Israeli effort has focused on developing defensive measures designed to prevent attacks on the civilian population and minimize casualties. Israel has developed this strategy for two reasons. First, most Palestinian terrorist attacks, as well as a smaller yet significant number of attacks by Lebanese groups, have been random attacks against civilians. Second, all Israeli governments have been highly sensitive to civilian casualties. The focus of this paper is Israel's preparedness against WMD attacks.

- 0364 **Bioterrorism in the United States: Threat, Preparedness, and Response.**
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Washington, D.C. November 2000. 337pp.
Over the last several years, a confluence of events—the World Trade Center bombing, the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack by the Aum Shinrikyo, and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City—focused attention on the growing threat of terrorist use of CBRN weapons in the United States. These developments gave rise to a set of perceptions that the United States is vulnerable to terrorist attack, that such attacks could entail the use of CBRN weapons, and that the United States has not been well prepared to deal effectively with such a challenge. Biological terrorism differs from other types of CBRN terrorism in that it would impose particularly heavy demands on the nation’s public health and health care systems.
- 0701 **Transnational Threats: Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies.**
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed. November 2000. 257pp.
On February 2–3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security cosponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The conference examined transnational threats, including terrorism involving WMD, cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and international organized crime. The goal of the conference was to evaluate the seriousness of such threats and discuss strategies for dealing with them. In particular, the conference sought to address the question of how the military and law enforcement could blend their strategies to better counter transnational threats.
- 0958 **Agricultural Biowarfare and Bioterrorism. An Analytical Framework and Recommendations for the Fifth Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference.**
Section of Microbiology, University of California, Davis, California. Mark Wheelis. November 2000. 9pp.
Anti-agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism differ significantly from biowarfare and bioterrorism directed against humans. For instance, a variety of possibilities for economic gain exist for perpetrators, including corporations, which may have state-of-the-art technical expertise. Furthermore, anti-agricultural attacks are substantially easier to accomplish as the agents are not hazardous to humans, delivery systems are readily available and unsophisticated, maximum effect may only require a few cases, delivery from outside the target country is possible, and an effective attack can be constructed to appear natural. These characteristics make biological attack on the agricultural sector of some countries a very real threat, perhaps more of a threat than attack on the civilian population. What goals might an attack on the agricultural sector serve? Who might be tempted to initiate an attack on the agricultural sector? What would be the consequences of an attack on the agricultural sector? What are the special features of an attack on the agricultural sector? How will genomics and genetic technology change the threat? What states are most at risk? How might an attack on the agricultural sector be deterred? Included are recommendations for BTWC Review Conference action and a bibliography.

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- 2000 cont.**
- 0001 **Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP). Playbook.**
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Domestic Preparedness Program, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. November 2000. 129pp.
As a result of the growing concerns regarding chemical/biological terrorism, Congress passed Public Law 104-201, the 1997 NDAA. This legislation, through Title XIV "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction," tasked DoD to assist federal, state, and local officials in deterrence of or response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism. This effort is commonly referred to as the NLD Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). In response to the latter of these objectives, SBCCOM developed the Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP). The CWIRP partnered with federal, state, and local emergency response personnel to identify and resolve issues involving chemical terrorist events. A detailed listing of the agencies involved in the CWIRP process is contained in Part VI. This playbook, one of several products of the CWIRP process, serves to identify the key issues that the program studied and provides basic recommendations and guidelines for enhancing response and management of a chemical incident.
- 0130 **Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident.**
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Domestic Preparedness Program, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. November 2000. 35pp.
This document was prepared for the DPP, by the SBCCOM CWIRP. Members of the law enforcement, health and safety, and the emergency response functional groups designed guidelines for response personnel in dealing with critical incident management decisions consistent with response to an actual chemical weapons emergency. The guidelines provide technical and operational guidance for agencies wishing to improve their response and related operations should a chemical weapons incident occur in their community.
- 0165 **Combating Terrorism. Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. November 2000. 78pp.
Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons. Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. They have unique capabilities and functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of agents and weapons. The type of terrorist incident determines which team is most appropriate to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by FEMA, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the operational coordination of federal response teams.

- 0243 **Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction? Government's Half Measures.**
Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C. Eric R. Taylor. November 27, 2000. 19pp.
In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act on domestic preparedness for terrorism using WMD. This law directs various departments and agencies of the federal government to make available to state and local governments training and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism involving the use of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The lack of any credible public education program in matters of awareness and response violates many entrenched principles of emergency management.
- 0262 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Sixth Committee.**
United Nations, New York, New York. Drahoslav Stefanek. November 29, 2000. 7pp.
The report of the Sixth Committee was presented by Drahoslav Štefánek (Slovakia). The item entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism" was included in the provisional agenda of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. The Sixth Committee considered the item and the views of the representatives who spoke during the committee's consideration of the item are reflected in the relevant summary records. The committee recommended adoption of a draft resolution by the General Assembly.
- 0269 **Organizational Design Principles for Countering Terrorism in the United States.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Matthew C. Mingus and Richard D. Orman. December 2000. 109pp.
Recent terrorist activities (the World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing, the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, etc.) have focused national attention on the topic of terrorism inside the borders of the United States. In response, two Presidential Decision Directives (PDD-62 and PDD-63) were issued to help define the terrorist threat and recommend a counterterrorism organization in the federal government. The directives do not determine, however, how the federal government works with state and local authorities. The directives also do not focus on local, state, and federal capabilities to preempt a possible terrorist attack. This thesis builds an organizational framework of the U.S. counterterrorism environment; explains the current U.S. counterterrorism structure from a local perspective; develops a set of principles that could be used by any local or federal agency to develop a new or more efficient counterterrorism organization; assesses two domestic counterterrorism organizations; and proffers specific recommendations on how U.S. counterterrorism organizations and programs could be more efficient.
- 0378 **Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.**
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, [Washington, D.C.]. December 15, 2000. 191pp.
The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 of the

NDAA. This act directed that a federally funded research and development center provide research, analytical, and other support to the Advisory Panel during the course of its activities and deliberations. RAND has been providing that support, under contract from DoD, since the Advisory Panel's inception. The Advisory Panel addressed specific programs for combating terrorism and larger questions of national strategy and federal organization.

2001

0569 **Report of the President of the United States on the Status of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Activities.**

[The White House], Washington, D.C. January 2001. 210pp.

This congressionally requested report provides the status at the beginning of 2001 of the federal government and industry programs on cyber security. Departments submitted their own input for this report. In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that the new economy is dependent upon IT networks and systems, which are vulnerable to malicious disruption. As a result, there have been federal government efforts to fix federal systems and work with industry to secure critical information systems.

0779 **CONPLAN. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.**

[The White House], Washington, D.C. January 2001. 44pp.

Publication of the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) represents a concerted effort by a number of federal departments and agencies to work together to achieve a common goal. The CONPLAN outlines an organized and unified capability for a timely, coordinated response by federal agencies to a terrorist threat or act.

0823 **Chemical Protective Clothing for Law Enforcement Patrol Officers and Emergency Medical Services when Responding to Terrorism with Chemical Weapons.**

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Domestic Preparedness Program, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Victor J. Arca, Stephen M. Marshall, William A. Lake, and Paul D. Fedele. January 2001. 27pp.

This report covers Man In Simulant Testing (MIST) of the commercially available, Level C chemical protective suits. These suits are being considered by law enforcement agencies for use at scenes where chemical warfare agents have been used by terrorists. This testing examined how well the complete protective suits protect the wearer against vapor adsorption at the skin by exposing test participants wearing the suits to a chemical agent simulant (methyl salicylate) and measuring the physiological protective dosage factor the wearers received while performing a set of typical law enforcement activities.

0850 **Health Alert Network.**

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. January 2001. 1pp.

CDC has been responding to public health emergencies for decades and has prepared for bioterrorism in particular since 1998. This program-in-brief describes the public health problem, CDC's accomplishments, and its next steps.

Frame No.

- 0851 **Laboratory Response to Chemical Terrorism.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. January 2001. 1pp.
CDC has been responding to public health emergencies for decades and has prepared for bioterrorism in particular since 1998. This program-in-brief describes the public health problem, CDC's accomplishments, and its next steps.
- 0852 **National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. January 2001. 1pp.
CDC has been responding to public health emergencies for decades and has prepared for bioterrorism in particular since 1998. This program-in-brief describes the public health problem, CDC's accomplishments, and its next steps.
- 0853 **DoD USS *Cole* Commission Report.**
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. January 9, 2001. 9pp.
Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, DoD has made significant improvements in protecting its service members, mainly in deterring, disrupting, and mitigating terrorist attacks on installations. The attack on the USS *Cole*, in the port of Aden, Yemen, on October 12, 2000, demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect U.S. forces, namely in-transit forces. This review focuses on finding ways to improve U.S. policies and practices for deterring, disrupting, and mitigating terrorist attack on forces in transit.
- 0862 **Bioterrorism and Biocrimes. The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900.**
Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. W. Seth Carus. February 2001. 209pp.
From 1996 to 2000, the threat of bioterrorism has become a subject of widespread concern. Journalists, academics, and policy analysts have considered the subject and in most cases have found much to alarm them. Most significantly, bioterrorism has captured the attention of policy makers at all levels of government in the United States. This study takes an intermediate course, providing empirical evidence to support the views of those who argue that biological agents are difficult to use as well as abundant evidence that some people have desired to inflict mass casualties on innocent populations through employment of biological agents. Ultimately, the evidence discussed supports the view that bioterrorism is a low probability, potentially high consequence event.

