

A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

**Confidential
U.S. State Department
Central Files**

**CUBA
1960–January 1963**

Foreign Affairs

A UPA Collection

from



**Confidential
U.S. State Department
Central Files**

**CUBA
1960–January 1963**

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Decimal Numbers 637 and 611.37**

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Robert E. Lester**

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INTRODUCTION

By the time John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency on January 20, 1961, U.S.–Cuban relations had become locked in a state of mutual hostility. The final act of the Eisenhower administration, in 1960, with regard to Cuba was to sever diplomatic relations. The Kennedy administration expanded upon and continued this policy by seeking to isolate, contain, undermine, and overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. The Castro government was seen in Washington as a client of the Soviet Union, with the dangerous potential of fostering Communist subversion and spreading Soviet influence throughout Latin America.

Bay of Pigs Invasion

Following his election in November 1960, President Kennedy had been briefed in general terms about the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) covert plan to support an attempt by Cuban émigrés to overthrow the Castro government. The plan was authorized by President Eisenhower and developed by the CIA during 1960. On January 19, 1961, President Eisenhower met with President-elect Kennedy and briefed him on various foreign policy concerns. Eisenhower made reference to the small force of Cuban émigrés that was being trained by the CIA in Guatemala and recommended that the effort be continued and accelerated. Eisenhower added that, in his opinion, the United States could not allow the Castro government to continue to exist in Cuba.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) briefed the government on the CIA's Cuba project on January 22, and the JCS met with President Kennedy on January 25 to discuss the implications of the proposed covert operation against Cuba. General Lyman Lemnitzer, JCS chairman, advised the president that time was working against the United States in Cuba, where Castro was tightening police state controls. Existing U.S. plans called for the establishment of a government-in-exile, the introduction of anti-Castro guerrilla forces into Cuba, and subsequent support of the guerrilla forces by U.S. military forces. On January 27, however, the JCS provided Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara an assessment of the CIA's plan to overthrow the Castro government in which they stated that the plan did not assure the accomplishment of the objective nor had there been detailed follow-up planning.

McNamara and General Lemnitzer took up the JCS concerns in a meeting with the president on January 28, attended by a number of other concerned officials. During the meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated that the State Department saw grave political dangers for the U.S. position throughout the Western Hemisphere if the Kennedy administration approved overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States (OAS). As a result of the January 28 meeting at the White House, President Kennedy requested a reassessment of the existing plans for an effort to overthrow the Castro government, the first of several reassessments required by the president.

Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer expressed skepticism about the CIA plan following the January 28 meeting. On February 3, the JCS submitted to McNamara a military evaluation of the CIA Para-Military plan, which was then focused on introducing a Cuban émigré brigade around the port of Trinidad. The JCS judged that the Trinidad beachhead offered the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the stated objective. But they noted that since the success of this operation was dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation was made. The JCS concluded that, if significant local support for the assault forces developed within the first two days, timely execution of the plan had a fair chance of ultimate success. They noted, however, that their information regarding the capabilities of the proposed assault force came from second- and thirdhand sources. In order to advise the president properly, they felt that a team of military officers should be dispatched to Guatemala to assess the preparations.

The JCS evaluation was discussed by President Kennedy and his closest advisers on February 8. Kennedy focused on a fallback option incorporated in the planning for the invasion. That option stipulated that if the invasion failed in its initial phase to unseat the Castro government, the invaders could fade into the Escambray mountains and join other guerrilla groups fighting against Castro. The fallback option was specifically cited in the February 8 meeting, and it made the invasion proposal more palatable for the president. But he still pressed for alternatives to a full-fledged invasion supported by U.S. planes, ships, and supplies. It became increasingly clear in the course of the numerous reviews of the plan prepared for the president that he was leery of a proposal that threatened to draw the United States openly into war. But he was eager to see the Castro government overthrown, and he did not want to have to face the political embarrassment of disbanding the Cuban émigré army and being accused of throwing away perhaps the last good opportunity of preventing Cuba from being lost to Communist control.

CIA officials contended that the agency's plan was sound. On February 17, Richard Bissell, deputy director of plans for the CIA and the motive force behind the planning for the invasion, prepared a memorandum that argued for a landing in force in the Trinidad area. He noted that Castro's position in Cuba was becoming stronger every day, and he contended that soon it would be impossible to unseat him without drastic and politically untenable actions such as an all-out embargo or the use of overt military force. Bissell argued his position in a meeting at the White House on February 18. He was opposed by Secretary of State Rusk, who contended that it would be better to delay any action and attempt to build up OAS support.

Reevaluation led to significant changes in the invasion plan. On March 10, the JCS submitted an evaluation prepared by three officers who went to Guatemala to inspect the combat-capability of the émigré army. Their findings were generally positive in terms of equipment, training, and morale. The small army of approximately one thousand men would be heavily outnumbered, however, and the logistics specialist concluded that logistic preparations were not adequate. Nonetheless, the team concluded that the invasion army could be ready to fight by April 1. Bissell followed with a memorandum on March 11 that argued that it would be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. At a meeting at the White House on March 11, however, President Kennedy indicated that, although he was willing to take the chance of going ahead, he could not endorse a plan that involved the United

States so openly. He directed the development of a plan where U.S. assistance would be less obvious.

Working under intense time pressure, the CIA produced a plan on March 15 targeted upon a sparsely populated area of swampland along the south coast of Cuba at a place called the Bay of Pigs, approximately one hundred miles west of Trinidad. The change of target was necessary in order to encompass an airstrip adequate for B-26 bombers, so that air support for the invasion would seem to come from within Cuba. The plan relied on a landing begun under cover of darkness and completed in the early hours after dawn. The JCS evaluated the prospects for the success of a landing at the Bay of Pigs and concluded that, while prospects for the Trinidad plan were better, the Bay of Pigs alternative was considered "feasible." They noted, however, that inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace. At a meeting on March 15, President Kennedy directed that the entire landing operation should be completed before dawn, so that the ships could be well away from shore by dawn, and the operation could be represented as a domestic guerrilla uprising. The revisions of this plan, code-named ZAPATA, were completed by the CIA on March 16, and the president approved the revised plan but reserved the right to call it off up to twenty-four hours prior to the landing.

During a meeting at the White House on March 29, a tentative date for the invasion was set for April 10. President Kennedy asked whether, in the event the invasion failed, the invading force could melt into the surrounding countryside and function as guerrillas, as had been assumed with earlier versions of the plan. Bissell replied that in the event of failure at the Bay of Pigs the entire invading force would have to be withdrawn. On April 4, Senator William Fulbright was invited to a meeting to discuss the plan. Senator Fulbright spoke out against the enterprise but the president's other advisers in the meeting supported it. On April 6, the time for the invasion was rescheduled for April 17, with the president retaining the option of canceling the operation twenty-four hours before it began.

The JCS issued instructions on April 7 to Admiral Dennison, commander-in-chief, Atlantic, concerning destroyer escort and combat air patrol to protect the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF), which was preparing to sail for Cuba. Dennison, in turn, issued his Operation Order for the operation on April 10 to Rear Admiral John E. Clark, who commanded Special Task Group 81.8, which was assigned to support the CEF. Clark was instructed that destroyers would not be used to support the landing operation and would not close within twenty miles of the objective area. With those limitations, and similar instructions concerning the necessity to avoid involving U.S. air cover in open combat with Castro's air force, the CEF was left to fight essentially alone, with only cover from the B-26 bombers of the small émigré air force, launched from a base in Nicaragua in support of the landings.

President Kennedy's lingering doubts concerning the success of the Cuban invasion force were largely allayed by a telegram on April 13 from Marine Colonel Jack Hawkins, the principal military adviser assigned to help prepare the Cuban brigade in Guatemala. Hawkins expressed no doubts when asked to evaluate the brigade's chances. He described the brigade leaders as very confident. Based on the confidence of the CIA officials managing the operation, President Kennedy allowed it to go forward as scheduled.

On April 15, a preliminary air strike was launched against Cuban airfields by B-26 bombers bearing the markings of the Cuban air force. The object of this attack by the Cuban émigré air force was to destroy Castro's air force on the ground before the

invasion was launched. This air strike only partially succeeded, and it had the effect of removing much of the element of surprise from the subsequent invasion. A critical decision affecting the possibility of success for the Bay of Pigs operation was taken on April 16 when President Kennedy decided, on the basis of advice from Secretary of State Rusk, that the air strikes scheduled for the morning of April 17 to support the invasion would have to be postponed until the airfield at the Bay of Pigs could be secured and the strikes launched from there. CIA Deputy Director General C. P. Cabell, along with Richard Bissell, protested the decision to McGeorge Bundy, who told them that they would have to discuss the matter with Rusk. Secretary Rusk explained the political considerations underlying the decision and offered to let them speak directly to the president about the matter. The CIA officials decided that there was no point in pressing the matter that far. The second strike against Cuban airfields, planned to eliminate the remainder of Castro's air force, did not take place as planned. When the invasion began at the Bay of Pigs on the morning of April 17, the Cuban government still had the air power to cripple it.

