§ 9.01 Miranda v. Arizona

 

The landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), resulted from the consolidation of four cases on appeal.  In each case, the suspect was taken into custody, questioned in a police interrogation room in which the suspect was alone with the interrogators, and never informed of his privilege against self-incrimination.

 

Miranda held that any statement, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, obtained as the result of custodial interrogation could not be used against the suspect in a criminal trial unless the police provided procedural safeguards effective to secure the suspect's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.  “Custodial interrogation” is defined in Miranda as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

 

§ 9.02 “Custody”

 

A person is deemed to be in custody if he is deprived of his freedom of action “in any significant way.”  “Custody” requires the existence of coercive conditions that would cause a reasonable person to believe, under all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, that he is not free to go.

 

Not all coercive environments equate to “custody.” For example, a police interrogation room may be deemed a coercive environment but the totality of the circumstances may indicate that a person is not in custody – e.g., he came to the police station voluntarily, was informed prior to questioning that he was not under arrest, and he was free to leave the police station at any time. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1971); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).

 

Brief detention by the police likewise does not necessarily put one in custody, for example, brief questioning during a routine traffic stop or roadblock.  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

 

§ 9.03 “Interrogation”

 

For purposes of Miranda [384 U.S. 436], “interrogation” refers to express questioning or its “functional equivalent,” i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).  For example, if the police know the person in custody may be susceptible to certain forms of persuasion, any statements or actions designed to play upon such susceptibilities may be deemed the functional equivalent of interrogation.

 

In Innis, a murder suspect was being transported to the police station when the police commented that they hoped that the murder weapon, which had not yet been located, would not be found by any children from a nearby school for the handicapped.  In response, the suspect, who had previously requested a lawyer, revealed the location of the gun.  The Court held that the comments were not the functional equivalent of interrogation because it found:

(1) the comments were brief;

(2) the comments were not particularly evocative;

(3) the suspect was not disoriented or upset when the comments were made;

(4) there was no evidence that the police should have known that the suspect would be susceptible to an appeal to his conscience.

 

§ 9.04 Procedural Safeguards:  The “Miranda Warnings”

 

            [A] Content of Miranda Warnings

 

The Court in Miranda [384 U.S. 436] noted that Congress and the states are free to develop procedural safeguards for protecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights during custodial interrogation. However, unless they are “fully as effective” as those described in Miranda, the police must apprise the suspect issue, prior to custodial interrogation, that:

(1) the suspect has a right to remain silent;

(2) anything said can and will be used against the suspect in court;

(3) the suspect has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have his lawyer present during interrogation;

(4) if the suspect is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

 

[B] Right to Remain Silent

 

Miranda [384 U.S. 436] states that, once warnings are given, if the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.  The police must honor a suspect's right to silence after he asserts the privilege but are not necessarily precluded from attempting to interrogate the suspect under different circumstances.  See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (holding that the police did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights when the interrogation ceased immediately upon request; two hours elapsed; the subsequent questioning was by a different officer, in a different location, for a different crime; and Miranda warnings were restated).

 

[C] Right to Counsel During Interrogations

 

                        [1] Fifth Amendment Right

 

When a suspect in custody invokes his right under Miranda [384 U.S. 436] to consult with an attorney, the police must cease the interrogation until the suspect's attorney is present unless the suspect initiates further “communication, exchanges, or conversations” with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  This rule is intended “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights” and applies to all interrogation, including questioning about crimes other than the one for which the suspect is in custody.  However, the Edwards rule does not apply unless a suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).

 

Furthermore, once a suspect in custody invokes his Miranda [384 U.S. 436] right to counsel, the police may not re-initiate interrogation at any time thereafter unless counsel is present. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).

 

Where the suspect initiates communications with the police in the absence of counsel, the police may recommence interrogation upon obtaining a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights.  A suspect initiates communications, exchanges or conversations by any comment or inquiry that indicates his desire to engage in a discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.  Comments or inquiries “relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship,” such as a request for water or to use a telephone, do not qualify as “communications, exchanges, or conversations” and thus do not properly trigger further police interrogation. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). 