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- 0001 **2001 cont.**
The Rise of the Counterterrorist States.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Laura K. Donohue and Juliette N. Kayyem. February 2001. 25pp.
The closing decades of the twentieth century witnessed the proliferation of America's federal counterterrorist measures. Receiving less attention was the equally expansive use of state counterterrorist law. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, thwarted attacks on New York City, and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing brought the issue of vulnerability of the U.S. homeland into sharp relief. The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway increased awareness of the

possible proliferation of weapons from the former Soviet bloc countries, and a flurry of anthrax hoaxes in the United States at the close of 1998 and into 1999 further heightened concern at both the federal and state level of the threat posed by terrorist use of CBRN weapons. This paper addresses these three types of state counterterrorist legislation and the legal and practical questions regarding the proper role of the states in America's counterterrorist efforts. It begins with a description of several current state counterterrorist statutes. The next section considers both the legal and policy ramifications of these measures, many of which may threaten both the supremacy of federal counterterrorist laws and First Amendment protections of speech and assembly. The concluding section argues that, as states appear to become less concerned with traditional criminal enforcement, and expressly embrace a realm of law enforcement more properly reserved for federal national security policy, these state laws could confuse both federal antiterrorist policy and the role for the states in the fight against terrorism.

0026 **Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Homeland Threat: Deterrence Through Consequence Management.**

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. David A. Tagg. February 5, 2001. 27pp.

The ability of the United States to protect its global interests, fulfill its responsibilities in the world community, and meet the challenges of the future depends on its ability to exercise the strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic ability. Through asymmetrical employment of WMD, potential adversaries can attack the U.S. homeland, threaten America's critical strengths, and undermine the military's ability to maintain full spectrum dominance, the key to achieving these concepts. America's WMD counterproliferation strategy depends, in part, on an effective consequence management program to deter potential adversaries from employing WMD against the U.S. homeland. Progress has been made in implementing this program. Failure to define the desired outcome for the national strategy, poor interagency coordination, and misdirected training continue to limit the overall effectiveness of the program, however. Prompt and urgent implementation of remedial measures is suggested for achieving near-term improvement. The current state of consequence management demands such improvement if adversarial attacks are to be adequately deterred.

0053 **Force Protection: The Paranoid Survive.**

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. George H. Slook. February 5, 2001. 24pp.

U.S. forces, while engaged in commitments throughout the world in support of the National Military Strategy, face a formidable threat from terrorists. This terrorist threat exists throughout the spectrum of military operations. Lessons from the past indicate that terrorists will seek to exploit weaknesses in our force protection when we are least expecting them to do so. The U.S. military must not only learn from past incidents but also observe trends in terrorist organizations and closely monitor its capabilities to better provide force protection for its troops. Terrorist organizations are becoming increasingly global and are using technology to expand their reach, intelligence, targeting, and lethality. As this threat evolves, so should U.S. ability to counter the threat. The geographic commanders in chief, service component commanders, and joint task force commanders must lead a comprehensive proactive approach to providing force protection against this

growing terrorist threat. This approach should involve force protection planning through all phases of military operations. Without an antiterrorism element in American force protection planning, the United States will always be reacting to the terrorists' actions.

0077 **The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors.**

USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado. James M. Smith and William C. Thomas, eds. March 2001. 180pp.

This book is a collection of current research from academia, the U.S. government, and the private sector. The authors' experiences and approaches to terrorism vary, but they share a deep understanding of the concepts underpinning the issue. They provide an analytical approach that promotes an awareness of the terrorist's perspective and then develop a strategic structure for combating it. Their recommendations regarding operational and organizational measures provide policy makers with several options for addressing modern threats.

0257 **An Analysis of the Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy.**

Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Richard C. Daigle. March 2001. 120pp.

The air force's dependence on the Internet continues to increase daily. This increased dependence comes with risks, however. The popularity and potential of the Internet attracts users with illegal as well as legal intentions. Since the air force considers the Internet an integral component of its information operations strategy, it must be confident that it can trust the security of this component. Therefore, reliable methods and information that help the air force classify the risks associated with the Internet can help the air force determine the best processes to assure the security of its use of this resource. This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomy developed by John Howard.

0377 **Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy.**

RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. Bruce Hoffman. March 27, 2001. 10pp.

Much has been done in recent years to ensure that America is prepared to counter the threat of terrorism. Yet, despite the many new legislative and programmatic initiatives, budgetary increases, and intense governmental concern and attention they evince, America's capabilities to defend itself against the threat of terrorism and to preempt or respond to such attacks arguably still remain inchoate and unfocused. Last November's suicide attack on the USS *Cole* tragically underscored these continued vulnerabilities. Indeed, within the United States it is by no means certain that Americans are better able today to address an Oklahoma City-like bombing scenario than they were six years ago. The issue in constructing an effective counterterrorism policy is, however, no longer the question of more attention, bigger budgets, and increased staffing that it once was. Rather it is a question of a need for greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and firmer understanding of the threat, and, in turn, the development of a comprehensive national strategy.

- 0387 **Combating Terrorism. FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. March 2001. 41pp.
GAO reviewed FEMA's actions to improve its capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents based on its response to lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing, requirements in PDDs 39 and 62, and its own guidance. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which FEMA has (1) incorporated the lessons learned from the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, (2) ensured the preparedness of states and federal agencies to respond to terrorist incidents, and (3) ensured that states' plans are tested through exercises. GAO found that FEMA (1) has made across-the-board improvements in those areas identified as needing action after the Oklahoma City bombing, (2) updated the Federal Response Plan to address how federal agencies, states, and localities would work together to respond to an act of terrorism, and (3) assessed states' capabilities for consequence management in 1995 and set up a system to continue monitoring those capabilities.
- 0428 **Combating Terrorism. Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management and Assurance, Washington, D.C. March 2001. 50pp.
This report to the chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, responds to a congressional request to follow up on the status of the corrective actions taken by the responsible agencies to address the internal control weaknesses and recommendations previously reported in October 1999 that could affect the U.S. ability to effectively respond to chemical or biological terrorist incidents. This ability is dependent, among other things, on the plans, methods, and procedures used to ensure that the medical supplies designated for this purpose are current, accounted for, and ready for use. The president's fiscal year 2001 budget proposed spending about \$11.3 billion to combat terrorism. Among the resources the federal government is devoting to combating chemical and biological terrorism are funding to develop and maintain a national stockpile of pharmaceutical and medical supplies that can be used to treat civilian and military victims of chemical and biological terrorist acts.
- 0478 **Electronic Crime Needs Assessment for State and Local Law Enforcement.**
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C. Hollis Stambaugh, David S. Beaupre, David J. Icové, Richard Baker, Wayne Cassaday, and Wayne P. Williams. March 2001. 57pp.
To address the growing problem of electronic crime, the NIJ, in conjunction with the National Cybercrime Training Partnership—a high-technology training consortium led by the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Justice Department—initiated a national study in fall 1998 to assess the need of state and local law enforcement agencies to combat electronic crime and cyberterrorism. Another objective of the study was to develop a better understanding of the various aspects of electronic crime, such as the most prevalent targets, offenders, and motives behind this type of crime.

- 0535 **Malicious Hackers: A Framework for Analysis and Case Study.**
Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Laura J. Kleen. March 2001. 218pp.
Recent years have seen an increase in the number and severity of information operations attacks upon DoD resources. At a higher level, the United States has come under cyber attack by individuals and groups seeking thrills, monetary gain, publicity for their causes, and a myriad of other goals. This effort develops a first cut model of individual hacker mentality that can be utilized to improve threat assessment, mitigate IA vulnerabilities, and improve risk assessment. Further, it is a first step toward automated characterization of information warfare attacks based upon hacker types.
- 0753 **Bioterrorism: Epidemiology and Surveillance.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. March 2001. 1 pp.
CDC has been responding to public health emergencies for decades and has prepared for bioterrorism in particular since 1998. This program-in-brief describes the public health problem, CDC's accomplishments, and its next steps.
- 0754 **Laboratory Response for Biological Terrorism.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. March 2001. 1pp.
CDC has been responding to public health emergencies for decades and has prepared for bioterrorism in particular since 1998. This program-in-brief describes the public health problem, CDC's accomplishments, and its next steps.
- 0755 **The United States' Counter-Terrorism Strategy for the 21st Century and Its Cornerstone for Consequence Management—National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Donald P. Walker. March 2, 2001. 55pp.
Terrorists armed with WMD pose a growing threat to the United States and its citizens, critical infrastructure, and territory. In response to this threat, President Clinton issued PDDs 39, 62, and 63, which restate the country's long-standing counterterrorism policy and outline the administration's strategy for dealing with it. In support of the administration's policy, Congress has passed laws and increased funding for counterterrorism programs. One such legislative measure, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1996, identified specific measures certain government departments or agencies needed to take to prepare the nation for the consequences of a WMD event. As a key part of its efforts, DoD created National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, the "cornerstone" of DoD's consequence management strategy. The purpose of this research project was to analyze the United States' counterterrorism/WMD strategy for the twenty-first century to determine if it was adequate to meet the future domestic security needs of our nation and assess how well DoD's National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams have been implemented into that strategy.
- 0810 **Defensive Information Operations—An Interagency Process.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. James T. Schutze. March 2, 2001. 31pp.
The U.S. military has long held the mission of protecting this country against foreign attack. One of the biggest threats facing the United States in the twenty-first

century, however, is of a far different nature than conventional armed attack. Due to the quantity, complexity, and diverse ownership of this country's information systems and critical infrastructures, no single governmental or private agency can singlehandedly provide an adequate defense. DoD, as a key player in the interagency effort, must rapidly respond to information attacks in coordination with a host of government departments and agencies, including the Commerce, Justice, and State Departments. This paper discusses the nature and level of the cyber threat and DoD's roles in countering it in an interagency environment. The paper also looks at the legal issues DoD must consider in planning and executing its information defense mission. It examines the current arrangement for protection of the nation's infrastructure and suggests there are organizational issues impeding the speed and effectiveness of the country's defense that must be addressed.

- 0841 **Disaster Medicine: Conventional Terrorist Bombings.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Daniel J. Dire. March 26, 2001. 49pp.