The invasion of Cuba by the Cuban brigade at the Bay of Pigs was in trouble almost from the beginning. After-action reports by Grayston Lynch and William Robertson of the CIA, who were directly involved in the invasion, provide a graphic picture of the breakdown of the invasion, after initial, limited success on the morning of April 17. The lack of effective air support left the Cuban brigade, and the supporting transports of the CEF, easy prey for the remaining planes of the Cuban air force. T-33 jet training planes were particularly effective against the B-26 bombers of the CEF's air force when they appeared over the beach. Meanwhile, the instructions from the JCS to Admiral Dennison were to keep fleet units well off the Cuban coast and to provide an air cap for CEF shipping only when it was outside Cuban territorial waters. As a result, the CIA had to report to the JCS at 10:17 a.m. on April 17 that two of the ships of the CEF, the *Rio Escondido* and the *Houston*, had been sunk, and that a third, the *Blagar*, was under heavy attack. By the afternoon of April 17, the CIA reported that the *Barbara J* and the *Atlantico* were also under attack off the coast of Cuba, and that the *Barbara J* was on fire. Much of the necessary supplies and ammunition for the Cuban brigade were lost in the ships sunk at the Bay of Pigs. The remaining vessels of the CEF fled out to sea and were only regrouped with difficulty.

Reports from the Cuban brigade ashore constituted a steady stream of pleas for air cover, ammunition, and supplies to ward off mounting pressure on the beachhead from Castro's forces, supported by tanks and jets. During the morning hours of April 18, messages from the brigade commander became increasingly desperate. By that afternoon, the brigade commander radioed that without jet cover his force could not survive.

During the early morning hours of April 19, an assessment of the disaster occurring at the Bay of Pigs took place at the White House. After the meeting with the president, the JCS sent instructions to Admiral Dennison to furnish U.S. air cover by six unmarked jet fighters over the CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time. The U.S. fighters were not authorized to attack ground targets but were given latitude to destroy the Cuban air force if it appeared and engaged. The air cover would permit CEF transport aircraft to fly in desperately needed supplies and to attack the tanks and ground forces mustered by Castro around the beachhead. Unfortunately, the order sent to the CEF airbase in Nicaragua also stipulated local time for the strike by CEF bombers, but local time in Nicaragua was one hour earlier

than at the Bay of Pigs. The CEF planes passed over Admiral Clark's Task Group just as he was preparing to put the authorized air cover into the air. The navy jets followed the CEF bombers to the beachhead as quickly as possible, but by the time they arrived, jets from Castro's air force had already broken up and driven off the CEF attack. That represented the last opportunity to try to salvage the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ironically, intelligence reports subsequently indicated that Fidel Castro himself was leading the tank column pressing the attack on the Cuban brigade. The morning of April 19 concluded with a last desperate signal from the brigade commander at the Bay of Pigs: "Out of ammunition. Men fighting in water. If no help given Blue Beach lost."

The Taylor Study Group

The collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion forced the U.S. government to take responsibility for an embarrassing and damaging failure, while U.S. naval forces off the Bay of Pigs scrambled to try to rescue as many survivors from the Cuban brigade as possible. The failure was followed by a determined effort in Washington to find out what went wrong. President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor, retired army chief of staff, to head a committee composed of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke to investigate the failure and to make recommendations concerning future U.S. capability of conducting similar operations. Taylor's Cuban Study Group conducted an intensive investigation, which involved gathering information and interviewing key participants across a period of a month and a half following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The interviews offered detailed insight into the lack of adequate planning, coordination, and oversight that helped to undermine the operation.

The Study Group met with President Kennedy on May 16 to give him a preliminary report concerning the investigation. The Study Group submitted its formal report to the president on June 13. The group found in its conclusions that, contrary to the president's much quoted statement to the press in taking responsibility for the collapse at the Bay of Pigs, this failure was not in fact an orphan but had a variety of fathers. The Study Group felt that before the operation became the responsibility of the Kennedy administration, it should have been canceled by the Eisenhower administration or converted into an amphibious operation under the direction of the Defense Department. When it was presented to the Kennedy administration as a well-advanced project, those in charge of the operation did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. In approving the operation, the group noted, the president and his senior officials were greatly influenced by the understanding that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status, if unable to hold the beachhead. That projection proved to be false. The JCS did not do an adequate job in assessing the military feasibility of the operation for the president, and they gave the impression of approving the ZAPATA plan, despite reservations. And the group concluded that it was a mistake to try to run the operation from Washington, rather than entrusting responsibility to a commander closer to the point of combat.

Reassessment of Cuba Policy

While the Taylor Study Group was conducting its investigation into the causes of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the U.S. government reassessed its Cuba policy in light of the failure. The process began on April 20 with a grim cabinet meeting in which the president and his advisers took stock of the shambles of their effort to unseat Fidel Castro. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles attended and recorded that the president was really quite shattered—here for the first time he faced a situation where his judgment had been mistaken, in spite of the fact that week after week of conferences had taken place before he gave the green light. The cabinet meeting was followed on April 22 by an angry National Security Council (NSC) meeting. The atmosphere was almost as emotional as the cabinet meeting two days earlier, the difference being that on this occasion the emphasis was on specific proposals to harass Castro. The upshot was a series of decisions by President Kennedy that spoke of his desire to find a new approach to undermine Castro's control of Cuba and prevent the spread of the Cuban revolution to Latin America. The president asked for a reassessment of U.S. support for guerrilla activities in Cuba. He instructed the State and Defense Departments to study the question of training Cuban soldiers within the U.S. armed forces. He authorized the creation of an interdepartmental study group to consider an increase in U.S. assistance to Latin American countries for internal security and counter guerrilla activities and, in the same vein, directed that the possibility of creating a Caribbean Security Agency be studied, to provide a pool of forces to counter Cuban subversion. The effect of the president's directives was to put in motion a comprehensive review of Cuba policy.

The policy review culminated in a paper prepared for the NSC on May 4 by an Interagency Task Force. The paper, entitled *Cuba and Communism in the Hemisphere*, formed the basis for an NSC discussion on May 5. The result of the discussion was an NSC Record of Action that outlined Cuba policy in the wake of the Bay of Pigs failure. The fundamental policy objective: "U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro and that since the agreed measures are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action." Among the agreed measures was the conclusion that the United States should not take military action against Cuba for the present, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future. It was noted that the president was concerned to receive timely intelligence concerning Cuban military capabilities and the enhancement of those capabilities by military assistance from the Sino-Soviet bloc. The president directed the CIA to make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Communist control in Cuba, and he agreed that relations with the Cuban émigré Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open. No separate Cuban military force could be organized in the United States, but Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. And it was agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of the other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral, and OAS arrangements against Castro. Castro may have won the battle of the Bay of Pigs, but the U.S. government was determined that he would not win the war to introduce and expand Communist influence and control in Latin America.

Operation MONGOOSE

The reassessment of Cuba policy begun in May eventuated in the authorization by President Kennedy on November 3, 1961, of the development of a new program designed to undermine the Castro government in Cuba. The program was codenamed Operation MONGOOSE. Overall control of the operation was entrusted to a new group established for the purpose, called the Special Group (Augmented), a slightly expanded version of the NSC 5412 Special Group, which oversaw covert operations. The Special Group (Augmented) consisted of regular Special Group members McGeorge Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, augmented by Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were not regular members of the group, they occasionally attended meetings. President Kennedy appointed Taylor as chairman of the group, but Robert Kennedy was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the president. Air Force Brigadier General Edward Lansdale was appointed chief of operations and coordinated the CIA's MONGOOSE operations with those within the State and Defense Departments.

Initial discussions within the Special Group (Augmented) on the scope and direction of Operation MONGOOSE led to decisions confirmed by the president on November 30. The decisions confirmed Lansdale's role as chief of operations and provided the green light from the president to go ahead with the operation as conceived on November 3, in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime. The first review of progress on the project was set for two weeks from the date of the November 30 memorandum of decision. In a meeting on December 1, called to discuss MONGOOSE plans, Attorney General Kennedy stressed that the president had reached a decision to accord higher priority to the Cuba problem. General Lansdale reported that he had surveyed all of the resources available for the project. He concluded that there were sizable active and potential resources available, but there was a very difficult job ahead. He stressed the importance of coming to an agreement as to the future of Cuba after Castro, so that appeals to potential resistance groups could be geared to a positive long-range program.

A measure of the Kennedy administration's renewed determination to eliminate Castro was the reauthorization of assassination attempts on the Cuban premier. Efforts had been made to assassinate Castro before the Bay of Pigs invasion in coordination with underworld figures from the Mafia, but those efforts had been suspended during the reassessment of Cuba policy following the Bay of Pigs.

On January 19, Attorney General Kennedy met with Lansdale and the MONGOOSE operations officers in the CIA and Defense Department to stress the importance of the project. Everyone understood that the project carried the top priority in the U.S. government. The attorney general quoted the president as saying that "the final chapter on Cuba has not been written."

