

A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

SOVIET UNION

**Special Studies,
1985–1988**

Supplement

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA

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1985–1988**

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The executive branch of the U.S. government requires a massive amount of information to make policy decisions. Many departments, agencies, and commissions of the government devote much of their energies to gathering and analyzing information; however, even the resources of the U.S. government are not adequate to gather all the information that is needed; therefore the government contracts universities, colleges, corporations, think tanks, and individuals to provide data and analyses. Because the great majority of these studies are difficult to find and obtain, University Publications of America (UPA) publishes some of the most important ones in its *Special Studies* series. The Soviet Union Supplement collection consists of studies on the Soviet Union that became available during the period 1985–1988.

ACRONYMS/INITIALISMS

The following acronyms and initialisms are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| CPSU | <i>Communist party of the Soviet Union</i> |
| ICBM | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile |
| MNTK | Network of interbranch science and technology complexes (USSR) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| Spetznaz | Special purpose forces (in Russian: spetsialnoe naznachenie) |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

REEL INDEX

The following index is a guide to the documents in the collection. The four-digit number on the far left is the frame number where a particular document begins. This is followed by the title, in bold, the originating institution and author, the date of the document, and the total number of pages in the document. A brief abstract follows.

Reel 1

Frame

1979

- 0001 **Soviet Laser-Fusion Research Organizations: A Preliminary Outline.**
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. S. Kassel, et al. February 1979. 188pp.

This report constitutes the first stage of the Soviet Laser-Fusion project intended to develop a comprehensive picture of Soviet laser fusion research in its organizational and substantive aspects. The aim of the first stage has been the collection of organizational data on Soviet research in this area and the initial identification of specific research teams, leadership structure, institutions and objectives, and their changes in time.

1980

- 0189 **Soviet Military Education System for Commissioning and Training Officers.**
General Electric Company, Washington, D.C. and TEMPO. C. F. Shelton. September 1980. 32pp.

This document covers the education process for soviet military forces. Partial contents: Higher Military Schools for Commissioning Officers; Organization; Instructor Complement; Curriculum; Manpower Levels; Military Academies; Other Advanced Officer Training; The Military Academy of the General Staff; Post Graduate Programs; Central Hierarchy; Overall Manpower Estimates.

1984

- 0221 **Declaratory Policy for the Strategic Employment of the Soviet Navy.** *Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J. J. Tritten. September 1984. 246pp.*

The first major goal of this research effort is to determine the Soviet Union's declaratory policy for the use of naval forces or other military forces in oceanic theaters in the event of a major (including nuclear) war. What is sought is not what the experts in the West think but what the Soviets themselves say. Without access to Soviet war plans, one must rely on those unclassified statements by the Soviets that are found in their speeches, articles, books, radio and TV addresses, etc. Using a methodology termed "thematic content analysis," the researcher attempts to achieve his first major goal—elucidation of the Soviet Union's declaratory policy for the use of naval forces. This study attempts to ascertain the declaratory policy for the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy in a war in which nuclear weapons are used or use of them is threatened. Primary emphasis is on those naval missions that the researcher discovers that the Soviets associate with nuclear warfare or with success in the attainment of war aims. It was the researcher's plan to identify declaratory employment policy herein from such material and then subsequently to test the workability of the declaratory policy in a larger study using other methodologies (hardware, exercise, sensitivity, and contingency analysis). Content analysis is the best technique available to infer declaratory roles and missions.

1985

- 0467 **Soviet Chemical Weapons Threat, 1985.** *Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. James A. Williams. January 1985. 26pp.*

Although the Soviets have claimed that they are pursuing only a defense against chemical weapons, the size and scope of their activities demonstrate a formidable capability to carry out offensive chemical operations. Soviet policy and doctrine promote the need for these types of weapons and their value in warfare. The Soviets recently have used chemical warfare agents and toxins in Afghanistan and have supplied them for use by client forces in Laos and Cambodia—actions that demonstrate Soviet willingness to exploit the military utility of chemical and toxin weapons. They have a wide range of chemical warfare agents and associated delivery/dissemination systems. The calculations for the offensive employment of chemical weapons have been established.

Research, development, and testing are continuing. The Soviets can produce very large quantities of chemical warfare agents. Storage depots within the USSR have undergone a significant increase in storage capacity since the late 1960s. The author believes that chemical weapons are collocated with conventional weapons in forward areas facing NATO. A large force of military specialists and equipment give the Soviets an unmatched capability to survive and operate on a contaminated battlefield. All Soviet forces (land, sea, and air) receive extensive training in chemical protection. Any military force fighting Soviet forces will run a substantial risk that the Soviets will use chemical weapons.

0493 **U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control: Where We Are and How We Got There.**

Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Santa Monica, California. Strobe Talbott. January 1985. 15pp.

When the Reagan administration came into office, the future of nuclear arms control was at a turning point. That was partly because of the situation that the new administration inherited, but it was also because of who the administration was. A group of people who had been unrelentingly critical of arms control from outside the executive branch found themselves suddenly on the inside, with the power to translate their long-standing disapproval into the basis for a new set of American objectives and policies. Those people faced a complicated mixture of opportunities and risks. As it turned out, they sometimes mistook one for the other. While one can be optimistic to the point of seeing a possibility of negotiations resuming between the United States and the USSR, one must also recognize the danger that those other negotiations—the intramural ones within the U.S. government—will continue to no avail, focused on such old issues as the real negotiability of cruise missiles, but also on the new and potentially crucial issue of the negotiability of strategic defenses. That is the single most interesting and important question that looms at the outset of the next chapter in the future of arms control—if there is to be one.

0508 **USSR Energy Atlas.**

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. January 1985. 78pp.

The USSR is the largest country in the world and the second-largest producer and consumer of energy. Its vast landmass and adjacent continental shelves contain enormous energy resources. The atlas uses a wide variety of information to portray many aspects of Soviet energy.

Maps, graphics, photographs, and text provide a general understanding and appreciation of the major Soviet energy resources—oil, gas, coal, and primary electricity—as well as minor fuels and alternative energy sources.

0586 U.S.-Soviet Interactions in the Third World.

Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Santa Monica, California. Francis Fukuyama. March 1985. 35pp.

The report begins outlining the general structure of U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Third World in the first three postwar decades, analyzes the several important changes that occurred during the mid-to-late 1970s, and concludes with an elaboration of the implications of these changes for the balance of the decade and beyond. While future U.S.-Soviet interaction in the Third World will look similar to what has occurred in the past, with the Soviet Union and its allies seeking to change a status quo backed by the United States, this paper argues that the United States and the Soviet Union are in the process of reversing roles in the Third World in certain key respects, and that consequently superpower interactions there are likely to appear quite different from what we have come to expect in the past.

0621 An Assessment of Military Influence on Soviet Defense Policy and the Party.

Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. John E. Murphy. 1985. 53pp.

This paper presents a review of the history and structure of Soviet military-party relationships showing an ever-increasing role of the military in resource allocation and foreign-policy decision making. The implications of this steady growth of the military role, status, and influence in the Soviet Union are studied in terms of the possibility of an eventual militarization of the Communist party and government. If current patterns of ideological stagnation, bureaucratic immobility, and economic deterioration continue, the party will find itself more progressively dependent on the military, underscoring its uneasiness of the status of this relationship.

0674 The Soviets—How Much Do We Know?

Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Walter R. Peacock. April 1985. 53pp.

Initial discussion of both the historical and current reasons for knowing the United States' primary adversary, the USSR, leads to further examination of the specific categories of knowledge that the professional military officer should have regarding the enemy. History, society, economy, political system, and geography are discussed along with the implications

each has in contributing to the senior professional's required knowledge. Next, the results of a questionnaire on the Soviet system administered to the Air War College, U.S. Air Force students in the class of 1985 lead to the conclusion that lieutenant colonels and colonels in the air force have only superficial knowledge of the USSR in the five categories of knowledge previously mentioned. General observations on the U.S. educational system, media, and professional military education programs at Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College point to a need to start the Soviet education process earlier in the individual's career, increase the exposure at all U.S. Air Force professional, military education schools and establish some type of additional mandatory training. Suggestions as to the specifics of implementing a program are offered with the hope of providing a starting point for fixing the problem.

0727

Soviet Foreign Military Sales: Why Are They So "Cheap"?

Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. David Oakes. May 1985. 59pp.

A review of the history of the Soviet Foreign Military Sales program and the Soviet economic system form the background for a discussion of the motivations behind the large Foreign Military Sales to the Third World. A hypothesis that the Soviets could not significantly reduce its Foreign Military Sales program even if its leadership desired to, is presented. It is then evaluated by discussing the forces on Foreign Military Sales both from an international and domestic perspective. These perspectives are further subdivided into political and economic types of forces. It is suggested that the hypothesis is true due to the strength of the economic motivations that tend to sustain military production and thus Foreign Military Sales at high levels.

0786

Analyzing the Soviet Press—Spot Report No. 1: The Irrelevance Today of [Vasily D.] Sokolovskiy's Book *Military Strategy*.

Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. James M. McConnell, et al. May 1985. 20pp.

The "bible" of Soviet strategic thinking in the 1960s was the work edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy. Although the question of the work's obsolescence was raised in the 1970s, it was only with the appearance of a recent book by Deputy Chief of the General Staff [M. A.] Gareev that the issue could be definitely settled. According to Gareev, Sokolavskiy is now out of date with respect to the specific features of modern war, and it is necessary to restore all the old strategic principles and categories that had been rejected or revised by Sokolovskiy.

Frame

0806 **The Soviet Style of Surprise.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Wayne James Rowe. June 1985. 179pp.

This thesis examines the nature and scope of surprise and its uses in modern warfare using historical data, computer-aided analysis, and three case studies—Manchuria, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. From the data analysis, this thesis develops a Soviet "style" of surprise. Additionally, the analysis indicates that with a relatively small number of deceptive uses the probability of a successful surprise attack is very high even if the ruses are detected and a warning is sounded. This thesis ends by making several recommendations on how the effects of a surprise attack may be reduced if not eliminated.

Reel 2

1985 cont.

0001 **Soviet Exploitation of the "Nuclear Winter" Hypothesis.**

Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, Virginia. Leon Goure. June 5, 1985. 77pp.

This study, which is based entirely on open Soviet sources, examines and analyzes Soviet views on and uses made by Soviet scientists of the so-called "Nuclear Winter" hypothesis. In particular, the study seeks to ascertain whether Soviet scientists have in fact independently confirmed the R. P. Turco, O. G. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack, and C. Sagan prediction of a "Nuclear Winter" phenomenon or have contributed independent data or scenarios to it. The findings of the study are that the Soviets view the "Nuclear Winter" hypothesis as a political and propaganda opportunity to influence Western scientific and public opinion and to restrain U.S. defense programs. Analysis of Soviet publications shows that, in fact, Soviet scientists have made no independent or new contributions to the study of the "Nuclear Winter" phenomenon, but have uncritically made use of the worst-case scenarios, parameters, and values published in the Crutzen-Birks [Paul J. Crutzen and John W. Birks] (*Ambio*, 1982) and the scientists' (*Science*, December 1983) studies, as well as models of atmospheric circulation borrowed from Western sources. Furthermore, current Soviet directives to scientists call for work on the further strengthening of the Soviet Union's military might, while it is also explained that the dire predictions of the possible consequences of a

nuclear war in no way diminish the utility of the Soviet civil defense program and the need for its further improvement.

- 0078 **Transforming Clients Into Surrogates: The Soviet Experience.**
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Rose E. Gottlemoeller. July 1985. 52pp.

This paper examines (1) the incentives for Soviet-client cooperation and the limits to their effectiveness and (2) how the Soviets manage their relationship with their Third World allies, focusing particularly on the Soviet ability to induce cooperation in activities beyond a client's borders. The research is based on primary sources, including Soviet theoretical writings and documents from the Grenadan revolution, Western analyses of overall Soviet performance in the Third World, detailed case studies of individual countries, and the current press. Four conditions that define a cooperative relationship between the USSR and its client states are applied to the cases of Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada. These five cases indicate that the Soviets have yet to find a surefire means of turning a client relationship into reliable surrogate performance. Even when the factors underlying cohesion and the necessary incentives seem to be operating on both sides, the Soviets cannot be certain that a client will remain committed to performing surrogate roles.

