

*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

# **ASIA**

**Special Studies,  
1995–1997**

**Supplement**

**UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA**

*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

**The Special Studies Series  
Foreign Nations**

**Asia**

**Special Studies,  
1995–1997**

**Supplement**

**Project Coordinator  
Paul Kesaris**

**Guide Compiled by  
Blair Hydrick**

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# SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

No single organization can provide the background information, the wide range of current data, and the crucial analyses that are required by the executive departments of the federal government on complex and volatile international issues. When there can be little margin of error concerning the facts and recommendations being given to key officials, executive departments depend upon an elite group of private and governmental organizations—think tanks—for special studies of the highest caliber.

The authors of these special studies are associated with many of the finest research facilities in the United States, including the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, the National Defense University, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Army Command and General Staff College, the American Institutes for Research, and major international institutes at Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, Georgetown, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Yale.

Described below are several of the federal government agencies and organizations, U.S. military educational institutions, and quasi- and nongovernment think tanks and consulting corporations identified in this publication.

## **U.S. Federal Government Agencies and Organizations**

### **Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense**

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense under a director appointed by the secretary of defense. The agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the director of defense research and engineering (DDRE), engages in advanced basic and applied research and development projects essential to the Department of Defense; conducts prototype projects that embody technology that may be incorporated into joint programs, programs in support of deployed U.S. forces, or selected military department (Army, Navy, and Air Force) programs; and, on request, assists the military departments in their research and development efforts.

In this regard, the agency arranges, manages, and directs the performance of work connected with assigned advanced projects by the military departments, other government agencies, individuals, private business entities, and educational or research institutions, as appropriate; recommends through the DDRE to the secretary of defense assignment of advanced projects to the agency; keeps the DDRE, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and other Department of Defense agencies informed on significant new developments and technological advances within assigned projects; and performs other such functions as the secretary of defense or the DDRE may assign.

### **Agency for International Development, Department of State**

Established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, the Agency for International Development (AID) is an independent government agency that provides economic development and humanitarian assistance to advance U.S. economic and political interests overseas.

### **Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce**

The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) promotes U.S. national and economic security and foreign policy interests by managing and enforcing the department's security-related trade and competitiveness programs.

BXA plays a key role in challenging issues involving national security and nonproliferation, export growth, and high technology. The bureau's continuing major challenge is combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction while furthering the growth of U.S. exports.

### **Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor**

The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) carries out the Department of Labor's international responsibilities under the direction of the deputy under secretary for international affairs and assists in formulating international economic, trade, and immigration policies affecting American workers.

ILAB implements these objectives through the following activities: (1) representing the secretary of labor on international issues in the interagency policy-making processes chaired by the National Economic Council and the National Security Council; (2) representing the U.S. government at the International Labor Organization; (3) implementing the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor supplemental agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); (4) issuing reports on international child labor issues and funding international programs to eliminate child labor exploitation; (5) representing the U.S. government in the Human Resources Working Group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; (6) preparing G-7 and European Union

meetings involving labor market policy issues; (7) representing the U.S. government in the Employment, Labor and Social Affairs (ELSA) Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; (8) assisting the U.S. Trade Representative in international trade negotiations, including immigration-related issues; (9) coordinating labor market technical assistance programs with foreign countries; and (10) undertaking research on the impact of international trade and immigration policies on U.S. workers.

### **Census Bureau, Department of Commerce**

The Census Bureau collects and provides timely, relevant, and quality data about the people and economy of the United States.

### **Central Intelligence Agency**

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the keystone of a U.S. intelligence community. Its mission consists of supporting the president, the National Security Council, and all who make and execute U.S. national security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the president.

The CIA's core beliefs and values include intelligence that adds substantial value to the management of crises, the conduct of war, and the development of policy; and objectivity in the substance of intelligence.

### **Commercial Service, Department of Commerce**

The Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce assists U.S. firms in regard to export potential by providing counseling and advice, information on markets abroad, international contacts, and advocacy services.

The Commercial Service is co-located in Export Assistance Centers throughout the United States and in more than seventy countries abroad. The domestic and international offices are directly linked through a worldwide communications and information network, which services U.S. exporters, including liaison with multilateral development banks.

### **Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense**

Established in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a designated combat support agency and the senior military intelligence component of the intelligence community. DIA's primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence to the U.S. armed forces. Intelligence support for operational forces encompasses a number of areas and challenges. Key areas of emphasis include targeting and battle damage assessment, weapons proliferation, warning of impending crises, support to peacekeeping operations, maintenance of databases on foreign military organizations and

their equipment, and, as necessary, support to UN operations and U.S. allies. In addition to providing intelligence to military forces, DIA also provides information to policy makers in the Department of Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DIA plays a key role in providing information on foreign weapons systems to U.S. weapons planners and the weapons acquisition community. In carrying out these missions, DIA coordinates and synthesizes military intelligence analysis for defense officials and military commanders worldwide, working in close concert with the intelligence components of the military services and the U.S. unified commands.

### **Department of Commerce**

The Department of Commerce promotes job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved living standards. Working in partnership with business, universities, communities, and workers, the Commerce Department builds and promotes U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace; strengthens the nation's economic infrastructure; keeps America competitive with science and technology and an information base; and provides management and stewardship of the nation's resources and assets.

### **Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture**

The Economic Research Service (ERS) provides economic analysis on efficiency, efficacy, and equity issues related to agriculture, food, the environment, and rural development to improve public and private decision making. The ERS is one of four agencies in the Research, Education, and Economics (REE) Mission Area of the Department of Agriculture.

### **Economics and Statistics Administration, Commerce Department**

Much of the statistical, economic, and demographic information collected by the federal government is made available to the public through the bureaus and offices of the Department of Commerce that are known collectively as the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA).

This information is gleaned from many bureaus and offices, including the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The Census Bureau conducts surveys for other departments as well as the Department of Commerce. Most of the data in its periodic economic indicators are derived from surveys of businesses, and most of the demographic information comes from surveys of households or the decennial census.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is the "nation's accountant," integrating and interpreting data to draw a picture of the U.S. economy. BEA's economic accounts—national, regional, and international—provide

information on such key issues as economic growth, regional development, and the nation's position in the world economy.

STAT-USA is an information service providing economic, business, and social/environmental program data produced by more than fifty federal sources.

### **Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress**

Since 1948, the Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress's principal fee-based research service, has provided U.S. government agencies with the research and analysis needed to carry out their national and international missions.

Using the collections of the Library of Congress, the research staff of the Federal Research Division provides the information in formats based on specific agency requirements. The Federal Research Division provides federal agencies access to millions of books, newspapers, journals, maps, microforms, and other special format materials; materials in many languages; many current periodicals, of which almost half are in foreign languages; computer records in a variety of databases, including both English and foreign-language information; and comprehensive coverage of legal, scientific, technical, historical, cultural, political, sociological, economic, and numerous other fields of research.

### **Foreign Broadcast Information Service**

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is a U.S. government operation that translates the text of daily broadcasts, government statements, and select news stories from non-English sources around the world. FBIS is supported by the CIA.

### **General Accounting Office, Comptroller General of the United States**

The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the investigative arm of the Congress and is charged with examining all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds.

GAO was established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. § 702) to independently audit government agencies. Over the years, Congress has expanded GAO's audit authority, added new responsibilities and duties, and strengthened GAO's ability to perform independently.

Supporting Congress is GAO's fundamental responsibility. In meeting this objective, GAO performs a variety of services, the most prominent of which are audits and evaluations of government programs and activities. The majority of these reviews are made in response to specific congressional requests. GAO also responds to individual member requests, as possible. Other assignments are initiated pursuant to standing commitments to congressional committees, and some reviews are specifically required by law.

Finally, some assignments are independently undertaken in accordance with GAO's basic legislative responsibilities.

The ability to review practically any government function requires a multidisciplinary staff. GAO's staff has expertise in a variety of disciplines—accounting, law, public and business administration, economics, the social and physical sciences, and others. When an assignment requires specialized experience not available within GAO, outside experts assist the permanent staff. GAO's staff goes wherever necessary on assignments, working onsite to gather data, test transactions, and observe firsthand how government programs and activities are carried out.

### **International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce**

The International Trade Administration (ITA) supports U.S. businesses in the global marketplace. The ITA is assigned to encourage, assist, and advocate U.S. exports by implementing a national export strategy, by focusing on the big emerging markets (BEMs), providing industry and country analysis for U.S. business, and supporting new-to-export and new-to-market businesses through U.S. Export Assistance Centers, domestic commercial service offices, and worldwide posts and commercial centers in seventy countries. In addition, ITA ensures that U.S. business has equal access to foreign markets by advocating on behalf of U.S. exporters who are competing for major overseas contracts and by implementing major trade agreements, such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), NAFTA, and the Japan "Framework." ITA enables U.S. business to compete against unfairly traded imports and to safeguard jobs and the competitive strength of American industry by enforcing antidumping and countervailing duty laws and agreements that provide remedies for unfair trade practices.

### **Office of Technology Policy, Department of Commerce**

Office of Technology Policy (OTP) is the only office in the federal government with the explicit mission of developing and advocating national policies that use technology to build economic strength. OTP carries out this mission through its programs, services, speeches, and publications.

OTP's mission includes work in partnership with the private sector to develop and advocate national policies that maximize technology's contribution to U.S. economic growth, the creation of high-wage jobs, and improvements in Americans' quality of life.

### **United States Institute of Peace**

Established in 1984, the United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Free from political pressures, the institute is able to

assist the executive branch, Congress, and others with nonpartisan research, analysis, and information.

The institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including grants, fellowships, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The institute's board of directors is appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

### **United States International Trade Commission**

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency that provides objective trade information to both the legislative and executive branches of government; determines the impact of imports on U.S. industries; and directs actions against certain unfair trade practices, such as patent, trademark, and copyright infringement. USITC analysts and economists investigate and publish reports on U.S. industries and the global trends that affect them. The agency also updates and publishes the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

## **U.S. Military Educational Institutions and Organizations**

### **Air Force Institute of Technology**

The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) traces its roots to the early days of powered flight when it was apparent that the progress of military aviation depended upon special education in this new science.

Graduates have made contributions to engineering, science, technology, medicine, logistics, and management. AFIT's flexibility is such that it adjusts quickly to changing Air Force requirements. The faculty, comprised of military and civilian personnel, stay abreast of projected Air Force operations, and the programs are continually updated to offer AFIT students the latest available material.

### **Air War College**

The mission of the Air War College is to educate senior officers to lead at the strategic level in the employment of air and space forces, including joint operations, in support of national security.

### **Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University**

The mission of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is to prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership and staff

positions by conducting postgraduate, executive-level courses of study and associated research dealing with the resource component of national power, with special emphasis on materiel acquisition and joint logistics and their integration into national security strategy for peace and war. Reflecting this joint and interagency perspective, 67 percent of the student body is composed of military representatives from the land, sea, and air services; 25 percent are drawn from the departments of defense and state and ten other federal agencies; 7 percent are international military officers; and 1 percent come from the private sector.

In addition, at the direction of the under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology, ICAF serves as the information provider under the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. In this capacity, ICAF acts as a consortium college of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).

### **Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University**

The research and analysis mission of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is implemented through the Research Directorate (RD). RD is structured around six geographic and functional teams, each led by a senior expert. The institute's research agenda focuses on analysis of key issues of strategy and policy that require in-depth research to support senior decision makers in the office of the secretary of defense, the Joint Staff, and the commanders-in-chief.

The studies and analyses typically address questions of strategic importance that have long-term implications for U.S. national security. INSS serves as the in-house think tank for senior Pentagon leadership. As part of the National Defense University (see below), RD's mission includes providing support to the colleges with research opportunities, faculty programs, and academic forums.

### **National Defense University**

The mission of the National Defense University (NDU) is to ensure excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of national security.

The NDU consists of the ICAF, the National War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. The NDU prepares selected commissioned officers and civilian officials from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies of the government for command, management, and staff responsibilities in a multinational, intergovernmental, or joint national security setting. The colleges' curricula emphasize the development and implementation of national security strategy and military strategy, mobilization, acquisition, management of resources, information and information technology for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. In addition to mission-specific education, the colleges

emphasize developing executive skills and improving competencies. The NDU faculty and students conduct short-range and long-range studies of national security policy, military strategy, the allocation and management of resources for national security, and civil-military affairs. A goal of university research is to create a national repository of expertise on mobilization, military strategy, and joint or combined policy and plans.

### **Naval Postgraduate School**

The Naval Postgraduate School, located in Monterey, California, is an academic institution whose emphasis is on study and research programs relevant to the Navy's interests and to the interests of other arms of the Department of Defense.

Students come from all service branches of the U.S. defense community, as well as from the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the services of more than twenty-five allied nations. The school provides more than forty programs of study, ranging from the traditional engineering and physical sciences to the rapidly evolving space science programs. The faculty, the majority of whom are civilians, are drawn from a broad range of educational institutions.

### **Naval War College**

The Naval War College prepares its students by providing them with a professional naval education, based on a clear understanding of the fundamental principles that have governed national security affairs in peace and in war throughout history.

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in command, staff, and management positions in naval, joint, and combined environments; to provide a sound understanding of military strategy and operational art; to instill joint attitudes and perspectives; and to serve as a center for research and war gaming that will develop advanced strategic, war fighting, and campaign concepts for future employment of maritime, joint, and combined forces.

The president of the Naval War College is a U.S. Navy unrestricted line officer in the grade of rear admiral. The deputy to the president/chief of staff administers the college's academic and research programs through an organization composed of the dean of academics, who directs and coordinates all academic programs and departments, including the two international programs—the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College; the dean of naval warfare studies, who directs and coordinates the college's major research efforts, including the War Gaming Department; the dean of administration, who is responsible for the direction of all day-to-day administrative and support functions; and the dean of students, who is responsible for all student matters connected with the colleges of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff.

### **Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College**

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) traces its origin to the establishment in 1947 of the Advanced Studies Group by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, then chief of staff. The initial mission of this group was to develop concepts of national security in light of the revolution in warfare brought about by the onset of the atomic age. The group was elevated to the joint level with the creation of the Department of Defense.

When the Army War College was reestablished in 1950, an Advanced Studies Group was chartered to consider strategy and land power. The group evolved into the Advanced Studies and Doctrine Division within the faculty of the college. As part of an army-wide reorganization in 1962, the division became the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies, addressing strategic questions as well as those of organizing, equipping, and preparing the army to fight. The mission became exclusively strategic in 1971, and the institute received its present name.

Another army reorganization, in 1973, brought both the U.S. Army War College and SSI under the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, and SSI became a War College department. More recently, SSI has developed a relationship with the Joint Staff, the National Defense University's Institute for National Security Studies, and the Center for Strategic Leadership (including its Peacekeeping Institute) at Carlisle Barracks. SSI continues to provide an analytical capability within the army to address strategic and other issues to support army participation in national security policy formulation.

### **U.S. Army Command and General Staff College**

The mission of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is to educate leaders in the values and practice of the profession of arms, to act as the executive agent for the army's Leader Development Program, to develop doctrine that guides the army, and to promote and support the advancement of military art and science. CGSC training, education, and professional military excellence prepare officers for wartime duties.

### **U.S. Army War College**

The mission of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) is to prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students about the employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs that benefit the USAWC, the U.S. Army, and the nation.

## **U.S. Pacific Command**

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is a joint command directing and coordinating the employment of U.S. forces in peace, crisis, or war to advance U.S. interests as an active player, partner, and beneficiary in the Asia-Pacific community.

In addition, USPACOM maintains a significant role in coordinating U.S. military strategy with security assistance policy and program management affecting twenty-eight foreign nations.

## **Quasi- and Nongovernment Think Tanks and Consulting Corporations**

### **American Institute in Taiwan**

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a nonprofit, private corporation established shortly after the U.S. government changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) of April 10, 1979, authorized the continuation of “commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.” It also provided that “any programs, transactions, or other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any Agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through the American Institute in Taiwan.” The Department of State, through a contract with the institute, provides a large part of AIT’s funding and guidance in its operations.

Congress, in passing the Taiwan Relations Act, also assumed an oversight role with respect to the institute’s operations.

### **Argonne National Laboratory**

Chartered in 1946, Argonne National Laboratory is one of the nation’s first national laboratories and a Department of Energy research center.

The laboratory supports more than two hundred research projects, ranging from studies of the atomic nucleus to global climate change research. Since 1990, Argonne has worked with more than six hundred companies and numerous federal agencies and other organizations. Argonne is operated by the University of Chicago for the U.S. Department of Energy.

Argonne research falls into four broad categories:

- (1) basic science research. This includes experimental and theoretical work in materials science, physics, chemistry, biology, high-energy physics, and mathematics and computer science, including high-performance computing;
- (2) energy resources programs;

(3) environmental management. Research includes alternative energy systems; environmental risk and economic impact assessments; hazardous waste site analysis and remediation planning; electrometallurgical treatment to prepare spent nuclear fuel for disposal; and new technologies for decontaminating and decommissioning aging nuclear reactors; and  
(4) industrial technology development.

### **Center for Naval Analyses**

The CNA Corporation (CNAC) is a nonprofit organization providing research, analysis, and technical services to the government and other organizations. CNAC's two operating divisions are the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Institute for Public Research (IPR).

CNA is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Department of the Navy. For more than fifty years, CNA has conducted research and analyses that have helped the effectiveness and efficiency of the navy and marine corps. CNA also conducts analyses for other Department of Defense and nondefense clients whose needs fall within CNA's mission as a federally funded research and development center.

IPR addresses a broad range of issues for government agencies and other organizations.

### **East-West Center**

The East-West Center (EWC), a national education and research institution, is a major resource of knowledge and information about Asia and the Pacific.

The center is a public, nonprofit institution with an eighteen-member international board of governors. Principal funding comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, corporations, and more than twenty Asian and Pacific governments. The center adopted a problem-oriented, multidisciplinary approach to research that addresses the region's critical issues.

The center is a national source of knowledge and information about the Asia-Pacific region. Current projects, for example, are dealing with issues of democratization; political and economic relations; health care; the changing role of the family; environment; resources; Northeast Asia development and cooperation; and investment in China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries.

### **Innovation Associates, Inc.**

Innovation Associates (IA) "operationalizes" the learning organization concept. In practice, this entails teaching, training, coaching, and consulting with clients to clarify and revitalize their sense of purpose; articulate a shared

vision of the future they aspire to create; understand the complexity and systemic nature of their key issues and decisions; and work together in “smart” teams. IA’s specific offerings include public training programs, customized on-site programs, train-the-trainer and licensing programs, and consulting services.

### **Japan–United States Friendship Commission**

The Japan–United States Friendship Commission was established as an independent agency by the U.S. Congress in 1975 (P.L. 94-118). The commission administers a U.S. government trust fund that originated in connection with the return to the Japanese government of certain U.S. facilities in Okinawa and for postwar American assistance to Japan. Income from the fund is available for the promotion of scholarly, cultural, and public affairs activities between the two countries.

In the first years the commission concentrated on people and institutions whose development could assist the Japan–U.S. relationship. Issues in that relationship were not singled out for attention, but it was hoped that more and better trained people and stronger institutions of communication would help clarify the issues. As economic competition grew and the American trade deficit with Japan worsened, members of the commission came to feel that a more active program to encourage the study of troublesome issues was called for. Such research could be pertinent to those in Congress concerned with Japan, various agencies of the executive branch, think tanks, academia, and the media. At Chairman Robert Ward’s first meeting in 1980 the decision was made to support research, preferably binational, that would illuminate pressing issues on which the two nations differed, provided that such support did not compromise the commission’s position to not take policy stands. Two projects approved at that meeting were for a study and discussions on U.S.–Japanese competition in the semiconductor industry, organized by the Japan Society, New York, and on the Japan–U.S. economic relationship, organized by Stanford University.

In the early 1990s, the commission reaffirmed its policy of support for policy-oriented research but defined its particular role for “basic research” with policy orientation on the Japanese political economy and U.S.–Japan relations rather than on more immediate, short-term, transitory issues. Following this policy, the commission supports research on land-use policy in Japan, liberalization in Japanese financial markets, cooperation in nonproliferation export controls, two-way flows in U.S.–Japan technology transfers, and other critical areas.

### **Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory**

Ernest Orlando Lawrence founded this laboratory, the oldest of the national laboratories, in 1931. Lawrence invented the cyclotron, which led to

revolutionary discoveries about the nature of the universe. Known as a mecca of particle physics, Berkeley Laboratory long ago broadened its focus. Today, they are a multiprogram laboratory where research in advanced materials, life sciences, energy efficiency, detectors, and accelerators serves the nation's needs in technology and the environment. Berkeley Laboratory is located in the Berkeley Hills, next to the University of California at Berkeley, and is managed by the University of California for the U.S. Department of Energy.