On February 20, Lansdale circulated a review of planning for the MONGOOSE operation. He outlined a program of action that he felt was essential to push forward according to a specific timetable. The timetable called for preliminary action on the project to begin in March, leading to guerrilla operations in August and September, followed by open revolt during the first two weeks of October. A decision critical to the success of such a program was still to be made, and Lansdale urged the Special Group (Augmented) to consider it—"will the U.S. respond with military force to aid a

Cuban revolt?” That was the fundamental question that confronted the Kennedy administration throughout the MONGOOSE exercise.

The Special Group (Augmented) considered Lansdale’s proposed plan on February 21, discussed it again with McNamara on February 26, and finally concluded on March 1 that it was essential to conduct an initial intelligence collection program before deciding whether to proceed with the operational proposals outlined by Lansdale. A target date of the end of May was established for a review of the situation in light of the intelligence efforts. A decision as to the next phase would be made at that time. On March 14, this decision was confirmed in guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE approved by the president. The guidelines stipulated that the immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months would be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Political, economic, and covert actions were authorized—short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area or other development that would require U.S. armed intervention.

The intelligence appreciation outlined in *The Situation and Prospects in Cuba* was viewed as far too negative by Lansdale and others, such as Richard Goodwin of the White House staff, who were involved in the MONGOOSE exercise. They saw evidence of cracks in the Castro government in Castro’s denunciation, on March 26, of Cuban Communist Party leader Anibal Escalante and other Communist functionaries. They looked for opportunities to exploit the apparent divisions in Castro’s ranks. The intelligence available at the time of the review of Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE on July 25 suggested, however, that Castro was in the process of consolidating his control over Cuban society. Cuba faced a significant economic crisis, but the Soviet bloc countries were expected to carry Cuba through the crisis and to continue to contribute to the military buildup in Cuba that was making Castro’s position increasingly secure.

In his assessment of Phase I, submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) on July 25, Lansdale took issue with the intelligence appreciations and argued that there were enough able-bodied and motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to initiate a successful revolt against Castro. But he added that they would require strong support from the United States, and he expressed the concern that time was running out for the United States to make a choice on Cuba.

The Special Group (Augmented) responded to Lansdale’s suggestions by instructing him to produce an outline plan calling for all actions that could be undertaken to undermine the Castro government, short of U.S. military intervention. In a memorandum to the president on August 17, General Taylor noted that the Special Group (Augmented) had reviewed the results of Phase I, the intelligence-gathering phase of Operation MONGOOSE, and while not yet satisfied with the level of intelligence achieved, the group was prepared to recommend that the president approve the operational plans outlined by Lansdale for Phase II. The operation would continue to focus on the need for additional intelligence concerning the possibility of a successful revolt against Castro. But it was judged to be time to move forward with efforts designed to hurt the local regime as much as possible on the economic front and work further to discredit the regime locally and abroad. The group felt that the new course of action would create added difficulties for the Castro government and would increase the visibility of its failures. With the clear understanding that Phase II would still limit Operation MONGOOSE to activities short of anything likely to draw

the United States into active military operations against Cuba, President Kennedy on August 20 gave his approval to proceed.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

By August, Operation MONGOOSE had taken on a new sense of urgency as evidence mounted that the Soviet Union had sharply increased military shipments to Cuba. At an August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), CIA Director McCone expressed his concern that the Soviet Union would underwrite its investment in Cuba by installing medium-range ballistic missiles on the island. On August 23, President Kennedy considered the new evidence of Soviet bloc activity in Cuba and issued a series of directives incorporated in NSAM No. 181. One of those directives stipulated that Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. In addition, the president directed that a study be made of the various alternatives that could be adopted to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack upon the United States. And he called for another study of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion.

Aerial photography established on August 29 that the Soviet Union was building surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles raised the stakes in Washington, where there was concern that the purpose of the anti-aircraft missiles might be to protect the subsequent introduction of ballistic missiles. On August 31, McGeorge Bundy assessed for President Kennedy the increased threat that Soviet medium-range missiles would pose for the United States. President Kennedy issued a warning on September 4 that the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, such as surface-to-surface missiles, would raise the gravest issues for the United States.

In an effort to assess Soviet intentions, Theodore Sorensen, the president's special counsel and close adviser, met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on September 6 for a discussion of outstanding tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dobrynin conveyed a personal message from Chairman Nikita Khrushchev to President Kennedy assuring the president that nothing would be undertaken before the American congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in relations between the two countries. Sorensen replied that the president felt that recent Soviet actions in Cuba had already caused a significant problem and that the chairman's message seemed, therefore, hollow and tardy. Sorensen added that the president took the Soviet military buildup in Cuba as a deliberate and personal affront.

On September 11, the Soviet Union warned that any attack by the United States on Cuba or upon Soviet ships bound for Cuba would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, those tasked with responsibility for Operation MONGOOSE worked on such assignments as developing post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. At a press conference on September 13, President Kennedy dismissed speculation concerning the possibility of an imminent invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. Military action by the United States against Cuba would be triggered, Kennedy stated, only if Cuba posed a threat to any other nation in the hemisphere, or if Cuba became an offensive military base for the Soviet Union.

On September 19, the intelligence community produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled *The Military Buildup in Cuba*. The estimate concluded that the Soviet military buildup was essentially defensive in nature, designed to

protect Cuba against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceived to be the danger that the United States might attempt to overthrow the Castro government. It was considered to be unlikely that the Soviet Union would run the risk of attempting to establish a base for offensive weapons, such as medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. CIA Director McCone, who was in France on a honeymoon holiday, questioned that conclusion and reiterated his concern that the Soviet Union was introducing ballistic missiles into Cuba. On September 21, President Kennedy instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to assure that military contingency plans with regard to Cuba were kept up to date, taking into account the additions to Cuban armaments resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians.

That same afternoon, Admiral Anderson, commander-in-chief, Atlantic, issued a directive to his command to be prepared to conduct an air and naval blockade of Cuba on command from higher authority. Also on September 21, the first credible report of the arrival of what appeared to be Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) was received in Washington. Intelligence analysts checked this report against available photography and other reports and, by September 28, developed the hypothesis that MRBM sites were under preparation in Pinar del Rio province. The Joint Staff made arrangements to brief the secretary of defense and the JCS on this dangerous development on Monday, October 1. By the end of September 1962, therefore, it was clear that Cuba was on the verge of becoming a more difficult and dangerous problem for the U.S. government. It remained to be determined whether the president would respond to that emerging threat by authorizing the use of military force to move the plans to contain, destabilize, and overthrow the Castro government beyond those envisioned and authorized under Phase II of Operation MONGOOSE.

Before October 1, 1962, U.S. intelligence suspected a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, but it did not know definitively whether these arms included strategic weapons capable of threatening the United States. On October 5, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone predicted that the Soviet military buildup in Cuba would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated this was more a probability than a possibility. Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy disagreed, doubting that the Soviet Union would mount such a brazen challenge. President Kennedy approved a U-2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba to obtain evidence about the development of MRBM sites on the island. The flight, which took place on October 14, provided the first proof of the existence of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. On October 16, McGeorge Bundy informed Kennedy of the photographs of the missile sites, and the president immediately called a meeting of his principal advisers for that morning. At this meeting the administration began its response to the Cuban missile crisis, the most dangerous U.S.–Soviet confrontation of the cold war.

During that morning meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested that there were two alternatives: (1) a quick unilateral military strike at the missile sites, or (2) alerting U.S. allies and the Soviet Union to the fact that the placement of the missiles could lead to war. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave a preliminary estimate of the military options. At the conclusion of the meeting the president asked his advisers to meet with him again that evening, stressing that the missiles had to be taken out. Other related issues for decision were whether to strike targets other than the missile sites and whether to invade the island.

At the evening meeting, Rusk, McNamara, and the president's Special Military Representative General Maxwell Taylor raised doubts about the efficacy of strictly

military actions, pointing to the political fallout in Latin America and noting that air strikes were unlikely to be completely effective. Despite these reservations, the discussion of the U.S. response still focused on a military riposte.

Kennedy's advisers met again on the morning and afternoon of October 17 and raised the possibility of warning both Castro and Khrushchev to remove the missiles. If the response was negative, then the United States would use the military air strike option. McNamara and Taylor both counseled against this idea since it would give time for the missiles to become operational. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson seconded this view. By the evening of October 17, the military option still held sway, although Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen argued strongly for a diplomatic approach, while Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin supported the idea of a blockade coupled with a declaration of war.

By the morning of October 18, Kennedy and his advisers began to explore the idea of blockading Cuba because of the expected negative reaction by U.S. allies to a military solution. Still, the president remained noncommittal about the blockade. He constantly queried his advisers about allied reactions to air strikes. Also on October 18, the CIA reported sensitive intelligence, based on U-2 flights and its best Soviet source, that mobile MRBMs were already operational and fixed intermediate-range missiles near Havana would be operational by December.

U.S. policy remained far from finalized when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called at the White House on October 18. Gromyko defended the Soviet Union's supplying arms to Cuba without mentioning the missiles and accused the United States of planning to invade the island. Kennedy responded that the arms supply had had a serious negative impact in the United States. The president pointedly told Gromyko that the United States was basing its policy on the Soviet assertion that the arms supplied to Castro were defensive (Kennedy did not inform Gromyko that he knew about the offensive weapons). Following the meeting, the president's advisers met at the State Department and following that with the president at the White House to discuss options. Although they reached no decision, they were becoming increasingly interested in the blockade as the preferred option.

