A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

Vietnam War Research Collections

VIETNAM DOCUMENTS AND
RESEARCH NOTES SERIES
Translation and Analysis of Significant
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Documents

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INTRODUCTION

The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was an interagency organization created in May 1965 by the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Operations Mission, and U.S. Information Agency (USIA), as part of the U.S. Mission in South Vietnam. JUSPAO coordinated all U.S. psychological and information activities, was directed by a senior USIA official in the Embassy, and carried out the traditional USIA programs. These programs explained and interpreted U.S. policies, actions, and culture to Vietnamese audiences. JUSPAO was also responsible for providing overall policy guidance to and coordination of U.S. psychological operational efforts. They developed, advised, and supported countrywide psychological operation (PSYOP) programs that involved the Vietnamese national media and the Vietnamese Ministry of Information. In the field, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) executed psychological programs with JUSPAO providing support, especially for pacification and national development programs ("nation-building"). Ultimately, JUSPAO was responsible for evaluating PSYOP activities in the field and on the national level in order to determine their validity and effectiveness.

The Vietnam Documents and Research Notes were issued as a research service by the U.S. Mission in South Vietnam. Originally, these notes were compiled and distributed by the North Vietnam Affairs Division of the JUSPAO in the U.S. Embassy. After December 1967, these notes were distributed by the minister-counselor for information, and after October 1972, by the U.S. Information Service Branch of the U.S. Embassy. The notes were compiled from sources within JUSPAO and are dated between October 1967 and February 1975.

These notes consist of and/or highlight translated Viet Cong and North Vietnamese political and military reports, treatises, resolutions, directives, and program descriptions. In addition, they contain U.S. and South Vietnamese commentary on the enemy material, as well as analyses of political methodology, strategy, infrastructure, and history. While the majority of the notes relate to political topics, military topics include analyses of soldiers’ diaries and comments on military conditions and tasks.

Captured documents represent one of the most valuable sources for first-hand intelligence on enemy activities, problems, and concerns. Information gleaned from captured documents can provide timely and detailed data on subjects ranging from enemy order of battle and attack plans, to strategy and tactics, to political proclamations and infrastructure. These Vietnam Documents and Research Notes highlight the effectiveness of the U.S., South Vietnamese, and Free World military and political efforts during the Vietnam War.
SOURCE NOTE

The documents included in UPA’s micropublication entitled *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes Series* are from the holdings of the Vietnam Studies Room, Library of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The reports in this micropublication have been filmed in their entirety. UPA has made every effort to include all of the Vietnam Documents and Research Notes that are held by Library of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.
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<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS/INITIALISMS</th>
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<tr>
<td>COSVN</td>
<td>Central Office for South Vietnam (North Vietnamese political and military controlling organization in South Vietnam, particularly in III and IV CTZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>Corps Tactical Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRV</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td>
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<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of [South] Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSPAO</td>
<td>Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office</td>
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<td>NFLSV</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (also called the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam)</td>
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<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army (see also VPA)</td>
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<td>PLAF</td>
<td>People's Liberation Armed Forces (VC/NVA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>PRG</td>
<td>Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>PRP</td>
<td>People's Revolutionary Party (Communist Party of South Vietnam; the Southern Branch of the Lao Dong Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>VANDPF</td>
<td>Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces</td>
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<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong (or Vietnamese Communist)</td>
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<td>VCI</td>
<td>Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
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<td>VPA</td>
<td>Vietnam People's Army (official name for North Vietnamese Army)</td>
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<td>VWP</td>
<td>Vietnam Workers' Party (North Vietnamese Communist Party)</td>
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REEL INDEX

The following index is a list of document titles and their contents. The four-digit number on the far left is the frame number at which the document begins. It is followed by the document title in bold, document number (if available), date, number of pages, and a descriptive abstract.

Reel 1
Frame No.

1966

Unnumbered. March. 29pp.
Outlines the history of the PRP from its designation as the South Branch of Lao Dong Party (North Vietnam’s Communist Party) to its transformation as the “vanguard” of the NLF. This study highlights the PRP’s policies and programs, reasons for formation, and organization and structure. Biographic sketches of prominent PRP leaders and a comparison of PRP and Lao Dong Party bylaws are included as appendices.

0030 Diary of an Infiltrator.
This is a composite “diary” created from several hundred captured diaries. The majority of the diaries were captured in the Central Highlands and cover the period from July 1965 to August 1966. This composite diary highlights the plight of NVA conscripted soldiers serving in South Vietnam, including the state of morale; health and food situation; progress of the war; political indoctrination methods; military training; effectiveness of Chieu Hoi and related programs; and the effects of air strikes and helicopter landings. Diary entries also highlight the personal side of war—loneliness, fear, homesickness, “the first kill,” and the determination to survive. All entries in this composite diary are direct quotations in translation from the Vietnamese.

0062 A Study: Prospects for the Viet Cong.
Analyzes the crisis in organization and effectiveness of VC to predict and conclude a victory in the South. Sections detail the South Vietnamese Communists’ organizational weapon; his doctrine; conditions in South Vietnam; and the Communist response to the problems of doctrine, manpower, logistics, and morale by political indoctrination and PRP leadership.

1967

0125 Diary of an Infiltrator.
Document No. 1. October. 6pp.
Excerpts from the diary of Mai Van Hung, an NVA soldier en route to the South. This diary was captured by the U.S. 25th Infantry during operations in the Central Highlands on March 14, 1967. Highlights include the plight of a young NVA draftee soldier serving in South Vietnam; the state of morale; progress of the war; political indoctrination; and military training. The diary entries also highlight the personal side of war—loneliness, fear, and homesickness. All excerpts in this report are direct quotations in translation from the Vietnamese.
0131 Problems of a North Vietnamese Regiment.
Consists of two documents highlighting the operational activities and results of the 95th Regiment (An Thai Regiment) of the NVA Army operating in South Vietnam. These documents were captured in Phu Yen Province on July 19, 1967, by the ROK 9th Infantry Division, operating in the Thon Bac Battle Area.
The first document is a resolution adopted by the An Thai Party Committee evaluating the enemy and friendly situation from the end of 1965 and a severe self-criticism of the regiment. Highlights include discussion of limited warfare problems, personnel and material losses, low morale, breaches of discipline, and poor leadership.
The second document is a directive dated May 13, 1967, defining the political tasks for the regiment's 1967 Summer Campaign in Phu Yen Province. The purpose of this campaign was to restore the Communist political and military infrastructure in an area where the South Vietnamese government's pacification program was enjoying success.

0165 Within a Viet Cong Stronghold: Deliberations of the Supply Council, Chau Thanh District, Binh Duong Province, January 1967.
Document No. 4. October. 8pp.
Consists of the minutes of a meeting of the standing committee of the Chau Thanh District VC Supply Council, captured by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Highlights the civilian support of VC units operating in the Iron Triangle and problems encountered when this support breaks down. The minutes focus on operational errors, bad morale, lack of party leadership, and effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities as reasons for this breakdown.

0173 Repressing Counter-Revolutionaries: The Viet Cong System of Punishment.
Document No. 5. October. 10pp.
Consists of a December 24, 1965, directive issued by the headquarters of the VC's Military Region 5, responsible for operations in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. This document was captured by U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division on October 3, 1966. This directive defines the policy for repression of counter-revolutionaries, or those who actively oppose VC efforts to gain control of South Vietnam, by methods ranging from assassination to thought reform. It reviews past policy shortcomings, and prescribes the desired methods for carrying out punishment policy in both GVN and VC areas of control.