The incidence of terrorism is increasing throughout the world. Bombing is a common form of terrorism that results in the injury or death of multiple victims. Survivors of terrorist bombings that arrive at civilian emergency departments have injuries different from other forms of trauma. The medical personnel treating these victims have only limited knowledge of blast physics, mechanisms and determinants of injury, and the epidemiology of bombing injuries. This paper reviews these issues and makes recommendations for the medical management of bombing victims.

- 0890 **Terrorism: Criminal Act or Act of War. Implications for National Security in the 21st Century.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Christopher G. Essig. March 27, 2001. 45pp.

There is no single logical determination for classifying acts of terrorism, either as acts of war or criminal acts. In light of the predicted terrorist threat significant enough to jeopardize the survival of the nation (catastrophic terror), this determination is less a legal or academic exercise and more practically an exercise in administering the paradigm (law enforcement or national security) used to respond to the threat. More important is this response's protection of U.S. interests and status in the world community. Catastrophic terror makes relying solely on a law enforcement response a dangerous option, but reflecting on the changing strategic environment, an act of war determination, in a legal classical sense, is equally impractical. A new determination carrying the same weight as an act of war must be developed and accepted domestically and internationally to provide legal response options offering greater latitude to law enforcement and national security forces. This latitude will provide the means to better meet threats to national security in the twenty-first century.

- 0935 **Combating Terrorism. Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. Raymond J. Decker. March 27, 2001. 5pp.

Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform, by the director,

national defense capabilities and management addresses two key issues that the new president and Congress will face concerning programs to combat terrorism. The overall leadership and management of such programs are fragmented within the federal government. No single entity acts as the federal government's top official accountable to both the president and Congress. Fragmentation exists in both coordination of domestic preparedness programs and in efforts to develop the attorney general's Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. While this plan is the current document that most resembles a national strategy, we believe it still lacks some critical elements to include measurable desired outcomes, linkage to resources, and a discussion of the role of state and local governments.

0940 **Critical Infrastructure Protection. Significant Challenges in Developing National Capabilities.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security Issues, Washington, D.C. April 25, 2001. 103pp.

To better protect the nation's critical computer-dependent infrastructures from computer-based attacks and disruption, President Clinton issued PDD 63 in 1998. The directive established the National Infrastructure Protection Center as a national focal point for gathering information on threats and facilitating the federal government's response to computer-based incidents. This report evaluates the center's progress in (1) developing national capabilities for analyzing cyber threat and vulnerability data and issuing warnings, (2) enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks, and (3) developing outreach and information-sharing initiatives with government and private-sector entities. GAO found that although the center has taken some steps to develop analysis and warning capabilities, the strategic capabilities described in PDD 63 have not been achieved. The center has provided important support to the FBI by coordinating investigations of computer crimes and providing technical assistance. The center has also developed crisis management procedures and drafted an emergency law enforcement sector plan, which is now being reviewed by sector members. The center's information-sharing relationships are still evolving and will probably have limited effectiveness until reporting procedures and thresholds are defined and trust relationships are established.

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2001 cont.

0001 **Viability of a Smallpox Attack on the U.S. Homeland.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Kenneth R. Russell Jr. April 2001. 39pp.

The possibility of WMD use in this country to harm Americans, including emergency responders, presents a genuine threat. Advances in technology assist the development and spread of biological weapons. Smallpox, an old disease, was used as a weapon in the past and is a viable security threat today. Part of the threat is the scarcity of vaccine supplies, which diminishes the capabilities of the United States to defend the homeland. The threat is further validated with recent reported outbreaks of smallpox cases in Russia, lending credence to the possible spread of the virus by accidental releases. CDC ordered new vaccines in an effort to defend

against an outbreak and protect the most vulnerable people. These actions provide convincing evidence that the United States is taking the threat seriously.

0040 **Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Non-Governmental Organizations.**

RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. April 3, 2001. 17pp.

This report consists of testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform by the vice president, external affairs and director, RAND Washington Office. Testimony concerns the nature of violent activities in the modern world; the general security environment for nonofficial Americans overseas; types of threats against nonofficial American citizens and nongovernmental organizations abroad; and recommendations for nonofficial American interests abroad.

0057 **The Legal and Ethical Implications of Information Operations.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ollie Washington Jr. April 10, 2001. 27pp.

Information operations (IO) is a family of programs and tools that is used to deprive or disrupt an adversary's information and information systems while assuring the continued availability of one's own. The technological tools of IO have been developed and implemented so rapidly that the domestic and international laws governing their use have not kept pace. Hackers, cyber criminals, terrorists, and foreign spies are using tools such as computer network attack, while domestic and international laws are insufficient to adequately patrol them. Further, the ethical issues involved in the use of these IO tools may not have been adequately debated, at least from a societal standpoint, to mediate possible conflicts with our national values. IO tools allow the United States to engage and disable enemy facilities previously engaged with kinetic weapons, without the physical collateral damage but with possible significant effect on noncombatants. International agreements such as the Geneva Convention do not specifically address IO and even within the U.S. military the rules of engagement on IO are not clear. This paper explores some of these incongruities and provides a perspective on the U.S. stance on use of IO.

0084 **Engagement or Containment of Rogues: The United States and Libya.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. T. Parker Jones. April 10, 2001. 32pp.

The United States has maintained unilateral sanctions against Muammar Qadhafi's Libya for almost twenty years. It has attempted to isolate Libya politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily since 1981 to reverse the country's support for international terrorism, regional subversion, and pursuit of WMD. Similar to U.S. practice with other "rogue" states, such a policy of isolation has little to show in the way of positive results twenty years later. This paper uses U.S. policy toward Libya as a case study in judging the utility and practicality of using a "rogue" state construct and containment as the policy of choice toward such a state. The paper argues that the case of Libya shows that a policy of conditional engagement has far greater potential for altering that state's behavior than the present course of unilateral containment.

- 0116 **Computer Network Defense and Attack: Information Warfare in the Department of Defense.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Carole N. Best. April 10, 2001. 23pp.
U.S. national military strategy paves the way for DoD into the twenty-first century. DoD touts information superiority as being critical to our strategy. The department has not adequately addressed two key aspects of this “enabler”, however—the defense of our networks and, should the need arise, attack of those networks belonging to our adversaries. This paper discusses current computer network defense and attack policy in the context of ends, ways, and means; explains what is lacking in the current policy; and offers recommendations for improvement. These recommendations include streamlining the interagency process; exploring a similar structure within the private sector and with our global allies; considering the concept of a separate information corps as a product of increasing emphasis in this area; linking information warfare to other military strategies; and assessing how the United States will fund the new tools in its information warfare kit bag.
- 0139 **Cyberterrorism Versus Cyberwar: At What Point Does Department of Justice (DoJ) Turn Over Cyber Incidents to the Department of Defense (DoD).**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Deborah P. Glass. April 10, 2001. 26pp.
The United States is dependent upon technology to the extent that every facet of the nation’s critical infrastructure (CI) depends on computer technology at some level. The conduct of future warfare, both offensively and defensively, is also increasingly technological. The realization that the United States is extremely vulnerable to asymmetric warfare via the Internet and to terrorism was part of the driving force behind the deployment of PDD 63. Because of the widespread dependence on the CI, consideration is being given to assigning ultimate responsibility over these interconnected systems to a single agency. Currently the FBI has cognizance over items relating to terrorism. DoD has responsibility over acts of war. The line between terrorism and warfare over the Internet is ambiguous, as are the lines of authority. This paper examines the definitions of terrorism and warfare where the Global Information Infrastructure and other components of our nation’s CI are concerned. At what point, and by what mechanism should responsibility and authority be transferred from the FBI to DoD? Should a different, perhaps even a new, agency be given ultimate responsibility for attacks on the CI?
- 0165 **Acts of Man—Acts of God. Who Should Manage the Military Response?**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Janet A. Robinson. April 10, 2001. 29pp.
Currently, requests to DoD for support in the aftermath of a natural disaster are made through the Executive Secretariat to the army’s director of military support. Should a domestic terrorist attack occur, which uses chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons (CBRNE), DoD has determined that the request may require special management and, as a result, would route the request to the Joint Staff. This paper analyzes the existing procedures to request military assistance for supporting civil authorities in the aftermath of both a natural disaster and a domestic CBRNE event. Recommendations are then made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of those procedures.

- 0194 **Combating Terrorism. Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. Raymond J. Decker. April 24, 2001. 11pp.
Testimony addresses three bills—H.R. 525, H.R. 1158, and H.R. 1292—to change the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism. Federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently difficult to lead and manage because the policy, strategy, programs, and activities cut across many agencies. The three bills and related proposals vary in scope. GAO believes that federal programs to combat terrorism will be improved by parts of each bill.
- 0205 **Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000.**
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. 2000. 93pp.
International terrorist attacks, numbers of casualties, and anti-U.S. attacks increased in 2000. Latin America and Colombia experienced the largest increase in terrorist attacks. Western Europe saw the largest decrease. Focus on Osama bin Laden increased with the attack on the USS *Cole* in Yemen and indictments for bombings in 1998 at two U.S. embassies in East Africa. Trial of two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 represent a victory for the international effort to hold terrorists accountable for their crimes.
- 0298 **Cyberespionage 2010: Is the Current Status of Espionage Under International Law Applicable in Cyberspace?**
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. Jorge H. Romero. April 30, 2001. 64pp.
This thesis argues that the current status of espionage under international law is applicable in cyberspace. Therefore, there is no need to reinterpret espionage under international law in cyberspace. There is no need for new treaties to regulate or control espionage in cyberspace among nations. At the present time, espionage is legal under international law. There are no international law prohibitions against espionage. Presently, there is a discussion about the applicability of various areas of the law in cyberspace. One school of thought led by Lawrence Lessig says that new laws are needed to adapt an area of law into cyberspace. The other school of thought led by Frank Easterbrook believes that there is no need for new laws—that current principles of laws can be analogized into cyberspace. This paper argues that Judge Easterbrook’s position should be followed in the area of espionage in cyberspace. Finally, it examines the consequences of cyberespionage in the present framework of espionage and international law.
- 0362 **Biological Weapons. Improved Response Program.**
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Homeland Defense Business Unit, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Mohamed Mughal. May 2001. 10pp.
The SBCCOM Improved Response Program (IRP) developed out of Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation (P.L. 104-201) to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD at both the national and local levels, and to enhance the capability of the federal government to prevent and respond to

such events. The program seeks to be the world leader in developing and applying improved approaches for responding to CB terrorism or other crises. The SBCCOM Biological Weapons IRP comprises a team of over sixty federal, state, and local responders and technical experts drawn from: Colorado, Kansas, New York, Delaware, New Jersey, Texas, Florida, Maryland, Washington federal agencies, (including USDA, DOE, DOD, PHS, CDC, EPA, FBI, and FEMA), and national laboratories (including Oak Ridge, Brookhaven, Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Pacific Northwest).