Meetings on October 19 centered on the legal aspects of a blockade, which most participants now agreed was a promising option, although for international legal reasons it was to be called a quarantine. Discussion of a military strike continued, however, with Taylor commenting that a blockade meant the abandonment of an air strike. Early in the afternoon, the participants formed two working groups to present alternatives to the president—a blockade scenario and a paper on the military option. Drafts of these reports were discussed. McNamara now pointed out that the United States would probably have to give up its missile bases in Italy and Turkey in return for a negotiated removal of the Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. When the meetings ended the two alternatives were still open.

The two options were submitted to the president at a meeting of the NSC on October 20. McNamara pushed for the blockade, advising the president that to succeed they probably would have to accept withdrawal of U.S. missiles in southern Europe. The pros and cons of the blockade were discussed, as were those of the air strike scenario, which at this point was still supported by Bundy, Taylor, and the JCS. The attorney general noted that a blockade coupled with an air strike was very attractive to him. McCone opposed the air strikes but admitted that a blockade did not seem to be a sufficient response. The president expressed his concern that

whichever option was chosen, the Soviet Union would respond with a blockade of Berlin. After further discussion, Kennedy was prepared to go with the blockade, but he wanted preparations for an air strike completed for either October 21 or 22 just in case. At the close of the NSC meeting, the participants considered how the blockade plan could be incorporated into the president's address to the nation.

On October 21, the NSC thoroughly vetted the president's speech, reviewed military contingency plans, and discussed diplomatic measures. The president rejected United Nations (UN) Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's suggestions for a proposed summit meeting and a neutralization of Cuba or return of Guantanamo as means of easing the Soviet decision to dismantle the missiles.

On October 22, U.S. representatives in Washington and Moscow delivered a letter from the president to Khrushchev stating that the Kennedy administration knew about the missiles and other offensive weapons introduced into Cuba by the Soviet Union and stating that the United States was determined to remove this threat to hemispheric security. Attached to the letter was a copy of the president's address to the nation, given one hour later, announcing the quarantine of Cuba and calling on the Soviet Union to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace.

On the evening of October 23, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to open up an informal channel to the Russians. Although the attorney general told the Soviet ambassador that he was not operating on instructions from the president, Dobrynin could have only believed that the attorney general spoke with the approval of his brother. Robert Kennedy emphasized the administration's sense of betrayal at Soviet duplicity. The next day, Khrushchev responded by accusing the United States of violating the UN Charter and all the norms of freedom of the seas. He reiterated the standard Soviet line that all the weapons being supplied to Cuba were defensive. Ignoring this self-serving explanation, President Kennedy asked Khrushchev to instruct Soviet vessels headed to Havana to observe the terms of the quarantine, which would go into effect at 2:00 p.m. on October 24. Khrushchev refused to comply, stating on October 24 that he considered the blockade an act of aggression that would push mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear war. As Soviet ships approached the quarantine line, the Kennedy administration had some sobering moments, but by the afternoon of October 24, the Soviet ships began to turn back.

In a long letter of October 26, Khrushchev repeated that the missiles were strictly defensive and accused the United States of proclaiming piratical measures in establishing the blockade. Khrushchev suggested that if Washington would promise not to invade Cuba and to remove the blockade, the Soviet Union would declare that its ships bound for the island were not carrying arms. The letter bore Khrushchev's personal style and the Kennedy administration was encouraged.

On October 27, Khrushchev agreed to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba but only in return for the United States removing its MRBMs from Turkey. The letter from Khrushchev, which the Kennedy administration deemed to have been drafted by committee, also insisted upon mutual pledges by the United States and the Soviet Union to respect the inviolability of Cuban and Turkish borders. Initial discussion by the Executive Committee suggested that the proposed trade was unacceptable. There had been preliminary discussion about a possible trade of Italian and Turkish missiles. While most of the president's advisers opposed a missile trade at an

Executive Committee meeting on October 27, the president suggested that a trade would be better than an attack on Cuba.

At the suggestion of Llewellyn Thompson, Ted Sorensen, and Robert Kennedy, the president deliberately ignored Khrushchev's letter of October 27 on the Turkish MRBMs altogether and responded to the letter of October 26. Kennedy responded on October 27 that the first issue to be dealt with was the removal of Soviet missiles and offensive weapons systems from Cuba. If this was done and properly verified, he promised to lift the quarantine and pledged not to invade Cuba. To make matters worse, a U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba and its pilot was killed. On the evening of October 27, Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin that time was running out. If the Soviet Union did not remove the missiles, the United States would do it. Dobrynin asked what Kennedy was offering. The attorney general mentioned the noninvasion pledge. When Dobrynin asked about the Turkish missiles, Robert Kennedy said there could be no quid pro quo since it was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) question and NATO would not act under threat. The attorney general added, at the president's instruction, that the missiles would be removed within four or five months.

On October 28, Khrushchev replied positively to the president's letter of October 27, saying that instructions had been given to Soviet officials in Cuba to dismantle and crate up for return to the Soviet Union the offensive arms. Khrushchev also informed Kennedy that First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov would go to New York to negotiate a solution aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation. Kuznetsov arrived the following day and began negotiations with Stevenson, John J. McCloy, and UN Secretary General U Thant to establish procedures to verify the removal of the missiles and to end the blockade. There was a storm cloud, however: Fidel Castro insisted that he would never accept UN verification on Cuban soil.

The Khrushchev letter of October 28 lightened the tension in Washington immensely, but there were still serious problems. Kennedy insisted on continuing low-level air reconnaissance over Cuba until the Soviet Union made good on its promise to allow UN verification. The president was adamant that the withdrawal of the missiles must be verified, a suspected Soviet submarine base eliminated, and Cuba demilitarized.

Stevenson informed Kennedy on November 3 that although the Russians might agree to ground inspection, the Cubans would not. Kennedy then insisted that Soviet IL-28 bombers in Cuba must also go. McCloy met Kuznetsov in Stamford, Connecticut, on November 4. The Soviet negotiator rejected the bombers as offensive weapons. He offered verification of all forty-two Soviet missiles at sea but insisted upon a guarantee against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and a prohibition of U.S.-backed subversion against Castro in return. As for the submarine base, Kuznetsov stated it was only a fishing port. In their correspondence on November 3 and 5, Kennedy and Khrushchev jostled over verification. Khrushchev argued that the bombers were not offensive, and furthermore they constituted a new demand.

Kennedy began to realize that ironclad verification in Cuba was impossible. John McCone sensed that the tide was running against full verification and submitted a strong dissent. He predicted that Castro would survive, and with bombers and Soviet missile boats, he could threaten the rest of Latin America. To make matters worse, according to McCone, the Soviet surface-to-air missiles in Cuba with their ability to

shoot down U-2s could provide blanket cover for the reintroduction of offensive missiles.

The dangers of verification became obvious on November 5 when during a meeting with Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy was interrupted by a call from the president, informing him that a U.S. plane flying reconnaissance over Cuba had been fired upon. Robert Kennedy stressed to Dobrynin that any arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba. In New York on November 6, Stevenson and McCloy learned that Soviet ships would be taking the missiles out of Cuba starting on November 6 and 7. Asked if they would also remove nuclear weapons as well, Kuznetsov replied that if there were nuclear weapons in Cuba they would be removed with the missiles.

With Soviet ships departing with the missiles that day, the U.S. government had to work out an ad hoc means of verification. U.S. officials concluded that the best method was for U.S. naval ships to pull alongside departing Soviet ships to verify and take photographs. At the Executive Committee meeting on the evening of November 6, the participants dissuaded the president from taking too hard a line with Khrushchev. Instead they persuaded Kennedy to concentrate on the issue at hand, verification of the missiles' removal, saving the bomber issue for later negotiations. Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev of November 6 nonetheless contained a strong objection to Khrushchev's view that the bombers were not offensive weapons and therefore not subject to the understanding of October 27–28.

At the next Executive Committee meeting, it was clear that the president had been won over. He agreed to delay action on the bombers until the missiles were out. At the UN, Stevenson and McCloy received instructions outlining the minimum deal the United States would accept—MRBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons must leave. The United States was prepared to accept Soviet assurances that there would be no submarine base in Cuba.

On November 8, Kuznetsov informed Stevenson and McCloy that the forty-two missiles were out of Cuba, completing the Soviet part of the understanding. The warheads would also go and the Soviets now expected the United States to fulfill its part of the bargain. The next day Stevenson suggested to Washington a plan for settling outstanding issues, which included calling off the quarantine, a formal U.S. pledge in the UN Security Council against invasion of Cuba in return for Soviet removal of the bombers with verification at sea, and a formal Soviet assurance to the Security Council that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba. Soviet compliance would be verified by Latin American diplomats in Cuba. The Soviet Union and Cuba would also agree not to reintroduce offensive weapons, and the United States would agree to call off subversion and sabotage against Cuba. Under Secretary of State George Ball did not like Stevenson's plan, which he characterized as a "guarantee" for Castro with "no obligations," but he passed it to the president without written comment.