0183 The People's Revolutionary Party in Rural Areas.
Illustrates the experiences of the PRP in the operation of the party infrastructure in rural areas. This document was promulgated by the Current Affairs Section, COSVN, on August 18, 1966 and was intended as a policy paper for study by village and hamlet PRP members on improvement of relations with the indigenous population. It was captured during Operation CEDAR FALLS on January 12, 1967.

0193 Religious Problems in North Viet-Nam.
Document No. 7. October. 10pp.
Consists of an article published in Hoc Tap, a journal of the Vietnamese Workers Party, outlining North Vietnam's policy toward religion. It highlights the problem of religious dissidence and the need to "use fully the power of the State machine" to counter this dissidence.
The Position of North Viet-Nam on Negotiations.
Excerpts from DRV statements concerning negotiation efforts. In addition, the excerpts highlight the use of negotiations for propaganda and political warfare purposes, especially against the American soldier and public, and world opinion. North Vietnam's "fighting and negotiating" strategy is described.

Political Program of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front.
Unnumbered. October. 40pp.
This report consists of three documents. The first, entitled Background to a Manifesto, highlights the NLF's current aims and ostensible plans for the future and its formula for "national salvation," with the VC's "three-pronged" tactics of combining political struggle, mass proselytizing, and military struggle. The second and third documents consist of the texts of the NLF political programs for 1967 and 1960, respectively.

"The Same Historical Chain"—"Forward under the Glorious Banner of the October Revolution."
Text of an article by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee, VWP, congratulating the USSR on the 50th anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution. Highlights the triumph of Soviet communism with special reference to its influence on the development of Vietnamese communism. Much of the text is a doctrinaire review of history, but it also sets forth North Vietnam's concept of its role in world communism. This article was broadcast by Radio Hanoi and disseminated in English by the Viet-Nam News Agency's International Service on November 4.

From Poetry to Reality: A North Vietnamese Soldier's Notebook.
Consists of a pocket-sized notebook captured by the 3d Marine Division in Quang Tri Province on October 11. This notebook belonged to an unnamed NVA soldier that infiltrated South Vietnam across the Ben Hai River. The notebook entries highlight Vietnamese renditions of common U.S. military commands, a personnel and weapons list, and diary entries regarding the soldier's mental attitudes on the war.

Viet Cong Youth Activities.
Insight into the VC system of youth organization is given in this captured document of two handwritten circular letters from a Binh Dinh provincial district Youth Group to the executive committees of subordinate chapters. These circulars outline a plan to organize village and hamlet youth for suicidal terrorist and paramilitary operations. This document was captured by the 1st Air Cavalry Division, operating in the east central part of Binh Dinh Province, in June.

Pacification and the Viet Cong Reaction.
Picture of pacification in a rural area as seen through VC eyes. Consists of a letter from a VC agent, operating in Phu Yen Province, to a superior officer and friend in the provincial VC infrastructure. It describes the effects of pacification on the VCI in the Song Cau District, including the defection to the GVN of numbers of village and hamlet guerrillas, and proposes assassination as method to regain control of the situation.

1968
“Out of Rice, Ammunition, and Bandages:” Notes of a VC Veteran.
Provides insight into the ebb and flow of advance and retreat, of success and failure, of rest and hardship in a VC battalion. This diary highlights the experiences of a combat-trained NVA medical corpsman operating in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces during campaigns in 1965 and 1966. All excerpts are direct quotations in translation from the Vietnamese.

NLF Thoughts on Peace Negotiations, World Policies—A Cadre’s Notes on a High Level Reorientation Course.
Records guidance given in a 1967 reorientation course to party personnel of VC Military Region 4 [Saigon area] on the thoughts of the NLF pertaining to peace negotiations and world opinion, and the “fighting while negotiating” policy. In addition, highlights include comments on the Sino-Soviet Crisis, pacification, and reaffirmation of the “three-pronged” strategy. This document was captured by the U.S. 199th Light Infantry Brigade during operations in Hau Nghia Province in July 1967.

Troop Training and Combat Competition Campaign—An Emulation Plan.
Describes an emulation campaign outlined in a directive prepared for the NVA Second Division, with an endorsement from the headquarters of the 64th Regiment, a subordinate element of the division. Emulation is one of the methods employed by Communist organizations to strengthen the conviction of their followers and to publicize the feats of heroes of the movement. NVA and VC units used this method to mold close-knit organization, raise morale of the individual soldier, and foster combat effectiveness. This document was captured by an element of the 3d Marine Division during operations in Quang Nam Province on May 6, 1967.

The Problems of a Dispensary.
Extracts from three captured documents attesting to the low morale, rice shortage, and lack of medical supplies afflicting a VC dispensary in Quang Nam Province in the midst of a U.S. and Allied ground operation. The documents were captured by the 198th Light Infantry Brigade in Quang Ngai Province on November 27, 1967.

“Rice Tassels and Potato Rows:” Viet Cong Goals for Production.
Commentary highlighting the NLF desire to increase agricultural output, agricultural tax collection, growing substitutes for rice, more women and children to participate in order to offset manpower shortage, and austerity measures. In addition, economic and logistical problems and loss of control over population and territory are discussed. This commentary was broadcast in Vietnamese by NLF Liberation Radio as a follow-up to an appeal for support of the 1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign.

Sharpening the Third Prong: An Increase of Viet Cong Proselytizing.
Highlights a directive drafted by the Military and Enemy Proselytizing Section of a Quang Ngai provincial district headquarters outlining the objectives and requirements of the proselytizing program for the 1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign. Proselytizing, part of the NLF’s “three-pronged” strategy, was a psychological warfare technique employed by the VC in an attempt to create discord and disaffection among target audiences. Primary targets were military personnel of the RVN Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces and GVN civil government officials and representatives. This document was captured by the U.S. 4th Infantry Division in early 1968 during operations in Quang Ngai Province.
0352 Self-Criticism: Report from a North Vietnamese Division.


Analyzes the political and ideological situation in several battalions of the NVA 3rd Division following operations against the U.S. and ROK forces in Binh Dinh Province. This is an example of the self-criticism encouraged in Communist ranks for the conditioning of troops and party members. This document was captured by the 1st Air Cavalry Division on January 10, 1968.


0372 Organizations and Committees Formed by the Viet Cong during the 1968 Lunar New Year Offensive.


Lists and describes the various united front creations following the early successes of the Tet Offensive. As an example of the VC's political struggle program, these organizations were designed to expand the popular support for the NLF and advance a general uprising in urban and rural areas. These organizations are subdivided into four categories: uprising committees; proselytizing organizations; political alliances; and territorial administrative organizations.

0380 "Time Opportunity:" The Uprising Appeal of Viet Cong Leaflets.


Sample collection of propaganda leaflets disseminated during the Tet Offensive emphasizing the theme that it was "now or never" for the revolutionary uprising. These leaflets use the phrase "thoi coi," which translates literally as "time opportunity." This phrase is generally taken to mean "the historically decisive moment—the time period in which a long sought opportunity may become reality and this opportunity must be grasped for it may never return."

0396 Viet Cong Political Geography.


Reproduces outline maps showing military regions and provinces under the VC military and political system. In addition, there are descriptions of the different military and administrative systems and organizations in the provinces, regions, and special zones. Compiled by Albert E. Palmerlee and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from captured documents in 1967.