### **National Research Council**

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the academy's purposes of further knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the academy, the National Research Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The National Research Council is administered jointly by both academies and the Institute of Medicine.

### **RAND Corporation**

RAND (an acronym for research and development) Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. From its inception in the days following World War II, RAND has focused on many pressing public policy problems, particularly research on national security issues.

In the 1960s, RAND began addressing major problems of domestic policy as well. RAND researchers operate on a broad front, assisting public policy makers at all levels; private sector leaders in many industries; and the public at large in efforts to strengthen the nation's economy, maintain its security, and improve its quality of life. They do so by analyzing choices and developments in many areas, including national defense, education and training, health care, criminal and civil justice, labor and population, science and technology, community development, international relations, and regional studies.

RAND was created at the urging of its original sponsor, the Air Force (then the Army Air Forces). Today, its activities are supported by a wide range of sources. U.S. government agencies provide the largest share of support. Charitable foundations, private sector firms, individuals, and earnings from RAND's endowment fund furnish a steadily growing proportion.

### **Sandia National Laboratory**

Sandia is a national security laboratory operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by the Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin company. Sandia designs nonnuclear components for the nation's nuclear weapons, performs a wide variety of energy research and development projects, and works on various responses to national security threats—both military and economic. The corporation encourages and seeks partnerships with appropriate U.S. industry and government groups to collaborate on emerging technologies that support Sandia's mission.

### **United States–Asia Environmental Partnership (US-AEP)**

The United States–Asia Environmental Partnership (US-AEP) is a public-private initiative that promotes environmentally sustainable development in Asia. US-AEP is jointly implemented by several U.S. government agencies, under the leadership of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

In creating US-AEP, the White House recognized Asia's growing commitment to sustainable development and America's increasing eagerness to share its experience, technology, and management practices.

With the participation of a wide range of partners—governments, nongovernment organizations, academia, and the private sector—US-AEP has become a flexible, responsive vehicle for delivering timely answers to environmental questions. US-AEP's mission is to promote a “clean revolution” in Asia: the continuing development and adoption of ever less-polluting and more resource-efficient products, processes, and services.

# EDITORIAL NOTE

The *Asia, 1995–1997 Supplement* collection consists of studies on Asia that became available during the period 1995–1997 from a variety of sources, including U.S. executive branch departments, agencies, and commissions; U.S. military educational institutions and organizations; and U.S. government contracts to universities, corporations, think tanks, and individuals.

# ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

<b>ABRI</b>	Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
<b>ACTPN</b>	Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations
<b>AEP</b>	Asian Environmental Partnership
<b>AMS</b>	Aggregate Measurements of Support
<b>APEC</b>	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
<b>APR</b>	Asia-Pacific Region
<b>ARF</b>	ASEAN Regional Forum
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
<b>BEMs</b>	Big Emerging Markets
<b>CBO</b>	Congressional Budget Office
<b>CCG</b>	Country Commercial Guide
<b>CNA</b>	Center for Naval Analyses
<b>COSTIND</b>	Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (PRC)
<b>CPC</b>	Communist Party of China; Crisis Prevention Center
<b>D.C.</b>	District of Columbia
<b>DPRK</b>	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
<b>FBIS</b>	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
<b>GAO</b>	General Accounting Office
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>IBM</b>	International Business Machines
<b>ITA</b>	Information Technology Agreement
<b>KIDA</b>	Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
<b>LDCs</b>	Lesser Developed Countries

<b>MIA</b>	Missing in Action
<b>MTCR</b>	Missile Technology Control Regime
<b>NA</b>	Not Available
<b>NGOs</b>	Nongovernmental Organizations
<b>NTT</b>	Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
<b>PLA</b>	People's Liberation Army (PRC)
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>RAM</b>	Reform the Armed Forces Movement
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>RMA</b>	Revolution in Military Affairs
<b>ROC</b>	Republic of China (Taiwan)
<b>ROK</b>	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
<b>SAR</b>	Special Administrative Region
<b>SFP</b>	Soldiers of the Filipino People
<b>SLOCs</b>	Sea Lines of Communication
<b>STA</b>	Science and Technology Agency (Japan)
<b>TMD</b>	Theater Missile Defenses
<b>TNWs</b>	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
<b>TPCC</b>	Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee
<b>U.K.</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>U.S.C.</b>	United States Code
<b>USDA</b>	United States Department of Agriculture
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization
<b>YOU</b>	Young Officers Union

# REEL INDEX

## Reel 1

Frame

### Asia (General)

1995

0001 **United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region.**

*Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. NA. February 1995. 38pp.*

This U.S. national security strategy, published in July 1994, is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are to enhance security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures, to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth, and to promote democracy abroad. In accordance with the national security strategy, this document explains U.S. defense policy toward furthering these goals in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). It builds upon the strategy's emphasis on maintaining a strong defense capability to enhance U.S. security and to provide a foundation for regional stability through mutually beneficial security partnerships. As the strategy states, East Asia is a region of growing importance to American goals: nowhere are the strands of our three-part strategy more intertwined; nowhere is the need for continued engagement more evident. In thinking about the APR, security comes first, and a committed U.S. military presence will continue to serve as a bedrock for America's security role in this dynamic area of the world. The regional security strategy for the APR emphasizes strengthening the bilateral alliances that have been at the heart of U.S. strategy for more than forty years. The United States is also committed to contribute to regional security through active participation in new multilateral fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Through such multilateral mechanisms the countries of the region seek to develop new cooperative approaches to achieve greater stability and security. Additionally, the Pacific Command sponsors multinational military activities.

0039 **Cautious Peace: Strategy and Circumstance in Asia-Pacific Security.**

*Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. James L. Lacy. July 1995. 182pp.*

This paper examines the conditions of security, alliance, and forward presence in which U.S. military forces may operate in the APR's near and distant future. The analysis includes: (1) a mid-decade overview of the Asia-Pacific economic, energy, environmental, political, and social development environment; (2) assessment of the near- or longer term conflict potential and prospects in the region; (3) examination of emerging security alignments, ambitions, and balances in Asia-Pacific security; (4) evaluation of the region's experience with and prospects for multilateral security arrangements; and (5) priority areas for U.S. defense policy and planning for the APR over the next several years.

0221 **Recommendations on Asia of the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.**

*President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, Washington, D.C. NA. September 14, 1995. 34pp.*

This report presents recommendations of the ACTPN concerning U.S. trade policies toward Asia. It includes sections on the following: (1) APEC: recommendations for an "Action Agenda" to be adopted at a November 1995 meeting in Osaka, Japan, including agenda items relating to trade liberalization, market access, foreign investments, trade in services, intellectual property rights, competition policy, energy and environmental policies, and worker rights and standards; (2) PRC: recommendations concerning use of the PRC's potential accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other means to make progress on selected fundamental trade issues, including tariffs, nontariff barriers, and foreign investments; (3) India: recommendations for developing a cooperative relationship with India in order to improve market access for U.S. business; (4) South Korea: recommendations concerning use of the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism for removing trade barriers related to South Korean certification and testing regimes, customs regulations, technical standards, lack of publication of rules, harassment of foreign companies, and government interference in pricing, taxation, and foreign investments; and (5) Vietnam: recommendations concerning full normalization of economic relations with Vietnam, including extension of most-favored-nation trade status. The report also includes a dissenting statement and a list of ACTPN members as of September 14, 1995.

0255 **Asia-Pacific Initiatives to Develop Technology-Based Economies.**

*Innovation Associates, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. Diane Palminteri. December 1995. 128pp.*

This report examines technology-based economic development programs in four countries as of 1994. It provides economic and political overviews and descriptions of selected programs in each country. Programs include science parks and science towns, regional technology institutes, national laboratory-industry collaboration, teaching factories, industrial associations, networking, and small and medium-size industry programs. Specific programs discussed include (1) regional R&D institutes, which conduct R&D and industrial services in Japan; (2) technology diffusion groups in Japan; (3) industrial associations in Japan and South Korea; (4) teaching factories in Singapore; and (5) science parks in South Korea and Taiwan. There are some valuable lessons for U.S. economic developers: (1) networks can be used to diffuse technologies to small and medium-size industries; (2) regional R&D institutes are important to small and medium-size industries; (3) industrial associations offer many services that help firms adopt new technologies; and (4) strong education and training programs are integral parts of successful technology strategies.

**1996**

0383 **US-AEP Country Assessments.**

*United States-Asia Environmental Partnership, Washington, D.C. NA. [1996.] 246pp.*

This report presents assessments of environmental conditions and policies, and underlying determinants of urban and industrial development, in selected Asian areas and countries (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand). The report covers all or most of the following for each country: (1) Economic conditions; environmental conditions; government institutions that deal with environmental issues; and environmental, industrial, and public information policies and laws. (2) Urban environment and infrastructure, including water supply, wastewater management, and solid and hazardous waste disposal; and awareness of and involvement in environmental issues among the private sector, academia, the public, and NGOs. (3) Environmental activities of U.S. government and multilateral organizations and non-U.S. bilateral assistance; and opportunities to

support clean industrial production and environmental management. Each assessment also includes a list of references and endnotes.

0629 **Asia-Pacific Economic Update.**

*United States Pacific Command, Washington, D.C. Lee H. Endress, Mark G. Harstad, and Jacquelyn Grizzard. Summer 1996. 109pp.*

The economic dynamism of the APR has been the subject of much academic research and journalistic commentary. Along with the end of the cold war, the tremendous success of economic development in East Asia has stimulated new thinking about the meaning of security. This thinking has been accompanied by questions regarding the relationship between economics and security in international relations. For example: (1) Should economics or military security be the primary regional concern and the basis for foreign policy? (2) Are international economic relations primarily cooperative or competitive and what are the security implications? This report offers a perspective on these issues that links economic ideas to a broader interpretation of security. Taking a broader view permits strategic thinking and security cooperation to go beyond the either/or nature of the questions posed above. Debates about the primacy of economics or military security tend to be nonproductive. Multinational dialogue within such organizations as the ARF, the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, the APEC organization, and the Pacific Basin Economic Council makes it abundantly clear that both economics and military security are high priority concerns throughout the region. Moreover, they are linked. It is also clear that regional leaders interpret security more comprehensively than just military defense; security has political, economic, and environmental dimensions as well. Discussions about the second question are often distorted by a fixation on the vague concept of international competitiveness and the use of military metaphors to describe international economic relations. With this vocabulary, international trade and investment are readily characterized as win-lose propositions and, in the extreme, as forms of warfare. A more constructive view recognizes that economic activity involves both competition and cooperation: competition among sellers and competition among buyers shape global markets for goods and services; yet economic exchange between individual buyers and sellers or trade between nations is inherently cooperative, providing an opportunity for mutual gain.

0738 **The Dynamics of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region.**

*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. M. Lyall Breckon and Thomas J. Hirschfeld. January 1996. 68pp.*

Rapid change in the APR—including explosive economic growth and the shifts in regional political and security perceptions this growth will generate—will present new problems and opportunities for U.S. defense planning in the next fifteen years. Yet elements of continuity will remain, notably the critical importance of the U.S.–Japan defense relationship and continued basing of U.S. forces in that country for stability throughout the region. This will be true even as economic power becomes relatively more important than military power in Asian affairs, and as the United States becomes more interdependent with, and vulnerable to, developments in Asian economies. The U.S. Navy will become a proportionately larger element of U.S. force presence in the Pacific, carrying more of the burden of preserving regional balance and maintaining the informal security system that has evolved since 1950. Apart from Korea, no formal region-wide or subregional security structures or force-related confidence-building arrangements on the European model are in prospect. Peacetime fleet missions in the APR will focus on reassurance and on deterrence of a diffuse range of threats to regional stability. Region-wide arms modernization will reflect economic growth more than reactive arms races, unless the U.S. balancing role in regional security loses credibility. Sea and air forces will expand, but there will be no significant military challenge to U.S. forces in the Pacific. Yet distance and, especially, the perceptions of regional states require that fleet units be regionally

based: surge capability, transitory presence, or assignment or earmarking of externally based forces will not be substitutes.

- 0806 **Human Dimensions of Asian Security.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Judith Banister and Peter Johnson. March 1996. 174pp.*

The commander of the Seventh Fleet asked CNA to assess the security environment of the APR between 1995 and 2010. This research memorandum addresses trends in those demographic, health, social, agricultural, and sustenance issues with potential effects for security throughout the region. The project's final report, "The Dynamics of Security in the Asia Pacific Region" (CNA Research Memorandum 95-172, January 1996) discusses the implications of these trends (and of other trends in the region) for U.S. forces, particularly the Navy. Data presented are for the most recent years or decades, and projections are for the fifteen-year period 1995–2010 unless otherwise specified. In recent decades, large parts of the APR have broken out of the cycle of poverty, illiteracy, and rapid population growth to achieve sustained economic growth on a per capita basis. Population will continue to grow in almost all APR countries in the coming fifteen years, straining existing systems that supply jobs, food, water, education, health care, and housing. Most APR governments and economies are responding to this challenge well enough to maintain per capita supply of these basic needs. If population growth were slower, living standards would increase further. Where production and availability of critical goods and services are falling behind population growth, discontent and instability are possible. Where population is growing and living standards are rising, the demand for more and higher quality food and other consumption goods escalates. In some cases, nations will turn to foreign suppliers, increasing international competition for resources. For example, in China, potentially arable land of reasonable quality is almost all in use and yields are already high, so food and feed imports are likely to greatly increase.

## Reel 2

### Asia (General) cont.

- 1996 cont.**
- 0001 **Asian Economic Prospects and Challenges, 1995–2010.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Erland Heginbotham. March 1996. 164pp.*  
The commander of the Seventh Fleet asked CNA to assess the security environment of the APR between 1995 and 2010. This research memorandum focuses on the most probable economic trends in the region. The project's final report discusses the implications of these trends (and of probable trends in other areas of transnational concern, as well as in individual countries) for U.S. forces, particularly the Navy.
- 0165 **APEC Agriculture and Trade: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Region Buying More U.S. Consumer-Ready Food Products.**  
*Economic Research Service, USDA, Washington, D.C. Sophia Wu Huang. May 1996. 67pp.*  
In fiscal year 1995, more than 60 percent of U.S. farm exports, worth a record \$33 billion, went to APEC forum members. Bulk exports showed the most dramatic growth, benefiting greatly from China's conversion from a net grain exporter into a major net importer. Chinese imports are projected to increase further over the long term. Continued trade liberalization throughout APEC, rapid economic growth in its developing economies, and limited arable land in China and East Asia will ensure continued growth in U.S. farm exports to APEC markets—especially meat for East Asia and grains for China and Southeast Asia.

- 0232 **Overview of U.S. Horticultural Exports to Asia.**  
*Economic Research Service, USDA, Washington, D.C. Boyd M. Buxton and Darina Batkova. October 1996. 219pp.*  
A graphical and tabular summary of U.S. exports to major Asian countries was prepared from U.S. export and UN trade data. U.S. exports of fifty-five horticultural commodities are ranked by average value over the 1993 to 1995 period to twenty-two major Asian countries, to four Asian regions, and to the world. Japan is the leading Asian market for U.S. horticultural exports. From UN import data, the change in U.S. market share is analyzed, and the top seven suppliers are identified by Asian country for twenty-three horticultural commodity categories.
- 0451 **Asian Security to the Year 2000.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dianne L. Smith. December 15, 1996. 172pp.*  
In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." No region of the world has greater potential for expanded influence on American interests. This compendium of papers from the conference examines the security policies being pursued by many of the key Asian actors—China, the Koreas, Pakistan, and the nations of Southeast Asia, particularly those in ASEAN. The contributors to this report paint the picture of a dynamic and diverse Asia on the verge of a new century. Each author identifies the critical issues that frame both challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign, economic, and security policies.
- 1997**
- 0623 **Report of the Commission on United States–Pacific Trade and Investment Policy: Building American Prosperity in the 21st Century.**  
*Commission on United States–Pacific Trade and Investment Policy, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 144pp.*  
Tremendous economic opportunities, persistent trade and investment barriers, and insufficient attention to the region characterize the conditions of U.S. economic relations with the APR. The commission has formulated its recommendations based on these broad observations. Some countries have received more commission attention than others, but the central thrust of the commission's report has been to put forth recommendations to promote greater market access for U.S. companies throughout the region. Implementation of these recommendations in a timely fashion will generate significant gains for the U.S. economy and workers. The report also includes dissenting opinions and several annexes.

## Australia

- 1995**
- 0767 **Australia's National Defense Strategy—Old Wine in New Bottles?**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Stephen Gray. April 1995. 86pp.*  
For the major part of its history Australia's national defense policy has relied upon alliances with major world powers to ensure its security. The Nixon Doctrine and the withdrawal of U.K. forces from east of the Suez Canal persuaded Australia to develop a more independent strategy, focused on developing regional balances of power and cooperative security agreements. Australia's defense forces are required to become self-reliant, but within a framework of alliances. Although contemplated throughout the 1970s, this strategy was first articulated in 1986, and it was most recently reinforced through the release of the 1994 defense white paper "Defending Australia." This paper examines this strategy, outlines its history and objectives, and reviews it in relation to Australia's regional setting and proposed objectives. Limitations such as constraining the area from which threats to Australia are assumed to occur, the definition of the nature of the threats, and

the time frame within which major threats may occur are examined. A series of questions suggests that the strategy does not reflect current or potential future regional balances of power, perspectives, and culture, while also failing to address emerging threats and actors such as nonstate institutions, information warfare, and economic warfare. The paper concludes that the strategy is flawed because it assumes that the outcome of political, military, and diplomatic liaison will be as hoped and fails to provide any alternative in the event that unanticipated regional tensions or hostilities eventuate that may threaten Australian interests. Stopping short of suggesting an alternative strategy, the paper recommends approaches to defining the region, including the use of alternative futures development.

0853 **Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young. October 20, 1995. 36pp.*

This is the second in an analytical series on joint issues. It follows the authors' "U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus," in which they articulated the need for more formal joint strategic plans. This essay examines the effect such plans would have on joint doctrine development and illustrates the potential benefits evident in Australian defense planning. Doctrine and planning share an iterative development process. The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, and even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. As the environment for that action changes, planners address new challenges and create the demand for better methods of organizing, employing, and supporting forces. Evolutionary, occasionally revolutionary, doctrinal changes result. The authors of this monograph explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level. They enter the current debate over the scope and authority of joint doctrine from a joint strategic planning perspective. In their view, joint doctrine must have roots, and those roots have to be planted firmly in the strategic concepts and plans developed to carry out the national military strategy. Without the fertile groundwork of strategic plans, the body of joint doctrine will struggle for viability.

**1997**

0889 **Country Commercial Guide: Australia, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 158pp.*

This country commercial guide (CCG) presents a comprehensive look at Australia's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), a multi-agency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community and are prepared annually at U.S. embassies. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Australia and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report rates the commercial environment in Australia as exceptionally friendly to U.S. business, with room for growth. Chapter topics include principal growth sectors, government role in the economy, balance of payments, infrastructure, political conditions, marketing U.S. products and services, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, protection of intellectual property, trade and project financing, and lists of Australian companies doing business with the U.S. government and U.S. businesses in various fields, along with their addresses. Report appendices contain economic and trade statistics.

## Reel 3

### Burma

1997

0001 **Country Commercial Guide: Burma, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 61pp.*

This CCG presents a general look at Burma's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Burma and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in Burma risky to investors because of exchange rate uncertainties, import restrictions, and human rights abuses by the government. Chapter topics include principal growth sectors, government role in the economy, balance of payments, infrastructure, political conditions, marketing U.S. products and services, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, protection of intellectual property, and trade and project financing. Report appendices contain economic and trade statistics.

### Cambodia

1995

0062 **Country Commercial Guide: Cambodia, Fiscal Year 1996.**

*International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. NA. 1995. 28pp.*

This CCG presents a general look at Cambodia's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Cambodia and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in Cambodia to offer opportunities to investors because of various trade incentives offered by the government and growth in tourism, services, manufacturing, and agriculture. A trade agreement between the United States and Cambodia has been negotiated but not yet signed, pending congressional approval of most-favored-nation status for Cambodia. Trade between the two nations is small at this time. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing of U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel. Report appendices contain economic and trade statistics.