- 0130 **Soviet Seismicity Study.**
Alexandria Laboratories, Teledyne Geotech, Alexandria, Virginia. Wayne Heltner. July 1985. 47pp.

A working INGRES data base "sov" has been established at the Center for Seismic Studies that contains the seismicity data reported in the annual Soviet publications, *Earthquakes in the USSR in 1973*, etc. for the time period 1973-1979. The total information reported is documented with the exception of reports of local intensity measures that are simply noted as being available. The data have been extensively reviewed for seismological consistency and have been related to the available National Earthquake Information Service and International Seismological Center epicenter data files available at the Center for Seismic Studies. A working cross-reference is thus available for all events reported by both the Soviet bulletins and the other two data sources. The files are compatible with other Center for Seismic Studies data bases but include extensions to document additional data available from the Soviet reports. All events have been regionalized in accordance with the exclusive geographical regions defined in Soviet publications and summary data are presented both annually and by the primary Soviet regions.

0177 **U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space.**

Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C. John H. Gibbons. July 1985. 125pp.

This technical memorandum outlines the principal issues of the space debate, the history and cooperation, and the experience of France, another country involved in space cooperation with the USSR. From a scientific and practical point of view, past experience has shown that cooperation in space can lead to substantive gains in some areas of space research and applications and can provide the United States with improved insight into the Soviet space program and Soviet society as a whole. Past experience suggests that technology transfer from the United States to the USSR will remain a major countervailing concern in any future space cooperation.

0302 **Cost Methodology for Aggregate U.S. and USSR Strategic Offensive Force Comparisons.**

Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Herschel Kanter and Bettina Garcia. August 1985. 40pp.

This document describes the development of cost estimating relationships and other cost factors for bombers, tankers, air-to-surface missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), fleet ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Both research, development, test, and explanation and initial procurement cost (cost estimating relationships) are presented as are cost factors for support, procurement, recurring procurement, military construction, operations and maintenance, and military personnel. The principal purpose for the derivation of these cost estimating relationships and cost factors is to estimate the costs of the USSR and the U.S. strategic intercontinental attack forces in the same consistent manner. A basic requirement in the development of these cost estimates is that they should contain only those input values and/or parameters that could be estimated based on observable characteristics of USSR systems.

0342 **Soviet Reactions to NATO's Emerging Technologies for Deep Attack.**
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Michael J. Sterling. August 1985. 32pp.

This document analyzes Soviet reactions to and concern over NATO's use of deep-look reconnaissance sensors, automated command and control, and highly accurate conventional munitions made possible by emerging technologies. It briefly describes the emerging technologies and their applications to deep attack concepts, and it examines Soviet commentary on the systems and employment concepts being discussed in the West, Soviet views of the utility of such systems, and their impact

on Soviet forces and tactics. It considers Soviet response options in the near and medium terms, and their implications for the West. Among its conclusions are the following: (1) the Soviets are more concerned with the long-range implications of emerging technologies rather than with any particular weapon; (2) the West should take care not to squander its lead in this area of weapons development; (3) any reconnaissance, command-control-communication, or attack systems the West develops must be resistant to Soviet countermeasures; and (4) because of the implications for future arms negotiations, future emerging technologies weapons should be distinguished from their nuclear counterparts, in terms of both their physical appearance and flight profiles.

0374 **Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technology: An Update.**

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown]. September 1985. 39pp.

Each year Moscow receives thousands of pieces of Western equipment and many tens of thousands of unclassified, classified, and proprietary documents as part of this campaign. Virtually every Soviet military research project—well over four thousand each year in the late 1970s and over five thousand in the early 1980s—benefits from these technical documents and hardware. The assimilation of Western technology is so broad that the United States and other Western nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet military buildup. Western products and technology secrets are being systematically acquired by intricately organized, highly effective collection programs specifically targeted to improve Soviet military weapon systems. The Soviet intelligence services—the Committee of State Security, USSR (KGB); the Chief Administration for Intelligence, Division General Staff of the Soviet Army; and their surrogates among the East European services—and Soviet trade and scientific organizations are actively involved in obtaining this technology. Targets include defense contractors, manufacturers, foreign trading firms, academic institutions, and electronic data bases. The purpose of this paper is to reveal in detail the structure of these Soviet programs, and to give examples of Soviet requirements and successes. Understanding the Soviet effort is a critical first step in protecting Western technology and preventing it from being turned against the West.

0413 **The Trust: The Classic Example of Soviet Manipulation.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Stephen A. Harris. September 1985. 67pp.

This thesis covers the career of the organization that came to be known as "The Trust." It is the classic example of Soviet deception and

manipulation, which proved to be very successful in neutralizing, for a period of about six years, the many and varied "White" Russian émigré groups that abounded in Europe after the Russian Revolution. It also lured back into Russia many of the leaders of these various Russian groups who were committed anti-Bolsheviks; the two most important victims were Sydney Reilly (Britain's "Master" spy) and Boris Savinkov ([Aleksandr] Kerensky's War Minister and a former terrorist under the Czars).

0480 The Soviet Naval Air Forces.

Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr. November 1985. 30pp.

This research memorandum reviews the evolution of the missions and capabilities of Soviet aviation assigned to maritime roles from the days of the Czarist navy to the present. The author addresses the mission priorities revealed in the Soviet literature, the hardware developed in response to those priorities, and the trends that can be identified from the literature and these developments.

0510 Soviet Attack Helicopters and Their Implications for U.S. Division Operations.

School of Advance Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Stephen R. Baribeau. December 2, 1985. 43pp.

This monograph is a historically based analysis of Soviet and U.S. attack helicopter development since 1962. Significant and recent changes in Soviet attack helicopter organization and employment are presented. Among the many conclusions drawn from this analysis are (1) rapid Soviet programs in development and employment of tactical attack helicopters has surprised western observers, (2) the average U.S. Army officer is not aware of the Soviet progress, (3) U.S. divisional doctrine does not address the impact of the Soviet attack helicopter, and (4) divisions are not training their forces to counter the Soviet threat. This monograph concludes that doctrinal and training changes that address the Soviet attack helicopter threat must be quickly developed and implemented. Failure to do so may have a negative impact on future U.S. division tactical operations against Soviet forces.

0553 **Vulnerability Analysis of Soviet Division-Level Troop Control: An Analysis of the Evolution of Soviet Troop Control Since the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.**

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Bruce L. Meisner. December 2, 1985. 56pp.

This study describes the Soviet troop control system in the motorized rifle division and analyzes it to determine its potential vulnerabilities. The study begins with a review of the evolution of the Soviet troop control system at the division level during and since World War II, followed by a brief analysis of what the Soviets call their "scientific basis" for tactical planning. Several specific aspects of the current division troop control system are then analyzed: (1) Decision Making and Planning Process, (2) Role of the Division Staff, (3) Division C2 Facilities/CPs, and (4) Impact of Cybernetics and Automation. The study concludes with an analysis of the vulnerabilities and means of exploitation of the Soviet division troop control system. One of the key findings from the historical analysis was that inadequate intelligence was the most frequent cause of disruption to Soviet forces at the division level during World War II. This may well be the main reason why the Soviet division decision cycle is so heavily dependent upon an accurate assessment of the battlefield. We can expect the Soviets to continue to move toward greater centralization and automation of division troop control. Computer automation will increasingly be applied to Soviet troop control activities and assist in the decision-making process. U.S. planners should maximize their efforts to identify those critical events and thus allow commanders to bring to bear the means to disrupt the Soviet troop control process at these critical times.

1986

0609 **Soviet Central Decision Making and Economic Growth: A Summing Up.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Abraham S. Becker. January 1986. 64pp.

This report summarizes important characteristics of Soviet economic decision making, examines Soviet prospects for economic growth under Gorbachev, and draws some policy implications for the United States. The author suggests that military development pressure is the most reliable U.S. bargaining tool, but cautions that its validity depends on continuation of Soviet economic stringencies and a Soviet belief that the U.S. threat can be rendered manageable. Therefore, U.S. military

pressure should be balanced by a readiness to define conditions of strategic parity and to reach workable agreements translating such criteria into reality.

0673 **Soviet Naval Aviation: Its Changing Roles.**

Defense Intelligence College. Melvin L. Mosier III. November 1985. 59pp.

Soviet naval aviation will no doubt play a major role in the Soviet navy's war and peacetime missions. Over the years, it has become a large and effective force with a global reach. The roles and missions of Soviet naval aviation appear to be changing as it becomes more powerful. The more dramatic changes are taking place in sea-based aviation; the result being the current construction of a large conventional carrier. The roles of land-based naval aviation are also changing, but to a lesser degree. This thesis examines these changes and discusses their effects and implications. As with most Soviet military topics, in order to analyze Soviet naval aviation in today's world, its historical aspects must be considered. Soviet military theorists and planners have a great propensity for reviewing events from the Great Patriotic War (World War II). Chapter one presents an overview of Soviet naval aviation during the war years, with attention to the events and roles within each of the four fleets; describes the developments during the latter years of the Stalin era; and focuses on Soviet naval aviation's anticarrier role, the anti-Polaris/Poseiden role, and other recent developments. Chapter two discusses the background and evolution of the change in naval doctrine that culminated in the construction of the new carrier. Evolution and changes in military doctrine are considered as the rationale for these changes, including command of the sea and fleet defense. Chapter two concludes with discussions of the characteristics of the new carrier and its applications. Land-based aviation, which has traditionally been emphasized over sea-based aviation, is discussed in chapter three, beginning with an overview of the advantages of land-based aviation as compared to sea-based aviation. This chapter also discusses the missions of land-based aviation to include a brief description of the various types and models of aircraft, their primary missions, and their distribution. The conclusion of this thesis is presented in chapter four.

0732 **Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Francis Fukuyama. February 1986. 98pp.

This report analyzes the reassessment of policy toward the Third World that has been taking place in high Soviet leadership circles since the end of the Leonid Brezhnev era. It is divided into two main parts: (1) a survey of the theoretical discussion that has been taking place in speeches by

Soviet leaders, official statements, articles in journals specializing in Third World issues, and elsewhere; and (2) a comparison of what the Soviets have been saying about the Third World with their actual behavior over the same time period, and a discussion of the potential consequences of the current reassessment for future Soviet policy. The report identifies the following three primary themes running through recent Soviet discussions of the Third World, all of which imply the need for a retrenchment from the activist policies of the mid- to late-1970s: (1) the pressure of economic constraints and the need to attend to the Soviet Union's own economic development; (2) an awareness of the damaging effect of past Soviet Third World activities on U.S.-Soviet relations, and the fact that increased superpower tension inhibits Moscow's ability to support progressive forces in the Third World; and (3) a critique of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as a solution to the problem of securing long-term influence in the Third World.

0830 **Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Objectives, Instruments, Results.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. John Van Oudenaren. February 1986. 127pp.

This report analyzes the objectives, instruments, and achievements of Soviet policy toward Western Europe. It focuses on the mechanisms used by the Soviet Union to pursue its objectives in Europe, including diplomacy, military power, arms control, the West European Communist parties, ties with the non-Communist left, propaganda, and trade. The author concludes that the Soviet Union has achieved mixed results in its policy toward Western Europe. While it has succeeded in helping to consolidate postwar gains, Soviet policy has not yet made a dramatic breakthrough toward its state objective of fostering a system of collective security in Europe. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that failure to achieve these maximal goals has led the Soviets to rethink their objectives or lower their expectations.

0957 **The Soviet Union and the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of Western Europe.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. John Van Oudenaren. February 1986. 55pp.

The Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties of Western Europe have always presented special opportunities and difficulties for Soviet foreign policy. From the Soviet perspective, these parties are important for three reasons, all of which must be considered in making policy toward them and toward Western Europe in general: (1) most of these parties are actual or prospective governing parties; (2) they represent that part of the

West European public that Soviet analysts regard as "realistic" in its attitudes toward the USSR and "progressive" on other issues; and (3) the parties of the non-Communist left, at least according to Soviet ideology, are potential partners in the revolutionary struggle. This paper examines Soviet policy toward the non-Communist left in Europe in light of the three roles these parties play in Soviet eyes. It reviews Soviet strategy toward the non-Communist left as it has evolved in recent years, analyzes trends within the parties of the non-Communist left and the way in which they are responding to various Soviet initiatives, and considers the implications for the Atlantic alliance of these trends and of Soviet efforts to exploit them.

Reel 3

1986 cont.

- 0001 **The New Soviet Leadership Confronts a Sagging Economy.**
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Robert L. Rhame. February 1986. 38pp.

A description of the current state of the Soviet economy and the problems confronting the new Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev form the basis for an analysis of the Soviet economic system and prospects for its improvement. The relationships between the Soviet system of government, the Communist party, and the Soviet economy are discussed in order to identify possible courses of action available to the Soviet leadership in their efforts to bolster a sagging economy. These courses of action are then evaluated for their potential success in light of systematic constraints. Further, the author identifies several ramifications economic change may have for Soviet foreign policy and provides recommendations for Western responses to these potential Soviet foreign policy shifts.

- 0039 **Assessment of the Soviet Food Program.**
International Economist Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Robert B. Koopmen. February 1986. 30pp.

The Soviet food program, officially introduced in 1982, has had no significant impact on Soviet agriculture. Rising production costs and slow growth in per capita production of many agricultural products remain the rule today. Poor coordination and cooperation between agriculture and its related sectors continue. Prospects for improvement in production depend

upon short-term, nonsystemic factors rather than dramatic changes in the basic Soviet system under which agriculture operates.

0069 **Soviet Military Power, 1986.**

Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. March, 1986. 157pp.

This report presents developments within the military forces of the USSR. Topics addressed include, (1) Nuclear Force Operations, (2) Strategic Defense and Space Operations, (3) Soviet Forces for Theater Operations, (4) Readiness, Mobility, and Sustainability, (5) Research, Development, and Production, (6) Global Ambitions, and (7) U.S. Policies and Programs. With the initial deployment of mobile SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles to operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) regiments in 1985, the Soviet Union confronted the world with further proof of its intensive drive for offensive military weapons capable of underwriting its political objectives against the West. Deployment of the SS-25 violates strategic arms limitation talks agreements. The new, highly survivable, road-mobile, fifth-generation SS-25s entered service as the deployment of the USSR's highly accurate, fourth-generation, silo-based SS-18 Mod 4 ICBM program was reaching completion. At the same time, test fringe of the fifth-generation, rail-mobile SS-X-24 ICBM continued. Preparations were also underway for test flights of three future ICBMs being developed to build on the capabilities of the fourth and fifth generations. By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the USSR's currently deployed strategic nuclear attack forces—ICBMs, SNLBMs, and manned strategic bombers—will have been replaced by more advanced strategic nuclear weapons systems. Paralleling the offensive strategic developments of 1985, the Soviet Union pressed forward with advanced strategic defense systems. Construction continued on new over-the-horizon radars and large phased-array radars capable of tracking greater numbers of targets with increased accuracy.

0226 **Soviet-West European Relations: Recent Trends and Near-Term Prospects.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Alan Platt. March 1986. 60pp.

This report examines key recent developments and trends in Western Europe, with an emphasis on the past two years, as a backdrop to an analysis of present and prospective Soviet relations with the West. It identifies five possible Soviet policy options toward Western Europe in the near and the medium term: (1) continuation of the kind of wedge-driving policy it used during much of 1983; (2) a differentiated policy of better relations with the United States and cool relations with Western Europe; (3) a policy of defiance toward the West; (4) pursuit of a broad-based neo-

detente relationship with both Western Europe and the United States; or (5) a purposefully confrontational policy toward the West. The author suggests that three considerations will be central to the USSR in determining which policy it pursues: (1) the possibility of gaining new concessions from the United States through the continued pursuit of its present policy course; (2) the degree of continued Atlantic Alliance unity over defense and arms control policies; and (3) the electoral prospects of antinuclear opposition parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s. In any case, the Soviet Union will not abandon its fundamental objectives in Europe.

0286 Soviet Military Thought—Concepts of War.

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Robert E. Orcutt, Jr. March 1986. 105pp.

Many Americans, including national policy makers and military officers, undoubtedly mirror image Western perspectives of the world onto their Soviet counterparts. In the military command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) area this misguided approach can lead to incorrect analysis and gross miscalculation of enemy capabilities and intentions. This thesis is an attempt to sensitize the U.S. military officer to a sampling of those cultural and ideological asymmetries that can make Soviet approaches to war and C3I decision making radically different from our own. Special emphasis is given to Soviet Marxist-Leninist views on peace, war, and military doctrine and science.

0391 The Impact of Eastern Europe on Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe.

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. A. Ross Johnson. March 1986. 90pp.

This report examines the ways in which Soviet control of Eastern Europe has both contributed to and detracted from the Soviet Union's pursuit of foreign policy goals in Western Europe. In successive sections, it (1) reviews the highlights of past USSR-East European-West European interactions and outlines general characteristics of the triangular relationship; (2) examines the impact of the Polish crisis; and (3) traces the East European foreign policy activity related to NATO's 1983 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces and analyzes the emergence of a group of East European states—East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania—whose policies differed from those of the Soviets. The author suggests that while Eastern Europe serves as a constraint on Soviet relations with Western Europe, Western Europe also acts as a constraint on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

0481 **Soviet Use of Spetznaz Forces.**

Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. David A. Burtt II. March 1986. 40pp.

Introductory remarks encompass the historical precedents leading up to the creation of the Soviet Spetznaz forces from World War II experience using partisans. A description of today's current Spetznaz units follows to include: mission, organization, manning, training, weapons, and tactics. The role of special forces and Spetznaz units in modern Soviet doctrine is discussed, as well as Spetznaz use in conjunction with the Soviet Operational Maneuver Group. Finally, Spetznaz vulnerabilities are discussed, as well as potential ways to counteract the use of Spetznaz.

0521 **Transfer of High-Technology to the Soviet Union: A Predicament for the United States.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. John E. Holland, Jr. March 21, 1986. 27pp.

Through reading Western open-source literature and by international purchases of U.S. computers and electronics, the Soviets have been able to modernize their military forces. This raises the question, "Should U.S. technology be in the public domain and available for exploitation by the Soviet Union?" The scope of Soviet information-gathering operations raises concerns about the true Russian motivation for detente. Complicating the technology-transfer issue has been the prevailing attitude that parity promotes stability among world powers. As a result of this philosophy, the United States has found itself restrained from acquiring a needed, significant technology advantage over the Soviet Union. Thus, ensuring that the Soviets are not able to apply U.S. technology too quickly becomes an important aspect of the technology-transfer solution. But technology controls are expensive and require the commitment of the U.S. public; therefore, resolve is required. Should the Soviets gain technological parity, then the United States would be compelled to match Soviet conventional forces to ensure that Soviet expansionism is equally restrained.

0548 **Spetznaz: A Soviet Sabotage Threat.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Burton A. Casteel, Jr. April 1, 1986. 36pp.

This report presents a realistic baseline view of the Spetznaz sabotage threat capability. It examines Soviet doctrine to familiarize the reader with Soviet concepts and perspectives as to why sabotage has to be conducted, and discusses historical examples where sabotage played a role. The study describes some of the methods Spetznaz forces use to gain entry into enemy territory and identifies potential targets.

Furthermore, an insight into Spetznaz sabotage training and examples of the various sabotage tools at their disposal are also discussed. The study concludes by asking, Are we ready, willing, and able to counter the Spetznaz sabotage threat?

- 0584 **The Background and Development of Soviet Military Doctrine.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Raymond J. Swider, Jr. April 1, 1986. 43pp.
This report defines Soviet military doctrine and traces its development. The report begins by explaining the Soviet ideological justification for the Soviet state and its nature. The state has fundamental duties, foremost of which is defense of Soviet-style socialism. As such, the state requires a fundamental military doctrine to guide defense efforts. The Soviets state that doctrine is a function of the study of military science. The foremost component of military science for forming doctrine is military history. The report describes the Soviet study of military history and its impact on military science and doctrine. Finally, the study questions the correctness of Soviet assumptions in light of incipient breakthroughs in weapons technology.
- 0627 **The Soviet Officer: A Credible Adversary.**
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Michael J. Lacki. April 1986. 48pp.
The intent of this report is to present a review of the training and indoctrination of Soviet officers. The report traces the elements of the Communist system that influence the officers' beliefs. Aspects of civilian and professional military education are reviewed. Some elements of the officer's life-style serve to provide another perspective of the officers' life. A summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet officer corps concludes the remarks.
- 0675 **Surprise: The Precursor to Soviet Operational Success.**
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Charles C. Campbell. April 9, 1986. 41pp.
This study examines the element of surprise within the context of operational warfare. Specifically, the study examines the degree to which surprise has emerged as the prevalent factor in the shaping of the Soviet army organization, force structure, and doctrine. The study also examines the implications that the Soviet emphasis on surprise has for the NATO defense of Central Europe. It includes an assessment as to the likelihood of a Soviet surprise attack and the NATO vulnerability to such an attack. The study concludes that Soviet planners increasingly favor a short-warning, unreinforced attack that denies NATO the warning time that it

requires to establish a viable, cohesive, and continuous forward defense. It further concludes that a strategy that provides for a surprise attack that offers the potential for strategic success in a single operational campaign is especially attractive to Soviet planners since it is grounded in historical experience, takes full advantage of Soviet military strengths and capabilities, and exploits NATO vulnerabilities. Lastly, the study suggests a full range of measures that can be implemented to reduce NATO's vulnerability to a short-warning, unreinforced attack in Central Europe. These include increasing the size of NATO's conventional forces in Central Europe, constructing permanently manned field fortifications along the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), and implementing a broad range of readiness initiatives.

0716 **USSR Report: Space.**

Joint Publications Research Service, Arlington, Virginia. [Author unknown.] April 21, 1986. 139pp.

Translated into English from various Russian articles.

0855 **The Soviet Economic Dilemma of Eastern Europe.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Keith Crane. May 1986. 79pp.

This report examines probable changes in Soviet economic policies toward Eastern Europe during the next decade. It studies the issue of Soviet economic subsidies to Eastern Europe and explores several hypotheses that could explain why they have been granted. Finally, it discusses the implications of increasing economic stringency in the Soviet Union for Soviet willingness to subsidize Eastern Europe, and the repercussions of a decline in subsidies for East European economies. The study concludes that the Soviet Union will continue to use an awkward, expensive system of trade within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to buttress its important strategic, ideological, bureaucratic, and political stakes in the region.

Reel 4

1986 cont.

0001 **U.S. Declaratory Policy on Soviet SSBN Security: 1970 to 1985.**

Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. John D. Perse. May 1986. 36pp.

U.S. defense officials have often said that the Soviet Union expects Western antisubmarine warfare forces to attack its ballistic missile

submarines and thus is prepared to defend them in war. These Soviet expectations may have been encouraged by U.S. declaratory policy on the subject—that is, the totality of official and other authoritative statements on strategic doctrines and policy, antisubmarine warfare capabilities and tactics, and antisubmarine warfare technology and programs from which Soviet observers reach conclusions about U.S. intentions. This paper reviews U.S. declaratory policy between 1970 and 1985 to determine specifically what that policy has been and then to infer what it has probably meant to the Soviets. It concludes that throughout this period official U.S. declaratory policy has implied an intent to engage in strategic antisubmarine warfare and that the Soviets have had strong reasons to believe that their ballistic missile submarines have been and will continue to be targets of U.S. antisubmarine warfare forces.