0406 Women in the Winter-Spring Campaign.


Outlines the tasks assigned by the Current Affairs Committee of the Women's Liberation Association of Binh Dinh Province, in support of the upcoming Winter-Spring Campaign. Women were called upon for front line combat duty, rear service operations, welfare work among soldiers' dependents, and propaganda, proselytizing and indoctrination activities.
The Quang Da Farmers' Association: A Provincial Activity Plan.
Outlines the activity plan for the Farmers Association of Quang Nam Province [Quang Da on VC maps] for the Winter-Spring Campaign. This plan calls for expanded agricultural output and food support of VC troops.
The Farmers' Liberation Association is considered the linch-pin for the NLF in rural areas. This organization serves the NLF as a conduit for educating the rural population in VC ideology and NLF policies. In addition, it acts as an agency for manpower recruitment and procurement of supplies. This report highlights the expectations of the NLF for the rural population in support of the Winter-Spring Campaign. This document was captured by the U.S. 1st Marine Division in Quang Nam Province.

Comprises the text of radio broadcast from Hanoi, in Vietnamese, regarding a decree passed by the DRV's National Assembly Standing Committee Secretariat outlining punishment for counterrevolutionary crimes in all of Vietnam.

Document No. 27. April. 6pp.
Describes offensive operations of the K2 Battalion of the NVA 9th Division in the vicinity of Phu Loi Base and Phu Huu Hamlet [Binh Duong Province] against U.S. and ARVN forces February 1–2. This document describes the pre-operation preparations, actions from the time of contact, lessons learned, and results. It was captured by an element of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division on February 28.

“The Decisive Hour:” Two Directives for Tet.
Consists of two directives outlining the preparation for the upcoming offensive and treatment of the populace in occupied or "liberated" areas. The first directive, promulgated by a PRP Provincial Standing Committee to subordinate district committees [possibly in Binh Dinh Province], exhorts VC and party members to prepare for the Winter-Spring Campaign, including forming suicide groups and conducting terrorist activities. The second directive, captured in the My Tho area, provides guidance on how troops should behave in the anticipated attack and occupation of cities and towns.

After Tet: Three Viet Cong Assessments.
Consists of three sample analyses of the Tet Offensive from the VC perspective. These assess the successes and failures and recommend actions to overcome the setbacks suffered. The first document, which was captured in Bien Hoa Province during March, contains a critique of VC units in that area and highlights military and political successes and failures. The second document is a circular issued by the PRP Standing Committee of Can Tho Province [Phong Dinh Province] outlining the post-Tet mission of VC units active in a Mekong Delta province. The third document is a political and proselytizing directive, disseminated in Hau Nghia Province, urging greater emphasis on the political struggle and on attempts to inspire U.S. and Allied troops to desert.

Analysis of North Vietnam's emphasis on economic decentralization, buildup of local industry and agriculture, and effective utilization of manpower, by Premier Pham Van Dong. Published in Hoc Tap, the theoretical journal of the VWP.
“The Party in Command:” Political Organization and the Viet Cong Armed Forces.
Document No. 34. May. 19pp.
Describes the intricate COSVN politico-military organization and its evolution from notes taken at a COSVN training conference and captured by ARVN forces in VC Military Region 3, during late 1967. Highlights include the party’s leadership over the armed forces; civil versus military problems; political commissar activities; and leadership of the operations committee of the provincial and district military commands.

“People’s Revolutionary Councils” in Rural Areas.
Directive issued by the VC High Command, the Standing Committee of the COSVN, emphasizing the political administrative organization at the local level in rural areas. This directive outlines instructions for creation and composition of People’s Liberation Councils and Committees. This document was captured March 5 by a unit of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia Province.

North Vietnam’s Role in the South.
Two papers outlining the presence of NVA units in South Vietnam and enumerating increases in Sino-Soviet war material being shipped to the South. The first paper was submitted by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman to DRV representatives in Paris at the May 27 meeting. The second paper, compiled from captured documents, intelligence briefs, and interrogation reports, also outlines the NVA presence in the South. These papers trace the buildup of NVA forces and supplies in the South, beginning after the 1954 Geneva Conference, and the escalation of the North’s war efforts and control in the South. Political activities are also discussed.

The Sixth Resolution, Central Office of South Viet-Nam.
Assesses the results of the Tet Offensive against South Vietnamese urban areas and outlines the immediate mission to continue the political and military struggle by whatever means necessary, including assassination. In addition, the text highlights methods by which COSVN will strengthen discipline and confidence of the party leadership and outlines the uprising policy.

Indoctrination Notes on Peace Talks: A Call for “Violent Revolution” to the End.
Consists of a set of notes taken during a political indoctrination course given for NVA troops. Highlights include reinforcement of the fighting while negotiating strategy; concern that peace talks will cause troops to develop “peace illusions”; and desire to increase combat activities. This document was captured by the 1st Marine Division in Quang Nam Province on June 11.

The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN).
Details the evolution, responsibility, leadership, and political and military organization of the highest level of the insurgent infrastructure in South Vietnam. This document was compiled from various captured documents by Albert E. Palmerlee for the use of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

The Leadership of the National Liberation Front.
Document No. 41. August. 5pp.
Listing of NLF leadership positions and incumbents. Compiled from a variety of sources, including Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi broadcasts, interrogation reports, and intelligence briefs.
Political Program of the Viet-Nam Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces.
Document No. 42. September. 7pp.
Liberation Radio broadcast text outlining the political program of the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces [ANDPF], a united front organization. The program describes three principal points: national salvation, national reconstruction, and national reunification.

Friction between Northern and Southern Vietnamese: Directives Urge Standing “Shoulder-to-Shoulder with Our Kith-and-Kin Brothers.”
Document Nos. 43–44. September. 8pp.
These two documents reveal the nature and extent of friction and discord between NVA troops and VC units, and efforts to alleviate this problem. The first document is a directive published by the Standing Committee of B1 [code name for COSVN Military Region Headquarters] on December 20, 1967 that stresses that it is the duty of the people to extend assistance and protection to northerners and calls for increased political and ideological indoctrination. This document was captured in Phuoc Long Province by the 101st Airborne Division on April 26.
The second directive, issued on June 2 by the South Vietnam Liberation Army Military Affairs Party Committee, cites that friction remains prevalent in the South Vietnam Liberation Army [VC] and treatment of NVA troops along infiltration routes must be improved. This document was captured by the U.S. 9th Infantry Division on August 8 in Gia Dinh Province.

Begins with NLF definitions of independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality and continues with an outline of the doctrinal theory of the General Offensive-General Uprising. Highlights include the theoretical basis for coordinating the military and political struggles; establishment of a National Democratic Coalition Government; strengthening the ideological requirements for victory; and an analysis of the situation as it was expected to develop in the Saigon-Cholon area. This document was captured on May 22, 1968, by a unit of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division in Bien Hoa Province.

On Political and Ideological Indoctrination against Desertion and Surrender.
Document No. 46. October. 7pp.
Describes the existence of severe morale problems in some VC units and introduces an activity plan for increased political and ideological indoctrination. Circulated to units of the Dong Nai Regiment, this document begins with praise, cites possible causes for low morale, and finally details a plan for enhancing the ideological commitment of individual soldiers and the proper discharge of the responsibilities of leadership. This document was captured by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division in Binh Duong Province on September 9.

“People’s Revolutionary Administrations:” A Progress Report.
Progress report on the organizational activity on the Sub-Region level. This document, a directive issued by the Current Affairs Committee of T3 [Sub-Region 3], outlines the effort to build “revolutionary” administrations at all organizational levels, the composition and functions of local administrations, and reasons for slow progress in the establishment of local “revolutionary” administrative units. This document was captured by elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division on September 10, 1968, during operations in the Mekong Delta area.
North Viet-Nam's New Food Policy.