- 0372 **Biological Weapons Response Template and Decision Tree.**
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Homeland Defense Business Unit, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Mohamed Mughal. May 2001. 24pp.
The Bioresponse Template is an integrated, full-spectrum response strategy designed to mitigate the consequences of a bioterrorist attack aimed at a civilian population. The template can be used by any community or government as a starting point to formulate its own bioresponse plans. Stages in the planning process include public health surveillance, key decisions, emergency response, and active investigation.
- 0396 **Combating Terrorism. Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management and Assurance, Washington, D.C. Linda M. Calbom. May 1, 2001. 15pp.
This testimony discusses the status of agencies' efforts to establish effective internal control over federal medical stockpiles that can be used to treat civilian and military victims in the event of a chemical or biological attack. In earlier reports, GAO recommended that federal agencies strengthen their management of these medical stockpiles. GAO found that these agencies have made significant progress toward implementing its recommendations. Management at each of the responsible agencies has given priority to and placed emphasis on strengthening internal control over stockpiles. As a result, inventory discrepancy rates and accountability have been reduced.
- 0411 **Combating Terrorism. Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. Raymond J. Decker. May 9, 2001. 10pp.
This testimony discusses the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 525). To improve federal efforts to help state and local personnel prepare for domestic terrorist attacks, H.R. 525 would create a single focal point for policy and coordination—the President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness—within the White House. Other proposals before Congress would also create a single focal point for terrorism. Some of these proposals place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President, and others place it in a lead executive agency. Both locations have advantages and disadvantages.

- 0421 **The United States Homeland Defense Against International Terrorism.**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. A. E. Dochnal. May 18, 2001. 24pp.
The U.S. Unified Commanders face growing potential threats from state actors, their proxies, and independent extremists and terrorists. While various analysts have tended to exaggerate the immediate threat, or the current threat posted by given actors, the threat remains real, and the nation needs to improve its defense and response capabilities. The U.S. Unified Commands must plan to defend and respond against threats in their respective areas of responsibility in order to protect American citizens, forces, assets, and allies.
- 0445 **CDC, ASTHO, NAACHO Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacities Project 2001.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response, Atlanta, Georgia. May 24, 2001. 2pp.
The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001 (Core Capacity Project) is a collaborative activity supported by CDC, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), and the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). The project was designed to identify and define the core capacities needed in state and local public health agencies to prepare for and respond to a public health emergency caused by bioterrorism; determine priorities among these capacities that need to be addressed to improve the immediate response to a bioterrorist act; and reach consensus on these capacities from key stakeholders (public health, hospitals, nongovernmental partners, other federal agencies) to ensure success in implementation. This report concerns the American Medical Association.
- 0447 **Overview of Process to Achieve Outcomes.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001, Tampa, Florida. May 24, 2001. 19pp.
The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001 (Core Capacity Project) is a collaborative activity supported by CDC, ASTHO, and NAACHO. The project was designed to identify and define the core capacities needed in state and local public health agencies to prepare for and respond to a public health emergency caused by bioterrorism; determine priorities among these capacities that need to be addressed to improve the immediate response to a bioterrorist act; and reach consensus on these capacities from key stakeholders (public health, hospitals, nongovernmental partners, other federal agencies) to ensure success in implementation. This report concerns the process and partnerships involved in the project.
- 0466 **Bioterrorism Preparedness & Core Capacity. “The New Jersey Perspective—Challenges & Opportunities.”**
NJ Department of Health & Senior Service, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001, Tampa, Florida. James S. Blumenstock. May 24, 2001. 26pp.
The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Core Capacity Project 2001 (Core Capacity Project) is a collaborative activity supported by CDC, ASTHO, and NAACHO. The project was designed to identify and define the core capacities needed in state and local public health agencies to prepare for and respond to a public health emergency caused by bioterrorism; determine priorities among these

capacities that need to be addressed to improve the immediate response to a bioterrorist act; and reach consensus on these capacities from key stakeholders (public health, hospitals, nongovernmental partners, other federal agencies) to ensure success in implementation. This report concerns New Jersey's experiences over time.

0492 **Guidelines for Use of Personal Protective Equipment by Law Enforcement Personnel During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident.**

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Domestic Preparedness Program, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. June 2001. 96pp.

This report, prepared by SBCCOM, attempts to identify and evaluate various personal protective equipment alternatives that law enforcement officials may choose to use based on the types of mission performed at the incident scene. SBCCOM was assigned the mission of developing an IRP to identify problems and develop solutions to the tasks associated with responding to such incidents. The CWIRP was established to deal specifically with terrorists' use of chemical weapons. The CWIRP subsequently formed the Law Enforcement Functional Group to identify key issues facing the law enforcement community in a chemical terrorist scenario. That group noted that most operational shortcomings facing law enforcement are related to equipment and training required for proper use and application of that equipment. Consequently, this report focuses primarily on the range of equipment that, from a practical standpoint, is reasonably available to most departments. This report attempts to discern the fundamental information that is required to help those responsible for acquisition make sound decisions.

0588 **Network Attack Program.**

Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, New York, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia. Jack May, and James Peterson. June 2001. 23pp.

This research developed algorithms to detect attacks on large networks and their network components, such as routers. A fast large network simulation was developed using self-organizing system techniques. This simulation utilized a very simple, but very fast, model that used only the most significant characteristics of the network. The core part of the simulation was less than one hundred lines of code that simulated over one million routers and links per second. In addition to testing the algorithm on real networks, the simulation will be needed for testing attacks that are impractical to implement on operational networks and for planning courses of action.

0611 **Bioterrorism and Other Infectious Disease Threats. A Local Perspective.**

KCMO Health Department, Kansas City, Missouri. Rex Archer. June 6, 2001. 31pp.

This report is by a NAACHO Metro Forum vice chair and board member concerning planning and preparations for response to a bioterrorism incident in the Kansas City, Missouri, Health Department. Items concern toxins, diseases, CDC, and partnerships.

- 0642 **DoD Antiterrorism Standards.**
U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. June 14, 2001. 37pp.
This instruction updates policy implementation, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for protection of personnel and assets from acts of terrorism. Specific guidance for DoD elements and personnel under the responsibility of the State Department (DOS) is outlined in the “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on Overseas Security Support, September 17, 1990,” and “Memorandum of Understanding Between DOS and DoD on Security on the Arabian Peninsula, September 15, 1996,” and subsequent “Memorandum of Understanding on Security, December 16, 1997,” applicable worldwide. Interim DoD AT/FP Construction Standards Memorandum, December 16, 1999, refers to specific common criteria and minimum construction standards to mitigate antiterrorism vulnerabilities and terrorist threats.
- 0679 **Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.**
United Nations, New York, New York. July 3, 2001. 32pp.
The present report was prepared by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pursuant to General Assembly resolution entitled “Measures to eliminate international terrorism,” in which the assembly requested the secretary-general to follow up closely the implementation of the Declaration and to submit an annual report on the implementation of paragraph 10 of the Declaration, taking into account the modalities set out in his report to the assembly at its fiftieth session and the views expressed by states in the debate of the Sixth Committee during that session. Items include information received from member states and international organizations, international legal instruments, workshops and training courses, and publication of a compendium of national laws and regulations.
- 0711 **Human Rights and Terrorism.**
United Nations, New York, New York. July 17, 2001. 5pp.
This report of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan addresses fifty-sixth session Item 131(b) of the provisional agenda, human rights and terrorism, including human rights questions such as alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- 0716 **Critical Infrastructure Protection. Significant Challenges in Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security Issues, Washington, D.C. Robert F. Dacey. July 25, 2001. 11pp.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center is an important element of the U.S. strategy to protect the nation’s infrastructures from hostile attacks, especially computer-based attacks. This testimony discusses the key findings of a GAO report on center’s progress in developing national capabilities for analyzing cyber threats and vulnerability data and issuing warnings, enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks, and establishing information-sharing relationships with governments and private-sector entities.