0037 **An Overview of the Kallningrad Space Flight Control Center.**

The Corporate Word, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] May 1986. 35pp.

This booklet gives a general description of the Kaliningrad Spaceflight Center near Moscow, where Soviet orbiting and interplanetary spacecraft are monitored and controlled. Brief descriptions of the equipment used and the scope of work done at the center are included.

0072 **Appearances of Soviet Leaders January–December 1985.**

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] May 1986. 202pp.

This publication provides a record of the known appearances of selected Soviet public figures during 1985. Coverage includes members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU, leading officials of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the chairman of the Committee for State Security, and the minister of internal affairs. This publication contains a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in its preparation; a list of the known appearances of the individuals during the period covered, including the date, nature, and location of each appearance and the source of information; and a chronological list of appearances with names arranged alphabetically for a given date.

0274 **U.S. and Soviet Rotary Wing Aviation at the Operational Level of War.**

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Stephen R. Baribeau. May 15, 1986. 51pp.

This monograph analyzes Soviet and U.S. Army rotary wing aviation to determine their respective capabilities to support the execution of operational level war by Soviet and U.S. commanders. In order to analyze operational level capabilities, a common definition for operational art and level of war has been determined. Current rotary wing organizations and equipment of the Soviet division, army, front, and theater and the U.S. division and corps are explained in some detail along with current tactical and operational employment doctrine. Analysis criteria include comparison of command and control doctrine, employment doctrine, relative force size and helicopter design. Among the many conclusions drawn from this analysis are (1) there has been rapid Soviet progress since 1975 to close the gap between U.S. and Soviet tactical level rotary wing forces; (2) decentralization of Soviet rotary wing forces to division, army, and front commanders has dramatically improved the ability of the Soviet operational commander to effectively employ helicopters in combat; (3) there has been a dramatic increase in the number of Soviet combat helicopters produced since 1975; (4) there is a clear advantage enjoyed by the Soviets in operational level heavy-lift helicopters; and (5) the realization that Soviet rotary wing forces exist only to enhance the tempo of the all-important land battle while U.S. forces are considered maneuver elements and can establish their own combat tempo. This monograph concludes that the U.S. Army is on the threshold of dramatic change and can seize the initiative from its numerically superior enemy if it aggressively develops true air-ground maneuver doctrine. Air-ground maneuver will give tactical and operational commanders great flexibility and quantitatively increase the tempo of modern combat.

0325 **Improving U.S.-Soviet Relations: Understanding the Soviet Viewpoint.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Malcolm L. Ogilvie, Jr. May 20, 1986. 35pp.

Lying at the heart of the U.S. understanding, or more possibly, misunderstanding, of the Soviets and their view of the world is the vast difference in the two viewpoints. The Soviets simply look at things differently than Americans and, as a result, one cannot expect either of their logic, decision processes, or conclusions to match given the same set of circumstances. While this phenomenon has generally been

identified and discussed throughout society, the author is not sure of the degree to which it has altered the manner in which the United States actually deals with the Soviets. A most serious threat to the United States and the world as we know it today could arise if both the United States and the Soviet Union develop and follow courses of action which, although genuinely perceived to be in their own best interests, sets these countries on a collision course. When a strategic nuclear exchange begins, the ultimate judgement as to who is right has precious little meaning for any of us. Weapons technology and development have occurred so rapidly that a major misunderstanding or misreading could be disastrous. This paper will delve into this subject by presenting the Soviet perspectives on several elements critical to U.S.-Soviet relations and then discussing these perspectives with the goal of providing insights and means by which our dealing with the Soviets might be altered and tensions between the two countries reduced.

- 0360 **Initiative In Soviet Air Force Tactics and Decision Making.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Jeffrey Scott Johnson. June 1986. 153pp.

This thesis discusses the evolution of initiative in fighter tactics of the Soviet Air Force. World War II forced pilots to break from restrictive tactics and to develop and use initiative in combat. By war's end, Soviet fighters' initiative greatly resembled the initiative of Western fighters; however, since World War II, technology and doctrine led to an increase in control measures and a decline in initiative. Despite this, veterans of combat have consistently spoken out for realistic training and the freedom for fighter initiative. As a result, emphasis on initiative rose in the late 1970s. But current Soviet pilots do not come close to having the initiative of World War II fighters and the recent emphasis on initiative may be short lived. Current technology gives the Soviet Air Force the choice of developing or extinguishing initiative among their fighters. History suggests that, without a threat to their survival, the choice against initiative will be made.

- 0513 **Know Your Enemy: A Comparison of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Motorized Rifle Regiment.**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Robert L. Jordan. 1986. 87pp.

This study attempts to identify the major organizational and equipment differences between a Soviet motorized rifle regiment and the opposing forces motorized rifle regiment. Analysis also includes basic tactical doctrine at the regimental level. Research indicates that there are

significant differences between the two organizations in regard to organizational structure and equipment appearance and capabilities. Analysis of tactical doctrine and employment does not reveal any significant differences.

0600 **A Study of Soviet Use of Field Artillery Weapons in a Direct Fire Role.**

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Larry W. Coker, Jr. 1986. 107pp.

This study is a detailed look at the information available in current Soviet military publications on how the Soviets use their field artillery weapons in a direct fire role. It includes a discussion of the historical background for use of direct fire as it was developed during the Great Patriotic War [World War II]. The primary emphasis is on how the Soviets currently employ direct fire during offensive and defensive operations, and the training techniques used to develop direct fire skills at individual and collective levels. The conclusions drawn from the study are (1) that the Soviets will aggressively use their field artillery in a direct fire role in both offensive and defensive situations, but most routinely in the meeting engagement; (2) the major advantages for the use of direct fire are timeliness, accuracy, and ammunition savings; (3) routine training is conducted by Soviet artillery units to develop their direct fire skills; and (4) the Soviets' significant numerical advantage in artillery assets allows them the flexibility to employ it for direct fire.

0707 **The Soviet Theory of Reflexive Control in Historical and Psycho-cultural Perspective: A Preliminary Study.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Diane Chotikul. July 1986. 121pp.

In the ongoing "information war" between the United States and the Soviet Union, a new method of exerting influence has captured the recent attention and interest of Western Sovietologists and military and political analysts. This new method is the Soviet theory of reflexive control, which, briefly stated, can be defined as "a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specifically prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision." Several authoritative studies have been published that describe in depth and in detail the scientific and mathematical components of reflexive control and its various military and technical applications; however, less attention has been devoted to an examination of the underlying historical and psychocultural factors that may have contributed to the development of this particular orientation toward decision making. This research effort represents an attempt to narrow this gap in our understanding of the evolution and significance of

the theory of reflexive control, and to develop a psychohistorical framework within which the theory may come to be better understood by Western analysis of Soviet affairs.

0828 **USSR Grain Policies and Data.**

International Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Emily Moore. July 1986. 84pp.

The Soviet Union consumes 218 million tons of grain a year but produces only about 180 million tons. The difference makes the Soviet Union the world's largest grain importer, accounting for almost 20 percent of international grain trade. This document presents a comprehensive data series on USSR grain yields, area, and production, including data by republics. It also includes a discussion of policies affecting Soviet grain output and an overview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture process for making short-term forecasts of USSR grain production. Limitations of the data, especially as they affect the ability to forecast grain production, are emphasized.

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1986 cont.

0001 **The Costs and Benefits of the Soviet Empire, 1981-1983.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Charles Wolfe, Jr., et al. August 1986. 56pp.

This report extends, through 1983, estimates of the economic costs of the Soviet empire that were published in a previous Rand study covering the period 1971 to 1980. Its objectives are (1) to determine the extent to which the Soviet Union allocates resources for its broad international security interests; (2) to evaluate the burden that the empire imposes on the Soviet economy, and how this burden has changed in recent years; (3) to identify gaps in the estimates as a guide to needed improvements in future data collection; (4) to evaluate the political, military, and other benefits that the Soviet leadership attributes to the empire; and (5) to consider the extent to which economic stringencies within the Soviet Union, as well as other possible explanations, account for the marked changes that occurred in empire costs between 1981 and 1983. The study finds that Soviet empire costs declined appreciably during the early 1980s, but remained substantial in both absolute and relative terms.

0057 **The Soviet Quest for Regional Security: Studies of Foreign Policy Decision Making in the USSR.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Jan A. Dellenbrant. September 1986. 167pp.

The report analyzes the regional dimensions of Soviet foreign policy. A theoretical framework on a bureaucratic politics-regional politics framework is presented. The behavior of some big actors, like first parts secretaries on central and regional levels, are analyzed. The main portion of the report is devoted to an analysis of Soviet foreign decision making concerning the Baltic region and decisions made during the Afghanistan and Polish crises.

0224 **The Soviet Central Asian Challenge: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Allen E. Dorn. September 1986. 77pp.

The Soviet Union faces a revolutionary challenge from its Central Asian Muslim population, which is capable of undermining Soviet authority in the region. This thesis establishes a neo-Gramscian theory for analyzing the Soviet Central Asian challenge as a developing counterhegemonic movement against the Russian-dominated state. Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and counterhegemony explains the mechanism of rule essential for group control of a state, as well as the mechanism of revolt required to permit a subordinate group to stage a successful social revolution. For the purpose of this thesis, traditional Gramscian theory was broadened to allow its application to societies like the Soviet Union where the dominant division of civil society is not economic class but rather nationality group. From this neo-Gramscian perspective, the Soviet Union is a "State of nations" ruled by hegemony by a single Russian nation, through a national ideology, Russian communism. The Central Asian counterhegemonic challenge to Russian hegemony revolves around three key issues: the rapidly expanding Muslim population of the region, the continued strength of Soviet Islam and Sufism, and Central Asia's Muslim nationalism. This thesis concludes that the Central Asian challenge appears capable of producing a successful Gramscian counterhegemonic revolution against the Soviet state without foreign aid or support.

0301 **The Icarus Illusion: Technology, Doctrine, and the Soviet Air Force.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Steven K. Black. September 1986. 129pp.

This thesis describes and analyzes the relationship between post-World War II Soviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet air employment doctrine. It tests the proposition that Soviet fighter aircraft are developed in response

to design criteria established solely on the basis of military requirements. The results show that Soviet fighter design has not only progressed largely independently of prevailing doctrinal requirements, but appears to have driven the development of tactical air employment doctrine over the past forty years.

0430 **Soviet Military Objectives In the Arctic Theater and How they Might Be Attained.**

Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Charles C. Peterson. September 1986. 44pp.

This memorandum lays out a plausible Soviet approach to the problem of securing control of the Arctic Ocean theater of military action during a war fought entirely with conventional weapons. In doing so, the memorandum focuses primarily of the strategic aspects of the problem, highlighting those aspects of the Soviet solution to it that by most conventional reckonings may seem unorthodox, but which effectively compensate for some of the Soviet navy's main weaknesses.

0474 **Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview.**

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] September 1986. 47pp.

Developments in the economy, technology, and the foreign threat are inducing the Soviets to modify their strategies. The slower growth of the Soviet economy in the past decade and harsh constraints on the availability of key resources have led the Soviet leaders to stress efficiency more than in the past. At the same time, dramatic improvements in Western weapons and advances in their own and foreign military research and development have led them to seek greater advances in weapon performance and capabilities. Changes are under way in the Soviet defense industrial establishment that respond to new conditions.

0521 **Transformation In Russian and Soviet Military History.**

Air Force Academy, Colorado. Steven E. Maffeo. October 1986. 58pp.

This highly selective bibliography was prepared for use at the 12th Military History Symposium on "Transformation in Russian and Soviet Military History" held at the Air Force Academy, October 1-3, 1986. The resources cited are in the Air Force Academy library collection.

0579 **Nuclear Power Status and Prospects in the USSR.**

World Energy Conference, London, England. L. D. Ryabev. October 1986. 12pp. [7 frames.]

