Chapter
11
|
Chapter
11 |
|
EQUAL
PROTECTION
FOR OTHER GROUPS AND INTERESTS
The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in conjunction with
the
equal protection aspects of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, has
been
essential to remedying race and gender discrimination by the local,
state,
and federal governments. However, these are not the only identifiable
classes
of persons to which the Equal Protection Clause pertains.
§11.01 Discrete
and Insular Minorities
[326-335]
[a] Resident Aliens
Scrutiny for classifications based on alienage varies with several factors. First, as the title of this sub-section indicates, the Court generally only scrutinizes discrimination against resident aliens but not discrimination against illegal aliens. Second, the Court subjects discrimination against aliens by state or local government bodies to far more rigorous scrutiny than it applies to discrimination against aliens by the federal government.
[b] Illegal
Aliens
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), held that a Texas law denying free public education to undocumented, school-age children violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Laws
that treat illegitimate children differently from legitimate children
must
be “substantially related to permissible state interests.” Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 265 (1978).
Classifications based on age are subject to a rational-basis test.
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), a Texas city denied a special use permit to establish a group home for the mentally retarded. Despite holding that mentally retarded individuals were not a quasi-suspect class, the Court struck down the challenged law because it did not pass the required rationality test.
In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment (Amendment 2) that precluded all laws prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of ‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.’” Id. at 624. The Constitution demands neutrality in the law and bans “‘classes among citizens.’” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
Amendment
2 not only repealed existing local ordinances prohibiting discrimination
against
homosexual persons but also prohibited all future “legislative,
executive
or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to
protect”
these individuals. Romer, 517
U.S. at 624. Rejecting Colorado’s argument that Amendment 2 simply
put
homosexuals in the same position as all other persons, the Court stated
that
Amendment 2 placed homosexuals in a class by themselves, depriving only
them
of protection against discrimination.
§11.02 Equal
Protection for the Poor
[335-344]
[1] Wealth as a Suspect Classification;
Fundamental
Rights to Necessities
The Court has not regarded the poor as a discrete and insular minority. Accordingly, laws differentiating on the basis of wealth are not subject to heightened scrutiny. Affording heightened scrutiny to laws that distinguish on the basis of wealth would call into question a wide range of social programs.
One of the most important areas in which the Court has examined the equal protection rights of the poor is public education. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court examined the method of funding public schools in Texas. Edgewood Independent School District and the Alamo Heights Independent School District were the poorest and richest districts respectively. Edgewood received $222 per pupil from the state fund, $108 per pupil in federal funds, and contributed an additional $26 per pupil from local taxes, for a total of $356 per pupil. The same numbers for the Alamo Heights district were $225, $36, and $333, respectively, for a total of $594 per pupil. The lower court had subjected the funding system to strict scrutiny, finding that wealth was a suspect classification and that education was a fundamental right. The Supreme Court rejected both conclusions.
The Rodriguez Court was concerned with the many difficulties and implications of applying strict scrutiny to educational funding. The Court noted that equality of education could not be precisely determined, and therefore could only be implemented in the most relative sense. The Court also feared that accepting appellee’s fundamental rights argument would require the Court to find an infinite number of fundamental rights based on the same rationale. For example, it might be that those who do not have adequate food and clothing are the least effective at utilizing their free speech and voting rights. Therefore, food and clothing would have to be recognized as fundamental constitutional rights. The Court emphasized that the case required expertise in taxing, spending, and educational policy, areas that traditionally have been the province of legislative bodies and that pose serious problems of creating judicially manageable standards.
[2] Access to the Justice
System
Access
to the courts, both criminal and civil, has become very expensive. On
several
occasions, the Court has addressed constitutional challenges to barriers
erected
by cost.
§11.03 Equality
in the Political Process
[344-353]
[1] Distinctions Based on
Wealth
The
centrality of voting rights in a democracy makes it essential that
arbitrary
restrictions not be allowed. Accordingly, the Court has given strict
scrutiny
to laws that make it difficult to exercise voting rights or dilute the
value
of a vote.
[2] Other Barriers to Political Participation: Apportionment, Ballot Access for Minority Parties, Gerrymandering
In
Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), which
established
the rule of one-person-one-vote,
the
plaintiffs challenged Alabama’s apportionment of the state legislature.
In
Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000), seven Justices agreed that the recount raised
constitutional
problems “that demand a remedy.” Id. at 111. The disagreement among
these
Justices concerned the specific nature of the remedy. For example,
Justice
Breyer proposed remanding the case and extending the certification
deadline
until December 18.
§11.04 The
Right to Travel
[353-356]
In
Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999), the Supreme Court struck down as against the right
to
travel a California statute that denied new residents the same level of
welfare
benefits available to those who had been California citizens for more
than
12 months.
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), upheld restrictions issued by the executive branch that prohibited business transactions with Cuba.
§11.05 “Economic
and Social Legislation”
[356-358]
The Court has afforded considerable scrutiny to government regulations that discriminate against suspect classifications or that discriminatorily distribute certain fundamental rights. In contrast, economic and social legislation has received “de minimis” scrutiny. For example, in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), the Court upheld, against due process and equal protection challenges, a New York City traffic regulation that prohibited advertising on commercial vehicles unless the ads were for the business of the vehicle’s owner. Addressing the due process claim, Justice Douglas found the regulation unnecessary and refused to pass judgment on the City’s finding that the law reduced traffic hazards caused by distracting advertisements. On the equal protection claim, Justice Douglas concluded that even if the City’s opinion that the classification reduced traffic hazards was incorrect, it “does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection.” Id. at 110. The Court also was not troubled by the fact that the City prohibited certain signs but allowed others. The Court said that equal protection did not require the eradication of all evils of the same sort.
|
Chapter
11 |
|