- 0727 **In the Name of National Security: U.S. Counterterrorist Measures, 1960–2000.**
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Laura K. Donohue. August 2001. 57pp.
Between 1960 and 2000 the United States responded to the growing threat of terrorism with a wide range of measures. The government implemented provisions that extended from the negotiation of international agreements, military strikes against state sponsors of terrorism, and the creation of decontamination teams, to changes in immigration procedures, advances in surveillance, and an increase in the severity of penalties associated with terrorist attack. As discussion in the United States progresses on the best course of action for dealing with conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological terrorism, it is useful to take stock of where the country stands in the development of its counterterrorism strategy and to consider what factors have shaped the American response. While some substantive areas may be developed further to respond more effectively to terrorism, the significant picture that emerges is how complex and detailed the American counterterrorist complex already has become. The many branches of government entrusted with the life and property of the citizens have felt it necessary to respond to successive terrorist threats by the introduction of a wide range of measures. Left unchecked, the continued expansion of U.S. provisions risks significant inroads into civil liberties, the alienation of minorities and other states, an increase in the number and effectiveness of terrorist acts, and unchecked expenditures. This article provides a taxonomy of efforts to address the threat and argues that, while some gaps may need to be addressed, the long-term effect of the steady expansion of U.S. counterterrorist measures is of more serious concern.
- 0784 **LEPCs and Deliberate Releases: Addressing Terrorist Activities in the Local Emergency Plan.**
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Washington, D.C. August 2001. 6pp.
In recent years, the threat of terrorist incidents involving chemical and biological materials has increased. Local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) should consider the possibility of terrorist events as they review existing plans and consider how to incorporate CT measures into their plans. CT planning and preparedness is often an extension of existing activities, rather than a totally new effort. This factsheet discusses how LEPCs can incorporate CT issues when they review and update their local plans. This factsheet builds on the National Response Team's Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1) and supersedes "Thinking about Deliberate Releases: Steps Your Community Can Take."
- 0790 **Combating Terrorism. Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. September 2001. 216pp.
U.S. policy and strategy for dealing with terrorism, along with the nature and perception of the terrorist threat, has been evolving over the past thirty years. A complex framework of programs and activities across more than forty federal agencies, bureaus, and offices is in place to combat terrorism. This report, mandated by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act passed on October 30, 2000, assesses the current framework for leadership and coordination of federal agencies' efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil and proposals for

change; progress the federal government has made in developing and implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically; the federal government's capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident; progress the federal government has made in helping state and local emergency responders prepare for a terrorist incident; and progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for combating cyber-based attacks. Although this report does not include recent efforts made in light of September 11, 2001, it is an analytical discussion of the progress made and challenges faced by the federal government and the nation as they move to better prepare the nation to combat terrorism.

1006

Preparing for the War on Terrorism.

RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. Bruce Hoffman. September [20], 2001. 9pp.

This is a statement of Bruce Hoffman, vice president, external affairs and director, RAND Washington Office before the House Committee on Government Reform. He previously testified before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform in March 2001 on the need for a national strategy with which to combat terrorism. Many of the same points he made then remain painfully germane to the topic he is asked to address in this testimony.

1015

Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a Balanced and Practical Response.

[Journal of Homeland Security, ANSER Institute of Homeland Security, Virginia]. James M. Loy and Robert G. Ross. September 2001. 11pp.

The authors, the commandant and chief, Office of Strategic Analysis, of the U.S. Coast Guard, believe effective homeland security regimes require significantly improved domestic security provisions implemented by government and the private sector. Those provisions must be built on a solid legal foundation and must be implemented so as to be effective and acceptable, both economically and societally.

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The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense.

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ian Roxborough. September 2001. 41pp.

With the exception of attacks by ballistic missiles, the continental United States was long held to be virtually immune from attack. For Americans, wars took place in other countries, but in the future that may not hold. While strategic thinkers agree that homeland defense needs greater attention, there is less consensus on the precise nature of the threat. The author disagrees with the commonly held assumption that the main threat to the American homeland will come from terrorism inspired by U.S. leadership of globalization. He contends that the architects of the American strategy for homeland defense need a broader perspective that includes a wide range of existing or potential threats.

- 0042 **Bioterrorism. Federal Research and Preparedness Activities.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Health Care—Public Health Issues, Washington, D.C. September 28, 2001. 95pp.
Federal research and preparedness activities related to bioterrorism center on detection; the development of vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals; and the development of performance standards for emergency response equipment. Preparedness activities include (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. To coordinate their activities to combat terrorism, federal departments and agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with other agencies to share resources and capabilities. Coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, however, raising concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include insufficient state and local planning and a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning.
- 0137 **Aviation Security. Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. September 20, 2001. 11pp.
A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Although the actual events and aviation security apparatus weaknesses that contributed to the horrendous terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, are not fully known, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. As reported last year, GAO's review of the FAA's oversight of air traffic control computer systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—countries whose systems GAO has examined—differ significantly from this country's.
- 0148 **Aviation Security. Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation's Airports.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. September 20, 2001. 11pp.
A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Although the actual events and aviation security apparatus weaknesses that contributed to the horrendous terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, are not fully known, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. As reported last year, GAO's review of the FAA's oversight of air traffic control computer systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—countries whose systems GAO has examined—differ significantly from this country's.

0159 **Aviation Security. Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning Screening Responsibilities.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. September 21, 2001. 14pp.

There are security concerns with airport access controls, passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and alternatives to current screening practices, including practices in selected other countries. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. In May of 2000, special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. In June 2000, testing of screeners showed that significant, long-standing weaknesses—measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage—continue to exist. More recent results show that as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners' performance declines significantly. Weaknesses in screening and controlling access to secure areas have left questions concerning alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, respondents identified five important criteria: improving screening performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues.

0173 **Homeland Security. A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. David M. Walker. September 21, 2001. 12pp.

The United States now faces increasingly diverse threats, which put great destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals. These threats range from cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to terrorist incidents involving WMD or infectious diseases. Efforts to combat this threat will involve federal agencies as well as state and local governments, the private sector, and private citizens. GAO believes that the federal government must address three fundamental needs, including clearly defined and effective leadership with a clear vision carry out and implement a homeland security strategy and the ability to marshal the necessary resources to get the job done; a national homeland security strategy based on a comprehensive assessment of national threats and risks; and clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms for the organizations involved in homeland security. Any strategy for homeland security must reduce risk where possible, assess the nation's vulnerabilities, and identify the critical infrastructure most in need of protection. To be comprehensive, the strategy should include steps to use intelligence assets or other means to identify attackers and prevent attacks before they occur, harden potential targets to minimize the damage from an attack, and effectively manage the consequences of an incident.

0185 **Aviation Security. Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Operations.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Washington, D.C. Gerald L. Dillingham. September 25, 2001. 14pp.

A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Billions of dollars and countless programs and policies have gone into developing such a system. Although many of the specific factors contributing to the terrible events of September 11 are still unclear,

it is apparent that our aviation security system is plagued by serious weaknesses that can have devastating consequences. Last year, as part of an undercover investigation, GAO special agents used fake law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports. They were also issued tickets and boarding passes and could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous items onto the aircraft. GAO tests of airport screeners also found major shortcomings in their ability to detect dangerous items hidden on passengers or in carry-on luggage. These weaknesses have raised questions about the need for alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, five outcomes should be considered: improving screener performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues.

0199

Re-Thinking Terrorism in Light of a War on Terrorism.

RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. Bruce Hoffman. September 26, 2001. 10pp.

Until last September 11, 2001, terrorists either in this country or abroad had killed no more than approximately one thousand Americans total since 1968. The enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide attacks of September 11 dwarf anything Americans have previously seen—either individually or in aggregate. Indeed, by the time the rubble and debris is cleared from New York City’s World Trade Center, the collapsed walls of the Pentagon are stabilized, and the last of the bodies are retrieved from the field in rural Pennsylvania, where a fourth suicide aircraft crashed, the death toll is likely to be exponentially higher. For that reason alone, the events of September 11 argue for nothing less than a reconfiguration of both American thinking about terrorism and national security architecture. Such a change is amply justified by the unique constellation of operational capabilities evident in that day’s tragic attacks: showing a level of planning, professionalism, and tradecraft rarely seen among the vast majority of terrorists and terrorist movements we have known. Among the most significant characteristics of the operation were its ambitious scope and dimensions; consummate coordination and synchronization; professionalism and tradecraft that kept so large an operation so secret; and the unswerving dedication and determination of the nineteen aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers, and the crews of the four aircraft they commandeered and the thousands of people working in or visiting both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

0209

Quadrennial Defense Review Report.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Directorate for Public Information & Analysis, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. September 30, 2001. 80pp.

The Quadrennial Defense Review was undertaken during a crucial time of transition to a new era. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the senior leaders of the DoD set out to establish a new strategy for America’s defense that would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home. This strategy sought to set the conditions to extend America’s influence and preserve America’s security and was built around four key goals to guide the development of U.S. forces and capabilities, their deployment and use: assuring allies and friends of the United

States' steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments; dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends; deterring aggression and coercion by deploying the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. A central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning from a "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a "capabilities-based" model for the future.

0289

Bioterrorism.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. October 2001. 1p. CDC has been responding to public health emergencies for decades and has prepared for bioterrorism in particular since 1998. This program-in-brief describes the public health problem, CDC's accomplishments, and its next steps.

0290

Chemical and Biological Defense. DoD Needs to Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Applied Research and Methods, Washington, D.C. October 2001. 55pp.

Public assessments by DoD officials have emphasized the seriousness of the military threat from CB weapons. Neither DoD nor the services, however, have systematically examined the adequacy of the current specialty mix of medical personnel for CB defense. Although some of the services have begun to review the adequacy of staffing of deployable medical units that would manage the consequences of chemical warfare scenarios, they have not done so for biological warfare scenarios. Joint protocols for treating CB casualties have recently been completed, but the services have not yet agreed on which health care providers should provide treatment. Relatively few military health care providers are trained to a standard of proficiency in providing care to CB casualties. The service surgeons general have begun integrating chemical and a few biological scenarios into their medical exercises, but no realistic field exercises of medical support for CB warfare have been concluded. DoD and the services have not fully addressed weaknesses and gaps in modeling, planning, training, tracking, or proficiency testing for the treatment of CB casualties. The resulting medical structure has not been rigorously tested for its capacity to deliver the required medical support. As a result, medical readiness for CB scenarios cannot be ensured.

0345

Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism.

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; Director of Central Intelligence, Langley, Virginia; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. October 2001. 25pp.

In the 1994 NDAA, as amended, Congress directed that the CPRC be established to review activities and programs related to countering proliferation within DoD, DOE, and the U.S. intelligence community. The findings and recommendations of the CPRC's annual review for 2001 are presented in this eighth annual report to Congress. Counterproliferation efforts, such as the CPRC, leverage the investments already made in maintaining the military forces and defense

infrastructure necessary to provide for the defense needs of the United States. Commensurate with the seriousness of the threat, DoD, DOE, and the intelligence community have made serious commitments to enhance national capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC/M and NBC terrorist threats.