The Bomber Crisis and the Noninvasion Pledge

Under Secretary of State Ball had his own plan for resolving the bomber crisis, which he recommended to the president. Earlier Ball had agreed with McGeorge Bundy that the bombers should be downgraded to a U.S.–Cuban problem, not a U.S.–Soviet issue. Ball now suggested that the United States accept the Soviet Union's contention that it could not control Castro and thus eliminate the issue of the IL-28s from the U.S.–Soviet dialogue. Ball's idea seemed the right course when

Khrushchev gave his “gentleman’s agreement” in a letter of November 12 to Kennedy that the bombers would be removed later. Khrushchev could not resist, however, pointing out that without air cover the bombers could be shot down by antiaircraft artillery, regular artillery, or fighters.

The Kennedy administration deliberated whether to accept Khrushchev’s “gentleman’s agreement.” Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin that if the Soviet Union gave the order to remove the bombers and they were out within thirty days, the United States would immediately lift the quarantine. McCone objected and warned that even stripped of missiles and bombers Castro remained a serious threat. Any chance that the issue would be resolved immediately was eliminated by Khrushchev’s letter of November 14 insisting that thirty days was not enough time for withdrawal of the IL-28s. Khrushchev suggested that if the United States stopped overflights of Cuba, something Kennedy was unprepared to do, he would announce the withdrawal of the bombers. In a November 15 letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy admitted that the bombers deal was only a matter of timing, but the issue of verification remained unresolved, especially in light of unconfirmed reports of weapons stored in caves. Kennedy demanded safeguards against the reintroduction of strategic weapons.

At the Executive Committee meeting on November 16, Kennedy vowed that the United States would continue to overfly Cuba in the face of Cuban threats to shoot down reconnaissance planes. The president accepted in principle McCone’s warning that surface-to-air missiles must not be allowed to shield a new Soviet military buildup. McCloy then presented Stevenson’s assessment that the U.S.–Soviet negotiations at the UN were deadlocked. The Soviets could not deliver on-site inspections because of Castro’s insistence on receiving in return a noninvasion pledge. The president suggested that perhaps the deadlock could be resolved informally with a public statement promising no invasion of Cuba, provided there was no military threat or civil war, while the United States continued unobtrusive overflights. Kennedy envisioned a solution without a clear, formal agreement.

The U.S. and Soviet negotiators met on the evening of November 19 at the Soviet compound in Locust Valley on Long Island for a discussion marked by recriminations and reproaches. McCloy stated that the president must say something about the bombers in his press conference of November 20. If there was no agreement on them, then there was no agreement on offensive weapons. The United States would not sign a noninvasion pledge—that would make it a treaty requiring Senate confirmation—but it would make a declaration in the UN. Kuznetsov replied that the Soviet Union would remove the bombers, but only in conjunction with settlement of other issues including overflights. McCloy shot back that there was no stopping overflights until there was adequate verification. Furthermore, if U.S. reconnaissance planes were attacked, they would return fire. At the Executive Committee meeting the morning of November 19, the same showdown state of mind prevailed. After the meeting, Ball informed McCloy that his Soviet counterparts should be informed that if there were no deal on the IL-28s, the Soviet Union could expect a more drastic and extended quarantine.

Under this pressure the Soviet Union retreated. Soviet sources assured U.S. officials that the procedure for verification of missiles could be used for bombers and that Soviet IL-28 technicians were returning to the Soviet Union. If the United States lifted the blockade and gave the Soviets a draft of a nonaggression pledge, the two sides had a deal.

The United States then lifted the quarantine and the crisis that began on October 16, 1962, was finally over. There was general agreement on November 20 that since Khrushchev had not insisted on a formal noninvasion pledge, he should not be given one. McCloy called Ball to register his belief that since the Soviet Union had come through for the United States, they should get a noninvasion declaration. Ball discussed it with McGeorge Bundy, who stated that forty-two missiles and thirty bombers did not constitute much of a concession. When the United States got real verification, Cuba would get a noninvasion pledge.

At the Executive Committee meeting on November 21, Kennedy agreed to abandon U.S. demands for ground inspection in Cuba, but he would not relinquish the right to invade Cuba in the event of civil war, in response to Cuban-fostered guerrilla subversion directed against Latin America, or if offensive weapons were reintroduced into Cuba. Kennedy was not prepared to build up Castro with a noninvasion pledge. Instead the president informed Khrushchev that Castro need have no fear of invasion of Cuba. Kennedy then drafted language with Ball for a very cautious and qualified pledge not to invade Cuba.

The “Understanding” on Cuba

At this point the Kennedy administration faced a crossroads. Either it could extend negotiations with the Soviet Union on UN verification and the noninvasion pledge or it could move to rapidly conclude the matter. Former President Eisenhower and McCloy favored a quick wrap-up on Cuba, relying on overflights and other intelligence resources to verify. Neither man held out much hope for the effectiveness of UN inspection of Cuba. McCone remained opposed to any noninvasion pledge.

The administration initially tried negotiations. McCloy and Stevenson met with Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan made the case for Castro's role in the negotiations, insisted on reciprocity of inspections, and objected that the draft U.S. noninvasion pledge was only an intention, not a commitment. Clearly, Mikoyan was not considering a quick resolution.

The president was unprepared to make concessions that would pave the way for a formal settlement. As he told the Executive Committee on November 29, he would rather have Soviet troops in Cuba than give Castro a noninvasion pledge. At this same meeting, the president authorized the continuation of MONGOOSE operations but restricted it to intelligence gathering. In his meeting with Mikoyan, who had just returned from a long and unpleasant visit to Cuba, Kennedy gave no ground.

At the Executive Committee meeting on December 3, Stevenson and Ball explained the three issues holding up negotiations in New York—the manner in which the United States expressed its intention to continue overflights, U.S. insistence on preservation of peace in the Caribbean, and the noninvasion undertaking.

McCloy and Stevenson argued for concessions to allow them to conclude the negotiations. It was generally agreed that the U.S. government should not accept just any agreement, but should hold out for a good one. The president authorized Stevenson and McCloy to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of a joint report to the Security Council, but on terms that the Soviet Union was not likely to accept. The Soviet negotiators rejected this last U.S. offer on December 14, stating that the noninvasion pledge was too qualified, that reference to overflights was included, and that there was no provision for Cuban participation. The Soviets

countered with a plan to send the Kennedy and Khrushchev letters of October 27 and 28 to the Security Council. The Kennedy administration responded with a plan to send the letters plus the White House and presidential press statements of October 27 and November 20. If the Soviets rejected this, then either a joint letter or separate letters to the secretary general should be sent saying that despite progress made, the United States and Soviet Union could not resolve their differences. There was no resolution. The United States and the Soviet Union decided on a joint letter to the secretary general admitting their inability to agree. The long and drawn-out negotiations for a mutually acceptable agreed resolution to the Cuban missile crisis ended in failure. There was no specific set of obligations and procedures, just Soviet removal of the missiles and the bombers and a promise of a gradual scaling down of Soviet military personnel in Cuba in return for a lifting of the quarantine, the indication that U.S. missiles would eventually be removed from Turkey, and limited assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. In the end, there were no formal U.S.–Soviet understandings to end the Cuban missile crisis.

Covert Operations against Cuba

The Kennedy administration used the natural breaking point of the end of the missile and bomber crises to reorganize its covert operations against Castro by disbanding Operation MONGOOSE and placing day-to-day responsibility for covert and overt operations under a State Department coordinator for Cuban affairs.

The Kennedy administration began 1963 with a new internal debate over covert operations against Cuba.

SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, 1960–January 1963

The U.S. State Department Central Files are the definitive source of American diplomatic reporting on political, military, social, and economic developments throughout the world in the twentieth century. Surpassing the scope of the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, the Central Files provide extensive coverage of all political, military, social, and economic matters relating to a particular country and/or world event.

The State Department Central Files for 1960–January 1963 cover a crucial period in U.S. and world history. Each part of the 1960–January 1963 series contains a wide range of primary materials: special reports and observations on political and military affairs; studies and statistics on socioeconomic matters; interviews and minutes of meetings with U.S. and foreign government officials and leaders; legal and claims documentation; full texts of important letters and cables sent and received by U.S. diplomats and embassy personnel; reports, news clippings, and translations from journals and newspapers; and countless high-level/head of state government documents, including speeches, memoranda, official reports, *aide-mémoire*, and transcripts of political meetings and assemblies.

In addition, these records offer new insights into the evolution of American foreign policy toward both allies and adversaries and into the shaping of the policies of these countries toward the United States. Of even greater importance for the study of individual countries is the comprehensive manner in which the Central Files illuminate the internal affairs of foreign countries. There are thousands of pages arranged topically and chronologically on crucial subjects: political parties, unrest and revolution, human rights, government administration, fiscal and monetary issues, labor, housing, police and crime, public health and works, national defense, military equipment and supplies, foreign policy making, wars and alliances, education, religion, culture, trade, industry, and natural resources. On these subjects and more, the Central Files offer authoritative, in-depth, and timely documentation and analysis.