Power industry is a leading and fast developing branch of the USSR economy. The production of primary fuel resources in the country should

increase from the present 2.3 billion tons of reference fuel/year up to 3.2–3.4 billion tons of reference fuel/year by 2000. During this period the electricity production at nuclear power plants is expected to increase at least 5–7 times. Technical and economical advantages of large-scale nuclear power development and the increased role of nuclear power in future energy production in the USSR are based on the following fundamental factors: (1) With the introduction of nuclear breeding technology the fuel resources will become practically unlimited. (2) There are reliable means to solve environmental protection issues at modern nuclear power plants and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities, as well as contemplated solutions of radioactive waste disposal problems. (3) Nuclear power plants are economically competitive with fossil-fuel power plants in a number of industrial regions. Includes five references and three tables.

- 0586 **Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown]. October 1986. 55pp.

This publication is a functional reference guide to leading officials of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, as well as to chiefs of prominent schools and attachés assigned to foreign countries. Names and positions reflect information received from unclassified sources as of October 1, 1986. Two lists follow the table of contents. The first lists military officers who hold membership of high-level bodies of the CPSU, including its Politburo, Central Committee, and Central Auditing Commission. The second list is a key to military rank abbreviations used in this publication.

- 0641 **Marshal [N. V.] Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation.**
Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Mary C. FitzGerald. November 1986. 31pp.

A review of Marshal N. V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977 to 1985 reveals that Ogarkov has long been the prophet of what General William Odom has dubbed the "third revolution" in Soviet military affairs. Ogarkov's recurrent message encapsulates the changes in Soviet doctrine and capabilities that constitute the new revolution: the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons and new combat characteristics of conventional means require that the forms and methods of combat actions be adapted accordingly. Like Ogarkov, most prominent Soviet military figures have concluded that nonnuclear weapons outfitted with emerging technologies will furnish conventional solutions to nuclear problems in a future war. But

Ogarkov's 1985 theater operation may well be the first official acknowledgement of the new, all-conventional dimension in Soviet strategy for a war on the European continent.

0672 **World Crop Production, November 1986. USSR Grain Statistics: 1981–1985 in Perspective.**

Foreign Agricultural Service, Washington, D.C. November 1986. 17pp. [Frames incorrectly numbered. This document begins on the second Frame 0672.]

Considering the significant role of grain in the economy of the USSR, it is necessary to analyze the yield and production data for the last five years and to put them into perspective. The period beginning 1971 was selected for this, since in the early 1970s, the leadership of the USSR seriously embarked on a program to improve the Soviet diet, specifically to increase the per capita consumption of livestock products. Also, 1971–1985 coincides with three five-year plans, which are central for all economic activity in the USSR. Greater and assured availability of grain was the focal point of the effort to improve livestock output.

0689 **Naval Ship Utility: The Soviet Perspective.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Dale M. Dassler, Jr. December 1986. 96pp.

This thesis critically reviews twenty-two articles from the Soviet naval digest, *Morskoy Sbornik*, dealing with a wide spectrum of measures of effectiveness such as individual time efficiency, antisubmarine warfare search effectiveness, command decision efficiency, effectiveness of antisubmarine warfare training, measures of force control, and others. These Soviet measures of effectiveness are categorized by level of combat action. Although there is some question about the specific Soviet meaning of the translations, this thesis uses the translator's rendering of the basic units of Soviet naval organization: individual, sub-unit (*podrazdeleniye*), unit (*chast'*), and force (*soyedineniye*). The level of combat action above force [generally agreed to be named front (*front*) and theater of military action (*Teatr Voyennykh Deystviy*)] are not included in this study. The articles illustrate the Soviet tendency to organize their operations research along the same lines as the units of naval organization and indicate that the most basic measure of naval ship utility is combat effectiveness.

0785 Threat and Opportunity: The Soviet View of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Karl W. Uchirnscko. December 1986. 149pp.

The Soviet response to the Strategic Defense Initiative during the period March 1983 through November 1985 provided indications of their view of the program both as a threat and as an opportunity to weaken NATO. The Strategic Defense Initiative is seen not only as a threat to the physical security of the Soviet Union, but also as part of an effort by the United States to seize the strategic initiative by neutralizing the military component of Soviet strategy. A major objective of that strategy is the political separation of Western Europe from the United States, which the Soviets sought to facilitate by aggravating allied concern over the Strategic Defense Initiative's potential implications for European security and economic interests.

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1986 cont.

0001 Soviet Policies Toward the Developing World during the 1980s: The Dilemmas of Power and Presence.

Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. D. S. Papp. December 1986. 415pp.

Contents: The evolution of Soviet policies; objectives and constraints; political-diplomatic parameters; economic assistance and trade; Soviet military assistance to the developing world; Soviet force-projection capabilities and military presence; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East; Sub-Saharan Africa; South Asia; Southeast Asia; Conclusions: the dilemmas of power and presence.

1987

0416 Structural Change In the Soviet Economy, 1959-1977: An Input-Output Analysis.

Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. M. C. Hatfield. 1987. 75pp.

Scholars have studied the Soviet economy for decades to better understand its operation, performance, and development. These efforts have concentrated on many aspects of the economy such as: the growth of gross national product and national income and their distribution

among main branches of the economy, output levels planned and achieved by various industries, the development and changes within individual industries, and the development strategy for the national economy and the resulting investment priorities. Few studies, however, have provided a detailed analysis of interactions among industries and how these interactions have changed over time. Input-output analysis is a methodology that was developed to analyze the interactions among industries. While input-output analysis has been used extensively to study the economy of individual countries, to compare economies of different countries, and to study changes in an economy over time, it has been used rather sparingly to gain additional information concerning the Soviet economy. This thesis uses reconstructed versions of the Soviet input-output model to study changes in the level of complexity and structures of the Soviet economy.

- 0491 **A Historical Investigation of Soviet Strategic Deception.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Robert K. George. January 1, 1987. 100pp.
This study consolidates various, unclassified Soviet military and political writings on strategic deception into a theoretical model. The Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are then compared and contrasted to the model. The study shows these two specific invasions to be "textbook" examples of Soviet strategic deceptions.
- 0591 **Economics of Defense: The Soviet Military Budget.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Jack L. Bailey, Jr. January 1, 1987. 32pp.
This report looks at the trend of the Soviet economy in recent years in an attempt to relate the condition of the general economy to the size of the Soviet defense budget. It highlights the difficulty in quantifying the Soviet defense budget and what attempts have been made to establish cost estimates.
- 0623 **Message Dated 8 January 1987 from Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations.**
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. January 1987. 7pp.
This message is an account to the world community on what the Soviet Union did concretely in 1986 to ensure that this year, proclaimed by the United Nations the International Year of Peace, justifies the hopes pinned on it.

- 0630 **Soviet Military Power, 1987.**
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] 1987. 157pp.
 Developments in the USSR armed forces over the past year are reviewed and placed in the context of current doctrine and strategy. The USSR strategic defense program is updated. The realities of the Soviet military power are documented. It is clear that the Soviet Union, together with Soviet-backed forces, is fully capable of simultaneous aggression in multiple regions of the world and of threatening U.S. vital interests. The U.S. national security strategies and the capabilities required to execute them must take into account the reality of the Soviet military power.
- 0787 **Marshal [N. V.] Ogarkov and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs.**
Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Mary C. FitzGerald. January 1987. 27pp.
 When the Soviets accepted "Mutual Assured Destruction" as a reality in present-day conditions, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of politics only in theory, an instrument of politics that cannot be used. A growing body of evidence thus indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Marshal N. V. Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term military development goal. Ogarkov and others now speak of a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and the trend toward new, conventional means. The most prominent Soviet military figures now equate the new conventional means with nuclear weapons in terms of tasks, ranges, and target sets. A review of Soviet military writings in the 1980s further indicates that the new conventional means will be used in a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers.
- 0814 **[Mikhail] Gorbachev's Arms Control Strategy.**
Russian Studies Program, University of Houston, Texas. Joseph L. Noguee. January 22, 1987. 23pp.
 Soviet foreign policy under the Gorbachev administration, along with domestic policy, has been in a state of flux, particularly in the realm of arms control policy. Both in substance and style Gorbachev introduced a new dynamic in arms control policy. He has skillfully manipulated the issue for propaganda appeal. But also he has shown flexibility in modifying Soviet positions both to respond to U.S. demands and to exert pressure on the United States to reach an agreement. Soviet arms control

objectives (some of which are incompatible) may be realized either through a formal agreement with the United States or without an agreement. These objectives include: (1) to use arms control to build a new framework for relations with the United States to replace detente; (2) to kill the strategic defense initiative; (3) to constrain U.S. development in manned aircraft and cruise missiles; (4) to delegitimize nuclear weapons as an instrument of military strategy; and (5) to exacerbate differences between the United States and Europe. During his first year in power Gorbachev relied heavily on propaganda with calls for eliminating nuclear weapons by the twenty-first century, his test ban moratorium, and denunciation of Strategic Defense Initiative. After the 21st Party Congress he significantly modified Soviet positions closer to those of the United States with his acceptance of the "zero option" for Intermediate Nuclear Forces, deep cuts in strategic weapons, and willingness to accept limited research on Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev now sees an arms control agreement as essential to his program for domestic reform and is prepared to make genuine concessions to achieve it. With or without an agreement the Soviet Union is committed to the long-term goal of building a psychological barrier in the West to the use or contemplated use of nuclear weapons.

Reel 7

1987 cont.

- 0001 **The Soviet General Staff: Its Impact on Military Professionalism and National Security Decision Making.**
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Kenneth M. Currie. February 15, 1987. 210pp.
Most studies of the Soviet military fail to note the paramount importance of the General Staff within the Ministry of Defense. The Soviet General Staff is the central directing organ within the Soviet military establishment. An examination of the role of the General Staff in terms of the elaboration and implementation of Soviet military doctrine, the participation of the Soviet military in various aspects of foreign policy activities—including arms control and the provision of military assistance—and the involvement of the General Staff in the affairs of the highest state organs concerned with Soviet national security affairs serves to confirm the substantial influence of this key organ, which is accurately characterized by the Soviets as the "brain of the army." At the same time, a focus upon

the activities of the General Staff in fostering the growth of a professional Soviet officer corps necessitates a re-appraisal of existing models of Party-military relations in the Soviet Union. The three prevailing models—conflict, institutional congruence, and participatory—of those relations all appear to have as their central assumption the existence of actual or latent hostility between the Party and military institutions. In the case of the latter two models, this potential conflict is minimized through the convergence of values and the Party's satisfaction of the military's corporate interests. The emergence of a stable, legitimate political system in the USSR suggests that it is time to re-evaluate Samuel Huntington's patterns of civil-military relations, for they appear relevant to the current Soviet situation. Adopting Huntington's criteria, there is ample evidence that a truly professional military officer corps has emerged in the USSR. The emergence of this corps suggests a long-term stability in Party-military relations. The Soviet military possesses unique expertise, strong corporate feelings, and a deep sense of responsibility to the Party, state, and society, which are all attributes of a professional military. The Party can be assured of the loyalty of such a modern, professional officer corps.

0211 **Book Analysis—*The Soviet Viewpoint*.**

Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. February 17, 1987. 30pp.

The average U.S. Air Force officer knows little of Soviet perceptions. This knowledge is essential in order to understand Soviet past and present actions and predict future actions. The Book Analysis—*The Soviet Viewpoint* [by Georgi Arbatov and William Oltmans] compares and contrasts Soviet viewpoints on several subjects with those of U.S. Soviet experts and consensus U.S. viewpoints.

0240 **Soviet Ground and Tactical Air Forces.**

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C. Jeffrey Record. February 23, 1987. 29pp. [Frame numbers are misnumbered. This document begins on the second 0240 frame.]