0090 **The Heirs of Angkor: An Analysis of Khmer Rouge Viability.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Charles E. Locke Jr. June 1995. 213pp.*

The purpose of this thesis is to address the question: What accounts for Khmer Rouge viability? One approach is to analyze the Khmer Rouge through their self definitions—located in their myths, rituals, and symbols—to better understand how they perceive themselves, their cause, and their future and how those perceptions can be used to defeat adversaries. This study focuses on insurgent activity as a battle of ideas using the Khmer Rouge as a case study. To analyze the application of this theory to insurgent viability, this study looked to the “symbolic dimension,” a medium of political exchange that defines reality through symbolic means. To provide linkage between symbols and viability, the symbolic actions of the Khmer Rouge are applied to five elements of insurgent viability: legitimacy, popular support, organization, external support, and defeating adversarial response. All five elements are explored from the origins of the insurgency in the 1950s, through the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975 and demise in 1979, and concluding with their

actions today. This thesis demonstrates that the Khmer Rouge insurgency relies on symbolic activity as one means of viability. Using ethnic discrimination myths and nationalist rituals, the insurgents swept to power in a rural-based movement. Fanatical beliefs in myths of common blood ties and racial purity drove the regime to destruction, however. To resurrect the movement, the Khmer Rouge play on the weakness of the present government, utilizing democratic symbols as well as former racist themes to replace the malevolent image of their governing years with an image of the Khmer Rouge as heirs to leadership.

- 1996**
- 0303 **Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, and Mine Clearing.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. February 1996. 45pp.*  
This report outlines Cambodia's progress toward holding free and fair national elections in 1998, meeting international human and political rights standards, and clearing land mines. The report contains additional comments from the departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

## China

- 1994**
- 0348 **Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas L. Wilborn. November 25, 1994. 43pp.*  
Relations between the United States and China reached their lowest point in almost twenty years when President George Bush imposed sanctions on Beijing after the PLA indiscriminately fired at unarmed demonstrators and their supporters at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. In the intervening years, some U.S. contacts, particularly trade, quickly attained or exceeded their pre-Tiananmen level. Until recently, however, the U.S. government resisted reestablishing formal security links. In this study, the author examines U.S.–China security cooperation before Tiananmen, the strategic context in which it took place, and the strategic environment of U.S.–China relations at the present time. He then concludes that the reasons that justified the program of security cooperation with China during the cold war are irrelevant today. Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with China are highly desirable in the strategic environment of the 1990s. China is a major regional power that inevitably will affect U.S. security interests, and the PLA is an extremely important institution within that nation. Additionally, as a member of the UN Security Council and one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China's actions can influence a wide range of U.S. global interests. In the future, China is likely to be even more powerful and its actions more significant for the United States. Structurally, renewed U.S.–China security cooperation can be modeled on the program of the 1980s. The purpose of the high level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation, however, will no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common enemy, as it was before, but to contribute to stability in an important region of the world and to achieve U.S. global objectives.

- 1995**
- 0391 **Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers.**  
*Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Karl W. Eikenberry. February 1995. 71pp.*  
This report on PRC policies regarding conventional arms transfers discusses historical patterns in PRC arms transfers; supply- and demand-side explanations for arms transfers in general and in the case of the PRC; reasons countries may decide to restrict sales; and means of influencing PRC policies on arms sales transfers. The report includes supporting tables throughout.

- 0462 **Price Deflators in Mainland China.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Chih-Ping Shih. March 1995. 72pp.*  
This thesis applies the theory of price indexes to the analysis of price changes in the PRC. Economic and political trends that may have contributed to the extreme inflation in China in the late 1980s are examined. The theory of price indexes is discussed. Several regression models are constructed to examine the relationship between inflation and several other measured economic factors in China. The model results indicate a relationship between the categories of economic goods and the price index. No similar relationships exist between coastal versus interior region or output/income level and the price level. Food was the economic category most strongly associated with the increases in price. This suggests that increases in the price of food are a major cause of inflation in China.
- 0534 **China as an Economic and Military Superpower: A Dangerous Combination?**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Merri B. Uckert. April 1995. 33pp.*  
China's economic and military power make it one of the most important nations to the United States as well as other Pacific Rim nations in 1995. It has one of the fastest growing economies in the world as well as one of the largest military machines. Together, these two factors have the ability to disrupt the current balance of power in the Southeast Asia region as well as pose a threat to the United States militarily. China's transition to a market-oriented economy has given it greater leverage and greater respect globally, yet its antiquated military is struggling to quickly modernize by purchasing updated technology from Russia. This paper looks at China's economy and military, how they interact, why China might be a threat, and the risk China poses. Additionally, it draws some conclusions about where China is heading.
- 0567 **Export Controls: Some Controls over Missile-related Technology Exports to China Are Weak.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. April 1995. 29pp.*  
This report on U.S. missile technology-related exports to the PRC and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) discusses the nature and extent of U.S. dual-use and missile technology exports to the PRC and the extent to which items are exported to sensitive end users; the ability of the U.S. government to monitor PRC compliance with export license conditions attached to U.S. missile technology-related exports and the terms of the PRC-U.S. bilateral understanding on MTCR adherence; the provisions of the bilateral understanding and the degree to which the understanding commits the PRC to adhere to the full range of MTCR commitments; and the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions imposed on the PRC.
- 0596 **China's Space Program and Its Implications for the United States.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. J. Barry Patterson. April 19, 1995. 35pp.*  
China became a serious member of the spacefaring community in 1985 and in response, the United States developed agreements to limit the economic impact on U.S. space programs and to control the spread of related technology. The United States is also concerned about transferring technology to China from U.S. satellite manufacturers. The technology involved in mating satellites to boosters, the technology used in measuring stress on the satellite at launch, and the development of apogee kick motors are all transferable to missile technology and may aid China in its intercontinental ballistic missile programs. To foster the growing relationship between China and the United States, clear policies and agreements are needed that match our national security interests with economic reality.

- 0631 **China Defense Industry Directory: U.S.–China Joint Defense Conversion Committee.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration, Washington, D.C. NA. May 1995. 18pp.*  
This directory lists forty-nine defense conversion projects in the PRC presenting opportunities for U.S. businesses. Project information was supplied by the PRC through its Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). The report lists projects in areas of communications, transportation, and engineering mechanisms; environmental protection and biological technology; medical instruments and applications of isotopes; and new materials. It provides the following details for each project: name of cooperative enterprise; objectives; and mode of cooperation, including joint venture, investment, cooperative production and research, and technology transfer. It also includes a list of contact persons at cooperative enterprises. This directory was published as one of the activities of the U.S.–China Joint Defense Conversion Commission, chaired by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and PRC Minister Ding Henggao of COSTIND.
- 0649 **National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. June 1995. 51pp.*  
This report assesses the nature and purpose of the PRC military modernization program and compares PRC military modernization efforts and spending to those of other countries in Asia. The report includes comments of the departments of Defense and State on a draft of the report.
- 0700 **The Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) Conference Workshops: China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. NA. July 25, 1995. 103pp.*  
BEMs is an initiative of the Clinton administration identifying ten of the greatest foreign market opportunities for trade expansion in the next decade. These transcripts of proceedings were taken at the BEMs conference held by the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration at the Georgetown University Leavey Center in Washington D.C., July 24–25, 1995. This document contains the workshops on China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
- 0803 **Environmental Problems in the People's Republic of China: Current Magnitude and Possible Control Options.**  
*Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. N. Batti, C. A. Biang, L. A. Poch, and M. M. Tompkins. September 1995. 102pp.*  
The PRC has been undergoing rapid economic development over the past several decades. This development has taken place with little or no attention being paid to its environmental consequences. This situation has resulted in severe contamination of the air, water, and soil resources of China, with attendant damage to human and natural populations. This report determines the major causes of air, water, and soil pollution in China and assesses their extent and magnitude. It then examines the effects of the pollutants on various components of the human and natural environment. It identifies possible regulatory and ameliorative options available to China to deal with these pollution problems and provides information on specific strategies and the costs associated with their implementation. The objective is to shed light on China's pollution control and remediation requirements in the near future.

- 0905 **Taiwan and China Unification Crisis: Danger or Opportunity for the United States?**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Donald G. Croom. September 11, 1995. 47pp.*

Taiwan and the PRC have two different systems of government and economics. The PRC's government is an authoritarian communist regime that is evolving its own style of free market economy. Taiwan's government is a freely elected democracy and its economy is already a free market system. The PRC's political leaders consider Taiwan to be an integral part of China and are determined to reunify Taiwan with mainland China, by force if necessary, rather than let Taiwan obtain its independence as a separate, internationally recognized entity. This study provides background material regarding the current relationship between the two countries and their relationships with the United States. This paper argues that mainland China will eventually reabsorb Taiwan and that the United States can influence this coming unification to ensure that it is done peacefully with favorable economic benefits to all three nations. This argument will be based on an analysis of historical data and recent events. This paper also provides recommendations on how the United States might influence the process by which Taiwan will be unified with mainland China in order to reduce potential conflicts within the Pacific Rim.

## Reel 4

### China cont.

1996

- 0001 **Changes in China's Labor Market: Implications for the Future.**

*U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Washington, D.C. NA. 1996. 207pp.*

This compilation of papers concerns changes in the PRC labor market and implications for the PRC's social, legal, and political future. Papers were presented at a symposium cosponsored by the Labor Department Bureau of International Labor Affairs and the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, held on September 22, 1995. Papers presented include material on China's state-owned enterprises; Chinese labor force characteristics and migration; Chinese employment, social security, and enterprise reforms; income distribution in Chinese society; Chinese labor laws; the impact of China's changing labor situation on U.S. enterprises; reforms in Chinese employment and social protection policies; and the prospects for a free labor movement in China.

- 0208 **The "Command and Control" Philosophy of the Communist Party of China.**

*Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico. George J. Kominiak, Jane C. Eisenberger, Kathryn L. Mensul, and Tara J. Sather. January 1996. 23pp.*

China's central political authorities have constructed a system that is designed to enable them to exert their personal influence and control over each level of every organization in the country—both civil and military. The Communist Party of China (CPC) is represented at all levels of each and every organization, including the PLA. These party entities are intended both to provide oversight and to ensure that party policies, directives, and orders are obeyed. This penchant for political control, which may have its roots in China's imperial past, appears to have been reinforced by the early developmental path chosen by the party's leadership. Current attempts aimed at maintaining political control of its resources, especially the military, are embodied in the formal system of "Political Work." In the PLA, this system of political control results in the involvement of political organs in day-to-day military matters to an extent unheard of in the West. Further work is needed in order to understand more fully both the system of "Political Work" and its contributions to the overall military (and civil) command and control philosophy of the CPC.

- 0231 **People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Christopher D. Yung. March 1996. 90pp.*  
The commander of the Seventh Fleet asked CNA to assess the security environment of the APR to the year 2010. In addition to an examination of the major countries of the region, of security trends in Asia (e.g., demographics and weapon development), and of future economic trends in the APR, this assessment warranted an evaluation of Chinese naval capabilities over the period of interest. This research memorandum presents the results of that evaluation. The overall findings of this research effort are in the project's final report, "The Dynamics of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region" (CNA Research Memorandum 95-172, January 1996). Much of the debate over China's future naval capabilities focuses on whether China will soon have a "blue water" navy: that is, the capability to seriously contest control over the seas adjacent to the Chinese coasts—the South China Sea and the East China Sea—as well as the capacity to simultaneously threaten to deny access to the Sea of Japan, the Philippine Sea, and the Northern Pacific Ocean against any other navy, excluding the U.S. Navy.
- 0321 **China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region through 2010.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Alfred D. Wilhelm Jr. March 1996. 98pp.*  
This research memorandum is part of a study sponsored by the commander of the Seventh Fleet to assess the security environment of the APR between now and 2010. It focuses on the most probable evolutionary trends for China during this period. The implications for the forces and for the Navy are contained in the final report for the project, "The Dynamics of Security in the Asia Pacific Region" (CNA Research Memorandum 95-172, January 1996). This research memorandum was reviewed by a group of China scholars at a meeting at CNA on May 5, 1995. Their comments have been incorporated in this overview. China's emergence as a major regional power will be one of the principal factors affecting the security, politics, and economies of Asia and the Pacific between now and 2010. The forces shaping China's emergence are primarily internal but include such important external factors as Beijing's perceptions of the intentions of its neighbors and of the United States. Much of the uncertainty about China's future course and impact on the region centers on whether, and how, China accepts the norms of the international system that has grown since World War II—norms that have not yet been tested by the rapid rise in national power of a large non-Western country. Alternative scenarios emerging from the rapid changes underway in China could have widely varying implications for this and other issues.
- 0419 **Dragon in the Shadows: Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Michael William Studeman. March 1996. 153pp.*  
The dispute among at least six riparian nations over jurisdictional rights to large tracts of the South China Sea continues to reign as one of the most likely flash points in the Asia-Pacific theater. The intentions of the chief protagonist in the conflict, China, will in large measure determine whether this dilemma will be resolved peacefully or violently. Relying on three case studies that focus on China's takeover of the Paracel Islands in 1974, its occupation of six reefs in 1988, and subsequent reef-hopping incidents in 1992 and 1995, this study highlights the conditions under which China expanded its presence in the South China Sea. Based on emerging trends, this thesis asserts that resource competition will most likely spark future violence in the South China Sea and that domestic pressures within China commit Beijing to a course of hard-shell revanchism. At the same time, regional sensitivities to Chinese "hegemony" and the correlation of military forces that weakly favor China suggest that China will strive to avoid or contain a conflict over the near term. By profiling the character of past Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, this thesis also exposes the stratagems by which Chinese armed forces have pursued national objectives in the region.

0572 **EAGLES and DRAGONS at Sea: The Inevitable Strategic Collision between the United States and China.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Ulysses O. Zalamea. March 6, 1996. 32pp.*

To advance China's expanding maritime interests, the Chinese navy is altering its strategic direction from ground-support missions to open-water operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy is maintaining a steady course to strongly affirm the continuing U.S. commitment in the region. Thus, on the offshore waters of the Western Pacific, the strategies of these two navies will inevitably collide. East Asia remains vital to America's economic renewal. It comprises the world's fastest-growing economies. It is also the biggest U.S. export market. Therefore, America's continued economic growth is tied to the region's enduring prosperity and security. But all is not well in East Asia. There are a number of "hot spots" that threaten regional stability. More importantly, China's shadow looms large behind almost every regional flash point. China is an emerging maritime power with towering aspirations, and, clearly, the Chinese navy will play a crucial role in promoting those ambitions. As the Chinese fleet prepares to venture away from its familiar shores, however, it is quickly discovering that the U.S. Navy's shadow looms even larger on the horizon.

0604 **China: Engagement or Containment.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. John D. Mills. April 7, 1996. 31pp.*

Many analysts predict that between 2010 and 2020 China will surpass the United States as the largest economy in the world and may also have the largest and strongest military force. China will be a superpower, possibly the most powerful nation in the world. Given these predictions, it is appropriate to ask what security strategy the United States should pursue with China both now and in the intervening years. Is China destined to be a hostile competitor of the United States or a powerful but responsible member of the international system? Should U.S. policy toward China be one of containment or engagement? This paper attempts to address these questions. In the author's view, while China will certainly become more powerful than it is today, it is unlikely that it will, in fifteen to twenty years, be truly equal to the United States as a superpower or that it will be a compliant member of the international system, regardless of what strategy the United States pursues. A U.S. strategy of containment, however, implemented now, would guarantee a hostile China that puts an increasingly larger share of its resources into military modernization, precipitating another cold war that would not be welcomed or affordable for either the United States or its friends and allies. On the other hand, a strategy of engagement (to include military engagement) might, if fashioned correctly and not executed piecemeal, result in a powerful China that would disagree and compete with the United States on many issues but do so within the bounds of internationally acceptable behavior.

0635 **People's Republic of China: U.S. Trade Partner or Threat to Our National Interests.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. John C. Bedford. April 15, 1996. 34pp.*

We are at a crossroads in our relations with China. U.S. national security interests are in jeopardy in Southeast Asia. Relations are currently at a new low since the United States recognized China in the early 1970s, and they could worsen in the future as China attempts to reestablish its historical position of regional power and influence. How does China's perceived new role affect U.S. interests? What is our national security strategy for dealing with the new China? China presents us with many complex concerns: its rapidly expanding economy, its lack of a leadership succession process, a renewed military modernization effort, proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, and an apparent desire for regional hegemony driven by resurgent nationalism. The United States has produced a comprehensive and well developed but poorly executed strategy for protecting

U.S. interests in the Southeast Asia region. We can further our national interests with better implementation of our engagement strategy and by strongly encouraging dialogue with our adversaries, clearly articulating our mutual interests. The United States must aggressively engage China to ensure that our national interests are preserved.

- 0669 **China's Strategic View: The Role of the People's Liberation Army.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. June Teufel Dreyer. April 25, 1996. 30pp.*

This report analyzes the PRC's strategic intentions, primarily based upon the nature and capabilities of the PLA. The report discusses the extent of PLA influence on PRC foreign policy; the ability of PLA naval, air, and ground forces to support a PRC strategy of aggression; and recent PRC military and political actions in the East Asia region. This report was originally prepared for the U.S. Army War College's Annual Strategy Conference, held in April 1996.

- 0699 **Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The U.S. Role.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert G. Sutter. April 25, 1996. 46pp.*

The author analyzes the key factors that shape China's domestic and international policies. He outlines a regime that is pragmatic in its international political and economic relations but highly protective on territorial and sovereignty issues, noting that it is a regime in transition and giving interpretations of where that transition might be headed. The author reviews U.S. objectives and courses of action and suggests that Chinese leaders will have as much difficulty predicting the future course of American policy as the other way around. He concludes with several useful guidelines for those charged with formulating policy with respect to China.

- 0745 **China and the Revolution in Military Affairs.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley. May 20, 1996. 64pp.*

This report was originally presented as two essays at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute's Seventh Annual Strategy Conference in April 1996. One of the issues at this conference was China's ability to participate in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). These two essays address that topic and paint a picture of a China with limited potential to become a peer competitor of the United States in the next two decades. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that China's relative power in Asia and globally will grow sharply in that period. Even partial success in pursuing advanced military technology and organizing concepts could enhance the speed and impact of that rise to power. The exploration of the issues surrounding the RMA has only just begun, and these essays are worthy of consideration by anyone interested in the role that China may play in the strategic military balance early in the twenty-first century.

- 0809 **Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Gregory B. Owens. June 1996. 82pp.*

The United States, Russia, and the U.K. have retired all nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, China has not. China seems to value highly tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Most studies of China's nuclear arsenal focus on strategic nuclear weapons. This focus could mislead those trying to understand PRC TNW strategy. The purpose of this thesis is to explain China's TNW development. China's nuclear arsenal evolution can be described in three phases. In the first phase, China developed a limited strategic nuclear deterrent. China's arsenal was driven by threat. Technology supplanted threat as the dominant driver during the next phase. While conducting research to miniaturize strategic warheads, China developed TNWs. During the third phase, a reduced threat caused political leaders to restrain the nuclear program. The nuclear program reverted to its

primary objective—building strategic weapons—causing TNW production to level off. This study explains the last two phases of TNW development. The research goals are twofold: to compare threat and technology, the primary motivations driving TNW production, and to examine the relationship between doctrine and development, describing how one influences the other. The conclusion offers U.S. foreign policy recommendations.

0891 **Annual Report: Joint United States and People's Republic of China Clean Coal Activities, April 1994–December 1995.**

*U.S. Department of Energy Office of Clean Coal Technology, Washington, D.C. NA. June 1996. 43pp.*

The U.S. Department of Energy and the PRC's Ministry of Coal Industry signed a protocol in the field of fossil energy research and development in April 1985. An annex to this agreement, Annex IX, was signed in April 1994 for cooperation between the U.S. Department of Energy and China's State Science and Technology Commission in the area of clean coal utilization. Article III of Annex IX requires the United States and China jointly to prepare an annual report describing the work performed and the results achieved. This report, in compliance with Article III, is a description of the activities conducted under Annex IX during the period from April 1994 through December 1995. The report also contains the plans for future activities for the next twelve months, or through December 1996. The United States and China signed Annex IX to address the common problems of power plant and other emissions resulting from the use of coal and the need to provide for a cleaner future environment. Both nations will derive benefits from cooperating to resolve these problems. As China seeks to commercialize clean coal technology, the United States can assist China by providing experience gained through the U.S. Department of Energy Clean Coal Technology Program.

0934 **International Agriculture and Trade Reports: China—Situation and Outlook Series.**

*USDA Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. NA. June 1996. 69pp.*

This report examines China's overall economic performance in the 1990s, particularly the performance of its agricultural sector. Important changes have taken place in China's agricultural trade in recent years because it is beginning to export more processed and high-value products and import more land-intensive and semi-processed goods. China shifted from a net grain exporter in 1994 to a net grain importer in 1995. Major topics include economic planning and performance; agricultural trade trends; grain production and stocks; market conditions for edible oil, cotton, sugar, and vegetables; and trade effects of Hong Kong's transfer to Chinese control. The report includes numerous charts and tables.