Outlines the goals, requirements, and administration of the food policy adopted by the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee, VWP on June 8. Highlights include efforts to redress the balance between production capabilities and requirements; increased planning and organization of circulation, distribution, and consumption; management unification and distribution activities of state and agricultural cooperatives; and abolishment of free market enterprise. Translation from an article in *Hoc Tap*, journal of the VWP, August 1968.

1969

Viet Cong Economic and Financial Missions in One Province.
Provides an appreciation of the nature of the missions and operations of the Binh Dinh Provincial Finance and Economy Section, a subsection of the COSVN infrastructure. This resolution outlines the present situation, various missions, and organizational efforts to achieve the desired results in the last months of 1968. Missions include agricultural production; self-sufficiency; financial, including taxation; food procurement; trade and business transactions; and training and improvement of technical skills. This document was captured by the ROK Capital Infantry Division.

Index of Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, and Other Publications of the North Vietnam Affairs Division, JUSPAO.

“Let Us Be Grateful to Karl Marx and Follow the Path Traced by Him.”
Consists of a review of the career and doctrines of Karl Marx and explores the question of how the Lao Dong Party has applied Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam. This speech by North Vietnam's party theoretician, Truong Chinh, was delivered on the 150th birthday of Karl Marx and was broadcasted by Radio Hanoi to all of Vietnam. Highlights include Truong Chinh's views on the application of Marx's teachings to the present and future conditions in North and South Vietnam; agrarian reforms; strengthening of the party's political base; and a rejection of the all-out offensive strategy, with the Tet 1968 offensive as an example.

An Activities Plan for Village Revolutionary Administration.
Document No. 52. February. 9pp.
Outlines the specific tasks to be undertaken by the functional offices of a village “revolutionary” administration upon occupation by the VC. They include tasks capable of being performed immediately, such as the consolidation of village military commands to improve combat efficiency and defense and levying of taxes, and longer term projects such as teacher training and construction of schools, houses, and hospitals. This document was issued on October 13, 1968, and appears to have originated from the My Tho Provincial Unit. It was captured by elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division.
Frame No.

Enumerates the tasks that need to be carried out to meet the demands of the war, increase agricultural and industrial production, expand communications and transportation system, and plan for the post-war period. This document appeared as an article by Nguyen Van Dai, vice chairman of the State Planning Commission, for broadcast by Radio Hanoi’s Domestic Service on January 17.

0722 “Make the Religion-Proselytizing Task a Routine Activity:” A Plan for One District.
Document No. 54. March. 9pp.
Outlines the plan for establishment of a religion-proselytizing subsection within a district organization [in Binh Dinh Province] and defines its task. The mission of this subsection is to expand activities to municipalities, towns, and hinterlands, and at the same time establish and expand agent networks in religious organizations, propagandize adherents, and use appropriate measures to retain support. This document was captured by a unit of the ROK’s Capital Infantry Division in Binh Dinh Province on January 10.

0731 A COSVN Directive for Eliminating Contacts with Puppet Personnel and Other “Complex Problems.”
Highlights the campaign for “motivating the masses” to continue supporting the VC cause by highlighting the various problems of defections, carelessness of security, misconduct, and “reactionary” tendencies. The campaign is outlined in a directive from the Current Affairs Committee of Sub-Region 3 of the COSVN, dated October 15, 1968. This document was captured by the U.S. 9th Infantry Division on November 20, 1968, in Long An Province.

0741 “It Is Better to Return Home and Cultivate the Land Than to Join the Revolutionary Army.” Reports on Desertion and Recruitment.
Conveys increasing incidence of desertion, particularly from provincial and higher units, the effect the deserters’ actions and words have upon recruitment problems, and lack of effective political and ideological indoctrination. The documents, dated July 13, 1968, and titled “The Status of Deserters” and “Situation of Strength Building,” are presumed to have been compiled by a district-level VC unit for submission to its next higher command. These documents were captured in Binh Dinh Province on January 1 by the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade.

0749 Self-Sufficiency: A Duty of Cadre and Combatant.
Illustrates the VC’s concern for food supplies by requiring combat and support units to become self-sufficient in food production. The first document, a circular dated November 25, 1968, and issued by the Coordination and Operation Section of a Dinh Tuong provincial unit, highlights self-sufficiency as a major policy of the party and prescribes self-sufficiency quotas for various provincial agencies and units according to function. It was captured in Dinh Tuong Province on January 8, 1969. The second document, a directive, was issued by the Commander of Unit 206 on November 29, 1968. It highlights the desire to comply with higher headquarters’ demands for self-sufficiency and requires certain units to act as “farmers.” This document was captured in Kontum Province on January 7, 1969.
**Provisional Revolutionary Government: The Broadcast Record.**
Document No. 60. June. 20pp.
Highlights the organization, structure, and membership of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam [PRG]. This document consists of texts of announcements by Liberation Radio on June 10.

**"Decisive Victory:" Step by Step, Bit by Bit.**
COSVN's interpretation, in the light of its doctrines, of the cessation of bombing in the North, the Paris Conference, and announced readiness of the U.S. to withdraw troops. These documents intimate that these developments are ingredients in the forthcoming "decisive victory" that will be completed by intensifying the military, political, and troop proselytizing attacks. Both documents foreshadow offensives to be launched in the summer of 1969. The first document, a circular issued by a Current Affairs Committee [possibly for Sub-Region 1] of COSVN was captured by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division in Binh Duong Province on March 1. The second document, leaves from the notebook of an unidentified District Party Committee member, was captured by the U.S. 9th Infantry Division on May 11 in Dinh Tuong Province.

**Truong Chinh: "Weaknesses, Shortcomings, and Mistakes" in Agricultural Cooperatives.**
Speech of Truong Chinh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and leading theoretician, before the Conference of Vinh Phu Province cadres on November 6, 1968. It reviews the situation of agricultural cooperativization in North Vietnam, criticizes deficiencies in the cooperative movement in Vinh Phu Province, and recommends ways of overcoming the deficiencies and mismanagement. This speech was published in the party newspaper *Nhan Dan* on January 29 and 30.

**Summer 1969: A Viet Cong Study of the Situation and Prospects.**
Document No. 64. July. 11pp.
Provides an assessment of the "revolutionary" situation in South Vietnam and highlights the principles and characteristics of the General Offensive-General Uprising. This document was issued by an unspecified command agency, presumably the South Vietnam Liberation Army, and captured by a unit of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division in the III CTZ.

**Hanoi's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): A Background Paper.**
Details the history, organization, structure, mission, and membership of the organization controlling and coordinating all political and military activities in the southern half of South Vietnam at the behest of the Politburo of North Vietnam's Lao Dong Party.

**COSVN Resolution No. 9.**
Details the resolution adopted by the Ninth Conference of COSVN held in early July. It reviews all aspects of the war situation and sets forth the mission, direction, and major operations designed to advance the General Offensive—General Uprising strategy. It also highlights the doctrine of "decisive victory" leading to realization of the "revolutionary" objectives of independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality.
Public Presentation of U.S. Prisoners of War.
Document No. 65. August. 8pp.
Reports how two captured soldiers were put on public display by their Communist
captors in order "to arouse a high degree of hatred among the masses." This doc-
ument was prepared by the Enemy/Civilian Proselytizing Section of the Political
Department of the Zone, and describes the purposes and preparations for the event,
the systematic exposure of the prisoners in circumstances calculated to induce the
maximum reaction on the part of the populace, and a critique of the entire atrocious
exhibition. This document was captured by the RVN 21st Infantry Division on
December 31, 1968, in the IV CTZ.