Soviet ground and tactical air forces, long numerically superior to Western ground and tactical air forces deployed on or along the Eurasian landmass, also enjoy profound geographical advantages, especially vis-à-vis NATO forces deployed in Europe. The quality of Soviet ground force weapons and equipment is moreover second to none anywhere in the world, and though Soviet tactical aircraft remain on balance technologically inferior to NATO's, the Soviets have managed to narrow the qualitative gap substantially during the past two decades. Against these advantages, however, must be counted a number of unquantifiable disadvantages, such as: (1) the comparatively greater strategic demands

imposed upon Soviet ground and the USSR's extensive borders, (2) the incompatibility of the Soviet military's professed operational doctrine and the Soviet Union's authoritarian political culture, (3) the inferior quality and training of Soviet military manpower, and (4) declining Soviet competitiveness in many advanced military technologies such as "stealth" and Strategic Defense Initiative related technologies. Between now and the year 2000 it is unlikely that the Soviet ground and tactical air forces would be prepared to give up their long-standing numerical and geographical advantages. On the other hand, if the West were to allocate more resources to exploiting its inherently greater technological competitiveness (an effort that would require, among other things, a reduction in present levels of licit and illicit advanced technology transfer to the Eastern bloc), it could compel the Soviet Union to choose between ground and tactical air forces that are (1) numerically superior but no longer qualitatively competitive, or (2) qualitatively competitive but no longer endowed with an operationally significant numerical advantage.

0269

The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy Environment to the Year 2000. *University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Alvin Z. Rubinstein. February 23, 1987. 29pp.*

The advent of the Gorbachev era invites comparison with the Khrushchev era thirty years ago. Both leaders were confronted by major domestic and foreign policy problems, dilemmas, and choices. The similarities are striking: the struggle for power at a time of mounting economic and political dilemmas; the quest for rationalization of Soviet-East European economic relationships, subject to Moscow's continued control; the need to improve relations with the United States; and the readiness to pursue Soviet objectives in the Third World irrespective of their adverse consequences for Soviet-American relations. The differences are significant and intensify Gorbachev's problem: Gorbachev's USSR is far stronger than Khrushchev's and is a credible nuclear power; Gorbachev has many more options in the Third World; the Far East is a major foreign policy issue; and U.S. influence in the international system is less in the 1980s than it was in the 1950s. The thrust of this analysis is toward essential continuity in the decade or so ahead. The Kremlin is confronted with growing domestic problems, but in foreign policy the following aims seem likely: preservation of the imperial system in Eastern Europe; improved relations with the United States, including arms control agreements if possible; normalization of ties with China and Japan; and competitive rivalry with the United States in the Third World.

- 0298 **Soviet Troop Control and the Power Distribution.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Stanley K. Snyder. March 1987. 37pp.
This thesis explores the purpose of Soviet troop control and how it relates to their national policy and tactics for war. While their command decision making body is highly centralized, decision making is executed at the local level through a system of staff representatives to control the reserves.
- 0335 **Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projections.**
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Francis Fukuyama, et al. March 1987. 86pp.
This paper analyzes the views of Soviet non-military writers and political leaders on the question of power projection in the Third World. Although Soviet writers do not broach the subject directly, they touch on power projection indirectly when writing on the themes of (1) the local political basis of revolutionary power, (2) external (Soviet Union) aid and assistance to Third World clients vs. competing domestic and military claims, (3) the role of "armed struggle" in promoting revolutionary change, and (4) the risky effects of Third World activism on relations with the United States. Each of these themes is examined in some detail. The author finds that only in discussions of armed struggle as a revolutionary strategy do the Soviets recognize greater opportunities for power projection, and this is restricted to Central America. Possible future Soviet policy is discussed.
- 0421 **Soviet Leadership on Nuclear War.**
Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. M. C. FitzGerald. April 1987. 43pp.
Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear war. Leading Soviet military thinkers have themselves traced the origin of this phenomenon to evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. In his 1982 book *Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland*, N. V. Ogarkov used provocative language to describe recent developments in military affairs. "A profound and revolutionary in the full sense of the word, perevorot (revolution, turnabout, upheaval) in military affairs is occurring in our time... ." He connected this revolution with rapid quantitative developments in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and with the significantly qualitative upgrading of conventional means of destruction. In his 1985 post-transfer book, *History Teaches Vigilance*, he

stressed that his profound and revolutionary, in the full sense of the word, perevorot is continuing in our time. This document presents opinions on Soviet leadership in nuclear war.

- 0464 **The Soviet's Use of Airpower in a Counterinsurgency Campaign.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Robert A. Sutley. April 1, 1987. 29pp.

In December 1979 the USSR invaded Afghanistan and has been involved in a counterinsurgency ever since. This study looks at one aspect of that conflict, Soviet airpower. Using the case study format it examines some doctrinal tenets that drive the Soviet's use of airpower and specifically how they are employing their assets in Afghanistan. By viewing their tactics and choices of weapons, Western observers can learn a great deal about the Soviet military's compatibilities. The study concludes with some of the lessons that have emerged from this conflict.

- 0493 **Geopolitics: The Key to Understanding Soviet Regional Behavior.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Bruce D. Slawter. April 1, 1987. 23pp.

The body of theoretical knowledge known as traditional geopolitics plays an important supporting role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. Understanding this role, one can begin to build a usable theoretical framework for analyzing Soviet behavior in strategically important regions of the world. This study, an article written for publication in *AIR FORCE Magazine*, shows how [Sir Halford J.] Mackinder's theoretical notion of systemic conflicts between heartland-controlling land powers and rimland-controlling sea powers is consistent with the Marxist-Leninist Theory of War—the ideological basis for Soviet foreign policy. The article then explains how the USSR is pursuing its fundamental geopolitical goal—increasing its influence in the rimlands of peninsular Europe and Asia—by providing the reader an up-to-date synopsis of ongoing Soviet activities in three key regions of the world: Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Caribbean basin.

- 0516 **Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission.**
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Francis Fukuyama. April 1987. 95pp.

This report considers the ways that policy toward the Third World has been a factor in Soviet civil-military relations. It pieces together what we know about evolving Soviet military views on the Third World, and tests the hypothesis that the military as an institution was in some way an advocate of intervention after the early 1970s. The author (1) provides a brief overview of the mechanics of Soviet decision making on the Third World and of how the military fits into the picture; (2) traces the ascending

curve of military interest in the Third World, beginning with the Soviet navy's pursuit of bases in the 1960s and the development by the early 1970s of the concept of a "liberating mission" for the Soviet armed forces as a whole; (3) discusses the subsequent downplaying of the "liberating mission" under the military leadership that took over in 1976; (4) analyzes the effect of the invasion of Afghanistan on the military's view of intervention in general and on civil-military relations; and (5) provides an overview of the evolution in military thinking about the Third World. The author concludes that the Soviet military's views of the Third World are complicated and do not fit a simple pattern. The Soviet military has a point of view on Third World issues distinct from that of the political leadership.

- 0611 **Red Terror In the Sky: Soviet Aerial Aggression, 1946-1986.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Martin C. Alvstad. April 1987. 39pp.

The Soviet Union shocked and surprised the world in 1983 when they shot down a Korean Air Lines jumbo jet and killed 269 people. Moscow's motive for this tragic destruction was based on their paranoia of the outside world penetrating their borders to spy on them. This article examines several incidents preceding the Korean Air Lines shoot down that reinforce this paranoia of the Soviets. The conclusion is clear: Moscow's policy is to force down or shoot down any aircraft violating their borders or approaching their sensitive military complexes. The Korean Air Lines shoot down or any future shoot downs around the Soviet periphery or inside their borders is a predictable event, not a surprise.

- 0650 **Key Personnel and Organizations of the Soviet Military High Command.**
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Edward L. Warner III, et al. April 1987. 82pp.

This paper describes the organizational arrangements, including the wartime chain of command, and policy-making relationships for the direction of defense policy at the highest levels of the Soviet system. It also provides a history of the occupants of senior command positions in the Ministry of Defense over the past ten to twenty years. This information is displayed in various forms, and the military commands that have served as stepping-stones to higher responsibility in the Soviet high command are identified. The paper provides information on organizational and personnel changes through February 1987.

0732 **Theater Strategy Training for Senior Leaders.**

Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. April 1987. 46pp.

Remarks on the declining combat experience of the active military force introduce a discussion on the importance of capturing the lessons of previous wars in training and education programs for future senior U.S. Air Force leaders. A discussion follows comparing U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army terminology concerning the operational level of war and operational art to set the basis for a look at current training and education programs. The author presents his views on the need for emphasis in training and educating future senior combat leaders for the operational level of war—that area where national strategy is focused into theater and campaign strategy and linked to battlefield tactics. This need for training and education goes beyond the study of history and procedural knowledge into the area of enhancing intuition, instinct, and judgement in the face of uncertain knowledge of the enemy. The senior service schools are offered as the forum for developing a foundation for these mental skills.

0778 **Deep Attack: The Soviet Conduct of Operational Maneuver.**

Soviet Army Studies Office, Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. D. M. Glantz. April 1987. 135pp.

In a 1967 study, Y. Novikov and F. Sverdov discussed the operational maneuver concept. It is undertaken to achieve success in an operation in keeping with the concept and under the guidance of the commander of an operational unit. Its scope, as regards forces involved, and particularly area and time (except for maneuver with nuclear power) transcends the bound of the battlefield. Operational maneuver is aimed at changing the situation in the course of an operation to facilitate the fulfillment of intermediate assignments or even bring the operation to a successful conclusion. It may take the form of maneuver with nuclear strikes delivered by operational or tactical missiles or the army air force, or a maneuver by operational groups from one sector to another to exploit success or outflank an enemy group on the defensive, etc. This paper, which addresses those Soviet experiences with operational maneuvers and ponders how those experiences have affected current Soviet operational techniques, was written on the assumption that we must understand what the contemporary Soviet officer has learned and applied from his army's past.

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1987 cont.

- 0001 **Appearances of Soviet Leaders, January–December 1986.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] April 1987. 232pp.

This publication provides a record of the known appearances of selected Soviet public figures during 1986. Coverage includes members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU, leading officials of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the chairman of the Committee for State Security, and the minister of internal affairs. This publication also contains a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in its preparation; a list of the individuals covered; an alphabetical list of the known appearances of the individuals during the period covered, including the date, nature, and location of each appearance and the source of information; and a chronological list of appearances with names arranged alphabetically for a given date. An index to major organizations and a personality index follows the directory listing.

- 0233 **Sea Control in the Arctic: A Soviet Perspective.**
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Dennis M. Egan and David W. Orr. April 20, 1987. 52pp.

This paper exposes the ominous Soviet capability to outflank the U.S. Maritime Strategy by exploiting sea control in the Arctic Ocean. This is a recent development resulting from a long-term effort by the Soviet Union to gain access to the immense natural resources of the Siberian region by constructing an intermodal transportation system that links the Trans-Siberian Railroad to various northward flowing rivers and port facilities of embarkation servicing the Soviet Northern Sea Route. By building an unprecedented ice-strengthened fleet of nuclear and conventionally powered icebreakers, naval combatants, and cargo ships, they have opened the Northern Sea Route to virtually year-round operation. This has been coupled to an infrastructure of specialized lighterage and handling systems to move cargo quickly through remote Arctic areas. Although the primary incentives for this development have been economic, the strategic implications are frightening. In the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Mediterranean, concentric circles of Soviet defensive power radiate outward from the motherland but are effectively contained by U.S. and NATO military power. Only in the Arctic can the Soviets project defensive forces virtually unopposed because the West continues

to envision the icy polar seas as impenetrable geographic barriers. Meanwhile, the Soviets have developed superior Arctic mobility which, in the near future, can be used to exploit their inherent geo-strategic advantages. They have the capability to project their military forces forward to the North American continent along a new polar axis of advance that provides them with interior lines of communication. Even without first use of nuclear weapons, they have the potential to cut vital U.S. and Canadian energy supplies and may be able to strategically dislocate North American military forces and material desperately needed by our NATO allies of Western Europe. Some recommendations are offered for U.S. and Canadian defense planners to counter this Soviet threat.