1003 **Modernization of the People's Liberation Army: A Threat to the United States?**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Joseph W. Blackburn. June 7, 1996. 120pp.*

This study investigates whether or not China, with a modernized military, presents a threat to the United States. The United States has been deeply engaged in the East Asia–Pacific region since the end of the Second World War. China, with the world's largest population and a landmass larger than the United States, is located in the heart of the fastest growing economic region in the world. Due in large part to a period of sustained economic growth averaging over 9 percent since 1980, the PRC has embarked upon a program of military modernization that will significantly increase its force projection capabilities. The study includes a brief review of relevant Chinese history, current events, diplomacy, economics, and the PLA military modernization program. It includes three case studies in which to examine U.S. and Chinese interests: Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and Korea. The methodology used to determine if China's military modernization poses a threat to the

United States includes an examination of Chinese and U.S. interests in the three case studies. Conflicting interests, coupled with capability, would indicate that China poses a threat. Conversely, complementary interests would argue that even with the increased capability, China does not pose a threat.

## Reel 5

### China cont.

#### 1996 cont.

0001 **China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Samuel S. Kim. July 29, 1996. 47pp.*

The author argues that despite all the estimates that the post-Tiananmen PRC is about to take the stage as a world power, the reality is far different. He believes that China is in fact a weak nation torn by internal economic and environmental problems. The author asserts that China's Communist leadership is desperately trying to put the democracy genie back in its bottle even while supporting a Leninist-capitalist economic approach that, ultimately, cannot succeed.

0048 **China's Transition into the 21st Century: U.S. and PRC Perspectives.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. David Shambaugh and Wang Zhongchun. July 29, 1996. 48pp.*

The following papers, presented by Dr. David Shambaugh and Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun, look at China from two very different perspectives. Shambaugh contends that those who succeed Deng Xiaoping, fearful of any further erosion of Communist Party hegemony and determined to return China to a purer form of neo-Maoist Marxism, will become even more conservative as China's economic and social problems intensify. Despite considerable political and economic challenges, his best estimate is that China will, from inherent inertia, "muddle through" well into the twenty-first century. Indeed, it is in the interests of the United States for China to hold together as a territorial nation-state and political unit because disintegration would foster socioeconomic dislocations that could destabilize Asia. At the same time, U.S. policy must maintain pressure on China to improve human and civil rights performance. Wang provides an overview of nearly half a century of Chinese defense policy, from a distinctly PRC perspective. He then argues that China has attained a position of security and, even though the world presents many uncertainties, that Beijing is committed to playing a positive role for peace and stability in Asia. The central principle in today's security analysis is that defense policy must support economic development so that China can grow into an economically progressive, democratic, and modern socialist country. Wang portrays China's military posture as one that seeks, above all, to protect China's territorial sovereignty, while focusing in this relatively peaceful era on modernizing in step with national economic development.

0096 **China Energy Databook.**

*Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, California. Jonathan E. Sinton (editor). September 1996. 470pp.*

This report provides an overall view of Chinese energy issues. Chapters include material on China's resources and reserves, energy production, energy industry investment, energy consumption, energy consuming equipment and activities, imports and exports of energy and energy-intensive products, the impact of energy use on the environment, international comparisons with Chinese energy production and use, and economic indicators. Many tables, figures, and maps are provided as are appendices on sectors of the Chinese economy and an abbreviations list and bibliography.

0566 **What's With the Relationship between America's Army and China's PLA?: An Examination of the Terms of the U.S. Army's Strategic Peacetime Engagement with the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Jer Donald Get. September 15, 1996. 48pp.*

In May 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the Army to examine various ways to reestablish the army-to-army ties that existed between the U.S. Army and Beijing's PLA prior to the 1980s. U.S. President George Bush ordered a curb in military-to-military ties following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, and, since then, efforts at rapprochement between the two armies have been faltering and uneven. There are some who question the value of renewing military ties with the PRC based on limited gains accrued to the U.S. Army from the earlier relationship. In this essay, U.S. Army Colonel Jer Donald Get argues that this is a shortsighted attitude. The reasons for renewing army-to-army ties are substantial given that China's relevance as a power will grow. The United States needs to marshal all the resources at its disposal to influence China positively. One of those resources, Get argues, is the U.S. Army. The ideas expressed in this monograph constitute a host of positive recommendations that could influence the course of trans-Pacific relations over the next decade. The U.S. Army and the PLA must take a measured approach, setting pragmatic objectives and extending the reciprocity that characterizes relations between the great powers. For both armies, and both nations, the stakes are high—to engage as strategic partners rather than clash again in conflict.

0614 **Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert S. Ross. September 30, 1996. 37pp.*

China's Japan policy is a central component of China's overall security policy, rivaling the U.S.–China relationship in importance. As both an economic and potential military great power, Japan has the ability to make a significant contribution to Chinese security. It can contribute to Chinese economic development and become a partner in managing regional security issues in the interest of stability in East Asia and their respective national interests. Alternatively, over the longer term, Japan has the ability to become a major threat to vital Chinese interests. Should Sino-Japanese security relations deteriorate, Tokyo could deny China access to its economic resources, including the Japanese market, and its capital and technology, and it could influence other countries in East Asia to do the same. This would have a significant impact on Chinese economic development and Beijing's long-term military modernization program. Japan could also participate in a regional coalition aimed at China and, most alarming, if it realized its considerable offensive military potential, it could directly influence the regional balance of power and regional diplomacy to China's strategic detriment.

0651 **Future of China's Grain Market.**

*U.S. Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Frederick W. Crook and W. Hunter Colby. October 1996. 25pp.*

In this report the USDA's Economic Research Service projects that China's demand for grain will outpace domestic supplies in the next ten years. By the year 2005, China will become a net importer of 32 million tons of grain. (All tons in this report refer to metric tons.) In the last two decades, China's trade with the rest of the world and the United States expanded dramatically. China has participated in international grain trade both as a buyer and as a seller. Since both China and the United States have large agricultural economies and both are major grain producers, a natural question is: in future decades how will the grain trade develop between these two economies? Will China's farmers be able to produce enough grain to keep pace with population increases and increased demand for feed grains to produce meat, eggs, and milk products for consumers? This report attempts to answer these questions.

- 0676 **Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. November 1996. 17pp.*  
This report on the U.S. sale to the PRC of advanced broadband telecommunications equipment focuses on the equipment's civilian and military applications, availability in the PRC, and importance to the PRC military and on the process and rationale for U.S. liberalization of the export of telecommunications equipment. The report includes comments by the Commerce, Defense, and State departments.
- 0693 **Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. November 1996. 41pp.*  
This report discusses Commerce Department approval of licenses for McDonnell Douglas Corporation to export machine tools to the PRC in 1994; the machine tools were to be used exclusively to produce parts for commercial aircraft, but the PRC temporarily stored some tools at a fighter aircraft factory, contrary to license conditions. The report covers military and civilian applications of the machine tools, the importance of military applications to PRC military modernization plans, the export licensing process, and whether risks associated with the export were addressed. The report also includes comments of the Defense, Commerce, and State departments and McDonnell Douglas on a draft of the report, and GAO responses.
- 0734 **Capability and Intention: An Analysis of the Modernization of the PLA.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Effie R. Petrie. December 1996. 133pp.*  
In the wake of the cold war, U.S. government officials and China analysts began to discuss the possibility of an emerging "China threat." This thesis assesses China's military modernization program in order to determine its capability and primary intent. Four aspects of the PLA are examined: the history of military modernization, PLA economic activities, the PLA's modernization strategy, and force utilization. Final analysis indicates that China's military modernization program is intended primarily to enhance domestic stability and economic growth and not to seek regional hegemony by force. There are several points of contention that may spur China to military action, however. Two possible areas of future conflict are Taiwan and the South China Sea. The author maintains that China will probably refrain from aggression in these areas unless it feels that its interests are endangered. It does not have the will or the capability to seek conflict in the region, in the author's view.
- 1997**
- 0867 **Country Commercial Guide: China, Fiscal Year 1998.**  
*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 84pp.*  
This CCG presents a general look at China's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in China and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in China to be uncertain for U.S. investors because the country's tremendous economic growth is combined with daunting barriers to success. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, and trade and project financing. The report's appendices contain economic and trade statistics.

## Reel 6

### China cont.

#### 1997 cont.

- 0001 **Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing's Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Fei-Ling Wang. January 24, 1997. 30pp.*

This report on PRC security policy outlines the PRC's views on the security situation and the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, the possible reunification of North Korea and South Korea, and the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

- 0031 **Chinese Views of Future Warfare.**

*National Defense University, NA. Michael Pillsbury (editor). March 1997. 462pp.*

This report is a compilation of articles by senior PRC military authors concerning PRC military doctrine with respect to types and causes of future wars, future security environment, possible future local conflict, and future warfare and revolution in military affairs. It also includes a December 1996 address by PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian at National Defense University. The report is divided into four parts, each containing a number of articles on the subject: Part I is entitled "The Strategic Thought of Deng Xiaoping," Part II is entitled "Future Security Trends," Part III is entitled "Modernizing for Local War," and Part IV is entitled "The Revolution in Military Affairs." Summaries of all articles are included as a preface to the actual report.

- 0493 **The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. March 4, 1997. 45pp.*

The author focuses on Russian arms sales to China and finds that these sales and China policy, in general, reveal much that is disturbing about the nature of the Russian policy process and Russia's profile in Asia. Russian state policy has also officially joined with China in a relationship described as a strategic cooperative partnership. He examines this relationship carefully for what it reveals about both states' international security policies. The author believes that Russian policy increasingly appears to be moving toward a confrontation with the United States from which only China will gain as a state, while private Russian interests also profit at the expense of Russia's strategic position. The anti-American aspects of this process also apparently accord with widely reported Chinese suspicions about U.S. policy. For this reason, he feels the evolving nature of the Russo-Chinese relationship is or should be of utmost interest to policy makers and analysts alike.

### Hong Kong

#### 1997

- 0538 **Country Commercial Guide: Hong Kong, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State. NA. 1997. 80pp.*

This CCG presents a general look at Hong Kong's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Hong Kong and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in Hong Kong to be uncertain for U.S. investors because its attractiveness as a profitable commercial and financial center is increasingly tempered by the high costs of doing business and Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services,

leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Hong Kong business contacts.

0618 **United States–Hong Kong Policy Act Report as of March 31, 1997.**

*U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. March 31, 1997. 41pp.*

This is the third biennial report to Congress on economic, political, and cultural conditions in Hong Kong of interest to the United States, in connection with Hong Kong's transition from the U.K. to the PRC, July 1, 1997. It covers the following: (1) significant developments in Hong Kong–U.S. relations, including economic relations, visits to Hong Kong of U.S. officials, law enforcement cooperation, and status of bilateral agreements with Hong Kong; (2) developments related to transition of Hong Kong to PRC affecting U.S. interests in and relations with Hong Kong, including disagreements between Hong Kong and PRC over Hong Kong legislature and laws, selection of Tung Chee-hwa as first chief executive of Hong Kong, passport and visa regime, and other matters; (3) Hong Kong–U.S. cultural, educational, scientific, and academic exchanges and significant problems in bilateral cooperation on export controls; and (4) democratic institutions in Hong Kong (including developments in electoral laws, political parties, the legal system, human rights, and freedom of expression) and Hong Kong participation in multilateral forums. The report also includes a chronology of major events in Hong Kong since March 1996 and a list of official U.S. visitors to Hong Kong, April 1, 1996–March 31, 1997. This report is required pursuant to section 301 of the U.S.–Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. § 731), as amended.

0659 **The Dragon and the Goose (What Becomes of the Golden Eggs?).**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Tina M. Chester. April 7, 1997. 33pp.*

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong territories will transition to a special administrative region (SAR) under the PRC, ending over 150 years of British colonial rule. This transfer of sovereignty could have profound effects on businesses and industries, foreign and domestic. International and regional political and economic implications are also expected. What is not known is just what these implications will be, how they will affect U.S.–Hong Kong relations, and, more importantly, what changes could occur to the already fragile U.S.–China alliance. Economics plays the pivotal role in understanding, evaluating, and speculating on future scenarios. Economic issues such as free trade, open markets, and import/export capability are at the forefront of what motivates Hong Kong, PRC, and U.S. actions. The need for economic stability is the primary driver for China's development of a SAR, meant to allow Hong Kong freedom to be economically influential in the international trade community. This very influence will enable Hong Kong to remain a SAR, without major controversy, for the next fifty years. Economic growth and well being will continue to be the glue that keeps the United States and China cooperating to resolve future issues.

0692 **Hong Kong's Reversion to China: Effective Monitoring Critical to Assess U.S. Nonproliferation Risks.**

*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. May 1997. 50pp.*

Hong Kong will revert to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, after over a century of U.K. rule. As the reversion date approaches, increasing attention has focused on how the territory will fare under China and how U.S. economic and security interests could be affected. U.S. economic presence in the territory is substantial, and Hong Kong's fate has significant implications for broader U.S.–China relations. Congress asked the GAO to focus on one key issue—whether U.S. export control policy toward Hong Kong will adequately protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests after Hong Kong's reversion to China. Congress raised concerns about the potential risks and consequences

of continuing to export sensitive technologies to the territory after reversion, given China's past proliferation behavior. This report outlines (1) how U.S. export controls are currently applied to Hong Kong as compared with China, (2) planned U.S. export control policy toward Hong Kong after reversion, and (3) possible safeguards and monitoring efforts to protect U.S. nonproliferation interests. The report also includes comments from the departments of Commerce, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; and the government of Hong Kong.

## Indonesia

1995

0742 **Civil Military Relations: The Role of ABRI in Indonesian Socio-Political Life.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. I Gede Wajan Sardjana. June 1995. 92pp.*

The argument in this thesis is that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) has a legitimate role in sociopolitical affairs and political life as well as roles in the defense and security of Indonesia. This dual function of ABRI allows ABRI officers to be actively involved in the decision-making process of the country. During the New Order Era, many ABRI officers were assigned to key positions of the government: state ministers, governors, district heads, and other high ranking officials at both the central administration and the regional levels. Excessive implementation of ABRI's dual function has resulted in many criticisms. The end of the cold war and the end of the East-West rivalry have brought the beginnings of a new world order. The issues of democratization, human rights, the environment, and openness are common throughout the world, including Indonesia. These global issues have increased the wave of criticism toward ABRI involvement in the political life of Indonesia. In addition, the success of the government's development programs has resulted in a more informed and conscious society that has begun to question the relevance of ABRI's involvement in sociopolitical affairs. This thesis describes some aspects of ABRI's dual functions, its future prospects, and some proposed actions necessary for future implementation of ABRI's dual function.

1996

0834 **Privatization in Indonesia: One Economic Strategy to Accelerate Economic Growth.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Benyamen N. Supit. June 1996. 104pp.*

This is a study of privatization in Indonesia. Privatization is defined as the transfer of ownership control or functions from the public to the private sector. After an overview of the terminology used in describing privatization and the current theory of privatization, this thesis examines four performance factors of Indonesia's economy: crises and reform, sustaining development, the growth challenge, and the public sector. The study analyzes public enterprise's role in economic development. Further, it examines privatization's purpose and the privatization process with respect to evaluation and selection of public enterprises. The study further indicates the priority for privatizing public enterprises. Finally, the author suggests considerations and requirements for management in a privatization program.

0938 **Agricultural Situation Annual Report.**

*U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia. NA. 1996. 42pp.*

This report provides an overview of the Indonesian economic situation with a particular focus on the agricultural sector and its potential as a market for U.S. commodities. The report provides a look at the situation and outlook for the economic sector by commodity grouping and for production resources and inputs. The report also provides various Indonesian agricultural statistics, a consumer index of twenty-seven capital cities in Indonesia, and data on Indonesia's agricultural exports and imports for 1995 and 1996.

## Reel 7

### Indonesia cont.

- 0001 **1996 cont.**  
**Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Sandra L. Nagy. December 1996. 168pp.*  
This is a study of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. Islamic fundamentalism is defined as the return to the foundations and principles of Islam, including all movements based on the desire to create a more Islamic society. After describing the practices and beliefs of Islam, this thesis examines the three aspects of universal Islamic fundamentalism: revivalism, resurgence, and radicalism. It analyzes the role of Islam in Indonesia under Dutch colonial rule, an alien Christian imperialist power. Following independence in 1945, Islam became less influential in national politics. Focusing on the current situation, this thesis examines the ways in which Islamic fundamentalism could potentially threaten U.S. security interests. It concludes that growing Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is inevitable but is not likely to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests in the near future. Nonetheless, it deserves close attention given Islam's propensity to mobilize mass support throughout Indonesia.
- 0169 **Country Commercial Guide: Indonesia, Fiscal Year 1997 (Revised).**  
*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1996. 93pp.*  
This CCG presents a general look at Indonesia's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Indonesia and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in Indonesia to be cautiously optimistic for U.S. investors. As one of the most dynamic, yet relatively unheralded economies in the APR, the Republic of Indonesia deserves the attention of U.S. exporters and investors alike. As alluring and untapped as the Indonesian market is, however, it nevertheless must be approached with some caution. Companies entering the market need to be patient and focused on long-term rather than short-term opportunities. In other words, Indonesia poses many of the same challenges as other developing economies, with tremendous payoff potential. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel and environment. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Indonesian business contacts.

### Japan

- 0262 **1994**  
**Redefining the U.S.–Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program.**  
*National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, NA. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green. November 1994. 68pp.*  
This report examines the outlook for the Japan–U.S. security alliance. It discusses changing attitudes in the Japanese government toward its international security role, including recommendations in a special advisory panel's review of the National Defense Program Outline; key issues facing Japan and the United States in managing the security alliance, including Japanese support of U.S. bases in Japan, cooperation in theater

missile defense, and technology transfer; and U.S. objectives in the alliance. The report also includes the Japanese special advisory panel's report on its review of the National Defense Program Outline, "Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century."

**1995**

- 0330 **The Japan–U.S. Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia: A Workshop Report.**  
*The Institute for International Policy Studies and the Center for Naval Analysis, NA. Ralph Cossa. January 1995. 58pp.*

This report documents a conference regarding the continued viability of the Japan–U.S. alliance in the post–cold war era and the future role and impact of emerging East Asian multilateral security agreements and alliances. Participants examined the issues affecting the future of the Japan–U.S. bilateral security relationship in conjunction with the current trend toward multilateralism, its motivating and driving forces, and its implications for Japan, the United States, and East Asia in general. The end of the cold war and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet empire have prompted calls for a reassessment of the continued viability of the Japan–U.S. security relationship. Has the current trend toward multilateral security dialogue in Asia, most recently evidenced by the establishment of the ARF, rendered the bilateral relationship obsolete? The conclusion of the conference was agreement that the relationship continues to be essential for both countries and for the entire APR.

- 0388 **The Japan–United States Friendship Commission, Biennial Report, 1993–1994.**  
*The Japan–U.S. Friendship Commission, NA. NA. 1995. 50pp.*

The Japan–U.S. Friendship Commission is an independent federal agency created in 1975 to administer a trust fund and award grants for Japanese-American cultural and educational exchanges; it is dedicated to promoting understanding and cooperation between the United States and Japan. Although governmental, the commission operates much like a private foundation. This is a biennial report, for fiscal years 1993 and 1994, on the commission's activities during those years. It includes a list of grants awarded by year and subject and their value in U.S. dollars and Japanese yen and the commission's budget and financial statement.

- 0438 **United States–Japan: An Economic View.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Walter F. Wall Jr. April 1995. 36pp.*

The cold war is over, the communist threat is gone, and the global community has shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar world. Old alliances established as security against the threat are in question. The reasons for the United States to expend military resources abroad are not as clear cut as they once were. The American people now focus inward on their standard of living, the economy, and their overall well-being. The strains of trade deficits are tearing at the long-established relationship between the United States and Japan. This paper addresses economic relations, focusing on the causes of the economic imbalance between the United States and Japan since World War II. There are many sources available that identify, empirically, the extent of this economic imbalance. The paper outlines the causes that led to this imbalance and discusses the effects it has had on the economic welfare of the United States and the future relationship with Japan. This paper focuses on the macro-level economic issues and does not consider the specific industries or commodities where imbalance occurs.

- 0474 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, STA: Roles and Activities, 1994.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. July 5, 1995. 35pp.*

The Science and Technology Agency (STA) was established on May 19, 1956, to support Japan's science and technology administrative structure. Since then, STA has been planning, formulating, and implementing basic science and technology policies and

coordinating the science and technology policies developed by other administrative bodies. In addition, the agency has been advancing large-scale projects dealing with atomic energy, space, and ocean development and has been encouraging research and development in various pioneering fields of science and technology, including earth sciences, disaster prevention, special materials, life sciences, and aeronautical technology. The agency has been exploring a variety of ways to advance science and technology in Japan.