0370 **Cyber Protests: The Threat to the U.S. Information Infrastructure.**

National Infrastructure Protection Center, FBI, Washington, D.C. October 2001. 6pp.

Political events and emerging international situations will increasingly lead to cyber protests. The cyber protests that have occurred thus far have had little impact on U.S. infrastructure. As computing technology becomes faster and better and hacking tools become more advanced and easier to use, cyber protesting and “hacktivism” will become more significant to U.S. national interests. Cyber protesters are becoming increasingly more organized and their techniques more sophisticated but, most likely, will continue to deface web sites and perform denial of service attacks. There will also be an increase in the number of apparently unrelated hacking groups participating in the cyber protests. National boundaries will not always be clearly delineated in attacks on opposing organizations. International activity will also tend to spill over into the United States. Because the United States is a multicultural, world-leading nation, it will suffer from attacks on culturally related sites and structures in the future.

0376 **11 September 2001: The Response.**

House of Commons, London, U.K. October 3, 2001. 118pp.

This paper examines the reaction within the United States, the United Kingdom, and the wider international community to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It contains background information on the main suspect, Osama bin Laden, and the al-Qaeda network, and it looks in detail at the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider region. It also details the military options available and the relevant issues of international law. A collection of documents and a bibliography relating to the response to the attacks is contained in a companion Library Standard Note.

0494 **Financial Management: Assessment of the Airline Industry’s Estimated Losses Arising From the Events of September 11.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management and Assurance, Washington, D.C. October 5, 2001. 21pp.

GAO analysis indicates that the airline industry will incur losses, resulting from the terrorist attacks, of at least \$5 billion and possibly more through December 31, 2001. While it is reasonable to assume that overall industry losses will amount to at least \$5 billion, carrier-by-carrier losses are likely to vary significantly from the formula-derived allocations of the \$5 billion. Therefore, some carriers may experience losses higher than their individual formula amount, while others’ losses may be lower. Because of this, the Transportation Department is initially disbursing only 50 percent of the allocations and is currently assessing how best to provide for any necessary adjustments to the amounts paid to each carrier. At present, there is no provision in the law to reallocate any portion of the formula amount for an individual carrier that is in excess of actual losses incurred by that carrier to other carriers whose actual losses may exceed their allocated amounts.

0515

Bioterrorism. Coordination and Preparedness.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Health Care—Public Health Issues, Washington, D.C. Janet Heinrich. October 5, 2001. 23pp.

This testimony discusses the efforts of federal agencies to prepare for the consequences of a bioterrorist attack. GAO found that federal agencies are participating in research and preparedness activities, from improving the detection of biological agents to developing a national stockpile of pharmaceuticals to treat victims of disasters. Federal agencies also have several efforts underway to coordinate these activities on a formal and informal basis, such as interagency work groups. Despite these efforts however, coordination between agencies remains fragmented. GAO also found emerging concerns about the preparedness of state and local jurisdictions, including insufficient state and local planning for response to terrorist events, inadequate public health infrastructure, a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning, insufficient capabilities for treating mass casualties, and the timely availability of medical teams and resources in an emergency. This testimony summarizes a September 2001 report.

0538

Bioterrorism. Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Health Care—Public Health Issues, Washington, D.C. Janet Heinrich. October 10, 2001. 24pp.

Federal research and preparedness activities related to bioterrorism center on detection of biological agents; development of new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals; and development of performance standards for emergency response equipment. Preparedness activities include: (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. To coordinate their activities, federal agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with each other to share resources and capabilities. GAO found, however, that coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, raising concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include poor state and local planning and the lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This report summarizes a September 2001 report.

0562

Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection, and the U.S. Food and Agricultural Sector.

RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. Peter Chalk. October 10, 2001. 12pp.

This testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government, Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia is by a policy analyst, RAND Washington Office. This testimony aims to expand the current debate on public infrastructure protection and bioterrorism by assessing the vulnerabilities of agriculture and the food chain to a deliberate act of agroterrorism, the deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, for purposes of undermining stability and/or generating fear. Depending on the disease

agent and vector chosen, agroterrorism is a tactic that can be used either to cause mass socioeconomic disruption or as a form of direct human aggression.

- 0574 **Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism.**
RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. John Parachini. October 12, 2001. 13pp.

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many Americans have become concerned about the prospect of biological terrorism. It now seems plausible that hijackers willing to kill themselves, travelers aboard commercial airliners, and thousands of others in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon might be willing to use biological agents to kill indiscriminately. These theoretical concerns have turned into a real fear. Reports that some of the suicide hijackers had an interest in crop-duster aircraft played a part in this new concern, as have the recent reports of the apparently deliberate use of anthrax spores in Florida. The fear over biological terrorism is greater than the fear inspired by more conventional forms of terrorism. Some of this fear is justified and some of it is exaggerated. Since the future is impossible to see clearly, Americans must anticipate a number of possible scenarios.

- 0587 **Homeland Security. Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. Raymond J. Decker. October 12, 2001. 8pp.

Risk management is a systematic and analytical process that weighs the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function and identifies actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. A good risk management approach includes the following three assessments: a threat, a vulnerability, and a criticality. After these assessments have been completed and evaluated, key steps can be taken to better prepare the United States against potential terrorist attacks. Threat assessments alone are insufficient to support the key judgments and decisions that must be made. Along with vulnerability and criticality assessments, however, leaders and managers make better decisions using this risk management approach. If the federal government were to apply this approach universally and if similar approaches were adopted by other segments of society, the United States could more effectively and efficiently prepare in-depth defenses against terrorist acts.

- 0595 **Homeland Security. Need to Consider VA's Role in Strengthening Federal Preparedness.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Health Care—Veterans' Health and Benefits Issues, Washington, D.C. Cynthia A. Bascetta. October 15, 2001. 12pp.

In the event of a domestic terrorist attack or other major disasters, the VA provides backup medical resources to the military health system and local communities. VA now assists other federal agencies that have lead responsibility for responding to disasters, including terrorism. VA areas of responsibility include disaster simulation exercises and maintaining medical stockpiles. Its efforts in these areas have enhanced national emergency preparedness by improving medical response procedures and by strengthening the security of federal pharmaceutical stockpiles to ensure rapid response to local authorities. VA also has resources that can play a role in future federal homeland security efforts. Its assets include the bricks, mortar, and human capital components of its health care system; graduate medical

education programs; and expertise involving emergency backup and support activities. In managing large-scale medical emergencies arising from terrorist attacks, VA's emergency response capabilities have strengths and weaknesses. Determining how VA can best contribute to homeland security is especially timely given the extraordinary level of federal activity underway to manage large-scale disasters.

0607 **Combating Terrorism. Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and Biological Preparedness.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. Henry L. Hinton Jr. October 17, 2001. 14pp.

Since the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the terrorist threat has risen to the top of the national agenda. Preparing for all possible contingencies is impractical, so a risk management approach should be used. This approach will include a threat assessment to determine which chemical or biological agents are of greatest concern. The federal government has various programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological terrorism, including response teams, support laboratories, training and equipment programs, and research efforts. Evaluations of chemical and biological preparedness have identified several problems and their solutions. Congress faces competing demands for spending as it seeks to invest resources to better prepare the nation for chemical and biological terrorism. Given the uncertainty of the chemical and biological threat, Congress may want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad applicability rather than in those that are applicable to a specific type of chemical or biological attack.

0621 **Biological Terrorism.**

U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Anna Johnson-Winegar. October 17, 2001. 8pp.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax cases in Florida have heightened the public's awareness of the threat posed by biological terrorism. DoD has considered the use of biological weapons as possible means for states and nonstate actors to counter America's overwhelming conventional war fighting strength. Following Operation Desert Storm and the identified shortfalls in biological defense capabilities, Congress directed DoD to consolidate chemical and biological defense efforts. Since the establishment of a joint chemical and biological defense program in 1994, and with continued congressional support, DoD has made significant progress in fielding biological defense equipment for our war fighters and stands ready to meet the most credible biological warfare threats.

0629 **Terrorism Insurance. Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Washington, D.C. Thomas J. McCool. October 24, 2001. 22p.

Before September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for losses from terrorism was a normal feature of insurance contracts. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have changed insurers' perceptions of their risk exposure. Both insurers and reinsurers say that they do not know how much to charge for this coverage, and because they cannot predict future losses, they may exclude terrorism insurance from future contracts unless the federal government provides

some guidance to the industry. Several insurance programs in the United States and other countries ensure that insurance will be available to cover risks that the private sector has been unable or unwilling to cover, including losses from catastrophic events and terrorism. For government insurance programs, the question of long-term cost and program funding needs to be addressed before any program is established. Some federal insurance programs have a statutory intent to provide subsidized coverage, while others are intended to be self-funding. Regardless of statutory intent, if federal insurance is underpriced relative to its long-run costs and the federal government pays the difference, a government subsidy results.

0651 **Homeland Security. A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Capabilities and Management, Washington, D.C. Raymond J. Decker. October 31, 2001. 13pp.

Because of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent appearance of letters containing anthrax, terrorism rose to the top of the national agenda. The attorney general has indicated that the country needs to be prepared for still more terrorist incidents. DOJ is working with state and local governments to complete risk management tools for the domestic preparedness program. The FBI, however, told GAO that these will be limited to threat assessments only and will not include other aspects of risk management that GAO advocates. Despite these inconclusive results, the federal government can benefit from risk management, a systematic and analytic process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset and to identify actions that reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. An effective risk management approach includes a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment. Such an approach could help the nation prepare against threats it faces and help better target finite resources to areas of highest priority.

0664 **European Security. U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, International Affairs and Trade, Washington, D.C. November 28, 2001. 102pp.