 

                        [2] Sixth Amendment Right

 

The right to counsel guaranteed as a result of Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436] falls within the protections of the Fifth Amendment and is available to a suspect upon being taken into custody.  This right differs in various respects from the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment, which, with the exception of the ruling in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (a pre-Miranda decision), has been held to attach only upon commencement of criminal proceedings, e.g., upon filing of an indictment.  [See Chapter 11, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Interrogation.]

 

§ 9.05 Waiver of Miranda Rights

 

            [A] Elements of Valid Waiver

 

Miranda [384 U.S. 436] states that a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights during interrogation “could” be found when, after the reading of Miranda rights, a suspect expressly states a willingness to make a statement, without the presence of an attorney, “followed closely” by such statement.  The validity of the waiver must be based on an assessment of “ ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' ” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 482 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

 

[B] Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Waiver

 

In order to be valid, a waiver must have been given “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).  A voluntary waiver is “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”  A knowing and intelligent waiver is made with “full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).  A waiver cannot be deemed “knowing and intelligent” unless the police issued proper Miranda [384 U.S. 436] warnings.

 

[C] Express and Implied Waiver

 

A valid waiver may not be presumed simply from the suspect's silence following reading of the Miranda [384 U.S. 436] warnings or from the fact that he confesses.  Nevertheless, an express statement of waiver is not invariably necessary.  North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).  In some cases, waiver may be clearly inferred from the suspect's words and actions that follow Miranda warnings, although the Supreme Court has given little guidance on when such circumstances exist.

 

§ 9.06 Inapplicability of Miranda

 

            [A] Interrogation by Undercover Police

 

Miranda [384 U.S. 436] warnings are not required if the suspect being questioned is unaware that the interrogator is a police officer.  Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (an undercover police agent, posing as a criminal, was positioned in the defendant's cellblock and engaged the defendant in a conversation designed to elicit details of the crime for which he was suspected; the Court held that such statements, although the result of interrogation while in custody, and in the absence of Miranda warnings, were admissible).

 

            [B] Physical Evidence

 

Since the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence, Miranda [384 U.S. 436] warnings are not required in order for the police to compel the production of physical or real evidence, such as a blood, breath, or handwriting sample.  [See Chapter 8, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.]

 

[C] Exigent Circumstances

 

A public safety exception to Miranda [384 U.S. 436] allows the police to interrogate a suspect prior to Miranda warnings if an exigency exists that requires immediate police action to ensure public safety, e.g., to locate a loaded weapon in a public place.  The questions asked prior to issuance of the warnings must be directed at the exigent circumstances only.  New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (observing that the defendant, who had just attacked a woman and then fled into a grocery store, had an empty shoulder holster, an officer validly asked the defendant, without issuing Miranda warnings, where the gun was).

 

[D] Routine Booking Questions

 

Miranda [384 U.S. 436] warnings need not be issued prior to asking a suspect in custody routine booking questions, such as name, address, date of birth, and other biographical data necessary to complete the booking process.  Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).

 

§ 9.07 Exclusionary Rule Under Miranda

 

[A] Impeachment Exception

 

A statement obtained in violation of Miranda [384 U.S. 436] may be used to impeach a defendant at trial.  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

 

[B] Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree Doctrine

 

The Supreme Court has interpreted Miranda [384 U.S. 436] to not support the “fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree” doctrine.  Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (the government may call a witness to testify at trial, even if that witness's identity became known as a result of a statement by defendant secured in violation of Miranda); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (the government may introduce a defendant's own voluntary, post-Miranda, admissions, even if they were obtained as a result of an earlier Miranda violation).

 

However, Tucker [417 U.S. 433] and Elstad [470 U.S. 298] were based on the premise that Miranda [384 U.S. 436] was a “prophylactic” but not a constitutional rule.  Subsequently, the Court in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), departed from the reasoning in Tucker and stated that Miranda was in fact a constitutional decision.  Nevertheless, the Court has not thus far reversed its position on the inapplicability of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine to statements obtained in violation of Miranda.