- 0509 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, Japan–U.S. Multimedia War.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. July 26, 1995. 44pp.*  
From 1993 through 1994, similar trends that should draw our attention have been occurring in two countries that border the Pacific Ocean, Japan and the United States. These are moves toward the construction of an “information highway” and the multimedia boom. The Clinton administration aims to rehabilitate American industries and regain international competitiveness, and it is promoting policies for the construction of an information highway. The announcement of the policy of giving serious consideration to the information highway in February 1993 and the announcement of an action for construction of a national information infrastructure in September of the same year showed strong determination to resuscitate communications and high technology in the United States. In Japan, there was the NTT announcement of plans for the construction of the Next Generation Communications Network in April 1993. This is a huge plan for the construction of a broadband integrated service network aimed at the twenty-first century with funding of 45 trillion yen. In some way, the thinking that an advanced information infrastructure will play an important role in the prosperity of industry and society in the future has arisen in both countries. We might say that Japan is facing the era of “optical” war. This paper contains chapters entitled: The Multimedia Era is Just Around the Corner; NTT on the Move; Japan Can Become the World’s Number One Multimedia Country; Japan’s Network Improvement Plan; America’s Information Highway Advancing Under Private Guidance; Question of NTT Breakup Controls the Future of Japan; What Is the Optimal Operating Strategy for NTT for the 21st Century?; The War in Japan’s Domestic Telecommunications Market; and Taking Over the Asian Telecommunications Market: Era of Dominance in the Global Telecommunications Market.
- 0553 **U.S.–Japan Cooperative Development: Progress on the FS-X Program Enhances Japanese Aerospace Capabilities.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. August 1995. 113pp.*  
This report outlines the progress that has been made in implementing the Japan–U.S. program to cooperatively develop the FS-X fighter aircraft, a significantly modified derivative of the U.S. F-16 Block 40 aircraft. The report discusses program status; U.S. government and contractor controls over technical data and hardware transferred to Japan for the program and recommended improvements regarding U.S. government review of export licenses related to the program; transfer of program technology from Japan to the United States; and benefits of the program for the Japanese and U.S. aerospace industries. The report also includes comments of the departments of Defense, State, and Commerce on a draft of the report, and GAO responses.
- 0666 **Japan: Spotlight on Automobile Industry Organizations.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. August 16, 1995. 19pp.*  
This report describes the functions of Japan’s automobile industry organizations, administered by the Japanese government to assist Japan’s automotive industry. It covers the functions of providing foreign and domestic technical information to member

corporations, influencing Japanese and foreign government policy making, and helping to implement Japanese government policies. The report also includes a list of major automobile industry organizations dealing with manufacturing, parts and materials, retail and distribution, repair and insurance, and other sectors.

0685 **Security Assistance to Japan: Assessment of Political, Military, and Economic Issues from 1947 to 1989.**

*Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. David W. Puvogel. September 1995. 80pp.*

Japan is an important ally of the United States in part due to its strategic location at the intersection of China, Korea, and the former Soviet Union. Japan is vital to the maintenance of regional stability and has been used by the United States in the East Asian balance of power. The relationship changed through time from the American occupation after World War II, to the rebuilding phase of Japan's economy, and finally a progression toward a more independent Japan capable of a larger portion of self defense. The rebuilding process of Japan was carried out largely by the United States and its various programs of security assistance. The United States used security assistance to show support for the U.S.–Japanese alliance, rebuild Japan's economy, and gain access to Japanese bases for military purposes of regional stabilization. Japan was effective in using U.S. security assistance to their advantage to achieve their goals. The end result of U.S. security assistance for the United States was an ally to counter communism, a major trade partner, and a strategic ally that served U.S. needs in two major conflicts.

0765 **The United States–Japan Treaty Relationship: Japan's Perspective on Renewed U.S. Commitment.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. John M. Kubera. September 1995. 112pp.*

With the ending of the cold war in Europe decreasing the tensions between East and West, the U.S.–Japan security relationship developed after World War II has come under continuous reexamination. In order to rectify possible misperceptions as to U.S. resolve for this alliance in the Pacific, the Department of Defense has currently initiated the U.S.–Japan Security Dialogue. Although the U.S.–Japan security relationship has a long history throughout the cold war, it is the recent changes in the strategic environment in Northeast Asia and the world that prompt a reassessment of Japan's own role. The issues that now influence Japan in its reassessment of its desired international role also influence its perspective toward its security relationship with the United States. The constraints placed upon Japan by its history of antimilitary policies, domestic budgetary problems, and present political alignment do not allow it enough freedom to take a hard line in negotiations with the United States.

**1996**

0877 **Japan 2010: Prospective Profiles.**

*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Kent E. Calder. March 1996. 45pp.*

The commander of the Seventh Fleet asked CNA to assess the security environment of the APR between now and 2010. Through an examination of relevant economic, political, and demographic data and projections, this research memorandum seeks to identify alternative Japanese security-policy orientations in the year 2010. The project's final report, "The Dynamics of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region" (CNA Research Memorandum 95-172, January 1996), discusses the implications of these trends (and of the probable trends in other countries of the region) for U.S. forces, particularly the Navy. A threefold analytical approach is used to analyze alternative Japanese futures. This

involves first identifying predictable long-term trends and “critical uncertainties” in the Japanese political economy—that is, crossroads with unusual significance in determining long-term futures. The approach then uses these systematically predictable and uncertain aspects as building blocks in developing scenarios of alternative futures.

- 0922 **Theater Missile Defense: The Effects of TMD on U.S.–Japan Security Relations.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Kenneth R. Spurlock. March 1996. 109pp.*

This thesis examines the continued pursuit of co-production efforts by the United States with Japan. The president has identified the development of Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) as a priority to counter the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In keeping with the priorities set forth by the president, the secretary of defense has made several proposals to the Japanese government regarding the purchase, increased technical exchanges, and co-production of TMD systems. This study reviews the potential effect that such efforts may have on the future of the U.S.–Japan security relationship and the ability of the United States to exert its influence in the APR. The environment that led to the initial security agreement in 1951 has been significantly altered and many believe that TMD may be the necessary tool to restore stability to the relationship. Through the application of three alliance theories this thesis analyzes the U.S. decision to pursue joint TMD production with Japan. This thesis provides background information for the three theories and applies them to the history of the U.S.–Japan alliance, the FS-X co-production effort, and the extended TMD proposals. Based on this application and analysis, the study concludes that co-production of TMD will impede the production of TMD, and therefore it is not in the direct interest of the United States. In addition the exchange of technology as well as the co-production efforts will reduce the credibility and influence of the United States within the U.S.–Japan alliance. If the United States alone continues with its domestic development and deploys TMD systems as part of its national military strategy, however, it can avoid the negative effects and degradation of its influence within the alliance.

## Reel 8

### Japan cont.

- 1996 cont.**
- 0001 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, White Paper on Science and Technology, 1995: 50 Years of Postwar Science and Technology in Japan.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. May 10, 1996. 293pp.*  
Part 1 of this white paper analyzes scientific and technological activity in postwar Japan over the past fifty years and the changes made in the nation’s basic approach to science and technology, the objective being to provide basic information to the public for expanding discussion on promoting science and technology. Part 2 consists of comparisons with other nations in the areas of science and technology and an overview of related activity in Japan today. Part 3 summarizes the specific science and technology policies being promoted under the General Guidelines for Science and Technology Policy, the foundation of Japan’s science and technology policy.
- 0294 **Water Pollution and Japan’s Declining Fish Catch.**  
*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Fawzi A. Taha. June 1996. 28pp.*  
This report describes the relationship between the decline in Japan’s fish catch and water pollution in coastal and inland waterways. It covers the role of fish in the Japanese diet; sources of water pollution; the eutrophication process; the structure of the fishing sector; government regulation to restrict water pollution; and the economic impact of the declining fish catch.

- 0322 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, Trends in Principal Indicators on R&D Activities in Japan.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. July 31, 1996. 93pp.*  
Charts presented in this report cover Japan's R&D activities in the natural science field, except some aspects of R&D activities where an international comparison is made. The notation (Natural Science) is affixed to the headings of charts that exclusively cover the natural science field, while the notation (Natural Science + Cultural and Social Sciences) is affixed to charts that cover both natural science and cultural and social sciences. The charts herein are mainly derived from a "Report on the Survey of Research and Development," which contains survey results of "Designated Statistics Number 61 under Statistics Law aiming to reveal the realities of R&D activities in Japan and to provide basic data for designing and implementing R&D promotional policies." The survey report has been regularly published since 1953.
- 0415 **Country Commercial Guide: Japan, Fiscal Year 1997.**  
*U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan. NA. August 1, 1996. 70pp.*  
This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Japan's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Japan and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in Japan to be optimistic for U.S. investors. U.S. companies interested in doing business in Asia should not overlook the opportunities Japan has to offer their products and services. In business, the Japan of today is in a state of constant change. To what degree and at what pace changes are taking place in Japan are hotly debated issues. It is clear, however, that political and economic fluctuations in Japan over the last several years have fostered developments in Japan's economy and society that have opened an indefinite and increasing number of opportunities for U.S. companies to establish themselves or expand their business in Japan. This guide looks at the elements of change in Japan, analyzes the trends, and explains how U.S. companies can position themselves to take advantage of these opportunities. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Japanese business contacts.
- 0485 **Annual Agricultural Situation Report: Japan.**  
*U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan. NA. September 30, 1996. 24pp.*  
Japan is the largest agricultural product importer in the world with total agricultural and forest product imports reaching a record \$69.7 billion in 1995, up 8 percent from the previous year. The United States is the most important supplier to Japan, providing roughly one-third of Japan's agricultural imports. In 1995, Japan's agricultural, fish, and forestry imports from the United States reached \$20.2 billion, the highest export level since 1970. Japan is the largest export market for many U.S. agricultural products, including feed grains, oilseeds, wheat, beef, and forest products. Although the outlook for increased feed grain and oilseed exports to Japan is somewhat dim due to relatively stagnant demand from Japan's livestock sector, good potential exists for increased imports of processed foods, meats, and forest products. Lowering the current high tariffs on panel and other processed wood products and continued progress in revising Japan's Building Standards Law to allow greater use of wood in housing construction are necessary for increased imports. Although bulk commodities continue to account for a significant percentage of total U.S. agricultural exports to Japan, consumer-oriented

products now account for 48 percent on a value basis. On a volume basis, the most important consumer-oriented products are fresh/chilled/frozen meats, fresh fruit, processed fruits and vegetables, and tree nuts. Consumer-oriented agricultural products showing the most significant growth include meats, dairy and egg products, fresh fruits and vegetables, snack foods, and pet foods. The biggest event of 1995 was the opening of the rice market to imported rice, as the government of Japan implemented the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture. In addition, a safeguard measure on pork imports was implemented under the Uruguay Round agreement.

0509 **Prospects for Growth in Japan in the 21st Century.**

*U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, Washington, D.C. Sumiye Okubo, William R. Brown, Fenwick W. Yu, and Kenneth J. Borghese. November 1996. 70pp.*

This report outlines recent trends in and prospects for Japan's economic growth, focusing on the impact of various government policies, particularly with respect to structural adjustment, and the impact of information technology. The report also discusses the recent history of Japan's economy; current conditions, including with respect to productivity, employment, investment, prices, trade, and exchange rate; and future trends, focusing on problems posed by the banking sector, the declining savings rate and labor supply, and the possible impact of trade liberalization, deregulation, and corporate restructuring.

0579 **United States–Japan Security Relations: Scenarios for the Future.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Timothy A. Zoerlein. December 1996. 166pp.*

This thesis examines the viability of the U.S.–Japan security relationship by considering four scenarios. The scenarios are discussed using a number of specific factors likely to affect the security relationship in the future. The alliance is also considered abstractly using international relations theory to highlight systemic explanations for the behavior of various states in the scenarios. First, the security relationship could come to an end if America is increasingly viewed as the “policeman of Asia” or the “cap in the bottle” of Japan without an identifiable benefit to match that role. While the United States was willing to subordinate economic concerns for the sake of security in the past, this will be increasingly difficult in the future. Second, the security arrangement could be threatened if Japan assumes a security role commensurate with its political and economic position in East Asia. If Japan increases the size of its military, this could cloud the rationale for the presence of American military forces in Japan. Japan might choose to do so because of regional dynamics, such as Korean unification; conflict caused by a fragmented or weak China; or the emergence of a regional trading bloc in East Asia. Third, the emergence of China as the dominant power in East Asia might threaten the United States and Japan and reinvigorate their security alliance. China's efforts to increase its influence in the region could cause uneasiness in the United States and Japan, prompting them to act as a balance against China. Fourth, efforts to update the relationship could ensure its long-term survival. Reassessing the purpose of the relationship and moving it from the needs of the cold war to the realities of the post–cold war era would be key to any attempt to update the alliance. In this context, the United States might consider changing the bilateral relationship.

0745 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, Japanese Government's Fiscal Year 1995 Policy, Long-Term Vision to Establish Information Infrastructure.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. December 17, 1996. 33pp.*

This report deals with various Japanese laws dating back to 1957 that document Japan's efforts to set up an information infrastructure and the Japanese government's long-term efforts to promote and implement this vision.

- 0778 **U.S.–Japan Trade: U.S. Company Views on the Implementation of the 1994 Insurance Agreement.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. December 1996. 54pp.*  
This report examines the implementation of the 1994 Japan–U.S. insurance agreement designed to reduce barriers impeding foreign firms' access to the Japanese insurance market. It focuses on the results of a survey of U.S. insurance providers concerning actions taken by the Japanese government to implement key provisions of the 1994 agreement and the impact of these actions on U.S. providers' ability to compete in the Japanese market.
- 1997**
- 0832 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, Japan's Space Business Ready to Take Off.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. February 5, 1997. 42pp.*  
This paper examines the Japanese space industry. Japan's space development, which has been seen as being behind that of the United States and Europe, has effectively used limited resources in a development policy centered on the National Space Development Agency, and this has been effective for catching up. As a result, Japan has achieved international technological standards, as can be seen in the successful development of the H-II large rocket and geostationary satellites, and the space industry in Japan has acquired the basic technology in this national space development. On the other hand, there has been development in fields like satellite telecommunications and satellite broadcasting where there is private demand for space utilization. In the future, Japan can expect a rapid expansion in the new market for mobile telecommunications and navigation satellites. At present, the major problem for Japan's economy is the loss of substance in industry. To solve this problem and maintain a prosperous economy in Japan, it is important to foster new industries that are supported by information, space, and biotechnology.
- 0874 **The Newest Age Now Begins: The Future of the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Catherine T. Bacon. April 7, 1997. 30pp.*  
The U.S.–Japan security alliance has linked both nations since the 1950s. During the cold war, security issues were paramount. Japan recovered, and America contained Soviet communism. Japan provided military base rights, and America provided the military muscle for security in Northeast Asia. The end of the cold war and economic changes in Japan and America are straining the alliance, however. Some argue that the alliance is no longer necessary, but it is still vital to bilateral security and economic interests. This research project discusses the alliance by examining trade tensions and social tensions. Large trade imbalances have caused the first tension, and the second tension was sparked by the rape of a young Okinawan girl by U.S. servicemen in September 1996. In April 1997, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed the importance of the treaty but also announced that Futema Marine Corps Air Station would close. To make clear the relevance of the alliance, this paper analyzes various aspects of both countries, including economic activities and security needs. Since a base has been closed, it is likely that more protests will follow. U.S. and Japanese planners should consider options for maintaining the security alliance.

- 0904 **Report to President William Jefferson Clinton of the Interagency Enforcement Team Regarding the U.S.–Japan Agreement on Autos and Auto Parts.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. NA. April 18, 1997. 55pp.*  
This is a semiannual report on progress made in implementing the Japan–U.S. agreement on trade in the automotive and automotive parts sector. It covers compliance with qualitative and quantitative criteria with respect to motor vehicles, original equipment parts, and aftermarket parts; it also addresses market conditions in the United States and Japan. The report also includes a summary of the first annual Japan–U.S. consultations to assess agreement implementation, held September 18–19, 1996, in San Francisco, California.
- 0959 **Remilitarization of Japan: Prospects and Impacts.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Tay Swee Yee. April 28, 1997. 44pp.*  
Japan has grown to be the world's richest country in terms of foreign exchange reserve. Yet her roles in the international arena are not commensurate with her economic stature. In the past, she was especially slow to respond to UN peace operations, citing constitutional limitations. What roles should Japan play internationally, roles that would not cause anxiety to neighboring countries? Also, there have always been concerns, especially among older Southeast Asians, who still have vivid memories of Japanese military atrocities during the Japanese occupation, that Japan may move toward militarism. What are the factors pushing or restraining Japan to remilitarize? This essay analyzes these issues and discusses the potential impact of a rearmed Japan on the world and on Southeast Asia in particular.

## Reel 9

### Japan cont.

- 1997 cont.**
- 0001 **FBIS Report: Science and Technology—Japan, MPT's Fiscal Year 1995 White Paper on Japan's Information Infrastructure, Telecommunications Policy for the 21st Century.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. May 13, 1997. 217pp.*  
This report discusses Japan's information infrastructure and telecommunications policy for the coming century. The report summarizes two Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications white papers dated June and November 1995. Topics include the evolution of telecommunications toward the distribution of diverse information; new developments in broadcasting geared to the multimedia age; promotion of twenty-first century–oriented technology development and standardization; the evolution of R&D oriented toward the multimedia age; trends in R&D toward the multimedia age; the significance of liberalization of telecommunications markets in Japan; the current status of market entry of new telecommunications carriers; an overview of the Type I telecommunications carriers market; rate reductions; the current status of information-communications industries and of the use of fiber-optic cables; a forecast for the mobile communications market; the current status of the diffusion of major radio stations and cable television; an analysis of major telecommunications carriers' revenues; the establishment of a special loan system for implementation of a subscriber fiber-optic network; activation of the telecommunications equipment market; the international procurement amounts of Type I telecommunications carriers; and the current status of the broadcasting business in Japan.

- 0218 **Explaining Alliance Sustainability: The U.S.–Japan Military Relationship.**  
*University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. Matthew Aaron Long. May 22, 1997. 203pp.*  
This study seeks to explain the rationale for a post–cold war continuation of the Japanese–American military relationship. By constructing an analytical framework that integrates a comparative approach to the study of national defense policy with aspects of the foreign policy/area studies and international relations theory's literature dealing with the nature of military alliances, this study identifies, accounts for the support of, and assesses the influence of alliance functions beyond the U.S. and Japanese external security environments that encourage maintenance of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. An integration of the national defense policy literature highlights four comparative aspects of a state's defense policies that are useful in understanding the environment surrounding the U.S.–Japan military alliance. A comparison of these four components when applied to the national security policies of Japan and the United States reveals the existence of greater fundamental differences than similarities in their security policies. Fundamental differences in national security orientation lay the foundation for the military alliance and its functions. These differences create and reinforce a condition of mutual dependency that enables the alliance to survive.
- 0421 **Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan–U.S.–Korea, A Workshop Report.**  
*Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, The National Institute for Defense Studies, and the Center for Naval Analyses, NA. Christopher Yung, Chang Soo Kim, Sung Hwan Wie, and Tomoyuki Ishizu. February 1997. 44pp.*  
In light of the evolving security environment in Northeast Asia and potential changes that may occur over the next decade, the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), and CNA held a workshop in Tokyo, Japan, on February 13 and 14, 1997, to examine the prospects for Korea–Japan–U.S. naval cooperation between now and 2010. The purposes of the workshop were to identify factors in the Asia-Pacific security environment that would affect the cooperative relationship, including roads to Korean unification; identify possible roles and missions for the Korean, Japanese, and American navies; explore current and future trilateral naval relations between the three countries; and examine the role of multilateral organizations and cooperation in shaping U.S.–Japan–Korea naval cooperation. Twelve papers (four from each participating institute) were presented on these topics, followed by commentary and discussion. The presentations stimulated candid expression of views and highlighted the differences and similarities of outlook among participants. Appendices A through C contain lists of participants and observers.
- 0465 **The “China Factor” in Japanese Military Modernization for the 21st Century.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Jeffrey S. Wiltse. June 1997. 214pp.*  
Japan's reevaluation of its security position and the role it wishes to play in regional and international matters has been influenced by the reemergence of China, which continues to affect Japan as it moves into its newly described role. Japan's ongoing modernization of its forces, which are directed under its National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Program, does not, however, seem to be in reaction to any overt perception of a Chinese threat or Chinese influence. These programs reflect Japan's decision to take a “balanced approach” to security, an approach based on the U.S.–Japan security arrangements, supported by a self-reliant defense force and in conjunction with regional and international approaches to security. The Japanese, with their balanced approach to security, are carefully preparing for the twenty-first century. By addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international perspectives, Japan is putting itself on a more even keel. It is no longer relying exclusively on the U.S.–Japan security arrangements nor is it waiting for the United States to lead the way in its foreign policy. The “China factor,” in its small way, has enabled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with

the United States, its neighbors, and the rest of the world as it prepares for the twenty-first century. Areas of tension remain, however, that could stress, strain, or break its security structure. Such an event could cause Japan to reassess the system it has chosen. What is clear, however, is that Sino-Japanese relations will play a critical role in whatever path Japan takes.