Since the end of the cold war, the United States and its European allies have used smaller militaries, disbursed more development assistance, and increased their reliance on multilateral organizations to provide for European security. Despite reductions in force levels and budgets, U.S. and European military forces have been actively engaged in peacekeeping and other security-enhancing activities in the region. The United States and its European allies have contributed to stability in the Balkans through various military and financial means. The Balkans operations have highlighted numerous shortfalls in the military capabilities of European allies, but competing budgetary priorities may limit allied ability to remedy these military shortfalls before the end of the decade. Defense expenditures are expected to remain relatively flat at year 2000 levels over the next four to five years for most European allies, placing major defense initiatives sponsored by NATO and the European Union in jeopardy.

0766 **Guidelines for Mass Fatality Management During Terrorist Incidents Involving Chemical Agents.**

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Domestic Preparedness Program, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. November 2001. 44pp.

SBCCOM established an IRP with the mission to identify problems and develop solutions to the difficult challenges associated with response to and recovery from acts of terrorism using unconventional weapons. SBCCOM established two separate analysis groups to address these challenges, one for biological and one for chemical events. This report assists emergency managers, medical examiners, and coroners to better prepare for and determine the best course of action for responding to a mass fatality situation following a chemical WMD incident.

0810 **Terrorism. Threat Assessment, Countermeasures and Policy.**

U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, Washington, D.C. November 2001. 38pp.

This twentieth issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*—planned well before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania—explores major themes in international terrorism and its increasingly violent nature through a series of articles, fact sheets, and references from experts within the U.S. government and from the academic and private sectors.

0848 **Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats.**

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Brian Michael Jenkins. November 15, 2001. 11pp.

Despite the high level of anxiety currently among Americans, they may still not fully comprehend the seriousness of the current and near-term threats they confront or the longer-term consequences of the trends underscored so dramatically on September 11, 2001. Over the past decade, they have experienced a series of devastating terrorist attacks—attacks that in terms of the concentration and magnitude of casualties have been greater than anything experienced by other nations: the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was followed by the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which was followed by the events of September 11, 2001—each worse than the last. Because those attacks have been sporadic, however, the passage of time between them has allowed Americans to return to business as usual. This time must be different.

0859 **Guarding Nuclear Reactors and Materials from Terrorists and Thieves.**

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. George Bunn. Lyudmila Zaitseva. November 2, 2001. 14pp.

This presentation was made at the Plenary Session: Combating Nuclear Terrorism IAEA Symposium, Vienna, Austria. The September 11, 2001, attacks alerted the world to the need to strengthen standards for protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material from theft and sabotage, the subject of possible revisions to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The information available on the threats against which countries protect their nuclear material and facilities shows great variation from country to country. Some countries do not perceive any threat of weapons-usable material theft by insiders for sale to terrorists, and some have not protected their nuclear power plants against terrorist truck bombers.

- 0873 **Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses.**
RAND Corporation Washington Office, Washington, D.C. John Parachini. November 6, 2001. 18pp.
This is the testimony given by John Parachini, policy analyst, RAND Washington Office, before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, which focuses on the potential perpetrator of the recent anthrax attacks. Examining the source of these attacks provides a current case study to review the threat of bioterrorism. Some preventive measures are reviewed, which aim to diminish the proliferation of biological agents to states and terrorists.
- 0891 **Homeland Security. Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and Long-Term National Needs.**
U.S. General Accounting Office, Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. David M. Walker. November 7, 2001. 23pp.
The United States now confronts a range of diffuse threats, which put increased destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals. These threats include terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure and computer systems, the potential use of WMD, and the spread of infectious diseases. Addressing these challenges requires leadership to develop and implement a homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant partners and to marshal and direct the necessary resources. Although homeland security is an urgent and vital national priority, the United States still must address short-term and long-term fiscal challenges that were present before September 11, 2001.
- 0914 **Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism.**
International Crisis Group, ICG Balkans Report, Brussels, Belgium. November 9, 2001. 41pp.
The global focus on Islamist extremist-inspired terrorism resulting from the September 11, 2001, atrocities has raised the question of the potential for such terrorist activity in, or emanating from, the Balkans. Given the presence of ex-mujahidin in Bosnia, the tens of thousands of former military and paramilitary fighters in Bosnia and Kosovo and Macedonia who are Muslims by tradition, if not for the most part by observance, and the large deployments of U.S. and other troops in the region, some (though by no means all) senior Western sources describe the potential terrorist threat as significant.
- 0955 **Options for Prosecuting International Terrorists.**
United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, Washington, D.C. David Scheffer. November 14, 2001. 16pp.
Terrorist suspects should not be granted prisoner of war (POW) status if apprehended, although officially organized forces of the Taliban in Afghanistan probably would qualify for POW status. The options for prosecution of the terrorist suspects include nine judicial forums that need not be mutually exclusive. There may well be occasion to prosecute different terrorist suspects in different courts in different jurisdictions simultaneously. The options include U.S. federal courts, military courts, or a military commission; foreign national courts; a UN Security Council ad hoc international criminal tribunal; a UN General Assembly ad hoc international criminal tribunal; a coalition treaty-based criminal tribunal; a special Islamic court; and UN-administered courts in Afghanistan. At least for the near future, key options for prosecution of terrorist suspects will be U.S. federal courts—

where so many of them already have been indicted for pre-September 11, 2001, crimes—and foreign national courts that will certainly play a key role in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist suspects.

0971 **Bioterrorism. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Role in Public Health Protection.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, Health Care—Public Health Issues, Washington, D.C. Janet Heinrich. November 15, 2001. 17pp.

Federal research and preparedness activities related to bioterrorism center on detection; the development of vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals; and the development of performance standards for emergency response equipment. Preparedness activities include (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. To coordinate their efforts to combat terrorism, federal agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with other agencies to share resources and capabilities. Coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, however, raising concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include insufficient state and local planning and a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This testimony summarizes a September 2001 report.

0988 **Peace Watch. Coping with Terrorism.**

United States Institute of Peace, Peace Watch, Special Double Issue, Washington, D.C. October/December 2001. 19pp.

The institute publishes its newsletter, *Peace Watch*, six times a year. This special double issue includes articles on "Coping with Terrorism"; "Turbulent Peace"; "Human Rights in the Middle East"; "A Crime Against Humanity"; "Hatred, Violence, and the Work of the Institute"; "Advancing Human Rights and Peace"; "Kosovo: Municipal Association, Confronting Organized Crime"; "Constitution Making in Rwanda; Grant Awards"; and "Fellowship and Scholarship Awards." The long-term struggle against terrorism will be largely an information war, a fight for people's minds, requiring a strategic communication campaign.

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0001 **Department of State. Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges.**

U.S. General Accounting Office, International Affairs and Trade, Washington, D.C. December 2001. 43pp.

GAO reviewed DOS's fiscal year 2000 performance report and its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. Weaknesses in DOS's fiscal year 2000 performance report made it difficult to determine the department's progress toward achieving such key outcomes as eliminating the threat from WMD and expanding foreign markets for U.S. products and services. These weaknesses are rooted in performance goals

and indicators established in DOS's performance plan for 2000, which GAO criticized in an earlier report. DOS has taken a major step toward implementing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requirements by producing a fiscal year 2002 plan that is superior to earlier efforts. DOS will need to focus on reporting on all indicators in the plan and, if targets are not achieved, clearly explain why and what actions it plans to achieve the targets in the future.

0044 **An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders.**

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C. Alim A. Fatah, Richard D. Arcilesi Jr., Kenneth J. Ewing, Charlotte H. Lattin, and Timothy F. Moshier. December 2001. 57pp.

This paper provides emergency first responders with information to aid them in their understanding of biological agent detection equipment. Among the topics discussed include the four most common classes of biological agents, challenges to biological agent detection, biological agent detection system components and technologies, and preparation for a biological incident. This paper discusses the various biological agents that are currently a threat to law enforcement officers and the general public along with elements that have an effect on these agents. This document also lists the parts needed to develop equipment and machines to combat this threat and the evaluation of equipment that is currently available.

0101 **Biological Terrorism: Department of Defense Research and Development.**

U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Warfare, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Anna Johnson-Winegar. December 5, 2001. 23pp.

This is a statement of Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for chemical and biological defense, before the House Science Committee (full committee hearing, "Science of Bioterrorism: Is the Federal Government Prepared?"). The testimony identifies DoD research and development work that may improve the nation's ability to detect, prevent, respond to, and remediate bioterrorist attacks. Testimony also concerns planning, coordination, and execution of activities to counter bioterrorism—with a focus on science and technology development activities—between DoD and other federal agencies.

0124 **Terrorists, Military Tribunals, and the Constitution.**

The Cato Institute, Policy Forum, Washington, D.C. December 6, 2001. 68pp.

President Bush recently issued an executive order that will allow military tribunals to hear the cases of people accused of terrorism. The executive order also made it clear that any such military proceeding would not adhere to a variety of constitutional norms. Are such trials appropriate under present circumstances—or has the president overstepped his authority? This policy forum presents a wide-ranging discussion of this subject.