0285 **Operational Employment of Airborne Forces: The Soviet Approach and the Implications for NATO.**

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lloyd W. Sherfey. April 22, 1987. 57pp.

This monograph examines the Soviet concept for the operational employment of airborne (parachute) forces and the implications of this threat for NATO planners. As background material the study first examines the pre-World War II evolution of Soviet airborne doctrine in relation to the evolving Soviet concept of deep battle. Proceeding to the wartime era, two examples of Soviet operational airborne employments are analyzed: the assaults of Vyzama and at the Dnepr River. The study then reviews the postwar era during which major Soviet advances in technology finally resulted in a force capable of meeting the expectations of the early Soviet theorists. The second portion of the monograph reviews the current Soviet airborne organization in terms of equipment and lift capability, and then assesses the most probable modes of employment in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Among the conclusions drawn are the following: (1) the majority of Soviet airborne insertions will be operational (as opposed to tactical or strategic); (2) employment will occur very early in the conflict; (3) the four most likely targets are logistical facilities, key terrain, reserves, and airfields; and (4) operational employments will consist of several massive insertions (up to division size) rather than numerous small ones. The final section of the monograph assesses the implication for NATO and concludes that while existing rear-battle doctrine and literature are adequate, there is a dangerous lack of emphasis on this threat. The study further recognizes that in order to counter this threat, planners will have to make difficult choices regarding the diversion of assets needed for the close battle.

Nevertheless, current Soviet literature and doctrine leaves little doubt that operational airborne insertions will occur, and it is imperative that NATO planners begin to address this issue.

0342 **Exploiting the Vertical Dimension: Continuing Development of the Soviet Desant Force Structure.**

Soviet Army Studies Office, Army Combined Armed Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. J. F. Holcombe and G. H. Turbiville. May 1987. 46pp.

The Soviet concept of "desant" is defined in their Military Encyclopedia Dictionary as forces, specially prepared and landed or designated for landing on the enemy's territory for the purpose of conducting combat actions. In other words, it encompasses both the force and the landing of the force together in one term. The evolution of the Soviet desant system remains a dynamic process. Their approach is primarily a systems approach, i.e., the interrelationships of technology, force structure, operational concepts and man himself. If we in the West are to be successful in accurately perceiving Soviet force development in all arenas, we must come to grips with understanding this unique approach to development. If we can do this, we will avoid the tendency to define Soviet military capabilities on the basis of a "snapshot" that reflects only a stage of development. By viewing trends in a systems context, with an understanding of the Soviet dialectical approach to military development, we can acquire some predictive ability and reduce the time lag between particular Soviet developments and our understanding of them.

0388 **The Role of Initiative in Soviet Operational Command.**

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Russell H. Thaden. May 20, 1987. 50pp.

This monograph examines the role of initiative in Soviet operational level command. It seeks to answer the question: Do Soviet operational commanders have the personal initiative and latitude to react to unexpected or changed situations on their own responsibility? This question is prompted by a real perception that Soviet commanders tend to be rigid and inflexible due to over centralized command and control. If this perception is correct, the Soviet army may be unable to react rapidly to changing situations. If it is false, Western military doctrine and planning may be based on false assumptions. The paper then examines Soviet operational initiative through World War II. This begins with a brief discussion of the prewar doctrinal basis. Then, three operational level commanders are examined: General M. M. Popov, who did not display significant individual initiative during his February 1943 operations;

General Pavel Rotmistrov, who commanded a tank army during and after the Battle of Kursk in mid-1943; and showed considerable initiative and moral courage, providing an important example of the increasing ability of the Soviet army to tolerate initiative; and Marshal Ivan S. Koniev, who showed extremely strong initiative and courage in developing his plan of operations for the Lvov-Sandomierz operation in July to August 1944. This section concludes with a discussion of the changes in Soviet doctrine during World War II that strengthened the importance of initiative. Next the monograph discusses the changes that have impacted on the initiative of Soviet commanders since World War II. Major factors are the complete mechanization of their forces, the impact of the atomic bomb, the role of advancing technology, and the changes in Soviet society and government. All of these changes tend to make it more necessary and possible for Soviet commanders to exercise their initiative. The monograph concludes that Soviet commanders are quite capable of exercising initiative in planning and conducting operations. This has a significant impact on U.S. doctrine and operational planning. The implication is that understanding the personality and skill of opposing Soviet commanders is extremely important as it affects Soviet capabilities as much as does their armament and doctrine.

- 0438 **USSR Confronts the Information Revolution.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] May 1987. 24pp.

On 12-13 November 1986 a conference, convened under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence, analyzed the implications of the information revolution for the Soviet Union. The conference brought together distinguished experts from the academic, business, and public policy communities.

- 0462 **Directory of Soviet Officials: Science and Education.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] May 1987. 378pp.

This directory identifies individuals who hold positions in selected party, government, scientific, and public organizations of the USSR.

- 0840 **An Appreciation for Vulnerability to Deception at the Operational Level.**

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Charles E. Burgdorf. May 7, 1987. 51pp. Historically, the army that concentrates adequate deception effort against specific enemy vulnerabilities to deception has usually been successful in its operation. The army that neglects its potential for vulnerability to deception is often not successful, when an opponent chooses to exploit

that vulnerability. The U.S. Army has recently renewed its interest in deception as a pro-active means of gaining surprise. More recently the issue of deception at the operational level has received attention. The Soviet Union on the other hand has steadily maintained and increased an emphasis in this area since World War II. Applying this historical condition to the apparent imbalance in developed deception doctrine, the operational planner becomes concerned, if not alarmed, at the potential for U.S. vulnerability to deception at the operational level. This study reviews historical examples of vulnerability to deception. It examines the Soviet concept of deception, or *maskirovka*, and the corresponding U.S. progress in developing organizations and doctrine for deception. And, filtered through the screen of modern warfare conditions, historical vulnerabilities are compared to U.S. conditions to determine current applicability of those vulnerabilities. From this examination the study derives potential U.S. vulnerabilities to deception at the operational level. Having proposed these vulnerabilities it examines implications for training, doctrine, and planning of current operations.

0891 **Soviet Airborne Forces and the Central Region: Problems and Perceptions.**

Soviet Army Studies Office, Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. J. F. Holcomb. June 1987. 35pp.

Use of massive amounts of airpower and conventional surface-to-surface missiles in lieu of nuclear strikes will allow the Soviets to break into NATO's operational rear with force-tailored, highly mobile formations called operational maneuver groups. The operational maneuver groups would be of division or army/corps size at army and front level, respectively. They would conduct raiding actions once in NATO's rear area to disrupt command, control, communications, and logistical functions, capture key facilities such as air-fields, and destroy nuclear weapons facilities and launchers. The goal of this operational concept is to present NATO military and political leaders with a fait-accompli by Day 3 or 4 in which the destruction of nuclear delivery means and the intermixing of Soviet and NATO units in the rear area preclude a NATO nuclear response to the offensive. All of these writers posit the massive Soviet employment of airborne and air-assault formations to support the advance of combined arms forces generally and in particular the operational maneuver groups as they penetrate beyond tactical (50 km) defenses into the operational depths. As the air defense environment in Europe is the densest of anywhere in the world this would seem to pose some problem to Soviet leaders tasked with employment of these forces in support of such an offensive. The purpose of this paper is to examine in

some detail the capabilities and limitations of Soviet airborne forces in a specific context, that is, in support of a theater offensive. To properly analyze this issue it is necessary to examine current Soviet views on employment of their airborne forces.

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1987 cont.

- 0001 **Assessment of the Impacts of Transferring Certain Nuclear Reactor Technologies to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.**
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington. J. W. Unton. June 1987. 73pp.
The Office of International Security Affairs of the U.S. Department of Energy has asked Pacific Northwest Laboratory researchers to assist in evaluating the impact that transfer of specific nuclear reactor technologies may have on U.S. national security interests. The evaluation is intended to be used as a technical basis and guideline to approve or disapprove requests from government and industry to transfer a specific technology to Soviet countries. The U.S. government has a responsibility to review such requests. For the post-Chernobyl information-gathering and dissemination process, the U.S. Department of Energy is serving as the U.S. government's point of contact with private industry. It is U.S. Department of Energy's policy to encourage and assist the Eastern Bloc countries to enhance the safety, reliability, and safe operation of civil nuclear reactor power plant facilities worldwide consistent with U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests. Any requests from industry for the supply of nuclear reactor technology, equipment, and services will be considered in accordance with existing nuclear export policy, law, and regulations. All requests and proposals, whether discussed in this document or not, will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. It should be noted that this is the initial version of the report. Subsequent, updated versions are expected to follow. Design and operation of nuclear reactor power plants involve an extensive array of technologies, not all of which have been addressed here.
- 0074 **Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] June 1987. 323pp.
This directory identifies individuals who hold positions in selected party, government, and public organizations of the USSR.

- 0397 **Directory of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] July 1987. 45pp.
An organizational and functional guide to the domestic headquarters units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including ambassadors at large whose permanent posts are in Moscow, officials of the Leningrad Diplomatic Agency, the staff and faculty of the training organs, and the foreign ministers of the USSR's constituent republics.
- 0442 **Directory of USSR Foreign Trade Organizations and Officials.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] July 1987. 106pp.
This publication is a reference guide to leading officials of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and other organizations engaged in foreign trade activities. It may be used to find the incumbents of given positions within an organization or the positions of given individuals. It also serves as a guide to the internal structure of some organizations. The directory supersedes the Directory of USSR Foreign Trade Organizations and Officials.
- 0548 **Soviet Aviation Technology's State of the Art SU-27 Fighter.**
Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. G. Fei. July 15, 1987. 12pp.
The SU-27 fighter makes use of avionics equipment representing the highest current level of Soviet technology and is estimated to be comparable in its overall capabilities to third generation U.S. fighters. What is attracting peoples' interest is whether or not the SU-27 is able to undertake long-range interceptor missions or has been created as a medium-type fighter for loading aboard aircraft carriers.
- 0560 **Arms Control and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs.**
Naval Warfare Operations Division, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. M. C. FitzGerald. August 1, 1987. 22pp.
According to Soviet military writers, the changes in doctrine that constitute the new revolution in Soviet military affairs were generated by evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. A review of Soviet military literature in the 1980s moreover provides evidence that changes in strategy, operational art, and tactics have in turn generated changes in force structure and weapons modernization that indicate a downgrading of nuclear contingencies and a preference for conventional warfare, especially in light of Gorbachev's repeated admissions that the present level of Soviet defense expenditures threatens to derail his internal restructuring. The new revolution in Soviet military affairs implies a genuine Soviet incentive to pursue arms control agreements with the United States.

0582 **Toward a Profile of Soviet Behavior in International Financial Markets.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. C. R. Neu and John Lund. August 1987. 69pp.

This report uses publicly available, unclassified information as background for an effort to describe the nature of and motivations for Soviet international hard-currency financial transactions. These include all Soviet dealings with the industrialized world outside the Soviet bloc and most Soviet dealings with developing countries. The authors attempt to determine how much, with whom, how, and why the Soviets deal in international financial markets. In addition, they have aimed to assess the value of future research into Soviet financial dealings. The report (1) provides an overview of the Soviet hard-currency balance sheet, (2) assesses the completeness of current reporting on Soviet debts, (3) discusses Soviet assets, (4) examines the style of Soviet operations in international financial markets, and (5) outlines possible directions for future research.

0651 **Soviet-Warsaw Pact Western Theater of Military Operations: Organizations and Missions.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Michael Sadyklewicz. August 1987. 186pp.

This note is part of a project designed to identify key aspects of a prospective Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, air-land offensive fought with conventional weapons in Central Europe, and to assess the capabilities of U.S. forces, operating within the NATO context, to identify and attack those targets within critical time periods. The author examines the organization and apparent missions of Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces operating in what the Soviets call the Western theater of military operations. Four scenarios illustrate the concepts of operations that the Warsaw Pact would probably follow during the first five days of a European theater conventional war. The scenarios depict the movements and activities of four representative divisions in the first strategic echelon.