## Korea

**1995**

0679 **Korean Unification: Alternative Economic Strategies.**

*Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. James P. Bell. September 1995. 128pp.*

Reunification of North and South Korea is the fervent wish of virtually all Koreans. They were naturally inspired by the 1990 reunification of East and West Germany. The subsequent specter of the German government spending in excess of \$100 billion per year to support eastern Germany has given pause to some Korean planners, however. They have proposed alternatives to a sudden, German-style absorption of the northern DPRK by the southern ROK. This paper analyzes unification by absorption and the principal alternatives, mainly from an economic perspective. The basic conclusion is that the alternatives are not clearly superior to sudden absorption and may not even achieve the objective. The gradual approaches would reduce or delay unemployment relief costs, but they would also entail production subsidies and continued inefficiency. They would delay northern development and raise the eventual cost of lifting northern living standards to southern levels. They would leave open the possibility that movement toward political union could be reversed. While unification by absorption would be very expensive for the ROK government, it can limit its costs by adopting policies different from those followed in Germany. Economic factors thus do not point unambiguously toward a policy of stabilizing the northern regime and accepting a long period of peaceful coexistence. While such a policy may prove necessary for political and military reasons, it is not mandated by economic considerations.

**1996**

0807 **Korea in the 21st Century.**

*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Paul Bracken. February 1996. 51pp.*

Between 1960 and today South Korea has gone from being poor to being middle class, from being rural to being urban, from having primary industries to having secondary and increasingly tertiary industries, and from having an inferiority complex with respect to Japan to having an attitude that could develop into chauvinism. The problem for the future is whether Korea can successfully continue its economic progress in a world that is more competitive, more wary of exploitative economic practices, and more dominated by large surrounding countries that have in the past been enemies. There is no way that Korea can deal confidently with such giants as China, Russia, and Japan on its own. In the future, Seoul may try to balance off China and Japan, which represent historic threats to the peninsula. In the Korean view, only the U.S. presence in the Pacific prevents the otherwise inevitable Japanese rearmament that could follow, for example, the emergence of China as a military power. Because Koreans are not convinced that the United States will be present in Northeast Asia for the longer term, and because Korea does not trust either China or Japan (certainly not to the degree that it has trusted the United States), Korea is building a modern navy. That navy is to show the flag, help protect Korea's sea lines of communication, and contribute, more than symbolically, to multilateral naval efforts. Such a navy could be regarded with suspicion by Japan, China, or Russia, unless Korea remains anchored in some security relationship with the United States.

- 0858 **Stability for the Korean Peninsula: The Arms Control Progress.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. David F. Treuting. March 15, 1996. 39pp.*  
One of the few remaining locations of confrontation left in the world is the Korean peninsula. As Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have dissolved the number of true Marxist/Communist nation states has been severely reduced. The history of the peninsula specifically with the United States and North Korea has been stormy since the armistice of 1953. The volatility of the peninsula suggests that renewed hostilities remain possible, with serious consequences for the entire Northeast Asia region. A methodology that offers some promise for all parties involved is the arms control process. This strategic research project analyzes the arms control methodology and its potential for stabilizing the Korean peninsula and therefore lessening the potential for war.
- 0897 **Engagement and Enlargement in Korea.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas R. Riley. April 1996. 41pp.*  
The end of the cold war resulted in a reassessment and modification of U.S. strategy. The focus shifted from containment to engagement and enlargement in regions of the world critical to U.S. interests. The change had significant impact on the ROK. U.S. strategy toward Korea changed to include fulfilling the Agreed Framework as a significant security objective. The new strategy employs significant nonmilitary measures to try to bring North Korea into the community of normal states, while still employing forward presence in South Korea to contain the North, pending its modification. The new approach to dealing with North Korea has been difficult for Seoul to accept, and has raised fears that U.S. direct contact with Pyongyang may be detrimental to its interests. Despite Seoul's trepidation, it is a major player in the new strategy. Indications point to Pyongyang's near-term compliance with the agreement, but it may take five to ten years to determine the full success of the strategy. At present, while U.S.–DPRK relations have improved, there has been no perceptible change in North-South relations.
- 0938 **Naval Cooperation after Korean Unification.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, NA. Christopher Yung, Chang Su Kim, Sung Hwan Wie, and Jae-Wook Lee. May 1996. 44pp.*  
The CNA and KIDA held a workshop in Washington, D.C., from December 4 to 6, 1995, to examine the prospects for U.S.–Korean naval relations in the year 2010. For purposes of analysis, the participants assumed the possibility of Korean unification over the next ten to fifteen years. The purpose of the workshop was to investigate potential threats in the region in 2010, identify the naval missions these threats imply, identify non-threat-related missions, and project the capabilities required to perform those missions.
- 1997**
- 0982 **An Alternative Scenario for the Reunification of Korea.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Steve A. Fondacaro. May 10, 1997. 43pp.*  
This paper posits an alternative scenario to Korean reunification to those currently being discussed in and out of South Korea. Much of what has been written discusses the demise of the present North Korean government along a spectrum of turbulence, from gradual decay to violent implosion (“soft” and “hard landings”). The predicted results also vary from peaceful absorption by the South Korean government to a “war of desperation” scenario precipitated by the decaying northern regime in a last-ditch effort to retain power. The point of commonality among all the discussions is that the Koreas are the primary drivers behind each reunification scenario. This paper explores a scenario where the two Koreas end up as secondary players in the future of the Korean peninsula. The primary regional actor to emerge will be China. The implications of Korean reunification on the

future Northeast Asian region are too far-reaching for China to assume a wait-and-see role. As the ascendant regional power, China will shape events on the Korean peninsula to fit its own future vision of Northeast Asia. It is further proposed that this Chinese vision will seek to maintain the peaceful division of North and South Korea in the short term (ten to twenty years) following the demise, hard or soft, of the present North Korean government. China is seen, in this scenario, as moving unilaterally, on the basis of long-standing agreements with North Korea, into North Korea as the government implodes (1) to prevent a new peninsular war instigated in desperation by the North; (2) to put in place a moderate, pro-Chinese interim government capable of stabilizing the North Korean internal situation, albeit with heavy Chinese assistance; and (3) to check the growth of U.S. regional influence. China views the implications for the region, and itself, as too great for this matter to be left solely to the Koreans to solve. It is in the Chinese interest to prevent the uncontrolled rise of a new, potentially powerful reunified Korean regional competitor. Additionally, China will seek to minimize, or at least prevent the increase of, U.S. influence in the region, which would predictably occur in a South Korean-controlled reunification scenario. For obvious historical, military, and economic reasons, the Japanese desire to maintain the geopolitical and economic status quo will cause them to play a supporting role in the Chinese effort. U.S. efforts to alter this scenario will be hampered by its negligible influence with the Chinese, the Chinese-North Korean agreements under which China will legitimately enter North Korea as its government's decay reaches critical mass, the tacit Japanese support, and the fact that the Chinese are in the best position to prevent the crashing North Korean government from sparking a war that would be disastrous for all nations in the region. This move, together with its predictable control of the Spratly Islands oil and natural gas reserves, an already powerful military, and a rapidly growing economy, will put China in a position to much more effectively influence the future of the region. In effect, this scenario will enable China to replace the United States as the regional stabilizer. The Japanese and the South Koreans will look to China to set the future pace and direction for Northeast Asia, as U.S. regional influence begins to wane. Predictably, this is a scenario the Chinese cannot fail to foresee and seriously consider.

## Reel 10

### Korea, North

1995

- 0001 **The North Korean Special Purpose Forces: An Assessment of the Threat.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Michael S. Durtschi. March 1995. 101pp.*

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the threat that the North Korean Special Forces pose and to explore how this threat might be deterred or countered. This thesis will answer three questions. First, in the event of a second Korean war, what will the special forces campaign look like? Second, how could one deter North Korea's use of this capability and, if that fails, can the threat be countered? Finally, what conclusions can be drawn from the North Korean case about the future use of special operations forces in general? This study provides an empirical assessment of the capabilities of the North Korean Special Purpose Forces and the threat they pose to the interests of both South Korea and the United States. It develops two possible campaign models, based on two prominent schools of thought on the use of special operations forces: autonomous use or integration with general purpose forces. This thesis then compares the capabilities of the North Korean Special Purpose Forces to the alternate campaign models to predict their possible uses in the event of a second Korean war. Finally, the study addresses how the ROK and the United States may deter or counter the threat these forces pose. It also

discusses what conclusions may be drawn from this study about the future use of special operations forces in general.

0102 **Strategic Implications of the U.S.–DPRK Framework Agreement.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas L. Wilborn. April 3, 1995. 43pp.*

On October 21, 1994, the United States and the DPRK signed an Agreed Framework that is designed to provide the procedure to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If and when successfully executed, it will satisfy U.S. negotiating objectives but, in the process, propel the United States into the center of North-South conflict. For South Korea, in addition to the explicit benefits of the provisions, it will facilitate more frequent and meaningful communication between the two halves of the now divided peninsula and a gradual, rather than chaotic, path to unification.

0145 **Strategic Implications of the Succession of Kim Jong II for U.S. Foreign Policy Towards North Korea.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. NA. June 2, 1995. 168pp.*

This study analyzes the strategic implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong II for U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea threatens vital U.S. interests in Northeast Asia and challenges U.S. regional and global leadership. In order to properly respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, it is essential to understand the man who will dictate North Korean actions—Kim Jong II. The study examines Kim Jong II's background, training, experience, personality, and leadership characteristics and the challenges he will face. The analysis of Kim Jong II indicates that he is a rational actor who has acted and will continue to act in a rational manner in pursuit of his desired ends. The framework for analysis is the strategic estimate process. Alternative courses of action are developed using the four elements of national power. The study identifies the strategic implications of probable North Korean actions and recommends appropriate U.S. courses of action on the basis of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability in achieving U.S. objectives in support of U.S. interests.

**1996**

0313 **Reunification of Korea: Bringing Back the South.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. John F. Ford. May 1996. 23pp.*

The extensive proliferation of WMD and of the means to deliver them is of international concern. On the Korean peninsula conventionally armed forces of the United States and the ROK face an adversary, the DPRK, that is suspected of having a limited arsenal of WMD and possibly the will to use them. How these weapons might be used by the DPRK to unify the Korean peninsula is unknown. This challenge is reviewed from a non-U.S. and non-South Korean perspective. Hypothetical advice on employing the capabilities of these weapons is given to Kim Jong II by a military adviser from the PRC. The specific advice highlights the potential of these weapons in relation to operational art and the principles of war. Information gathered from unclassified sources on the capabilities of U.S. and South Korean forces, the potential effects of WMD, and the reported public positions of respective governments is used to form the basis for defeat by North Korean forces.

0336 **Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. David S. Maxwell. May 23, 1996. 54pp.*

This monograph examines the question of what will happen on the Korean peninsula if North Korea collapses without a fight. In 1996 the DPRK appears to be on the verge of disintegration due in large part to Kim II Sung's philosophy of *juche* or self-reliance (which

is nothing more than the political, economic, and social isolation of North Korea), the disastrous flooding of 1995 resulting in widespread famine, and disproportionate military spending at the expense of economic development and social welfare. The collapse of the DPRK will mark the end of the Korean War and require that the “victors” conduct post-conflict operations for which they are responsible. Four possible scenarios for collapse are advanced: two “soft landing” and two “hard landing.” The soft landing scenarios result in gradual reunification in accordance with the ROK’s three-phase reunification plan. The hard landing scenarios cause tremendous suffering, lead to increased instability, and require intervention in order to stabilize the peninsula and prevent spillover to both the north and south as well as massive migration of the north’s population. In order to determine what the United States should do, as well as what it can do, the strategic interests, objectives, and concerns of China, Russia, Japan, the ROK, and the United States are analyzed. The common theme is the desire to benefit economically from a stable peninsula. The Tumen River region could become the economic center of gravity for Northeast Asia and become the carrot that could attract cooperation among all the powers of the region and the United States. Finally, the monograph concludes by presenting the four mission essential tasks that must be accomplished following DPRK collapse: (1) establishment of security and stability; (2) humanitarian relief operations; (3) security of nuclear research, production, storage, and delivery facilities; and (4) disarming, demobilizing, and resettling the DPRK military. In order to accomplish those tasks the UN Security Council should recognize its responsibilities for conducting post-conflict operations to restore order in the north, establish a mandate for such operations, and build a coalition among the Northeast Asian powers and the United States to conduct combined operations under UN command.

- 0390 **When the Weak Challenge the Strong: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Jaeho Cheon. June 1996. 163pp.*  
 This thesis examines the political behavior of weak states in crises through a detailed case study of the recent North Korean nuclear crisis. In the early 1990s, North Korea initiated a political challenge that threatened both U.S. nonproliferation and South Korean defense interests. North Korea manipulated the shared risks of the ensuing crisis to achieve political objectives rather than military victory, which was unobtainable due to U.S. and South Korean defense efforts. It is puzzling how a small state, such as North Korea, could successfully challenge more powerful states and not be punished. Indeed, North Korea was rewarded for its challenge. Asymmetric conflict theory states that a weaker state, even after assessing its disadvantages vis-à-vis an opponent, can successfully challenge stronger adversaries to political and strategic advantage. In the North Korean nuclear crisis, its limited aims/fait accompli strategy—namely, developing nuclear weapons and gaining economic benefits from the West and changing domestic politics—was the driving force behind its challenge. The findings of this study provide some theoretical insights as well as policy implications for the United States and South Korea in their policy toward North Korean nuclear behavior.

## Korea, South

- 1995**
- 0553 **South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. May 5, 1995. 31pp.*  
 This report examines South Korean government and business acquisition of foreign proprietary technology by indirect methods. The report discusses South Korea’s rationale for seeking indirect technology transfers; countries and types of technologies targeted; and acquisition strategies, including contacts with foreign academia, participation in international R&D projects, cooperation with foreign companies, foreign patents, employment of foreign scientists, establishment of physical presence in foreign countries, use of foreign databases, and commercial espionage.

- 0584 **Economic Growth in South Korea: Government or Free Market Achievement?**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Antonio Carlos Stangherlin Rebelo. December 1995. 86pp.*  
This thesis is an attempt to assess South Korean economic performance since the end of the Korean War, to evaluate how interventionist the government has been, and to decide which has been responsible for the economic growth, the government or the free market. The main indicators of South Korean performance and the roles of the government and of the free market on the economy are discussed. A regression is run relating the GDP growth rate to the degree of trade liberalization and government spending. The findings can be summarized as follows: (1) South Korean performance has been outstanding. (2) The government and free market's roles and their contributions to economic growth have varied over different periods in the Korean economy. First was the period from the end of the Korean War until the military coup of 1961, with highly interventionist government, repressed free market, and poor results. Second was the period from 1961 until 1980, characterized by an interplay between the government and the free market leading to high economic growth. Third was the period from 1980 to the present, the liberalization period, with market forces being the main source of high economic growth. (3) The economy has been negatively affected by government spending and trade restrictions.
- 0670 **Case Studies in East Asian Economic Development: The Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Mary R. Evans. December 1995. 145pp.*  
Since the end of the cold war, economic strength has become the leading symbol of power and means of achieving peace and stability. East Asia is widely viewed as the up-and-coming economic power center. Examination of East Asian economic development can provide some useful insights into overall patterns of development and influence, and it can also suggest the path to a post-cold war future of peace and prosperity. This thesis provides two representative case studies: the ROK and the PRC. These studies emphasize the importance of external (foreign) development assistance to modernization in lesser developed countries (LDCs) and the roles played by the United States and Japan as the world's major sources of such assistance. Findings include: (1) LDCs can make extensive use of foreign development assistance without losing control—or sovereignty—over their economies or the direction of their development; (2) mature, industrialized economies can provide large amounts of assistance to LDCs without destroying their own economic futures; (3) the experience of the East Asians can provide useful alternatives for LDCs worldwide; and (4) a partnership has emerged between the United States and Japan as sources of development assistance.
- 1996**
- 0815 **Conference Report: International Workshop on the U.S.–ROK Alliance.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. David W. Boose Jr. (editor). March 11, 1996. 57pp.*  
For nearly half a century, the security alliance between the United States and the ROK has deterred aggression and helped assure stability in Northeast Asia. The countries in this area, along with the United States, anticipate rapid progress in this region toward democratic industrialization as the cold war recedes and the few remaining communist states undergo inevitable transformation. In October 1995, scholars, military officers, diplomats, journalists, public figures, and concerned private citizens of the alliance partners and regional states gathered in Seoul, South Korea, to assess the impact of these changes and to seek new directions for the alliance. This conference report summarizes their deliberations.

- 0872 **The Invitation to Struggle: Executive and Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. William E. Berry Jr. May 17, 1996. 35pp.*  
The author examines the history of the ongoing debate between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government regarding policy in Korea, particularly the presence of U.S. troops. Most of the current congressional criticism is focused on the effectiveness of the administration's counter-proliferation policy with respect to North Korea. Concern over the North Korean nuclear threat has become an important issue. The author concludes that, until the nuclear issue is resolved, U.S. forces will likely remain in South Korea because vital national security interests are involved.

- 0907 **Annual Agricultural Situation Report: South Korea.**  
*U.S. Embassy, Seoul, South Korea. D. B. Voboril. October 1, 1996. 35pp.*  
Historically, Korea has been a relatively poor, isolated country constrained by its mountainous terrain and limited natural resources. With a high population density and limited arable land, Koreans were forced to depend on intensive production of rice and other grain crops. This situation was exacerbated by the frequent—and often brutal—subjugation of the Korean people by foreign powers. With these constraints and rather bleak historical setting as a backdrop, the government set out in the mid-1960s on a path that has turned Korea into one of the four “Asian Tigers.” It accomplished this through an economic policy that focused on rapid economic growth generated by an export-oriented manufacturing sector. The success of this policy over the past three decades has been remarkable. By contrast, however, the Korean government invested far fewer resources in the rural sector and pursued a policy of self-sufficiency maintained through highly restrictive import policies. With the government's attention and investments focused on the industrial sector, the gap between the rural and urban sector widened at a steady pace. As a result, rural infrastructure, educational facilities, and medical services in the rural areas are markedly inferior to those in the urban areas. U.S. agricultural exports to Korea reached a record-level \$3.75 billion in 1995, or a 65 percent increase over the 1994 level of \$2.3 billion. Exports of agricultural, fishery, and forestry products reached \$4.2 billion compared to \$2.7 billion in 1994. Growth should be less dramatic in 1996, though the total for agricultural exports should approach \$4.0 billion, or an annual increase of 5 percent. The report also includes data on Korean land use, crop production, livestock inventory, prices of major agricultural products, and agricultural imports and exports.

**1997**

- 0942 **Country Commercial Guide: Korea, Fiscal Year 1998.**  
*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State. NA. 1997. 140pp.*  
This CCG presents a comprehensive look at South Korea's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in South Korea and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in South Korea to be optimistic for U.S. investors. U.S. companies interested in doing business in Asia should not overlook the opportunities South Korea has to offer their products and services. In a market growing as fast and changing as rapidly as Korea's, American exporters cannot afford not to be present. While the Korean market is not always easy to enter and be successful in, Americans have the considerable assistance of the U.S. Department of Commerce and other organizations such as the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea. Korea truly is a sophisticated, upscale market that continues to develop. It offers lucrative opportunities for American firms. This guide looks at the elements of change in South Korea, analyzes the trends,

and explains how U.S. companies can position themselves to take advantage of these opportunities. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and South Korean business contacts.

## Reel 11

### Korea, South cont.

- 1997 cont.**
- 0001 **South Korea: Are New Methods More Amenable to New Interest?**  
*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thomas D. Webb. May 22, 1997. 59pp.*  
U.S. Army forces have been stationed in South Korea since the signing of the armistice in 1953. The intent of the forces was to contain the spread of communism and provide the United States with a security arc to protect her western borders. Since 1953, several changes have occurred with respect to the Southwest Asia region. U.S. Army doctrine has changed, along with national strategy, from containment and forward presence to force projection. In addition, though North Korea still poses a formidable threat to regional stability, South Korea maintains an improved military force capable of executing a credible defense along the 38th Parallel. Furthermore, the United States has additional interests in the Pacific Rim generated by the economic prosperity of the entire Pacific Rim. The purpose of this paper is to determine if U.S. Army forces should remain in South Korea. It is the author's contention that a static defense in South Korea is no longer consistent with Army doctrine. Furthermore, the Army could better support national interests in the region by developing contingencies for deployment from continental U.S. sites or other Pacific military installations.
- 0060 **Korea's Strategy for Leadership in Research and Development.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Technology Policy, Washington, D.C. Graham R. Mitchell. June 1997. 33pp.*  
Korea is rapidly developing its own industrial infrastructure to ensure its competitiveness and continued growth in the global marketplace. A key component of this infrastructure development is the assimilation of technology and management techniques developed by more industrialized nations, especially the United States. Together, the public and private sectors of Korea have focused strategically on competitiveness through increased technological self-sufficiency and identification of new sources of technology. The Korean globalization strategy takes advantage of all opportunities to improve its technological infrastructure and global competitiveness. This report explains the methods of technology transfer employed by Korea's public and private sectors.
- 0093 **CBO Memorandum: The Role of Foreign Aid in Development—South Korea and the Philippines.**  
*Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C. Eric J. Labs. September 1997. 56pp.*  
What role does foreign aid play in promoting the economic development and improving the social welfare of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America? That question is difficult to answer and has been the subject of much debate among development specialists as well as members of Congress and the American public. Drawing on the works of other scholars, this memorandum analyzes the role of foreign aid in the development of South Korea and the Philippines between 1953 and 1993. It is one of three memoranda that are

being published as background for "The Role of Foreign Aid in Development," a CBO study published in 1997. The memoranda are intended to illustrate more fully the themes identified in the main study.

