§ 10.01 Voluntary Confessions

 

A confession that is freely and voluntarily made, following proper Miranda [384 U.S. 436] warnings, is admissible against the defendant at a criminal trial.  The voluntariness of a confession is to be assessed from the totality of all the circumstances, taking into account both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.

 

§ 10.02 Involuntary Confessions

 

A confession that results from police coercion violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.  The following factors may negate the voluntariness of a confession.

 

[A] Actual or Threatened Physical Force

 

A confession obtained by threatened or actual use of violence is inadmissible.  Confessions have also been invalidated when the police have “warned” a suspect that, unless he confesses, he may be the victim of mob violence or deadly attacks from fellow prisoners.

 

[B] Deprivation

 

Confessions have been suppressed in cases in which the police deprived a suspect of food, water, or sleep, for an extended period of time.

 

[C] Psychological Pressures

 

Among the relevant factors that determine whether undue psychological pressure was imposed on a suspect are:

·        length of custodial detention.

·        whether the interrogation was prolonged.

·        whether the questioning occurred in the daytime or at night.

·        whether the interrogation is conducted incommunicado.

·        the personal characteristics of the suspect (e.g., age, intelligence, level of education, psychological makeup, and prior experience with the police).

 

[D] Promises of Leniency

 

A confession is not necessarily a product of coercion where the police expressly or implicitly promise leniency in exchange for the suspect's cooperation. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (repudiating Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), which held that a confession was involuntary if it was obtained by any promise for leniency, “however slight”).

 

Lower courts have determined that some types of promises of leniency will render a confession involuntary, such as assurances that some of the charges will be dropped or that the defendant will receive a reduction in punishment.  However, standing alone, courts rarely invalidate a confession based on a mere promise by the police to bring the defendant's cooperation to the prosecutor's attention, or promise that a prosecutor will discuss leniency in exchange for a confession, without in fact making any assurances as to results.

 

[E] Threat of Harsh Legal Treatment

 

A confession procured by a threat of especially harsh treatment – directed at the suspect himself or another – may be invalid.  E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (suppressing a confession as involuntary because it was secured in response to a wrongful police threat to take the suspect's wife into custody).

 

Some lower courts have ruled that a confession is involuntary if the police threaten to inform the prosecutor of a suspect's refusal to cooperate, since this is a threat to penalize the suspect for asserting his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 

 

[F] Deception

 

Deception about the strength of the case against the suspect – e.g., if the police falsely inform a suspect that an accomplice has already confessed – without more, generally will not invalidate a confession, although it may be a factor weighed in an assessment of the voluntariness of the confession.

 

§ 10.03 Exclusionary Rule

 

[A] Impeachment

 

A coerced confession is inadmissible at the defendant's criminal trial for all purposes, including impeachment.

 

[B] Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree Doctrine

 

The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applies to coerced confessions, but it is generally assumed that the doctrine does apply in such circumstances.