SOURCE NOTE

Microfilmed from the holdings of the National Archives, College Park, MD, Record Group 59: Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal Files, decimal numbers 637 (Cuba foreign affairs) and 611.37 (U.S.–Cuba foreign affairs) for the period 1960–January 1963. All available original documents have been microfilmed.

ORGANIZATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DECIMAL FILING SYSTEM

From 1910 to 1963 the Department of State used a decimal classification system to organize its Central Files. This system assembled and arranged individual documents according to their subject, with each subject having been assigned a specific decimal code. The decimal system from 1950 to January 1963 consists of ten primary classifications numbered 0 through 9, each covering a broad subject area.

CLASS 0: Miscellaneous.

CLASS 1: Administration of the United States Government.

CLASS 2: Protection of Interests (Persons and Property).

CLASS 3: International Conferences, Congresses, Meetings, and Organizations.

CLASS 4: International Trade and Commerce. Trade Relations, Customs Administration.

CLASS 5: International Informational and Educational Relations. Cultural Affairs. Psychological Warfare.

CLASS 6: International Political Relations. Bilateral Treaties.

CLASS 7: Internal Political and National Defense Affairs.

CLASS 8: Internal Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs.

CLASS 9: Other Internal Affairs. Communications. Transportation. Science.


Foreign Affairs

For this section of the U.S. State Department Central Files, University Publications of America (UPA) has microfilmed the documents contained in Class 6. Within this class, each subject is defined by a decimal file number. The decimal file number is followed by a slant mark (/). The number after the slant mark (/) refers to the date on which the document was generated. Documents within each decimal file number are arranged in chronological order. The entire decimal file number is stamped on the right side of the first page of every document.

In this publication, records classified 637 deal with the foreign policy of Cuba and its political relations with other nations. Due to the State Department's arrangement of these records, countries assigned numbers below 37 will not be found in this file. UPA, however, has included files dealing with the political relations between the United States (country number 11) and Cuba (37) in this publication. In order to find the political relations between Cuba and countries other than the United States that have a number lower than 37, the researcher should check the Class 6 records for that country. These records can be found either at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland, or, for many countries, in microform publications that UPA has made available for libraries. Inadvertently filed with Cuba's general foreign relations are documents with the decimal numbers representing Puerto Rico (11C), Costa Rica (18), and South and Central America (20). UPA has filmed these documents as they are arranged in the files.


In a small number of instances, documents were assigned erroneous or incomplete decimal numbers. UPA has included, in brackets, corrected decimal entries. In addition, misfiled decimal number documents have also been included in brackets.

CLASS 6. Example, 637.61/11-2061



637.61/11-2061 indicates a document dated November 20, 1961, relating to the bilateral relations between Cuba (37) and the USSR (61).

CLASS 6. Example, 611.37/12-260



611.37/12-260 indicates a document dated December 2, 1960, relating to the bilateral relations between the United States (11) and Cuba (37).

Note: For the convenience of the researcher, wherever a specific classification number totals more than one hundred pages, a breakdown of the material by month and year is provided. Where applicable, major subjects have been included with the month and year breakdown.

NUMERICAL LIST OF COUNTRY NUMBERS

- 00 THE WORLD (Universe)
- 01 Outer Space (Aerosphere)
- 01a Moon
- 02 Antarctic
- 03 Arctic
- 10 THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
- 11 United States
- 11a Hawaii (Ocean or Kuré Islands and Palmyra Island)
- 11b U.S. Possessions in the Pacific Ocean
- 11c Puerto Rico
- 11d Guam
- 11e American Samoa (Tutuila, Manua Islands, etc.)
- 11f Canal Zone (Panama Canal Zone), Perido, Naos, Culebra, and Flamenco Islands
- 11g Virgin Islands of the U.S. (St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas)
- 11h Wake Island
- 12 Mexico
- 13 CENTRAL AMERICA
- 14 Guatemala
- 15 Honduras
- 16 El Salvador
- 17 Nicaragua
- 18 Costa Rica
- 19 Panama
- 20 SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA (South of the Rio Grande River)
- 21 Colombia
- 22 Ecuador (Galapagos Islands)
- 23 Peru
- 24 Bolivia
- 25 Chile
- 31 Venezuela
- 32 Brazil
- 33 Uruguay
- 34 Paraguay
- 35 Argentina

- 36 WEST INDIAN REPUBLICS
- 37 Cuba, including Isle of Pines
- 38 Haiti
- 39 Dominican Republic
- 40 EUROPE
- 40a Ireland (Eire) (Irish Free State)
- 40b Iceland
- 41 Great Britain, United Kingdom
- 41a Northern Ireland
- 41b British possessions in the Western Hemisphere (except Canada)
- 41c British Honduras
- 41d British Guiana
- 41e British West Indies (includes 41f–41j)
- 41f The West Indies (Federation of British Colonies in the Caribbean)
- 41g Bahamas
- 41h Bermuda
- 41j Virgin Islands
- 41r Falkland Islands
- 41s South Orkney Islands (South Georgia, South Orkneys, and South Sandwich Islands)
- 41t South Shetland Islands
- 42 Canada (including Newfoundland and Labrador)
- 43 Australia
- 44 New Zealand (Cook Islands, Kermad Islands, and Union Islands [Tokela])
- 45 British Territories in Africa
- 45a Union of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope, Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal)
- 45b British South Africa (45c–45f)
- 45c Rhodesia (Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Nyasaland Federation)
- 45d Basutoland
- 45e Bechuanaland
- 45f Swaziland
- 45g British West Africa
- 45h Nigeria (including that portion of the Cameroons under British Protectorate)
- 45j Ghana (*see* 79)
- 45m Sierra Leone
- 45n Gambia
- 45p British East Africa
- 45r Kenya Colony
- 45s Uganda
- 45t Zanzibar
- 45u Somaliland (protectorate)
- 45w Sudan
- 45x British Southwest Africa (formerly German Southwest Africa)
- 46 British territories in Asia
- 46a Andaman and Nicobar Islands
- 46b Laccadive Islands

- 46c Aden Colony and Protectorate (Hadhramaut, Kamaran, Perim, Socotra, Abdul Quiri, and Kuria Muria Islands)
- 46d Bahrein Islands
- 46e Ceylon
- 46f Singapore (Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean)
- 46g Hong Kong
- 46h British Borneo (North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak)
- 46j Republic of the Maldiv Islands
- 46k Fiji
- 46m Papua (formerly British New Guinea)
- 46n Pacific Islands, including Tonga (Friendly), Cocos (Isla de Cocos), Labuan, Solomon, Pitcairn, Gilbert Islands, Ellice Islands, and British interest in Christmas Island, Phoenix, and Keeling Islands
- 47 British territories in Mediterranean
- 47a Gibraltar
- 47b Malta
- 47c Cyprus
- 47d St. Helena and dependencies (Diego Alvarez, Gough, Inaccessible, and Nightingale Islands)
- 47e Tristan da Cunha
- 47f Ascension Island
- 47g Seychelles
- 47h Mauritius
- 48 Poland (including Danzig)
- 49 Czechoslovakia
- 50 WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE
- 50a Luxembourg
- 50b Monaco
- 50c Andorra
- 50d San Marino
- 50f Liechtenstein
- 50g Free Territory of Trieste (FTT)
- 51 France (including Corsica)
- 51a St. Pierre and Miquelon
- 51b Martinique
- 51c Guadeloupe and dependencies (Marie Galante, Les Saintes, Desirade, St. Barthelemy and St. Martin) (French West Indies, collectively)
- 51d French Guiana (Cayenne) Inini
- 51e French colonies in America
- 51f French India
- 51g Indochina
- 51h Cambodia
- 51j Laos
- 51k Vietnam
- 51m New Caledonia and dependencies (Isle of Pines, Loyalty Islands, Huon Islands, Chesterfield Islands, Wallis Archipelago)
- 51n Society Islands (Tahiti, Moorea-Morea; Leeward Island-Iles Sous-le-Vent)