The Death and Funeral of Ho Chi Minh: The Broadcast Record.
Consists of the texts of various Viet-Nam News Agency reports and broadcasts by
Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi announcing the illness, death, funeral arrange-
ments, receipts of condolence messages, appeals and responses from "Uncle Ho's"
followers, accounts of rites and ceremonies, and lists of delegations to the funeral.

An Elaboration of the Eighth Resolution of the Central Office of South Vietnam.
Incomplete text of a speech by a spokesman for the COSVN to key cadre at the end
of a four-day political reorientation meeting reiterating support for a political, military,
and doctrinal resolution adopted by the Eighth Conference of the COSVN. This
document presents an elaboration of the basic policy of "fighting a strong enemy with a
weak force, anticipating the possible expansion of the war, and expecting a protracted
war will have definite transitional phases." This document was captured by a U.S.
military unit operating in the IV CTZ in November 1968.

The Impact of the Sapper on the Vietnam War: A Background Paper.
Unnumbered. October. 18pp.
Analyzes the development and significance of the apparent increase in sapper
units, their activities in South Vietnam since mid-1968, and of sapper forces and their
impact on the war. This paper was compiled from captured documents, interrogation
reports, and intelligence briefs.

The New Statute on Agricultural Cooperatives in the Context of the Agricultural
Unnumbered. October. 27pp.
Consists of an introductory analysis and historical sketch of North Vietnam's
agricultural and cooperativization policies and translations of three documents related
to the new statute. These documents include a digest of the new statute; an appeal
by Ho Chi Minh; and an analysis of the new statute that appeared in the August 1969
issue of Tuyen-Huan [Propaganda-Training], the monthly journal of the propaganda
cadres whose mission it was to disseminate and explain the new statute.
Two Speeches by General Vo Nguyen Giap.

Two speeches, disseminated by the Hanoi Domestic Service in June and August, by General Vo Nguyen Giap, minister of defense of North Vietnam and commander-in-chief of the VPA. The first, delivered to a congress of antiaircraft and air forces and the second, before the Third Military Sector cadre, stresses the need for an all-out preparation for continued political and military conflict and outlines measures needed for the rebuilding and continued "socialist construction" of local military and political forces. References are made to the bombing halt, Paris Peace Talks, and the de-Americanization of the war.

Truong Chinh's Speech on the 15th Anniversary of the Bai Anh Viet-Nam.

Commemorates the anniversary of North Vietnam's only pictorial magazine and provides a platform for raising the call to improve the magazine due to its growing importance in propaganda activities abroad.

1970


Article written by General Vo Nguyen Giap, minister of defense of North Vietnam and commander-in-chief of the VPA, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the VPA and in preparation of the party's 40th anniversary. It systematically and comprehensively deals with the party's military theory, strategy, and tactics, with a minimum of propaganda content. Emphasis is on flexibility and creativity in conducting operations and reviews the party's policy of a protracted people's war, "of fighting strength with weakness," and "fighting many with few."

Under the Party's Banner, Vietnam's Military Art Has Constantly Developed and Triumphed.

Article composed by Colonel General Van Tien Dung, VPA Chief of Staff, commemorating the VPA's 25th anniversary. It discusses military strategy, methods, and tactics, and avoids the dogmatic formulations of strategies focusing on "passing through distinct phases." Emphasis is on flexibility in planning and conducting the struggle, supporting the strategy of a prolonged, comprehensive people's war, and the combination of guerrilla and big-unit warfare.

Party Leadership Is the Cause of the Growth and Victories of Our Army.

Article written by Lieutenant General Song Hao, chairman of the VPA's General Political Department, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the VPA. This article focuses on the party's leadership of military matters. It emphasizes the ideological education of the army, the army as a tool of the party, and the formation and development of the people's war, particularly the importance of equipment and techniques.
0393 **Ideological Deficiencies and Lowered Combat Effectiveness.**
Document No. 73. February. 12pp.
Contains a catalog of psychological and ideological "shortcomings" presented in the form of a directive, issued on October 1, 1969, by the commander of Unit 591, a military command of a Nong Truong [literally translated as a "farm site" but used as a cover for designating an NVA regiment or division]. These shortcomings include low morale, fear of hardships, surrendering and informing on comrades, self-inflicted wounds, and a general lack of "fighting spirit" and are attributable to poor leadership. Increased political and ideological education and indoctrination are given as remedies for the above shortcomings. This document was captured by a U.S. military unit in II CTZ on October 6, 1969.

0405 **"Vietnamization [of the War:]...The Path Leading to Collapse [of Neocolonialism in South Viet-Nam]."**
Document No. 74. February. 34pp.
Commentary on the Nixon administration's plan for Vietnamization of the war, broadcasted by Liberation Radio on December 14, 1969. The commentary characterizes the plan as "acceptance by the U.S. of its defeat in Vietnam," and predicts the "complete failure of U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam." Highlights include dogmatic discussions on replacement of U.S. military forces with those of the GVN, strengthening of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's administration, and the alleged economic developments in South Vietnam.

0439 **Index of Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, and Other Publications of the North Vietnam Affairs Division, JUSPAO.**
Document No. 75. March. 9pp.
Lists document number, title, and total pages for documents numbers 1–74, unnumbered publications, and an addenda listing documents 76–93.

0448 **Forty Years of Party Activity.**
Details the history of the party from its point of view. Published in pamphlet form by the Historical Research Department of the party and serialized in official party newspaper *Nhan Dan [The People]* in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Lao Dong Party. This history contains no significant doctrinal revision of the 1960 history entitled *Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party*. In addition, this report contains two other items of collateral interest: a review of *Forty Years of Party Activity* and a chronology entitled *Landmarks in the Party's History*. These two articles appeared in the February 2 edition of Viet-Nam Courier, an official English language weekly for foreign audiences.

0581 **Under the Glorious Party Banner for Independence, Freedom and Socialism, Let Us Advance and Achieve New Victories.**
Written by Le Duan, Party First Secretary, to commemorate the party's 40th anniversary, it analyzes the "great problems, essential tasks, principles and methods of the Vietnamese Revolution." Published by *Nhan Dan [The People]*, the official VWP newspaper, cadre and party members were encouraged to study this article in order to "correctly teach" the party's line and policies. Le Duan details various aspects of the Vietnamese Revolution and emphasizes the need for flexibility and pragmatism. Highlights include discussions of united front policy, revolutionary methods, class struggle, the "Southern Revolution," economic, industrial, and agricultural problems and policies, and party leadership.
An Analysis, for Propaganda Cadres, of Le Duan's "Under the Glorious Party Banner..."
"Instruction on propaganda studies and activities to help in the study of Le Duan's work." Published in the March and April editions of Tuyen Huan [Propaganda-Training], the journal for propaganda cadres.

Document No. 78. May. 41pp.
Consists of two articles highlighting the new objectives and examples of the 1970 State Plan. The first article, entitled "Struggle for the Successful Fulfillment of the 1970 State Plan" and appearing in the January issue of Hoc Tap [Study], outlines the objectives of the new state plan. These objectives include increase in agricultural and consumer goods production; increase in heavy industry; implementation of spiritual and material incentives; and support of the "productive labor movement." The second article, entitled "Hanoi's 1970 Plan for Economic Construction and Cultural Development," published by Hanoi Moi [New Hanoi], presents in detail the 1970 state plan for the Hanoi area.