0837 **Soviet High-Technology Restructuring Drive: The MNTK Network.**

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Simon Kassel. August 1987. 55pp.

This note assesses the nature and effectiveness of a new type of Soviet scientific-industrial organization, a network of interbranch science and technology complexes (MNTKs) designed to stimulate the development of advanced technologies. The author analyzes the structure, special features, and research areas of the MNTKs, and considers their intended capabilities in the light of early Soviet comments on their operation. He

concludes with an assessment of their probable impact on the development of Soviet advanced technologies. Currently available information on each reported MNTK is provided in an appendix.

0892 **Enterprise-Level Computing in the Soviet Economy.**

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] August 1987. 64pp.

Since 1966 the Soviets have undertaken a massive program to introduce computer-based information and control systems (ASUs) into all management levels of the economy. ASU is a generic term used by the Soviets to designate a wide variety of computerized data-processing systems, from simple automated bookkeeping to complex systems for the collection, processing, and distribution of economic data throughout the economy. ASUs applied to enterprise management (ASUPs) are intended to foster more rapid and extensive information exchange within and outside the enterprise and, ultimately, the routine use of optimization techniques in enterprise management decisions. After two decades ASUPs have been introduced in less than ten percent of all enterprises, and these ASUPs generally are limited to information collection and processing for accounting applications. Soviet industry has provided slow, unreliable, and sometimes obsolete computer equipment to enterprises, usually in insufficient quantities. The USSR has taken initiatives to step up and change the character of enterprise computerization.

0956 **Soviet Naval Strategy?**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. James J. Tritten. August 1987. 14pp.

This report addresses concepts of Soviet military doctrine and assesses recent Soviet literature discussion of a "theory" of the navy. The author concludes that under Soviet military doctrine, there is only one military strategy, and that an independent naval strategy does not exist.

Reel 10

1987 cont.

0001 **Eastern Europe and Soviet Coalitional Warfare: Dilemmas of Analysis.**

Soviet Army Studies Office, Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. N. Gross. September 1987. 33pp.

Soviet strategists believe that whether a future war is limited or all-nuclear, short or protracted, it will be fought in the European theater or on

a global scale by opposing coalitions of states. Yet, at present, Soviet military theoreticians address coalitional operations and strategic coordination. The author examines Western scholarship on Soviet/East European military relations. She identifies some flaws and failures in the study of coalitional warfare: (1) Western scholars, while ignoring substantive issues for which there is an abundance of untapped evidence, have paid too much attention to questions (e.g., political reliability) that cannot be answered through an empirical investigation; (2) little effort has been devoted to the systematic study of published East European military materials and the data on military experiences of emigres from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania; and (3) academic scholars have tended to study the Warsaw Pact as a political institution rather than examine the complexities of Soviet/East European relations broadly conceived. She recommends that independent researchers pay attention to military aspects of Soviet-East European relations, namely, defense economy, military history, strategic thinking, operations and tactics, i.e., the areas carefully studied by military scholars in the Eastern bloc.

0034 **Development of Soviet "Tactical" Aviation In the Postwar Period: Technological Change, Organizational Innovation and Doctrinal Continuity.**

Soviet Army Studies Office, Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. J. W. Kipp. November 1987. 37pp.

There have been four distinct periods of military aviation doctrinal development since 1945, during which the composition, organization, and structure of Soviet air forces have undergone considerable changes. By the 1980s, along with other technological changes, aviation in all its manifestations had recast operational art. The air sphere in combat actions and operations has acquired an ever-growing role, which gives to modern operations a three-dimensional, deep character. The path to this present situation contained its own share of twists and ironies. That same path also offers some clues relating to the further development of Soviet air forces and their roles in operational art and tactics.

0071 **Guide to Monetary Measures of Soviet Defense Activities.**

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] November 1987. 27pp.

This paper is intended to acquaint the reader with the considerations involved in choosing a monetary base for valuing Soviet defense activities. The paper is tutorial in nature, simplistic in some respects, and not intended to be either definitive or an official presentation of intelligence estimates. It focuses on the concepts behind the measures rather than on the methods of data collection and calculation.

- 0098 **Understanding the Soviet Threat: The Necessity of Analyzing Soviet Military Thought and Actions from a Soviet Perspective.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Matthew Deane Tittle. December 1987. 114pp.

In order to properly evaluate the Soviet officer's actions in war, it is not only necessary to know his order of battle and capabilities but also to have some understanding of his preconceptions and values in the thought and decision-making processes and to evaluate his actions from that perspective. To project American values into Soviet ideological bases of the Soviet and American cultures. Proper interpretation of Soviet military thought must include an understanding of its foundation in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet/Russian culture, as well as of its concepts such as military doctrine, science, and art. All of these are radically different from their U.S. counterparts. This thesis is written as a primer for U.S. military officers, all of whom require a fundamental understanding of the Soviet perspective.

- 0212 **Practice Makes Perfect: Soviet Air Support Doctrine and Its Tactical Application In Afghanistan.**
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Terence L. Gilbert. December 4, 1987. 48pp.

Since World War II, the Soviet military has maintained a strong belief in the importance of air support for ground operations. The Soviets believe that tactical air operations possess extraordinary flexibility and maneuverability to add depth to the battlefield and increase the tempo of combat operations. The Afghan War has been a perfect laboratory for them to test these precepts of airpower. In addition, it allowed the U.S. military a special opportunity to evaluate the application of Soviet air support doctrine in an actual combat environment. This monograph reviews Soviet air support doctrine as it existed on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Next, a detailed examination of its application in the Afghan War is presented to determine the overall success of the doctrine in a combat environment. The study concludes that the overall application of Soviet air support doctrine has been successful. At the tactical level, the employment of air assets reflected a general trend of continuity and the reinforcement of doctrinal concepts developed before the war. In particular, the successful use of the HIND attack helicopter made it the most effective and the most feared Soviet weapon in the theater. Training, pilot initiative, and discipline all seemed to suffer under the centralized command and control system of the Soviet military; nevertheless, the Soviet pilot showed the ability to adapt to the

situation. Even more significantly, the Soviets are applying the lessons they have learned in the Afghan War to improve the overall readiness of Soviet air forces in Central Europe.

- 0260 **Soviet Tactical Surprises: The Doctrine and How to Counter It.**
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Joseph A. Bolick. December 4, 1987. 52pp.

This study examines Soviet surprise within the context of tactical warfare. It assesses Soviet military art in relationship to their current doctrine, defines the elements of surprise and reviews their historical use. It also discusses the advantages of surprise operations and those the Soviets expect if used against NATO. The main body of the study is concerned with how the Soviets will achieve surprise and how the United States can prevent or counter it. A discussion of Soviet organization, methods of execution, counter-reconnaissance, radio electronic combat, intelligence collection, and other items such as the use of deception to support surprise operations is included. It states that U.S. commanders and intelligence personnel must understand the Soviets' options, presents ways to improve the intelligence system so it can detect surprise, and discusses actions leaders can take to assist in this process. The final section presents ways to counter surprise. The study concludes that Soviet forces will use surprise to support their tactical operations. This tactical use will be integrated with the operational and strategic surprise plan. U.S. detection, prevention, and countering will depend on intelligence and operations personnel understanding the battlefield and its ambiguities.

1988

- 0312 **Problem of Space in Soviet Operational Art.**
Soviet Army Studies Office, Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. J. W. Kipp. January 1988. 16pp.

This essay provides commentary and context to the Soviet General Staff's approach to the study and preparation of space as an arena for the conduct of military actions. These comments are based on a lecture given by General-Major I. B. Shaposhnikov at the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff in the mid-1970s and draw upon a larger study of these issues that was undertaken by the author et al.: "Soviet Views on Military Operations in Space (1986)."

- 0328 **Appearances of Soviet Leaders, January–December 1987.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] March 1988. 245pp.
This publication provides a record of the known appearances of selected Soviet public figures during 1987. Coverage includes members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU, leading officials of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the chairman of the Committee for State Security, and the minister of internal affairs. The publication contains a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in its preparation; a list of the individuals covered; an alphabetical list of the known appearances of the individuals during the period covered, including the data, nature, and location of each appearance and the source of information; and a chronological list of appearances with names arranged alphabetically for a given date.
- 0573 **The Nationalities Problem and the Soviet Military: An Individual Study Project.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Terry L. Wagner. March 7, 1988. 46pp.
There are significant changes taking place in the Soviet population that will alter the demographics of the Soviet Union. These changes will have a definite impact on the Soviet armed forces and will require Soviet leaders, both political and military, to rethink the future roles of the current nationalities in the armed forces. This paper examines past and current nationalities issues for the Soviet army and explores the various problem areas that have been documented. It also briefly assesses future implications of the nationalities problems for both the Soviets and the West.
- 0619 **Soviet Attack Tempo: The Linchpin in Soviet Maneuver Doctrine.**
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Richard H. Gribbling. March 9, 1988. 57pp.
This paper analyzes the strengths of tempo and firepower in Soviet maneuver doctrine and determines how these strengths can be countered. This is done by first defining Soviet maneuver theory, then testing the theory by examining specific tactical examples of Soviet offensive operations during World War II on the Eastern Front. Finally, Soviet maneuver theory will be reviewed in light of present Airland Battle doctrine within the context of the Central European battlefield. This study concludes that countering Soviet maneuver doctrine requires U.S. commanders to focus on disrupting enemy attack tempo. This is done by extending the space and time that the Soviet's must move across the

battlefield. Lengthening the battlefield must be an integrated effort combining counter-mobility planning with rapid maneuver to concentrate firepower at different moments during the fight.

0676 **Technology Transfer and the Early Development of Soviet Computers.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Daniel L. Burghart. April 1, 1988. 28pp.

This study examines the early development of computers in the Soviet Union, as well as the part that technology transfer from the West has played in that development. It outlines the conditions under which the first computers evolved, in both the East and the West, and follows the course of this evolution through third generation machines. The study's main thesis is that Soviet deficiencies in the computer field are due, at least in part, to the conscious decision on the part of the Soviets to copy from the West, rather than concentrating on the development of their own designs. The study concludes that this failure to develop a domestic computer research and design capability will have serious long-term effects on Soviet efforts to overcome the gap that exists in computing capability between the East and the West.

0704 **The Soviet MIR Space Station.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Thomas E. Snook. April 1, 1988. 36pp.

The purpose of this paper is to determine if the Soviet MIR space station represents a significant advance when compared to the Soviets' preceding Salyut 7 space station. A description and comparison of the physical features of Salyut 7 and MIR are presented. A discussion and analysis of the scientific, commercial, military, and political uses or missions of the Salyut 7 and MIR space stations are included. The MIR space station is determined to be a significant advance relative to the Salyut 7 space station.

0740 **The Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. William Ray Brownlee. April 5, 1988. 34pp.

At the end of the Civil War in 1921, the Red Army was a badly equipped, poorly trained, and ill-disciplined force. Today it is a modern, technologically sophisticated and highly effective army. This change has been most dramatic and overshadows similar advances made by the USSR as an industrial power. Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power in March of 1985. Since that time he has made twelve changes in the Soviet High Command. The latest was to replace the defense minister. The

purpose of this paper is to discuss the nature of the political control of the Soviet military, its history, effectiveness, and the effects of *perestroika* on that relationship.

- 0774 **International Manned Flight USSR-SAR.** *(NASA Technical Translation), National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] June 1988. 108pp.* Manned international space flights of the USSR-SAR are described. Data on the Proton and the Soyuz launch vehicles, and descriptions of the operations in the control rooms and training of control personnel are given. Cosmonaut training is discussed, as well as brief biographical data on the cosmonauts. Medical monitoring and medical support during spaceflights is presented.

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The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first Arabic number refers to the reel, and the Arabic number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular file containing the subject begins. Therefore, 10: 0573 directs the researcher to the file that begins at Frame 0573 of Reel 10. By referring to the Reel Index located in the initial part of this guide, the researcher can find the main entry for the subject.

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