Chapter
18 |
MISTAKES OF LAW
Under both the common law and Model Penal Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one. Nevertheless, a number of doctrines apply when a defendant is ignorant or mistaken about the law.
§ 18.02 Reasonable-Reliance
Doctrine (Entrapment by Estoppel)
Under both the common law and Model Penal Code, a person is excused for committing a criminal offense if he reasonably relies on an official statement of the law, later determined to be erroneous, obtained from a person or public body with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or enforcement of the law defining the offense.
[A] "Official Statement" – For a statement of the law to be "official," it must be contained in:
| 1.) | a statute later declared to be invalid; | |
| 2.) | a judicial decision of the highest court in the jurisdiction, later determined to be erroneous; or | |
| 3.) | an official, but erroneous, interpretation of the law, secured from a public officer in charge of its interpretation, administration, or enforcement, such as the Attorney General of the state or, in the case of federal law, of the United States. |
Even if a person obtains an interpretation
of the law from a proper source, that interpretation must come in an "official"
manner, not an offhand or informal manner. For example, a person may rely
on an official "opinion letter" from the state Attorney General,
formally interpreting the statute in question.
[B] Exemptions to the Reasonable Reliance Doctrine
[1] Reliance on One’s Own Interpretation of the Law – A person is not excused for committing a crime if he relies on his own erroneous reading of the law, even if a reasonable person – even a reasonable law–trained person – would have similarly misunderstood the law.
[2] Advice
of Prosecutor – Although there is very little case law on the matter,
there is some support for the proposition that a person may not reasonably
rely on an interpretation of a law provided by a local prosecuting attorney.
[3] Advice
of Private Counsel – Reliance on erroneous advice provided by a private
attorney is not a defense to a crime.
§ 18.03 Fair Notice
and the Lambert Principle
[A] Common Law – At common law, every one is presumed to know the law. However, in Lambert v. California [355 U.S. 225 (1957)], the Court overturned the petitioner’s conviction for failing to register with the city of Los Angeles as a prior convicted felon, as required pursuant to a strict liability ordinance of which he was unaware; the Court reversed on "lack of fair notice" due process grounds.
The Supreme Court held in Lambert that, under very limited circumstances, a person who is unaware of a duly enacted and published criminal statute may successfully assert a constitutional defense in a prosecution of that offense.
Key to the court’s decision in Lambert was the passive nature of the offense. Namely, (1) it punished an omission (failure to register); (2) the duty to act was imposed on the basis of a status (presence in Los Angeles), rather than on the basis of an activity; and (3) the offense was malum prohibitum. As a result of these factors, there was nothing to alert a reasonable person to the need to inquire into the law.
[B] Model Code – The Model Penal Code’s fair notice exception [MPC § 2.04(3)(a)] applies where:
| 1.) | a defendant does not believe that his conduct is illegal, and | |
| 2.) | the statute defining the offense is not known to him; and was "not published or otherwise reasonably made available" to him before he violated the law. |
§ 18.04 Ignorance
or Mistake that Negates Mens rea
[A] Common
Law
[1] "Different Law" Approach – A defendant’s lack of knowledge of, or misunderstanding regarding the meaning or application of, another law – usually, it will be a nonpenal law – will negate the mens rea element in the definition of the criminal offense. When a defendant seeks to avoid conviction for a criminal offense by asserting a different-law mistake, on the ground that the different-law mistake negates his mens rea, the first matter for determination is whether the offense charged is one of specific-intent, general-intent, or strict-liability.
[2] Specific-Intent
Offenses – A different-law mistake, whether reasonable or unreasonable,
is a defense in the prosecution of a specific-intent offense, if the mistake
negates the specific intent in the prosecuted offense.
[3] General-Intent Offenses – Although there is very little case law on point, a different-law mistake, whether reasonable or unreasonable, apparently is not a defense to a general-intent crime.
[4] Strict-Liability
Offenses – A different-law mistake is never a defense to a strict-liability
offense.
[B] Model Penal Code – MPC § 2.04(1) provides that mistake or ignorance of the law is a defense if it negates a material element of the offense. Application of this defense generally surfaces in cases of a different-law mistake.
Chapter
18 |