Vietnamese Communists Observe Lenin Centenary: A Le Duan Article and a Truong Chinh Address.
Consists of two documents, the first being Le Duan's assessment of the work of V. I. Lenin and an expression of the party's gratitude for Soviet support of the Vietnamese Revolution. This assessment was published in the Soviet theoretical journal, Kommunist, and consisted of a longer version of Party Secretary Le Duan's speech in Moscow during the Soviet observance of V. I. Lenin's birth on April 22. The second document consists of the remarks of Truong Chinh during Hanoi's Lenin celebrations eulogizing V. I. Lenin, linking Soviet and Vietnamese Communist struggles by citing Ho Chi Minh as Lenin's pupil, and paying tribute to Stalinism. In addition, his speech provides an analysis of the Vietnamese Revolution in Leninist theory, international Communist history, and the current Indochinese scene.

Highlights the initiative by Prince Norodom Sihanouk for a conference of all Indochinese peoples' organizations and outlines the activities and results of the conference. The conference was attended by representatives from North Vietnam, the NLF and PRG, the Lao Patriotic Front [Pathet Lao], and a Cambodian delegation headed by Prince Sihanouk. Chinese and Soviet governments lent moral support to the conference and its activities. This report consists of the texts of speeches, communiqués, and expressions of support from the USSR and the PRC.

The Viet Cong Infrastructure: A Background Paper.
Details the organization, structure, and operations of the VC political infrastructure [VCI] in its efforts to control the population in South Vietnam. The text is a translation of a GVN publication prepared to assist local government officials in assessing VC activity in their areas.


Analyzes Resolution No. 14, emanating from the Current Affairs Committee of the COSVN, regarding the poor performance of the NVA and VC during the 1969 Autumn Campaign. This directive emphasizes the need for intensified guerrilla warfare activities by military and political cadres and improvement of the coordination of local party and military leadership throughout South Vietnam. This directive is an implementing document and supports COSVN No. 9 (Reel 1, frame 0846).

Reel 3

1970 cont.


Document No. 82. August. 19pp.

Analysis of the NVA/VC 1969 Autumn Campaign, compiled by the Standing Committee of COSVN. The content alternates between self-commendation and self-criticism. Highlights poor leadership as a leading cause for poor results; exhorts party cadres and soldiers to follow COSVN Resolution No. 14 (Reel 2, frame 0994) by intensifying and strengthening the guerrilla warfare movement during the General Offensive–General Uprising stage; and cites political reorientation of the party and its adherents as a necessity for carrying the war into urban areas.

Pham Van Dong's Speech on the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [National Day Speech].


Describes the August Revolution and the founding of the DRV, the Viet Minh War [against the French], reiterates the need for the continued "building of socialism in the North," and discusses the U.S. peace movement and the U.S. government's continued unpopular support of the South Vietnamese "puppet" government. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's speech reinforces the national policy position outlined in Party Secretary Le Duan's speech of February 1970 (Document No. 77, Reel 2, frame 0708).


Document No. 84. September. 133pp.

Published by the Viet-Nam News Agency, this document and its appendices provide a detailed chronology of the evolution of North Vietnamese communism and the establishment, organization, and development of the DRV. In addition, this chronology corrects errors in earlier party histories.


Texts of radio and press reports on the various National Day celebrations. In addition, there are comments regarding the DRV's support of the NLF in South Vietnam, and the Laotian and Cambodian Fronts.
Provides the texts of several South Vietnamese Communist messages to the DRV leadership and some reports of the observances in the "liberated zones" of South Vietnam. Highlights include condemnation of the GVN's pacification program; Nambo Resistance Day declaration; expressions of admiration for the DRV; and pledges of support of revolutionary movements in Laos and Cambodia.

Developing Vietnamese Military Science: An Address by General Vo Nguyen Giap.
Introduces a Central Military Party Committee resolution on tasks related to military science and announces the decision to establish a Military Science Organ and a Military Science Council. The address indicates that the creation of these military bodies is due to the expansion of the war into Cambodia and increased activities in Laos and will "help the Central Military Party Committee by organizing a distribution of labor, coordination, and an exchange of experiences among the various branches and echelons." This address was delivered before an All-Army Conference on Military Science on October 29.

The Viet Cong's March-April 1970 Plans for Expanding Control In Cambodia: A Documentary Record.
Consists of a collection of ten captured documents highlighting the importance the VC attached to the Cambodian bases, their intention of using them in an upcoming offensive operation planned for spring 1970, and their reaction to the new political situation brought about by the Cambodian National Assembly's creation of a government unwilling to sanction continued Vietnamese Communist violation of Cambodian neutrality.

The "Local Military Task" in North Vietnam.
Document No. 89. February. 45pp.
Outlines a report by Major General Nguyen Don on a Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee resolution regarding efforts to ensure a constant flow of manpower to the regular army and to establish increased control over all aspects of North Vietnamese life through general militarization of the populace.

Details the establishment and organization of the Public Security Sector and the People's Police force in North Vietnam. Highlights include a 1962 order establishing the tasks of the People's Police; address commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Public Security Sector's establishment; press commentaries on activities of the People's Security Forces; description of the South Vietnamese People's Liberation Security Forces; and a directive outlining the development of Armed Security Forces in South Vietnam.
The 19th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers Party and Its Reference Documents.
Documents highlighting the activities and results of the 19th Plenary Session, including analysis of the war situation; discussion of the 1971 State Plan; reiteration of the party's political and ideological line; DRV support of the Southern Revolution and the NLF-PRG; and responses from the NLF-PRG to the DRV support.

Five captured documents highlighting the effects of an unsuccessful campaign, loss of key cadre on the district and village levels, and the slow recruitment of personnel in Sub-Region 5. The documents stress the importance of the reindoctrination of COSVN No. 9, highlight the sub-region's military activity plan and its faults, and exhort the soldiers to an increased effort by providing more leadership understanding of offensive campaign problems.

Viet Cong Political Geography of South Vietnam.
Provides an up-to-date understanding, description, and history of the VC/NVA military-political geography of South Vietnam. Emphasis is upon showing the VC’s restructuring of its administrative subdivisions to provide maneuver space for tactical units, and to facilitate control of area commands that support their politico-military operations.

Ideological Problems within the People’s Liberation Armed Forces.
Document No. 94. May. 64pp.
Full text of a Liberation Radio broadcast in April of an article by Cuu Long [pseudonym of Major General Tran Do] highlighting the problem and result of poor political indoctrination and ideological education. Low morale and lack of “revolutionary commitment” are also attributed to food and medical shortages, logistical problems, lack of secure rear areas, and increased demands on the indigenous populace by VC/NVA leaders. Reorientation of indoctrination and education efforts is suggested to counter ideological problems.

Reel 4

1971 cont.

The DRV Elects Its Fourth National Assembly, Part I.
Provides background on the National Assembly, North Vietnam’s “highest representative organ of the people,” and a record of the elections as reported by the DRV press and broadcast media. Highlights include articles of the DRV constitution pertaining to elections, the National Election Law, election procedures, and accomplishments of the National Assembly.

The DRV Elects Its Fourth National Assembly, Part II.
Document No. 95 (Part II). June. 93pp.
Highlights include activities of the Third Legislature pertaining to the Southern Deputies, the PRG, and the war situation; the nominating process; campaigns in Hanoi and the provinces; and the results.
The Vietnam Workers' Party's 1963 Decision to Escalate the War in the South.


Consists of the VWP Central Committee resolution of December 1963 formally authorizing an increase in North Vietnam's presence in the south for 1964 and subsequent years. The decision to formulate this resolution was taken by the South Vietnamese military after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem's government and his death. The instability following Diem's overthrow was thought to be an opportune time to attempt an expanded military conquest of South Vietnam. This resolution "clarifies the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam," provides "guidelines and missions in order to attain victory," advances possible U.S. reactions, and highlights the coordination of the political and military struggle and the culmination of the General Offensive-General Uprising. The resolution also outlines the tactics, discipline, and organization of military forces and the political hierarchy, and describes the "mission of North Viet-Nam."