- 51p Lesser groups (Tuamotu-Tumotu or Low Archipelago; Gambier Archipelago; Marquesas; Tubuai Archipelago-Austral Islands)
- 51r New Hebrides
- 51s Algeria
- 51t French West Africa and the Sahara (Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, French Sudan, Upper Senegal, and the Niger; Mauritania and Dakar), Togo
- 51u French Equatorial Africa (French Congo) (Gabun-Gabon; Middle Congo-Moyen Congo; Ubanga Shari-Oubangui Chari; and Chad-Tchad; Brazzaville); Cameroun
- 51v French Somali Coast and dependencies (Somali Coast); Djibouti, Issa-Somalis; Dankali, Adaels, Ouemas, and Debenehs
- 51w Madagascar
- 51x Other African Islands (Mayotte, Comoro, Reunion, Amsterdam, St. Paul Marion, Crozet, and Kerguelen)
- 51y French possessions and protectorates in Oceania and Eastern Pacific (Australasia and Oceania)
- 52 Spain
- 52a Canary Islands
- 52b Spanish possessions in Africa
- 52c Rio de Oro and Adrar (Western Sahara)
- 52d Rio Muni and Cape San Juan (Spanish Guinea)
- 52e Fernando Po, Annobon, Corisco, and Elobey Islands
- 52f Tetuan and Ceuta; Gomera, Alhucemas, Melilla
- 52g Balearic Islands
- 53 Portugal
- 53a Madeira
- 53b Azores
- 53c Mozambique
- 53d Portuguese India (Goa, Damao, and Diu)
- 53e Macao (Macau)
- 53f Timor
- 53g Cape Verde Islands (Santo Antão, São Nicolau, São Vicente, Fogo, Santiago, Boa Vista, Sal Santa, Luzia, Branco, Raso, Maio, Brava, Rei, and Rombo)
- 53h Portuguese Guinea (Guinea Coast), Bijagoz Islands, and Bolama Island
- 53k São Thomé (São Tomé) and Príncipe
- 53m Ladana and Cabinda
- 53n Angola (Portuguese West Africa), Congo, Loanda, Benguella, Mossamedes, Huilla, and Lunda
- 53p Portuguese East Africa
- 54 Switzerland
- 55 Belgium
- 55a Belgian Congo (Belgian Kongo)
- 56 Netherlands
- 56a Surinam (Netherlands Guiana)
- 56b Netherlands Antilles (formerly Netherlands West Indies) (Curaçao, Bonaire, Aruba, St. Martin, St. Eustatius, Saba)

- 56c Miscellaneous Islands (Riau-Lingga Archipelago, Bangka-Banca; Billiton, Molucca, Timor Archipelago, Bai and Lombok, Netherlands New Guinea, or Western New Guinea)
- 56d Indonesia
- 56f Sumatra
- 57 Norway
- 57a Scandinavia (57, 58, 59, 60e)
- 57b Spitsbergen (Spitzbergen)
- 57c Lapland (Parts of 57, 58, 60e, 61)
- 58 Sweden
- 59 Denmark
- 59a Greenland
- 59b Faeroe (Faroe) or Sheep Islands
- 60 EASTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE (including Balkans, 67, 68, 69, 81, and European part of 82)
- 60a Baltic States
- 60b Estonia
- 60c Latvia
- 60d Lithuania
- 60e Finland (Aland Islands)
- 61 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- 61a Bessarabia
- 61b Ukraine
- 61c Sakhalin Island (Russian portion)
- 62 Germany
- 62a Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) (Saar)
- 62b Russian Zone (East Germany)
- 62c Polish Administration
- 63 Austria
- 64 Hungary
- 65 Italy
- 65a Vatican City
- 66 Rumania (Roumania)
- 67 Albania
- 68 Yugoslavia
- 69 Bulgaria
- 70 AFRICA (For Belgian possessions, *see* 55a) (For British possessions, *see* 45) (For French possessions, *see* 51s, etc.)
- 70a Mediterranean countries (General)
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- 70c Cameroon
- 70d Togo
- 70e Mali
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- 70g Congo Republic
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- 70j Niger
- 70k Upper Volta

- 70m Ivory Coast
- 70u Nigeria
- 70x Republic of South Africa
- 71 Morocco
- 72 Tunisia
- 73 Tripoli (Libya or Libia), Barca, Misurata, Benghazi, Derna, Cyrenaica
- 74 Egypt (*see* 86b)
- 75 Ethiopia (Hamara, Galla, and Harar)
- 75a Eritrea
- 76 Liberia
- 77 Trust Territory of Somaliland
- 78 Tanganyika Territory (Ruanda-Urundi), formerly German East Africa
- 79 West African states (includes 45j and 70b)
- 80 NEAR EAST
- 81 Greece
- 81a Crete
- 81b Samos
- 82 Turkey
- 83 Syria (*see* 86b)
- 83a Lebanon (Levant States)
- 84 Palestine
- 84a Israel
- 85 Jordan (Hashemite Jordan Kingdom) (formerly Trans-Jordan)
- 86 Arabia (Arab League) (United Arab states, includes 86b and 86h)
- 86a Saudia Arabia (Kingdom of Hejas and Nejd)
- 86b United Arab Republic (includes 74 and 83)
- 86d Kuwait
- 86e Muscat and Oman
- 86f Qatar
- 86g Trucial Sheikhs
- 86h Yemen
- 87 Iraq (Mesopotamia)
- 88 Iran (Persia)
- 89 Afghanistan
- 90 FAR EAST (including all of Asia)
- 90a Bhutan
- 90b Burma
- 90c Nepal
- 90d Pakistan (Baluchistan)
- 91 India
- 92 Thailand (Siam)
- 93 China
- 93a Manchuria
- 93b Tibet
- 94 Japan
- 94a Formosa (Taiwan)
- 94b Sakhalin Island (Japanese portion)
- 94c Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), Nampo Islands (Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus)

- 95 Korea
- 95a North Korea
- 95b South Korea
- 96 Philippine Republic
- 97 Malaya (Federation of Malaya comprises the states Pahang, Perak, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, and the settlements Malacca and Penang) (includes Province of Wellesley)
- 98 Republic of Indonesia (Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes)
- 99 Pacific Islands (Mandated), New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands (Bougainville, Baku), Marshall Islands, Nauru, Caroline Islands, Pelew (Palau) Islands, Marianna Islands (Ladrone Islands), Samoa (Samoan Islands, Western Samoa), Savaii, Upolu

ACRONYM LIST

CEF	Cuban Expeditionary Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MRBM	Medium-range ballistic missiles
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
PRC	People's Republic of China
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Reel 1

International Political Relations; Bilateral Treaties—Cuba

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Reel 2

International Political Relations; Bilateral Treaties—Cuba cont.

0001	637.61	Political Relations between Cuba and the USSR cont. September 1962 cont. Neutrality of Panama Canal; U.S. trade embargo; Soviet military buildup in Cuba; Soviets supply guided missiles to Cuba; Cuban defectors; Soviet military aid; Monroe Doctrine.
0152		October 1962 Cuban missile crisis; U.S. trade embargo; proposal for U.S. recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile to be established at Guantanamo Naval Base; Monroe Doctrine.
0217		November 1962 Mikoyan-Castro talks; dismantling of Soviet offensive missile bases.
0224		December 1962 Yugoslavia tries to convince Cuba to break ties to USSR.
0232		January 1963 Fourth Anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
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0766	637.985	Political Relations between Cuba and Indonesia: Cultural Treaties and Agreements

Reel 3

International Political Relations; Bilateral Treaties—U.S.—Cuba

0001	611.37	<p>Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba January 1960</p> <p>Cuban propaganda; Cuban anti-American policy; U.S. recall of Ambassador Philip Bonsal; proposed reduction in Cuban sugar quota; Brazilian offer to mediate U.S.—Cuban dispute; possible Cuban complaint against United States in UN; President Eisenhower's statement on U.S. Cuban policy.</p>
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Frame No.	File	Subject
0167		<p>February 1960</p> <p>Cuban anti-American policy; President Eisenhower's statement on U.S. Cuban policy; Latin American views on U.S.–Cuba dispute; U.S. recall of Ambassador Philip Bonsal; Cuban propaganda; Brazilian offer to mediate U.S.–Cuban dispute; possible U.S.–Cuban negotiations; Cuban expropriation of property of U.S. nationals.</p>
0360		<p>March 1960</p> <p>Cuban anti-American policy; Cuban propaganda; possible U.S.–Cuban negotiations; alleged U.S. sabotage of French munitions ship in Cuba; Latin American views on U.S.–Cuban dispute; return of Ambassador Philip Bonsal to Cuba; Cuban complaint against United States in UN; Monroe Doctrine; U.S. arms embargo; proposed reduction of Cuban sugar quota; proposed U.S. economic sanctions.</p>
0523		<p>April 1960</p> <p>Proposed reduction of Cuban sugar quota; Cuban propaganda; Cuban anti-American policy; defections from Castro regime.</p>
0605		<p>May 1960</p> <p>Cuban propaganda; Cuban anti-American policy; U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security hearings on Cuba and interviews with former members of Batista regime; anti–U.S. demonstrations; U.S. violations of Cuban territorial waters; allegations of U.S. preparations to invade Cuba by way of Guatemala and of U.S. sabotage of French munitions ship in Cuba.</p>
0716		<p>June 1960</p> <p>Allegations of U.S. sabotage of French munitions ship in Cuba and that aircraft from United States had strafed and bombed Havana; Cuban propaganda; Cuban anti-American policy; Cuban expropriation of property of U.S. nationals; Chester Lacayo case; Cuban criticism of OAS; provocative actions by Cuban government against United States; U.S. violations of Cuban territorial waters and airspace; encounter between U.S. submarine <i>Sea Poacher</i> and Cuban patrol boat; National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs meeting and briefing materials; proposed reduction in Cuban sugar quota; House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs hearings on communism in Latin America; U.S. legislation to implement protocol to Habana Convention.</p>

Frame No. File Subject

Reel 4

International Political Relations; Bilateral Treaties—U.S.—Cuba cont.