- 0192 **Third Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. III. For Ray Downey.**
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, [Washington, D.C.]. December 15, 2001. 269pp.
The conclusions and recommendations included in this document are the result of almost three years of research and deliberation. In 2001 the advisory panel has focused on several functional challenges to protecting the United States against terrorism in five specific areas: state and local response, health and medical capabilities, immigration and border control, security against cyber attacks, and roles and missions on the use of the military. To understand the key conclusions and recommendations in this interim report, it is important to place the recommendations in the context of previous research and analysis. Therefore, this interim report begins with a brief summary of the recommendations contained in the second annual report.
- 0461 **Training to Help Traumatized Populations.**
United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, Washington, D.C. December 17, 2001. 8pp.
Societies riven by ethnic conflict often expect younger generations to maintain certain mental representations of traumatic historical events and to clearly establish ethnic boundaries that distinguish one traumatized ethnic group from another. The needs of traumatized people take many forms and can be successfully addressed in different ways by a variety of professionals—ranging from psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers to educators, religious clergy, and development practitioners. Trauma training programs are more likely to be successful if they are based on a deep understanding of the complex political, economic, and social forces and events that contributed to the context in which the trauma occurred.
- 0469 **U.S. Report to UNSC on Counterterrorism Measures.**
U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, Washington, D.C. December 19, 2001. 26pp.
According to UN Security Council resolution, countries are required to submit a report by the end of December 2001. The resolution requires nations to specifically target terrorists' fund-raising activities, financial assets, and ability to cross borders and acquire weapons. In addition to discussing what it has done, the United States noted in the report that many states have to make changes in their laws, regulations, and practices to fully implement the resolution and said it is ready to provide technical assistance to help in these efforts. Those with the capacity to assist in these changes are needed to help those who lack the expertise and resources to achieve full implementation.
- 0495 **A Command and Control Structure for Joint Interagency Counterterrorism Operations Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction Within a Regional Commander-in-Chief's Area of Responsibility.**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Kevin C. Colyer. June 1, 2001. 145pp.
The threat of state or nonstate actors conducting terrorism utilizing WMD against U.S. personnel, property, or other locations of United States interest outside the continental U.S. or its territories represents a serious threat to U.S. vital interests.

While numerous U.S. government agencies have joined the effort to prepare against this possibility, the system remains disjointed and inefficient. This study presents a command and control structure that meets the requirements of the operation to solve this dilemma.

- 0640 **Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses.**
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. John R. Martin, ed. January 2002. 108pp.
Within only a few days of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.
- 0748 **The Global War on Terrorism. The First 100 Days.**
The Coalition Information Centers, Washington, D.C., London, U.K., and Islamabad, Pakistan. 24pp.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked freedom. The world has responded with an unprecedented coalition against international terrorism. In the first one hundred days of the war, President George W. Bush increased America's homeland security and built a worldwide coalition that began to destroy al-Qaeda's grip on Afghanistan by driving the Taliban from power; disrupted al-Qaeda's global operations and terrorist financing networks; destroyed al-Qaeda terrorist training camps; helped the innocent people of Afghanistan recover from the Taliban's reign of terror; and helped Afghans put aside long-standing differences to form a new interim government that represents all Afghans—including women. President Bush is implementing a comprehensive and visionary foreign policy against international terrorism, stating that any nation harboring or supporting terrorism will be regarded as a hostile regime.
- 0772 **Coping After Terrorism. A Guide to Healing and Recovery.**
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims of Crime, Washington, D.C. September 2001. 10pp.
This Office for Victims of Crime handbook provides victims of terrorism with information based on the expertise of mental health, crisis counseling, and victim assistance professionals. The handbook is intended to help victims understand their reactions to an act of terrorism or mass violence.
- 0782 **Operational Art of Counterterrorism.**
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Paul J. Wille. 2000–2001. 55pp.
Terrorism is a real threat to the lives of the citizens of the United States and those of her allies. Osama bin Laden's organization sponsored the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, which resulted in seventeen dead U.S. sailors, dozens of injuries, and millions of dollars in damage. Field Manual 3-0 must support counterterrorism planning, which is an important issue for the U.S. Army for several reasons. The army, an instrument of national power, is employed to shape the global security environment in support of the National Security Strategy. One of the army's

mission-essential tasks is to provide support to civilian authorities dealing with crises. Historically, the army's support of civil authorities has included a wide variety of missions. Combating terrorism is also a type of stability operation that the army may execute. Terrorist acts against the United States are intended to limit U.S. engagement and influence in the terrorist's region of interest and throughout the world. Information on terrorist organizations, particularly on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization, is used here to determine if the elements of operational art in army doctrine are adequate to develop a concept plan to defeat a terrorist organization.

0837 **Teaching Guide on International Terrorism: Definitions, Causes, and Responses.**

United States Institute of Peace, Education Program, Washington, D.C. November 2001. 22pp.

Dealing with terrorism has become the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy today. Yet, terrorism has rarely been dealt with in high school courses. The teaching guide is aimed at grades 11 and 12 with the objective of providing teachers with lesson plans, bibliographic sources, and factual material to assist them in understanding the varying views and definitions of terrorism, some of terrorism's possible origins, and different ways in which terrorism may be addressed.

0859 **Anthrax and Mass-Casualty Terrorism: What Is the Bioterrorist Threat After September 11?**

Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; and U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, Washington, D.C. Jason Pate. November 2001. 5pp.

The unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent series of anthrax attacks have ushered in a new era of terrorism in the United States. Although there previously have been relatively large-scale terrorist attacks in America, such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the coordination, planning, and scale of the September 11, 2001, attacks demonstrate that mass-casualty terrorism has reached the U.S. homeland. This article reviews the historical context of the current anthrax attacks, paying special attention to looking at the current situation in broad perspective. It also explores United States' vulnerabilities to this type of terrorism and offers policy recommendations to address these vulnerabilities.

0864 **Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001. An Updated Account.**

Her Majesty's Government, 10 Downing St., London, England [U.K]. November 14, 2001. 23pp.

This document summarizes both the public and newly declassified material linking Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network to the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001. It updates the document published by Prime Minister Tony Blair on October 4, 2001. The update has been produced to remind people why the British are engaged in this action and to publish new information, including that linking the majority of the hijackers with al-Qaeda, rather than just the three originally stated. A senior bin Laden associate has admitted since October 4 he has trained some of the hijackers in Afghanistan. Bin Laden's own statements and those of his

lieutenants since October 4 have also been increasingly self-incriminatory as he has made no attempt to deny responsibility for the attacks.

0887 **The Network of Terrorism: The United States and the International Campaign to End Global Terrorism: Defeating Terror; Defending Freedom.**

[U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, Washington, D.C.] [October 11, 2001]. 14pp.

This report summarizes what is known about the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the attacks' connection to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network. It links al-Qaeda to previous attacks on American lives, provides a sampling of opinion from the Islamic world, and describes American humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Today, the United States, joined by nations throughout the world, is engaged in a sustained effort to identify and destroy a global network of terrorists.

0901 **Securing the Homeland. Strengthening the Nation.**

Office of Homeland Security, The White House, Washington, D.C. George W. Bush. [2001]. 36pp.

This report concerns September 11, 2001, and its aftermath, America's response to date, and the national strategy. Budget initiatives of 2003 include supporting first responders; defending against bioterrorism; securing America's borders; and using twenty-first century technology to secure the homeland. Additional budget priorities include transportation security, federal law enforcement, Citizen Corps, DoD and the intelligence community, and protecting our critical infrastructure.

0937 **Agricultural Bioterrorism.**

[USDA, APHIS, Washington, D.C.]. David R. Franz. [September 2000]. 11pp.

This presentation was made at the Fifth Annual Emergency Preparedness Satellite Seminar sponsored by USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), FEMA, and DoD. The document covers biological warfare-related zoonoses, diseases that affect both humans and animals. It discusses foreign animal disease and emerging infectious disease agents of interest to terrorists bent on agricultural attacks. Recent outbreak illustrations and potential economic impacts are also mentioned.

0948 **Agricultural Counterterrorism.**

[USDA, APHIS, Washington, D.C.]. David L. Huxsoll. [September 2000]. 13pp.

This presentation was made at the Fifth Annual Emergency Preparedness Satellite Seminar sponsored by USDA's APHIS, FEMA, and DoD. This report discusses preparedness, veterinary surveillance, agent identification, response, mitigation, training, and research related to agroterrorism.

0961 **What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions.**

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Washington, D.C. September 10, 2001. 9pp.

This is a publication of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which comprises a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (Title 31, Part 595 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (Title 31, Part 596 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), and Foreign Terrorist

Organizations Sanctions Regulations (Title 31, Part 597 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations). The report includes a list of named terrorist organizations.

- 0970 **Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?**
Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler. [1987]. 12pp.
Two options for nuclear devices to be built by terrorists are considered here: using the earliest design principles in a so-called crude design and using more advanced principles in a so-called sophisticated design. A crude design is one in which either of the methods successfully demonstrated in 1945—the gun type and the implosion type—is applied. A small, sophisticated design is one with a diameter of about one or two feet and a weight of one hundred to a few hundred pounds, so that it is readily transportable (for example, in the trunk of a standard car). Its size and weight may be compared with that of a crude design, which would be on the order of a ton or more and require a larger vehicle. It would also be possible, in about the same size and weight as a crude model but using a more sophisticated design, to build a device requiring a smaller amount of fissile material to achieve similar effects.
- 0982 **Bioterrorism: An Overview.**
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. Rick Roman. [1999]. 43pp.
This slide set was developed by the senior epidemic support coordinator of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program. It covers the specific roles of different types of laboratories in the event of an attack and how each laboratory should respond.
- 1025 **Blueprint for the National Domestic Preparedness Office.**
National Domestic Preparedness Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 2001. 38pp.
Success in preventing, preparing for, and responding to a terrorist attack in the United States involving conventional and nonconventional WMD depends upon the establishment and maintenance of a coordinated crisis and consequence management infrastructure. Emergency responders, who arrive first on the scene, as well as those in the medical profession who provide interim treatment, must be adequately trained, equipped, and exercised to ensure their ability to effectively respond and conduct relief and recovery operations as part of a multiagency team. The federal agencies recognize that the response to bioterrorism is qualitatively different from a chemical event and primarily involves the public health and medical communities.
- 1063 **Defense Against Toxin Weapons.**
U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland. David R. Franz. [1996]. 27pp.
The purpose of this manual is to provide basic information on biological toxins to military leaders and health care providers at all levels to help them make informed decisions on protecting their troops from toxins. This primer puts toxins in context, attempts to remove the elements of mystery and fear that surround them, and provides general information that will ultimately help leaders make rational

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decisions, protect their soldiers, and win battles. The mission of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command's Medical Biological Defense Research Program is to study and to develop means of medically defending the U.S. armed forces from toxins and infectious threats posed by adversaries. Physical measures, such as the protective mask and decontamination systems, developed for the chemical threat are, for the most part, effective against toxin threats.

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