Appended are the texts of a January 21, 1964, Nhan Dan editorial commenting on the Ninth Session and speech by First Secretary Le Duan printed in Hoc Tap.

Communist "Repression" in South Vietnam, Part I.


Examines one of the means of "revolutionary violence" (an integral part of Communist strategy) called "repression" or political violence. The other means is military violence or combat. This report highlights the rationale and methods for the use of repression, including assassination, to "demoralize the enemy, sow dissension and confusion, limit their activities, and create enthusiasm among the revolutionary people." Hundreds of captured documents, referring to security and security problems, were examined and a representative number have been included in this report. These range from a directive from the DRV Ministry of Public Security to an individual death warrant and show the continuity of VC policy and its application.

Communist "Repression" in South Vietnam, Part II.

Document No. 97 (Part II). August. 120pp.

Continues examination of representative captured documents on security and security problems and application of repression or political violence (see above).


Detailed examination of a resolution approved by the Ninth Conference of the VWP Central Committee during December 1963, highlighting the ideological "malaise" within the International Communist Movement, stemming from the Sino-Soviet Crisis, and its effects on the Vietnamese revolutionary line. This report consists of the resolution text and examines the political setting for its promulgation and subsequent implementation. This "political setting" is a speech by General Vo Nguyen Giap regarding national defense and buildup of the People's armed forces, a joint statement by PRC Party Chairman Liu Shao-chi and President Ho Chi Minh regarding international relations and support, and the broadcast record and reporting on the activities of the VWP delegation to the USSR and President Ho Chi Minh.
The Study of COSVN Resolution 10.

COSVN Directive No. 01/CT 71, a study guide and summary of Resolution 10, highlights the continuing General Offensive—General Uprising, stated as beginning with Tet 1968; continued “socialist construction” in North Vietnam; successes and counter-activities against the Vietnamization and pacification programs; state of the political and military forces in South Vietnam; commitment of increased NVA troops to operations in support of insurrections in Laos and Cambodia; and the state of the party. Appended are both notes on the dissemination of the resolution and directive and discussion on confidence in the party leadership and the desire for a return to guerrilla warfare.


Highlights the efforts of the VWP in conducting the Ho Chi Minh Image Campaign, immortalizing “Uncle Ho,” between his death in September 1969 and the convocation of the Fourth Legislature of the National Assembly in November 1971. In addition, this report highlights the importance of the Ho Chi Minh Image Campaign to the NLF and the PRG. Various North Vietnamese journal articles highlight Ho Chi Minh’s life, political theory, and contribution to the revolutionary movements in South Vietnam and Indochina. The leadership succession issue and campaign’s effects on youth groups are also discussed.

The Ho Chi Minh Image, 1969–1971, Part II.
Document No. 100 (Part II). October. 161pp.

See previous entry for description.

Reel 5

1972

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Part I: Preparing to Form the PRG.

Details the events, policies, and conditions leading to the founding of the PRG by the NLF, COSVN, and the VANDPF. Various directives, promulgated by COSVN, PRP, and the NLF, are used to highlight the evolution of the PRG through the expansion of the Communist political administrative structure in 1967, Tet Offensive in 1968, establishment of liberation and revolutionary committees, creation of the VANDPF (a predominantly disenchanted middle class organization) and the Paris Peace Conferences in early 1969.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Part II: The Founding Conference of the PRG.

Activities of the PRP, NLF, and VANDPF preparatory committee and the establishment of a “republican regime in South Vietnam, the PRGSV, and an Advisory Council to the Government.” Highlights the activities undertaken by the Communist leadership and VANDPF’s associated groups, including religious, trade union, Montagnard, peasant and farmers’, minority, women’s, and student organizations. This report consists of the text of the formal resolution outlining the PRG’s organization and mission, its composition, action program, and speeches from prominent participants.
The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, 
Part III: The First Nine Months of the PRG.
Highlights the propaganda activities by the NLF and COSVN in support of the PRG, including expansion of its political, economic, and military administrative machinery and the enlistment of civil support.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, 
Part IV: The PRG's Diplomatic Offensive.
Consists of captured documents illustrating the meaning and techniques of the "diplomatic offensive" in the PRG's international propaganda and its part in the PRP's political struggle in South Vietnam. In addition, reconstitution of the NLF delegation to the Paris Peace Talks by a PRG delegation, adoption of the NLF's 10-Point Plan, and effects of the talks on the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam are discussed.

The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, Part I.
Details the history, organization, and mission of the PRP in South Vietnam and its control by the VWP Central Committee through the COSVN. Upon creation, it was declared part of the NLF and charged with the mission of engaging in the national democratic revolution and in setting up a "broad coalition government." The first part of this report reprints a 1966 memorandum from the PRP's Saigon Regional Committee outlining party strategy and tactics; following sections consist of two training manuals.

The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, Part II: COSVN's 1969–1970 Attempt to Revitalize the PRP.
Document No. 102 (Part II). February. 56pp.
Documents illustrating some party procedures and problems since the failure of the Tet 1968 offensive. Highlights directives and circulars calling for party reindoctrination and ideological education, strengthening of infrastructure on the local level, conducting elections, establishment of an inspection system, improvement of discipline, and attention to guerilla warfare and the Three-Man Cell.

The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, Part III: The 1971 Reindoctrination of the PRP.
Documents highlight the PRP efforts at political and ideological reeducation and reindoctrination in light of political and military developments in 1971, including the expansion of the Communist insurgencies in Laos and Cambodia. Items continue to illustrate party procedures and problems since the failure of Tet 1968.

The Structure of Power in the DRV: Constitution and Party Statute.
Constitution of the DRV and the Statute of the VWP, an understanding of North Vietnam's Communist governmental structure can be gleaned from studying these two documents. A brief introduction provides the history of the promulgation of these documents.

The "Local Forces" and Army Recruiting in North Vietnam.
Several documents highlight the organization and functions of the VPA, its relationship to the regular army, and its position in the socio-political structure. Highlights include recruitment and political and ideological indoctrination.
0750 Leaders of the PRG-NLF and Affiliated Organizations, May 1972.
Lists of members, denoting office or responsibility, of the PRG, NLF Central Committee, VANDPF, NLF-affiliated organizations, PRP, revolutionary organizations, and 1972 revolutionary administrations. In addition, the background section of this report is the text of a Liberation Radio broadcast entitled “Ten Point Lenient and Humanitarian Policy of the PRG,” which called for the establishment of local and provincial revolutionary administrations during an upcoming offensive, the Eastertide Offensive [1972 Easter Invasion].

0791 [Senior General Vo Nguyen] Giap: “Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People’s Army,” Part I.
Consists of a portion of a serialized article authored by Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap on the VPA and its Communist military tradition. Discussion in Part I centers on General Giap’s interpretations of Marxist-Leninist theories of military organization and Vietnamese military history and traditions with a Marxian analysis. The titles of the two items are “Marxist-Leninist Theory on Military Organizations of the Proletariat” and “Our People’s Traditions and Experiences in Building Armed Forces in the Past.”

0850 [Senior General Vo Nguyen] Giap: “Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People’s Army,” Part II.
Portion of a serialized article authored by Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap on the VPA and its Communist military tradition. This portion discusses Vietnamese military history from the founding in 1930 of the Indochina Communist Party [to 1972]. General Giap stresses the struggles of the VPA against French, Japanese, and American military forces, and highlights changes in organization, character, tactics, and VPA weaponry. The title is “The Creativeness of Our Party and People.”