## Malaysia

- 1996**
- 0149 **Country Commercial Guide: Malaysia, Fiscal Year 1997.**  
*Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, Washington, D.C. NA. August 1996. 41pp.*  
This CCG presents a general look at Malaysia's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Malaysia and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in Malaysia to be cautiously optimistic for U.S. investors. Although the population of Malaysia is only 20.7 million, it is a more important market for U.S. exports than many countries of much larger size. This market is, moreover, continuing to grow rapidly in line with the ongoing expansion and transformation of the economy. There are no significant barriers to export-oriented U.S. manufacturing, business, or investment in Malaysia, but there are certain barriers to new investment, primarily in service industries. Most sectors of the economy are very open to international trade, and U.S. products have been successful in practically all of them. The United States is Malaysia's second largest supplier. The report lists the principal opportunities for U.S. manufactured exports. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel and environment. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Malaysian business contacts.
- 0190 **Agricultural Situation Report.**  
*U.S. Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. NA. September 30, 1996. 29pp.*  
Malaysia has enjoyed two decades of rapid growth and economic diversification, which has transformed the country from an exporter of rubber and tin to a major player in the world trade of high tech electronics. The agricultural sector was the third biggest contributor to the Malaysian economy, accounting for 14 percent of the GDP in 1995. Nevertheless, agriculture still accounts for 18 percent of export earnings and 19 percent of the total workforce. The agricultural sector grew 4.2 percent in 1995 after a 1.0 percent decline in the previous year. Increases in palm oil prices and output contributed significantly to the impressive performance. Sharply higher rubber prices offset a marginal decline in output to regain the role of a respectful contributor to the agricultural sector. On the down side, output of forest products was lower as a result of the reduced number of logging permits issued by the state governments. Cocoa output also recorded a decline following rapid massive conversion of cocoa area to oil palm. Agricultural trade still makes up a significant amount of Malaysia's two-way trade. In 1995, nearly 12 percent of Malaysia's world trade was in agricultural products. Agricultural exports rose 9.7 percent in 1995 (value basis). While lagging behind an overall 25 percent increase in total merchandise imports, agricultural imports still managed an impressive 19 percent growth in 1995 (value basis). Tables provide information on Malaysian agricultural products and prices.

## Micronesia

1995

- 0219 **Emerging Micronesian Island Nations: Challenges for United States Policy.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Edward C. Camacho. June 1995. 200pp.*

This thesis is a study of Micronesia and its various peoples. It is an introduction to the geography and history of a region that is not well known but is strategically important, at one time to Japan and presently to the United States. Micronesia is one of three major regions of the Pacific. The others are Melanesia and Polynesia. The region's inhabitants are a diverse group of people with a blend of several different ethnicities, languages, and cultures. Over half of these people are Americans, and they occupy a place of importance in the national interest of the United States. For both historic and strategic reasons, the United States stands to gain by increasing its present level of support to the Micronesian Islands, including its territories and their inhabitants as they pursue a better future of peace, quiet, and prosperity. Without enhanced American support, the islanders will lag further in development and will look more attractive to other nations, particularly Japan, China, and Korea.

## Northeast Asia

1995

- 0419 **Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures: Suggestions for Northeast Asia.**  
*Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Arian L. Pregoner. May 1995. 30pp.*

Relationships between countries generally exist somewhere in the gray area between war and peace. Crisis prevention activities are particularly important and should have two goals: stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war and supporting or reinforcing efforts to move countries toward peace. A crisis prevention center (CPC) should facilitate efforts to achieve these goals. Its functions can be grouped into three broad, interrelated categories: establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries; supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues; and supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security-building measures. Technology will play a critical role in a CPC. First, technology is required to establish communication systems and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Second, technically based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues. In addition, technology can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries. Establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Potential first steps for such a CPC should include establishing communication channels and a dedicated communications center in each country, together with an agreement to use the system as a "hot line" in bilateral and multilateral emergency situations. A central CPC could also be established as a regional communications hub. The central CPC could coordinate a number of functions aimed at stabilizing regional tensions and supporting confidence-building activities, perhaps initially in an unofficial capacity. Specific recommendations for confidence-building measures are discussed.

1996

- 0449 **International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China–Japan–United States Strategic Triangle.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas L. Wilborn. March 21, 1996. 70pp.*

The author analyzes three bilateral relationships connecting China, Japan, and the United States to each other, taking into account vital U.S security and economic interests in

Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world. He suggests that in the short range, Washington should avoid significant changes of policy; but in the long range, it should establish ways for the major states, particularly China and Japan, to assert greater initiative commensurate with their economic power within a stable political context. Multilateral operational structures to supplement existing bilateral relations in Northeast Asia may provide a means for the United States to influence long-range trends and protect U.S. interests.

0519 **The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security.**

*Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Ralph A. Cossa. August 1996. 76pp.*

The political, economic, and security environment of the APR in the twenty-first century will be shaped in very large part by the interrelationships among the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. To the extent these four nations can cooperate, a generally benign environment can develop in which the challenges sure to develop in the region can be managed. Conversely, tensions and conflict among the four will have a profoundly destabilizing impact regionally, if not globally. This monograph addresses the future roles and interests of the four major Asia-Pacific powers and how their policies will affect security in Northeast Asia and, more specifically, on the Korean peninsula as we enter the twenty-first century. Each of these powers is undergoing a transition of sorts. In the case of the United States and possibly Japan, the changes may be more of style than substance but will impact their respective foreign policy outlooks nonetheless. In the case of China and especially Russia, the potential for significant change is much greater. There is a high degree of unpredictability regarding the future paths of these two nations as we approach the twenty-first century. The future course and behavior of the two Koreas, individually and (at some unpredictable point in the future) together, add to the uncertainty. While the four major powers have the ability to influence events on the Korean peninsula, they cannot direct or fully orchestrate them. On the other hand, actions by the Koreas can force policy choices by the big four that they might otherwise not pursue; the Korean "tail" has on occasion proven itself capable of wagging some very large dogs.

## **New Zealand**

### **1996**

0595 **Agricultural Situation Report: New Zealand.**

*U.S. Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand. NA. September 30, 1996. 14pp.*

Real GDP growth in New Zealand is estimated to be 2.8 percent in 1996. This represented a slowing in economic growth from the previous year. Exchange rate movements and mild climatic conditions have had significant impacts on agricultural prices and supply. The sharp appreciation of the New Zealand dollar against the U.S. dollar has further depressed an already sagging beef market. Excellent growing conditions increased the milk flow to record levels in marketing year 1995/1996. Milk output in the 1996/1997 marketing year is uncertain as a very wet spring has reduced pasture growth in some areas. Weak profitability continues to characterize the apple and kiwifruit industries. Increased branding and development of new varieties should help bolster returns. Most of New Zealand's agricultural and horticultural exports are controlled or influenced in some way by producer boards. These boards owe their existence to legislation, and several of the statutes that created them have been under review in recent years. At the request of the dairy industry, the government introduced the Dairy Board Amendment Bill in late 1995. It became law in August 1996. The Meat Producers Board, Wool Board, and Pork Industry Board will have completely new acts when the Producer Board Acts Reform Bill is enacted. Their bill was introduced into Parliament in late July 1996.

1997

0609 **Country Commercial Guide: New Zealand, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. [1997.] 47pp.*

This CCG presents a comprehensive look at New Zealand's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in New Zealand and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The report considers the commercial environment in New Zealand to be optimistic for U.S. investors. New Zealand is the perfect export destination for new-to-export companies. New Zealand is an English-speaking country with a strong and stable democracy. Business practices are very similar to those in the United States. While New Zealand's population is small, Kiwis tend to be eager to try new technologies. New Zealand's strong export record with Japan and its positive trend of export growth to ASEAN makes it an ideal joint venture partner for reexportation of U.S.-made goods. New Zealand companies and foreign exporters to New Zealand operate in one of the least regulated markets in the world. The foundation of New Zealand's growing economic prosperity has been its relatively low interest rates and very low inflation, combined with political stability and business deregulation. Foreign goods and investors are welcome, particularly those operating in sectors that can contribute to foreign-exchange earnings and employment. Frequent requests for manufacturing and service industry contacts, along with the United States' strong trading position with New Zealand, reflect a high regard placed on U.S. products and services. Major business opportunities for U.S. exporters will emerge from the growing discretionary income of the New Zealand public and its recent emphasis on consumer choice. Competition is open and encouraged by the economic reforms undertaken by the New Zealand government. The only disadvantage to U.S. imports occurs when they face competition from similar, tariff-free products made in Australia. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and New Zealand business contacts.

## Philippines

1995

0656 **The Muslim Secessionist Movement in the Philippines: Issues and Prospects.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Ruben G. Domingo. June 1995. 137pp.*

The Muslim Secessionist Movement in the southern Philippines in the mid 1970s was the most serious threat to the stability of the country. The Muslim population of the islands has been in a state of unrest ever since the coming of the Spanish conquistadors in the sixteenth century. The Moros resisted all attempts by Spain to convert them to Catholicism and led a number of uprisings against Spanish and later American rule. The Moros came into the same orbit as the rest of the country with the adoption of the 1935 Philippine Commonwealth Constitution, which provided for a single regime for the entire country and ended the rule of the Moro datos and sultans in the southern islands. The Muslim leaders vainly petitioned Washington for separate treatment for they foresaw the dangers of a unified structure. From 1936 onwards the pressure of penetration from the Christian north was upon the Muslims. As land-hungry Christian settlers poured into Mindanao in the 1950s and 1960s, communal tensions began to build up. Grievances so accumulated during the 1960s that Muslim leaders began thinking of ways to turn back the tide of Christian penetration. Muslims feared more than just the loss of land. They feared more the threat of political subjugation and the possible extinction of their religion

and way of life. Both Christian and Muslim groups began to form armed groups and fight among themselves. What followed was the formation of a separatist movement that seriously challenged the might of the Philippine armed forces in the 1970s. In 1968 the Muslim Independence Movement, later renamed the Mindanao Independence Movement, was formed; later another group calling itself the Moro National Liberation Front broke off and led an armed struggle in the southern Philippines after martial law was declared in 1972. The problem assumed international dimensions when Libya began supplying arms to the Moro National Liberation Front. Negotiations with the central government began in 1976, which led to the Tripoli Agreement promising autonomy to thirteen southern provinces. The cease-fire resulting from the agreement held for a while but disagreement over carrying out the agreement caused a resumption of hostilities. Although hostilities diminished in the 1980s there was still no clear solution to the Muslim problem in sight. The primary concern of this research is to discuss the issues that caused the secessionist movement in the southern Philippines; the rebels' strategy to create a separate state composed of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan; and the strategy of the Philippine government to resolve the Muslim separatist problem. Comparative analyses will be made with countersecessionist programs carried out in selected countries to assess the effectiveness of the government's approach in resolving the problem in the southern Philippines.

- 0793 **Negotiating Peace with the Reform the Armed Forces Movement/Soldiers of the Filipino People/Young Officers Union: Issues and Prospects.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Carlos F. Garcia. June 1995. 130pp.*  
 President Fidel V. Ramos in his first State of the Nation address on July 27, 1992, emphasized that the advancement of peace and reconciliation would be among the priorities of his administration. Presently, the government is holding peace negotiations with the Reform the Armed Forces Movement/Soldiers of the Filipino People/Young Officers Union (RAM/SFP/YOU) after both parties signed a peace agreement on December 23, 1992, to pave way for the peace process. The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the crucial negotiating issues and positions and to arrive at an educated estimate of what could derail the peace process and what the government could do about it. The paper will also attempt to determine the RAM/SFP/YOU intentions and probable courses of action during the peace process and to formulate the best possible courses of action the government panel may take in terms of issues to be raised, bargaining positions, negotiation procedures, and other related matters based on a set of negotiation guidelines. Lastly, the study will present possible scenarios anticipating the RAM/SFP/YOU likely courses of action and the recommended government countermoves.

- 1996**  
 0923 **Incident at Mischief Reef: Implications for the Philippines, China, and the United States.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stanley E. Meyer. January 8, 1996. 34pp.*  
 The February 1995 Chinese occupation of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the South China Sea raised tensions throughout the region and heightened concern throughout much of the industrialized/maritime world. Instability or armed conflict in this key area, particularly involving the Republic of the Philippines, could affect important, if not vital, U.S. security and economic interests. This paper examines the implications of the Spratly Island issue on U.S. interests in the South China Sea, emphasizing the U.S. bilateral treaty relationship with the Philippines. After briefly reviewing the historical background and the various players' probable intentions, several possible approaches are discussed that could reduce the likelihood of conflict and instability. The author believes the best approach to addressing near-term economic concerns and solving long-term sovereignty issues is through the ARF. As a member of the ARF, the United States must

make it clear to China that we will protect our vital interests regarding freedom of the seas, despite our strong desire for economic and political engagement. Without speculating on hypothetical situations, the U.S. intent is to honor its treaty obligations.

0957 **Developing the National Military Strategy of the Philippines.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Edilberto P. Adan. April 15, 1996. 49pp.*

With the passage of a Modernization Bill, the armed forces of the Philippines will embark on planning for new defense equipment acquisitions. A national defense strategy that considers not only potential threats but also a net military assessment of allies and potential enemies, a hierarchy of national interests, and a time frame for military strategy vis-à-vis the domestic insurgency, among others, will facilitate strategic planning, force development, and capability determination. Securing public support and establishing credibility are challenges that the country's leaders must face. There are lessons from other countries' defense models.

1006 **Annual Agricultural Situation Report: Philippines.**

*U.S. Embassy, Manila, Philippines. NA. September 30, 1996. 15pp.*

After stagnating in 1991 and 1992, the Philippine economy has grown at an accelerating pace. Real GNP expanded 5.5 percent in 1995. With the population now estimated at 70 million, per capita GNP exceeded the \$1,000 level for the first time in 1995. Agriculture accounts for 20.67 percent of GNP and economic growth in 1995 would have been stronger were it not for agricultural setbacks due to typhoons. For calendar year 1995, the agricultural sector grew by a feeble 1.7 percent in constant prices. For the same period, the sector is estimated to have employed 41 percent of the labor force, contributed 21 percent to GDP, and added 12 percent to export earnings. Low productivity for basic food and food ingredients as well as for feed grains characterized 1995 for the sector. In the first six months of 1996, the sector recovered and grew by 3.85 percent at constant prices. The better-than-expected recovery of the agricultural sector was mainly due to the combined effect of improved production output and higher farmgate prices. January to June prices rose by 20.28 percent in 1996 as compared to 3.61 percent for the same period in 1995. Production output was enhanced by favorable weather conditions that prevailed over an expanded area. For calendar year 1996, the outlook for agricultural output should continue to be positive with both government and private analysts predicting a real growth rate of 3.3 to 4.0 percent. The report includes data on Philippine crops, agricultural prices, and agricultural imports and exports.

**1997**

1021 **Insurgency: The Philippine Experience—A Way of Life.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Orlando A. Ambrocio. April 7, 1997. 50pp.*

Insurgency and the Philippines have been together ever since the country was introduced to the rest of the world by Portuguese sailor Ferdinand Magellan. The idea that the Europeans brought insurgency to the islands is an idea that this part of the country's history proves. From 1521 to the present, the Philippines and insurgency have been like a married couple who are having more than their fair share of domestic problems. Despite this history, the country has managed to survive as a free and independent democracy. We must learn the root causes of insurgency and then effectively deal with both the insurgents and the root causes that fostered or nurtured the insurgency. Most importantly, we must understand that complacency is an attitude to be guarded against.

- 1071 **Country Commercial Guide: Philippines, Fiscal Year 1998.**  
*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. July 11, 1997. 111pp.*  
This CCG presents a general look at the Philippines' commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in the Philippines and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. The Philippines has solidified its position as a new economic center of Asia, offering excellent opportunities for U.S. exporters and investors. The spotlight of attention on the Philippines continued to brighten with a successful APEC summit in November, which included the visits of eighteen national leaders and over five hundred international business executives. Also, the Ramos administration stayed the course of reform policies, taking the ASEAN lead in supporting the U.S. position on the Information Technology Agreement and passing long-awaited IPR legislation. Prestigious international institutions have upgraded the Philippines' credit rating. And finally, the Philippines will soon "graduate" from its eighteen-year International Monetary Fund guidance. American firms are continuing to recognize the attractiveness of this market, investing 292 million U.S. dollars in mostly capital-intensive projects and increasing exports from .3 billion U.S. dollars in 1995 to \$.1 billion in 1996, a 15 percent jump. The Philippines is now our twenty-first largest export market, up from number twenty-three in 1995. Leading U.S. export sectors over the near term continue to be defense equipment, power plant equipment and services, instrumentation, transportation equipment and services, telecommunications equipment, and agricultural products. Information technology projects and power plants continued to highlight U.S. investment. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel and environment. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Philippine business contacts.

## Reel 12

### Southeast Asia

- 1995
- 0001 **Emerging Energy Security Issues: Report Series Number 3—Indochina Energy Outlook.**  
*East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii. Charles J. Johnson, Amy J. Lamke, and Binsheng Li. May 1995. 32pp.*  
Indochina contains large energy resources of oil, gas, coal, and hydropower, and it will become an important oil, gas, and electricity exporter in Southeast Asia over the next decade. The combination of substantial energy resources and economic reforms in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is attracting major investments in the energy sector. This report discusses the economy; the resources, reserves, and projected production of oil, gas, coal, and hydropower; and electric power in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
- 0033 **Stonework or Sandcastle?: Asia's Regional Security Forum.**  
*Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. James L. Lacy. July 1995. 65pp.*  
Multilateral security dialogues and interactions are fairly new in the APR. The principal embodiment at present is the eighteen-nation ARF, established in 1993. This paper examines ARF's origins, what the forum is about at present (mid-1995), where it may be plausibly headed over the next several years, and with what near and longer term implications for U.S. regional defense policy in the APR.

- 0098 **The Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) Conference: Workshops—ASEAN.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. NA. July 24, 1995. 87pp.*  
BEMs is an initiative of the Clinton administration identifying ten of the greatest foreign market opportunities for trade expansion in the next decade. The transcripts were taken at the BEMs conference held by the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration at the Georgetown University Leavey Center in Washington D.C., July 24–25, 1995. This document contains the workshops on ASEAN.
- 1996**
- 0185 **An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Henry J. Kenny. February 1996. 47pp.*  
International sea lanes through Southeast Asia are important to the economic well-being of billions of people throughout the world. As the interdependence of nations continues to grow, prolonged interruption of the vast amount of merchandise trade through these waters would seriously damage the economies of Southeast Asia and require the trading nations of Asia and the Pacific to make difficult adjustments. This survey assesses the vulnerability of these sea lanes to blockage, focusing on three factors: the likelihood of blockage, to include a realistic appreciation of the possibilities and probabilities of blockage; the extent of blockage, ranging from full blockage to minor disruption or curtailment of maritime traffic; and the duration of blockage, ranging from days to years. Both potential military and nonmilitary causes for blockage are evaluated in terms of these three factors. A separate CNA study examines the direct economic impact of the blockage of these key straits.
- 0232 **The Security Environment in Southeast Asia and Australia, 1995–2010.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Lyall Breckon. March 1996. 69pp.*  
The commander of the Seventh Fleet asked CNA to assess the security environment of the APR between 1995 and 2010. This research memorandum focuses on the most probable trends relating to Southeast Asia and Australia during this period. The project's final report, "The Dynamics of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region" (CNA Research Memorandum 95-172, January 1996), discusses the implications of these trends (and of the probable trends in other countries of the region) for U.S. forces, particularly the Navy.
- 0301 **Arms Acquisition: An Impediment to ASEAN Collective Security.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Rosli Mohd Yusof. April 2, 1996. 38pp.*  
Collective security has received much attention among observers of ASEAN because of its unprecedented move in July 1994 to form the ARF to discuss security issues. The move is considered a departure from its original charter that precluded discussion on a multilateral level of security or military issues. Military and security issues are discussed on a bilateral level except for those that are related to members of the military agreement known as the Five Power Defense Arrangement: the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Optimists see this departure as a precursor for ASEAN to establish a security community in the Southeast Asian region, a region considered a potential flash point, especially around the Spratly Islands.
- 0339 **The Spratly Islands Dispute: Can ASEAN Provide the Framework for a Solution?**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Larry W. Coker Jr. April 15, 1996. 38pp.*  
The conflict in the Spratly Islands involves six nations: China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. Each country has at least a partial claim to the islands. ASEAN consists of seven nations: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and, since July 1995, Vietnam. Four of these ASEAN nations also have claims

within the Spratly Islands. This study explores the possibility that ASEAN, an organization that now hosts a regional forum to address regional security issues, might be able to provide a framework for a solution to the major regional security challenge of the Spratly Islands dispute.