0001	611.37	Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba cont. July 1960 Proposed reduction of Cuban sugar quota; Cuban complaint against United States in UN Security Council; proposed emergency proclamation for placing controls on Cuban transactions; world reaction to U.S.—Cuban dispute; Soviet pledge to support Cuba in event of U.S. attack; Monroe Doctrine; provocative actions by Cuban government against United States; encounter between U.S. submarine <i>Sea Poacher</i> and Cuban patrol boat; allegations that aircraft from United States had strafed and bombed Havana; Cuban anti-American policy; Cuban propaganda.
0321		August 1960 World reaction to U.S.—Cuban dispute; U.S. economic policy toward Cuba; proposed reduction of Cuban sugar quota; offers by Mexico, Brazil, and Canada to mediate U.S.—Cuban dispute; Cuban complaint against United States in UN Security Council; Cuban propaganda; Cuban anti-American policy.
0392		September 1960 U.S. petroleum policy toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic; proposed U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba; proposed OAS investigation of Cuban charges of U.S. aggression; limitations on movements of U.S. Ambassador Philip Bonsal; Cuban propaganda.
0438		October 1960 Allegations of U.S. preparations for invasion of Cuba, of U.S. embassy involvement with counterrevolutionary activities, and of U.S. support for armed expedition by anti-Castro Cubans; possible Cuban demand for U.S. withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base; U.S. trade embargo; protest of attack on Cuban consulate in Miami, Florida; U.S. violations of Cuban airspace; Cuban complaints against United States in UN Security Council and General Assembly; Latin American support for U.S. Cuba policy; U.S. diplomatic representation in Havana in event of break in relations.
0657		November 1960 Cuban complaint against United States in UN General Assembly; allegations of U.S. aggression against Cuba; U.S. recall of Ambassador Philip Bonsal; proposed reduction of Cuban sugar quota; U.S. trade embargo; U.S. violations of Cuban airspace; Cuban expropriation of property of U.S. nationals.

<i>Frame No.</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Subject</i>
0747		December 1960 Cuban propaganda; Cuban complaint against United States in UN General Assembly; reaction of Castro regime to election of President John F. Kennedy; allegations of U.S. financial aid to anti-Castro Cuban rebels and of U.S. preparations for invasion; Fair Play for Cuba Committee; proposed break in U.S.–Cuban diplomatic relations; efforts to improve working relationship between U.S. embassy and Cuban Department of Investigation of the Revolutionary Army.

Reel 5

International Political Relations; Bilateral Treaties—U.S.–Cuba cont.

0001	611.37	Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba cont. January 1961 UN Security Council meeting on Cuban complaints regarding U.S. invasion plans; Cuban campaign to eliminate illiteracy; U.S. termination of diplomatic relations and world press reaction; U.S. legal position with regard to Guantanamo Naval Base; Fair Play for Cuba Committee; report on Cuban refugees; effect of break in diplomatic relations on neutrality laws; allegations of U.S. training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala.
0321		February 1961 U.S. termination of diplomatic relations and world press reaction; Ecuador and Brazil offer to mediate U.S.–Cuban dispute.
0389		March 1961 Suggested points for U.S.–Cuban negotiations; allegations of U.S. plans for aggression against Cuba and of CIA support for anti-Castro activities; Fair Play for Cuba Committee; Argentine offer to mediate U.S.–Cuban dispute; Cuban complaint against United States in UN Security Council.
0473		April 1961 Cuban plans to present complaints against United States to UN General Assembly; Fair Play for Cuba Committee; allegations of U.S. psychological warfare and plans for aggression against Cuba; Argentine offer to mediate U.S.–Cuban dispute; Bay of Pigs invasion and world press reaction; proposed Brazilian and Mexican UN General Assembly resolutions on conciliation between the United States and Cuba; anti–U.S. demonstrations; letter from Nikita Khrushchev to President Kennedy protesting Bay of Pigs invasion.

<i>Frame No.</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Subject</i>
0750		<p>May 1961 World press reaction to Bay of Pigs invasion; Cuban complaint to UN General Assembly regarding Bay of Pigs and continuing U.S. aggression; criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad; petition in support of U.S. Cuba policy.</p>

Reel 6

International Political Relations; Bilateral Treaties—U.S.—Cuba cont.

0001	611.37	<p>Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba cont. June 1961 U.S. support for anti-Castro Cubans; criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad; proposed papal mediation in U.S.—Cuban dispute.</p>
0037		<p>July 1961 Criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad; proposed U.S. blockade of Cuba; Cuban complaint regarding U.S. aggression to UN Security Council.</p>
0069		<p>August 1961 U.S. seizure of Cuban patrol boat brought to United States by defector and return of vessel to Cuba; Cuban complaint regarding U.S. aggression to UN Security Council; hijacking of Eastern Airlines and Pan American aircraft to Cuba; waiver of immunity by foreign commercial airlines; criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad; Cuban propaganda.</p>
0175		<p>September 1961 Criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad; return of seized Cuban patrol boat; proposals for U.S.—Cuban negotiations and for U.S. trade embargo; Punta del Este Conference.</p>
0217		<p>October 1961 Proposals for U.S. trade embargo and U.S.—Cuban negotiations; Cuban propaganda.</p>
0236		<p>November 1961 Allegations of U.S. brutalities toward Cuban citizens and of new U.S. invasion preparations; Cuban and PRC propaganda; criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad.</p>
0268		<p>December 1961 OAS study of alleged subversive activities and human rights violations by Castro regime.</p>

<i>Frame No.</i>	<i>File</i>	<i>Subject</i>
0279		January 1962 Criticism of U.S. Cuba policy at home and abroad; allegations of new U.S. invasion preparations; Punta del Este Conference.
0302		February 1962 Proposals for U.S. economic sanctions and U.S. support for Cuban exile military action; Cuban expulsion from OAS; Punta del Este Conference; U.S. arms embargo.
0331		March 1962 U.S. trade embargo; proposal for U.S. blockade of Cuba; Cuban complaint regarding use of Guantanamo Naval Base as center for subversive activities against Cuba; U.S. offer to exchange surplus foodstuffs for release of Bay of Pigs prisoners.
0370		April 1962 Punta del Este Conference; U.S. trade embargo; expulsion of Cuba from OAS.
0384		May 1962 Alleged violations of Cuban territory and provocations by U.S. military forces at Guantanamo Naval Base.
0415		June 1962 U.S. exchange of surplus foodstuffs for release of Bay of Pigs prisoners; U.S. violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters; provocative acts by Cuban sentries at Guantanamo Naval Base.
0483		July 1962 Cuban trade with West Germany; alleged threat to Cuban nationals in the United States by the American government; U.S. violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters.
0507		August 1962 Attack on Havana by boats of anti-Castro Cubans based in Florida; Soviet military aid to Cuba; Monroe Doctrine; U.S. violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters; provocative incidents between Cubans and U.S. military personnel at Guantanamo Naval Base.
0575		September 1962 U.S. violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters; attack on Havana by boats of anti-Castro Cubans based in Florida; Soviet military aid to Cuba; Soviet pledge to support Cuba in event of U.S. attack; negotiations for release of Bay of Pigs prisoners; Cuban propaganda; U.S. quarantine of Cuba and trade embargo; Monroe Doctrine.

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0697		October 1962 Soviet offensive missile bases in Cuba; U.S. violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters; provocative incidents between Cubans and U.S. military personnel at Guantanamo Naval Base; negotiations for release of Bay of Pigs prisoners; actions taken by U.S. government against Castro regime; Cuban missile crisis and world reaction.
0874		November 1962 Cuban missile crisis and world reaction; Nasser-Khrushchev correspondence regarding Cuba.

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0001	611.37	Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba cont. November 1962 cont. Cuban missile crisis and world reaction; U.S. noninvasion guarantee to Cuba.
0089		December 1962 Removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and verification process; proposed creation of Western Hemisphere military alliance; Mexican position on Cuba; U.S. policy toward Cuban exiles.
0150		January 1963 Verification of removal of Soviet missiles and aircraft from Cuba; U.S.—Soviet talks regarding Cuba; U.S. noninvasion guarantee to Cuba.
0171	611.37022 [611.3722]	Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba: War; Hostilities—Neutral Commerce; Blockade]
0174	611.371	Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba: Peace; Friendship
0177	611.3722	Political Relations between the U.S. and Cuba: War; Hostilities—Neutral Commerce; Blockade July 1960
0179		April 1961
0182		May 1961
0203		February 1962 Canadian trade with Cuba.

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0210		September 1962 International law problems of blockade; U.S. naval blockade of Cuba.
0234		October 1962 U.S. naval blockade of Cuba; Cuban missile crisis and world reaction; policy toward non-Soviet bloc ships in Cuban trade; Latin American trade with Cuba; U.S. actions to counter Cuban subversive activities; U.S. trade embargo; exclusion of ships in Cuba-Soviet bloc trade from U.S. ports; legal basis for quarantine of Cuba.

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