Reel 6

1972 cont.

0001 [Senior General Vo Nguyen] Giap: “Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People’s Army,” Part III.
Portion of a serialized article authored by Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap on the VPA and its Communist military tradition. This portion discusses the necessity for modernizing the VPA while retaining its revolutionary character as a people’s army. The retention of this character will be assured by the “dialectical unity” between “the material and technical factors” and the “political and spiritual factors” under the auspices of the party’s correct leadership of the army. The title is “Strongly and Largely Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build a Regular, Modern People’s Armed Forces.”
**Bases of Power in the DRV.**


Details the structure and organization of the various power bases in the DRV government and their effects on the decision-making process since the Easteride Offensive [1972 Easter Invasion]. These power bases include the Politburo, Party Central Committee, the National Defense Council, Central Military Affairs Party Committee, military, and the state central bureaucratic administration. The articles and statements comprising this report highlight the activities of the various ministries and other governmental bodies, political maneuvering, and political and military preparations for the Easteride Offensive. Brief discussions of the National Assembly, the Vietnam Fatherland Front, local representation, and a listing of government and party officers are included.

**PRP Abandons 1972 Plans for a Revolution in Saigon.**


Documents highlight the efforts by the PRP, in theory, to activate the populace in Saigon prior to and during the Easteride Offensive [1972 Easter Invasion]. But there was little evidence of widespread agitation and even less popular response in the Saigon area, between the launching of the invasion and its termination. While the call for a General Offensive–General Uprising was made, PRP strategy stressed seizure of power in a city's outskirts, intensification and consolidation of political power, and then wait for the final "liberation drive" on the city. This strategy, as gleaned from this report, was not effective in the Saigon area. Lack of political preparations, calls for determined guerrilla warfare efforts, the possibility of a Paris Peace Talks-brokered ceasefire and its effects on NVA/VC forces, and calls for a more determined effort to seize South Vietnamese real estate are included.

**The Communists' Aborted Plans for the Seizure of Danang.**


Evaluates the abandonment of the military-political seizure of Danang during the summer of 1972 and the possible occupation of Danang by NVA/VC forces in the event of a ceasefire arising from the Paris Peace Talks in October. The first portion of this report contains the text of an article in the April issue of *Tien Phong [Vanguard]*, noting that a ceasefire might present the NVA/VC with their best opportunity for seizing strategic territory and cities. The final portion consists of three documents outlining PRP and military preparations for the seizure of Danang in the event of a ceasefire.

**1973**

**PRP Plans for Controlling "Liberated Areas" in South Vietnam.**


Consists of a two-part captured document outlining plans, drafted in August 1972 by a regional PRP authority [possibly the PRP regional committee of the VC Military Region 5], for consolidating political power and stimulating economic activity in those areas over which it had control in 1972; entitled "Strive to Build Revolutionary Political Power, Actively Dispute Political Power with the Enemy So As to Create Conditions for Seizing Total Power for the People" and "Economic Plan for the Coming Period."

**The Leadership of the PRG, NFLSV, and Their Affiliated Organizations, 1973.**


Biographic profiles of prominent leaders and lists of members of the PRG, NLF and affiliated organizations, VANDPF, revolutionary organizations, COSVN, PLAF, and PRP. Appended is the NLF-PRG appeal to the South Vietnamese people on the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement.
0390 **DRV Cadre Policy in the “New Phase.”**
Highlights the change in the mission and bureaucracy of the DRV cadre organization, and the emphasis on economic reconstruction in the months immediately following the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement. This report consists of a major policy paper released by the Party Politburo, in resolution form entitled “Tasks Related to Cadres in the New Phase,” and an article discussing the Party Politburo resolution, entitled “Some Problems on Cadres and on Organization in the Socialist Revolution,” by First Secretary Le Duan.

0468 **COSVN’s Directive 02/73 “On Policies Related to the Political Settlement and Ceasefire.”**
Exhorts Vietnamese Communists, controlled by COSVN, to “prepare to continue the struggle for power in South Vietnam by primarily political means” in 1973. In addition, it provides long-term insights into what the Vietnamese Communists mean by the political struggle. Highlights include concept of political violence in the context of the new situation; continued military violence [struggle] where applicable; combination of political movement of the masses and political violence; consolidation and enlargement of liberated areas and the revolutionary administration; and continued DRV support.

Details the structure, history since 1960, and membership of the VWP and its political control in the government of the DRV. The Central Committee, its political bureau, and related organizations are discussed. Biographical sketches of the members of the Politburo and Central Committee are included.

Details the organization, bureaucracy, and brief history of the DRV government. Lists of the principal government members, bureaucrats, and military leaders are included.

0665 **COSVN Directive 03.**
Provides an appraisal of Communist activities since the ceasefire, and outlines an action program emphasizing a Communist buildup and refitting and the continued implementation of the “three-pronged” strategy, particularly the political struggle. In addition, this directive represents a refinement and re-evaluation of the ceasefire guidelines described in COSVN Directive 02.
1974

Consists of selected North Vietnamese press commentaries highlighting the performance of the government, its position in international affairs, and efforts to remind the USSR and PRC of their responsibilities to the Vietnamese Revolution. Selections include a series of articles by Chien Thang [Victor], a pseudonym, published in Quan Doi Nhan Dan [The People's Army], a VPA military newspaper, or broadcast by Radio Hanoi beginning in November 1973 under the banner title Heighten Revolutionary Struggle. These articles represent a discussion of the DRV's military outlook, including a plan for offensive operations in fall 1973. Other selections highlight the DRV's views toward the Great Power Detente, and the role of the USSR and PRC in it. The first consists of a series of articles by Chien Bin [Combatant], a pseudonym, under the banner title Present Strategic Problems of the U.S. Imperialists. The second consists of three articles by Huong Xuan, under the banner title Nixon Administration and International Detente. These selections were published in Quan Doi Nhan Dan or broadcast by Radio Hanoi in October and November 1973.

Reviews a political reorientation and training directive captured in late February in Binh Thuan Province. This document provides a summary of the Communist strategy for South Vietnam, including use of the Paris Peace Agreement as a time for buildup and consolidation; lip service to the establishment of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord; outline of a program for mobilization and refitting of guerrilla and main force units; continued use of terrorism and subversion; development of a government and economic structure to compete with the GVN; and propaganda activities, both domestic and international, particularly directed toward the United States.

1975

Provides insights into North Vietnamese decisions, in the fall of 1974, to veer from the path of negotiations toward national reconciliation and to re-emphasize the military option, due in part to the cutoff of U.S. military aide to the GVN. COSVN Directive 8, captured in Go Cong Province in December 1974, stresses the role of revolutionary violence in Communist strategy and exhorts all commands to conduct major military campaigns with the tactical aim of defeating the GVN's pacification program. Highlights include continued DRV support, military leadership, and use of forces; expansion of international propaganda efforts; only a remote possibility of a U.S. response; and a delineation of the shortcomings and problems since the ceasefire as motives for the operations. The Binh Dinh Resolution is a provincial distillation of the DRV policy deliberations and decisions from the fall of 1974. It parallels the COSVN directive by calling for a major assault on the GVN and its pacification program. It outlines Communist strategy and tactics combining Communist political and military efforts, calls for an expanded public relations campaign using propaganda and terrorism, provides rationalizations for the more military line of action, and discounts a possible U.S. reaction due to internal dissension.
SUBJECT INDEX

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