0377 **Special Report: The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventative Diplomacy.**

*United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. NA. August 1996. 18pp.*

This report summarizes the conclusions of a series of study group meetings and conferences on prospects for preventing conflict over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the implications for U.S. policy.

0395 **Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia.**

*National Defense University Institute for Strategic Studies and the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C., and Alexandria, Virginia. John H. Noer and David Gregory. October 1996. 118pp.*

To ensure unrestricted sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia, the U.S. Navy is assigned the task of helping to maintain clear maritime passage through the sea lanes of the region. For many years, the prime concern was military, not economic, as the United States required secure maritime transport via SLOCs in case of war. Now the emphasis has shifted to the economic component of U.S. national security, a policy reaffirmed when the United States announced that it would not accept disruption of trade in the South China Sea. In March and again in May 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned quarreling claimants to the Spratly reefs not to interfere with international shipping. What is the economic logic behind the American stance on freedom of navigation for commercial shipping? For the United States, a concern is: Who benefits from keeping sea lanes open, and how much do they benefit? A related question is: Who would be hurt if the sea lanes were closed, and how much would it hurt them?

0513 **The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security without an American Umbrella.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Larry M. Wortzel. December 13, 1996. 45pp.*

The author argues that Asia is looking for stability and that U.S. support for the goals of ASEAN, through ARF, offers a unique opportunity to foster stability, prosperity, and democracy in that region. Therefore, the author contends, multilateral dialogues, supported by the kind of credibility that results when policy and diplomacy have the support of strong, ready military forces, are needed. ARF, first held in July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand, is a unique, Asian-led experiment in multilateral security in Asia. It took shape at a time when the United States seemed to have withdrawn from its leading role in regional and world security, particularly in the APR. In fact, according to quotes attributed to a senior Chinese leader by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman, despite assurances from Washington, the perception in Asia is that the United States would never trade one of its cities (Los Angeles was the city in question) for the goal of securing peace for one of its friends in Asia.

**1997**

0558 **The Spratly Island Dispute and U.S. National Security Interests.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Carlos S. Badger. April 24, 1997. 27pp.*

The South China Sea is a major maritime route connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans. Disputes have arisen among several countries that have made conflicting claims to the islands and waters of the South China Sea. Among the disputed island claims are the Spratly Islands, which are claimed in whole or in part by Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei. The PRC, whose emerging leadership is under pressure to continue

economic growth, is the principal threat and claims all of the disputed islands and most of the South China Sea basin. The Spratly Islands dispute has importance to U.S. national security interests because it has become the key focus for claims in the South China Sea. This paper describes what the Spratly Islands dispute is about and how its resolution might affect U.S. national security interests.

## Singapore

1997

0585 **Country Commercial Guide: Singapore, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 76pp.*

This CCG presents a general look at Singapore's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Singapore and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. Singapore moved up one spot to become the United States' eighth largest export market in 1996, a bigger customer than better-known markets such as the Netherlands, France, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and India. Singapore boasts one of the most developed industrial, commercial, financial, and consumer economies in the world and is an excellent market for U.S. products. Singapore's role as the gateway to Southeast Asia means that almost any American product can find an interested buyer here, either for Singapore itself or for one of Singapore's own trading partners in the booming Southeast Asian region. Shipments from the United States accounted for about 16.7 billion U.S. dollars or 13 percent of Singapore's total imports in 1996, consisting largely of electronic equipment, electrical machinery, aircraft and parts, process control devices, and plastics. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel and environment. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Singapore business contacts.

## Taiwan

1996

0661 **Country Commercial Guide: Taiwan, Fiscal Year 1997.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1996. 75pp.*

This CCG presents a general look at Taiwan's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Taiwan and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. Taiwan is an excellent market for U.S. firms. Taiwan firms and consumers are receptive to foreign products, have money and are not afraid to spend. Taiwan is a leading producer of personal computers. Its chemical and steel industries have ambitious expansion plans and the authorities are liberalizing the power generation and telecommunications markets. On the consumer front, 70 percent of Taiwan households are wired for cable television (more than in the United States); Taiwanese travelers took 5.2 million trips overseas in 1995 and spent on those trips the most of any Asian nationals after Japan; and 13.2 million people have life insurance policies. U.S. exports range from steam boilers to soybeans. U.S. investors range from giants such as IBM to individuals offering translation and legal services. The competition in the market is

fierce, with Japanese firms well-entrenched and late-coming Europeans capturing market share. Nonetheless Taiwanese consumers generally have strong feelings of goodwill toward the United States and favorable images of U.S. products. U.S. firms with good products at competitive prices will find Taiwan a rewarding market. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel and environment. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Taiwan business contacts.

0736 **An Introduction to the Strategic Thinking Process of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Military.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Sheau-jung Lu. March 1, 1996. 34pp.*

This paper introduces the strategic thinking process of the ROC military. It elaborates on divisions of strategic levels and how the thinking process works in the ROC military. The paper will focus on the strategic level of warfare. In addition, it will apply the ROC thinking process to historical examples of war, in order to exemplify the divergent thinking process of the United States and the ROC. After comparing and contrasting, the author proposes some personal recommendations for enhancing and improving the thinking process.

0770 **Separation or Unification for Taiwan: An Economic Comparison.**

*Institute for Defense Analyses, NA. James P. Bell. September 1996. 127pp.*

The continuing separation of Taiwan from mainland China, and unofficial U.S. support for Taiwan, is a major obstacle to a stable U.S. relationship with China. This paper examines whether growing economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland might eventually cause Taiwan to accept unification as a SAR under the PRC. In particular, it compares the costs and benefits for Taiwan of SAR status with the alternative of losing all economic ties to the mainland. At some point in the future, the PRC might present such an ultimatum to Taiwan. The paper concludes that, from a short-run economic perspective, Taiwan might be better off as a SAR. Over a longer planning horizon, if forced to choose, Taiwan would probably be better off without ties to China than to be a SAR under mainland authority. This work suggests that no near-term solution is likely and that U.S. commitments documented in the Taiwan Relations Act will continue to block stable U.S.–China ties.

0897 **Annual Agricultural Situation Report: Taiwan.**

*American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan. Rosemary Kao. October 15, 1996. 27pp.* Taiwan's economy grew 6.1 percent in 1995. The per capita GNP reached 12,439 U.S. dollars, the twenty-fifth-highest in the world. In 1996, Taiwan's economy is expected to grow 6.2 percent. Prices remained stable and unemployment low. Merchandise export totaled 111.7 billion U.S. dollars, giving Taiwan a trade surplus of 8.1 billion U.S. dollars for 1995. Taiwan was the world's fourteenth largest exporter and fifteenth largest importer, with its two-way trade ranked fourteenth largest worldwide. Two-way trade will continue to grow but Taiwan's trade surplus with the world is expected to fall in 1996. In contrast to the healthy economic growth, the agricultural sector's contribution to GDP continued to decline to 3.5 percent in 1995 and is expected to decline further in 1996. In the "Paddy & Upland Utilization Adjustment Program," Taiwan plans to reduce guaranteed purchases of corn, sorghum, and soybeans in order to cut the Aggregate Measurements of Support (AMS) by 20 percent by July 2001. In 1995, Taiwan's total agricultural imports jumped by 9.7 percent. Imports from the United States grew by 21 percent to 3,373 million U.S. dollars thanks to healthy growth in the traditional bulk grains, intermediate products, and the newly emerging consumer-oriented food items. In 1995, the United States remained Taiwan's number one agricultural supplier and the U.S. share also increased to

34.8 percent from the 31.5 percent level in 1994. Taiwan has been actively engaged in bilateral consultations with contracting parties of the WTO. In order to accede to the WTO by July 1997, a goal set by the top authorities, more concessions on agricultural imports are expected.

- 0924 **A Study of the Chinese Relationship across the Taiwan Strait.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Hsin-yi Kuo. December 1996. 71pp.*  
This is a study of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait. The relationship between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland is important not only to the two governments but also to the world community. After an overview of the historical background and the political policy development of each side, this thesis points out the ROC and the PRC's current strategies in terms of their cross-strait relationship. Further, it examines four factors in the future development of their cross-strait relationship: international politics, the PRC's stability, the ROC's public opinion of Taiwan independence, and interactions between both sides. Finally, the author provides conclusions and recommendations on how to improve the future relationship between the PRC and the ROC. The four primary recommendations are: adopting a concept of "soft sovereignty," implementing more pragmatic consultations, increasing exchanges, and creating mutual trust.
- 0995 **Trends in Political Reform in Taiwan.**  
*Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Roxanne D. Sismanidis. August 1987. 38pp.*  
This study analyzes trends in political reform in Taiwan as an aid in understanding political developments and recent personnel changes in the Kuomintang and the Taiwan government. The study examines the background of the reforms, the initiation of a political reform by President Chiang Ching-kuo, and the implementation of the reforms. Analysis of the major trends of the reform program will reveal likely future political developments in Taiwan.

## Reel 13

### Thailand

- 1995
- 0001 **Thailand and the Issue of Income Distribution.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Sompodh Sripoom. June 1995. 81pp.*  
Over the past thirty-five years, income structures and poverty levels in Thailand have generally followed the same patterns as most developing countries. This study shows a growing income inequality between different groups of the Thai population. The country's poverty levels, however, whether expressed as a percent of the total population or in absolute terms, have reduced significantly. These contrasting results are explained by two main factors: natural resource endowments and the effects of government policies on income distribution. Growth patterns and income structures in each region, especially in the agricultural sector, are primarily determined by natural resource endowments. These regional and sectoral endowments are either strengthened or weakened by government policies. Among these policies, the economic and social development plans have a great impact on income distribution. As the Thai economy has matured, the government is now attempting to both reduce poverty and narrow the income gap.

- 0082 **Annual Agricultural Situation Report: Thailand.**  
*U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand. NA. October 10, 1995. 29pp.*  
The agricultural sector in Thailand grew 3.6 percent in 1994 and is forecast to grow 3.5 percent in 1995. While approximately 57 percent of Thailand's labor force continued to be at least partially employed in agriculture, the sector directly contributed only about 10 percent to national GDP in 1994. Although the relative size of agriculture's contribution to GDP will likely continue to decline, agriculture remains a critical component to the national economic well-being, particularly as a provider of key inputs to the manufacturing sector. In 1994, the manufactured items for export that registered significant expansion included sugar, canned seafood, and furniture.
- 1996
- 0111 **The Telephone Organization of Thailand: Final Report on a "Technical Study and Update of the Fundamental Plan for Telecommunications Services."**  
*Communications General International, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. NA. February 16, 1996. 124pp.*  
This study, conducted by Communications General International, was funded by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency on behalf of the Telephone Organization of Thailand. The purpose of the report is to provide important revisions and updates to currently available planning information. The focus of the study was on demand forecast, switching capacity provision, lines connected, and penetration through to the end of the Tenth National Plan in the year 2011. The report is divided into the following sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Executive Summary; (3) Routing and Switching Revisions and Updates; (4) Transmission Revisions and Updates; (5) Outside Plant Revisions and Updates; (6) Land and Buildings; (7) Numbering Plan; (8) Development Plans; (9) Technical Standards; (10) Impact of New Technology; and (11) Appendices.
- 0235 **Defining Trends Affecting the National Security of Thailand from 1996 to 2006.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Chokechai Wattanawarangoon. April 15, 1996. 25pp.*  
In the post-cold war era, there are two major uncertainties in Southeast Asia. The first is the extent to which the United States will engage itself in Asia-Pacific stability. The second uncertainty is the true intentions of the PRC in its relations with the Southeast Asia states. While uncertainties exist, the Southeast Asia states are undergoing changes in their economies, politics, and security. Factors that induced changes include a reduction of political conflicts, the primacy of economic considerations in international relations and how economic interdependence shapes the interstate conflicts, the emerging PRC economy, the rapid growth of the middle class, and the increasing roles of NGOs and private-volunteered organizations in international security issues. These uncertainties and the changing environment facing Southeast Asia have brought about trends that affect the national security of Thailand.
- 0260 **Annual Agricultural Situation Report: Thailand.**  
*U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand. NA. October 11, 1996. 15pp.*  
In 1995, agricultural production in Thailand slowed down across the board, due mainly to floods and fishing disputes with neighboring countries. Agricultural prices rose substantially, however, resulting in increased farm incomes for the second year in a row. Thailand's strong economic performance overall in the past few years has had a positive impact on the agricultural sector by increasing consumer demand for a wider variety of food products. Growth in the food processing and manufacturing sector, particularly those products destined for the export market, has also been a contributing factor to growing demand for agricultural commodities. Thailand's overall agricultural exports, notably fisheries products, rice, sugar, rubber, and poultry, provided a significant boost to the overall economy.

**1997**

0275 **Country Commercial Guide: Thailand, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 112pp.*

This CCG presents a general look at Thailand's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Thailand and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. U.S. business and investment is vigorous in Thailand, but American companies can take even better advantage of the trade and investment opportunities that abound. Thailand is a rapidly industrializing country of 60 million people, with a dynamic economy that has emerged in the last decade as one of the largest in Southeast Asia. Over the past decade, the Thai economy was one of the fastest growing in the world, at more than 8 percent annual growth. Even if the current setback causes growth to decline to a 1997 projected rate of 5.9 percent, Thailand's economic profile is still enviable by global standards. Activity in the industrial and commercial sectors is expected to recover rapidly enough to counter lingering weaknesses in the troubled property and financial sectors. A combination of government funding and private sector investment will be able to support the country's ambitious physical and social development plans. A fair barometer of the international business community's view of Thailand's long-term investment climate is the swelling number of U.S. and other foreign companies that have chosen Thailand as their Southeast Asian manufacturing hub. Corporate risk analysts are comfortable with Thailand's long-term prospects for prosperity and for social, economic, and political stability. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Thai business contacts.

## Vietnam

**1994**

0387 **M.I.A.: Accounting for the Missing in Southeast Asia.**

*Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. Paul D. Mather. 1994. 219pp.*

Among the numerous analyses of those missing in action in Southeast Asia, this study is the first to concentrate on the process whereby the U.S. military tried to resolve each case. Much of the continuing controversy ignores or refuses to accept the fact that the U.S. government, through the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and other mechanisms, has made a thorough, sustained, good faith effort to determine the fate of every serviceman declared missing in action in that conflict. The author, who spent more than fifteen years in Southeast Asia taking part in those endeavors, tells the story of this unique effort from the point of view of an informed insider. A member of the MIA search team from the early 1970s through the late 1980s, Paul Mather is well qualified to relate the history of this effort. He covers a wide range of topics, from field work at crash sites and personal interchanges with Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and Thai officials, through the various international accords that governed the activities of the U.S. investigatory teams. Although political changes in the United States alternately facilitated or hampered search efforts, the attempt to resolve every case never ceased. Colonel Mather faithfully records the efforts of individuals and organizations that played major roles in this drama: congressional committees; the National League of Families; private citizens who made sincere efforts to help; senior government officials like General John Vessey, who headed

a special full-accounting commission; military agencies such as the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Army's Central Identification Laboratory; scoundrels and swindlers who exploited the tragedy for personal gain; and self-styled Rambos who acted on their own.

- 1995**
- 0606 **U.S.–Vietnam Relations: Issues and Implications.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. NA. April 1995. 34pp.*  
This report focuses on various issues related to the process of normalization of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the United States. The report also discusses ongoing changes in Vietnam's foreign and domestic policies and the international community's reaction to the changes; changes in U.S. policy toward Vietnam and the substance of bilateral relations; interests being pursued by the United States and Vietnam in bilateral relations; prospects for Vietnam's economic and political development; and key factors affecting the pace of normalization of relations. The report includes comments of the State and Defense departments on a draft of the report and the GAO response.
- 1996**
- 0640 **United States National Security Interests in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Melvin E. Richmond Jr. April 15, 1996. 73pp.*  
Once known as a center of instability, conflict, and poverty, the countries of Southeast Asia are emerging into global prominence. Some of the most dramatic shifts occurring in Southeast Asia are in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The United States has significant national interests in Vietnam, including the security of U.S. allies, the nonproliferation of WMD, the enhancement of regional stability, cooperation on counternarcotics activities, access to markets and raw materials, security of sea lines of communication, promotion of free-market economies, success of emerging democracies, protection of U.S. citizens abroad, achievement of the fullest possible accounting for unaccounted-for Americans, and promotion of human rights. This paper analyzes each area and recommends policy positions to achieve/protect these interests.
- 0713 **Vietnamese Strategic Culture and the Coming Struggle for the South China Sea.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Andrew A. Butterfield. December 1996. 107pp.*  
Despite inferior strength, Vietnam clings to extensive claims in the South China Sea in conflict with China's claims. Through use of the concept of "strategic culture," this thesis investigates the factors, including perceived historical lessons, that drive Vietnam to maintain this strategic posture. The most relevant lessons are that (1) China perpetually desires and frequently attempts to dominate Vietnam, and resistance historically has served Vietnam better than appeasement; and (2) Vietnam has the inherent ability to attract foreign benefactors that will help her balance against Chinese power and achieve her own goals. The author explores how these lessons have shaped a modern-day Vietnamese strategic culture and whether it is suited to the strategic realities that Vietnam currently faces. A conclusion is that Vietnam's current strategic culture is likely to continue either until it is shown to be inadequate in conflict with China over control of the South China Sea or until Vietnam succeeds in attracting a new benefactor or protector.
- 1997**
- 0820 **Country Commercial Guide: Vietnam, Fiscal Year 1998.**  
*U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. NA. 1997. 143pp.*  
This CCG presents a general look at Vietnam's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the

TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. These guides are prepared annually by the U.S. embassy. This report examines economic conditions and trends in Vietnam and the implications for U.S. trade and investment. Vietnam is endowed with highly attractive and competitive natural and human resources. Given its large, relatively young and literate population of 77 million; low cost labor base; political stability; substantial energy and mineral reserves; significant agricultural capability; and long, marine-rich coastline, many experts believe that the long-term economic potential is so significant that taking a position now in the market is a prerequisite for future success in the Asian market. Indeed, despite the inevitable development difficulties and attendant problems encountered doing business here, there is every reason to believe that Vietnam will mobilize more fully and efficiently its resource capability, fortify its comparative advantages vis-à-vis the other "Asian Tigers," and achieve its objective of becoming a full participant in the regional and global economy. The establishment of the U.S. embassy in Vietnam in 1995 further stimulated many U.S. firms to seek entrance into this promising new market, which had been denied our trade and investment prior to the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo in February 1994. The American Chamber of Commerce branches in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City already have more than five hundred corporate participants, among which can be counted some of the largest multinationals in the world. The United States faces strong competition from Asian and European firms that have had a "head start" in gaining a foothold in this market. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese government attaches great importance to building economic relations with the United States. In order to take best advantage of Vietnam's promising potential, U.S. companies should consider several factors. Approaching the market with the intent to develop and implement a long-term business strategy will both facilitate market entry and enhance the prospect of ultimate success. Vietnam's economy is now open to U.S. firms. The business challenges presented should not be underestimated, but neither should the expectation be overlooked that we are likely to become one of Vietnam's major trade and investment partners. To that end, U.S. firms are encouraged to evaluate the impressive commercial potential of this still unexploited, dynamic market. Chapter topics include economic trends and outlook, political environment, marketing U.S. products and services, leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment, trade regulations and standards, investment climate, trade and project financing, and business travel and environment. Report appendices contain economic, trade, and investment statistics and U.S. and Vietnamese business contacts.

# SUBJECT INDEX

The following index is a guide to the major topics, personalities, activities, and programs in this microform publication. The first number after each subentry refers to the reel, while the four-digit number following the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular file containing information on the subject begins. Hence, 4: 0934 directs the researcher to the file that begins at frame 0934 of Reel 4. By referring to the Reel Index, which constitutes the initial segment of this guide, the researcher will find the main entry for the subject.

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