§ 18.01 Nuisance [384-400]

 

[A] Overview

 

Nuisance arises from an allegation of injury to person or property. As in other areas of tort, the injury need not be physical, and can include injury to rights or property enjoyment. The law of nuisance recognizes two distinct categories of claims: private nuisance and public nuisance. Defendant's conduct may create an actionable public nuisance when it interferes with the public health, safety or welfare.  It may constitute a private nuisance when it interferes with another's current possessory or beneficial interest in the use or quiet enjoyment of land.

 

The complainant in private nuisance needn’t own the property; he need only be a lawful occupant or the holder of one or more other use rights. In contrast, for a suit in public nuisance, the complainant needn’t have a property interest in any property affected by defendant's conduct. A defendant may incur liability in both private and public nuisance.

 

[B] Nuisance and Trespass Distinguished

 

A claim in trespass ordinarily seeks damages for a physical intrusion onto property. Where the intrusion is permanent, or if it is serious or persistent, the suit sounds in trespass. In contrast, when the defendant's conduct creates conditions of noise, lights, odor or vibration that interfere with the plaintiff's quiet enjoyment of the property, but do not interrupt the plaintiff's possessory interests, the claim is more properly brought in private nuisance.

 

[1] Continuing Nuisance and Trespass; Permanent Nuisance and Trespass

 

The laws of nuisance and of trespass distinguish between “continuing” and “permanent” nuisance and trespass. A nuisance or trespass is “continuing” (or “temporary”) if it could be discontinued or abated at any time, such as an industrial activity that causes airborne pollution. A “permanent” nuisance or trespass is an interference or an intrusion that has no ready means of abatement.  For a “permanent” condition, a single statute of limitations will apply, while for a “continuing” condition, the statute of limitations is tolled anew each day the activity continues.

 

[C] Private Nuisance

 

[1] Elements

 

[a] Unreasonable Interference

 

A private nuisance is an “unreasonable interference” with the use or enjoyment of the owner or possessor's use or enjoyment of a property interest. It might take a wide range of forms, from the pollution of a residence's well water; or the creation of a sulphurous smell within a downtown financial district.

 

[b] Current Possessory Interest

 

The private nuisance claim can only be brought by one with a current possessory or beneficial interest in the property.

 

[c] Intentional or Unintentional Conduct

 

Restatement § 822 establishes liability in private nuisance for an “invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land” where the invasion is “(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.”  For a defendant's act to be “intentional”, he need only have intended the act (i.e., discharge of industrial smoke from a facility's smokestack).  He need not have intended or desired that the smoke would alight elsewhere.  When the act is “unintentional”, or accidental, liability only follows a showing that the defendant's conduct was negligent, reckless, or constituted an abnormally dangerous activity. In nuisance actions, the intentional character of a defendant's conduct may be proved circumstantially, for example, by means of the permissible inference that a manufacturer knows that toxins leaving its industrial chimney will necessarily land on another's property. [Bradley v. American Smelting, 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985).]

 

[2] Nature of the Interest Interfered with

 

The particular use to which a property is put, and the sensitivities of the persons using the property, are proper factors in evaluating if defendant's conduct constitutes an unreasonable interference that rises to the level of a nuisance.

 

Some decisions distinguish nuisance per se from nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se would be any act that constitutes a nuisance under any circumstances, such as the permanent chronic contamination of plaintiff's property, or the maintenance of a house of ill repute.  Nuisance per accidens requires the fact finder's evaluation of whether, “under all the surrounding circumstances . . . [the acts] substantially interfer[e] with [plaintiff's] comfortable enjoyment[.]” [Vickridge v. Catholic Diocese, 510 P.2d 1296 (Kan. 1976).]

 

A private nuisance action may not be maintained by a remote vendee against a prior seller of property. [Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).]  Diminished property values due to public “stigma” concerning potential contamination will not be the subject of a nuisance action absent a showing of an actual or a factually predictable encroachment upon the property. [Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Company, 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992).]

 

[3] Corrective Justice and Utilitarianism

 

The tort policies of corrective justice and utilitarianism are in sharp conflict in the law of nuisance. The right to an injunction or to an order of abatement, under the corrective justice approach, holds true no matter how great the economic interest of defendant's conduct.  The utilitarian approach, in contrast, invites a comparison of the value of the defendant's conduct with the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and may lead to a conclusion that upon payment of damages, the defendant's activity may continue. 

 

The Restatement attempts to reconcile the corrective justice approach with the utilitarian one. Restatement § 826 provides that an intentional invasion of another's use of land is unreasonable if “the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the conduct[.]”  Where, in contrast, the utility of defendant's conduct outweighs the burden on plaintiff, and money damages can compensate for plaintiff's harm without causing financial ruin to defendant, money damages, and not an injunction, may be an appropriate response.

 

While not expressly relying upon Restatement § 826, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), the New York Court of Appeals effectively accepted the Restatement's invitation to permit nuisance-creating but beneficial activities to continue their operations upon the condition that they compensate neighboring landowners for their hardship. Boomer recognized that to deny the injunction was to depart from the corrective justice-no balancing approach discussed above, but held nevertheless that it was “fair to both sides to grant permanent damages to plaintiffs which will terminate this private litigation.” The grant of permanent damages to the plaintiffs before the court would not be an invitation for further and future litigation as the award would be entered as a servitude on the land of each plaintiff, precluding litigation by future occupiers of the land.

 

[D] Public Nuisance

 

[1] Generally

 

Public nuisance is defined widely as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.” Restatement § 821B.  That section states that “circumstances” for such evaluation include: “(a) whether the conduct involves a substantial interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect and, to the actor's knowledge, has a substantial detrimental effect upon the public right.”

 

[2] Proper Complainants

 

A public nuisance suit may be brought by a public official or a public agency, or it may be brought by a private individual or business that has “suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public[.]”  Restatement § 821C. For private party public nuisance claimants, this predicate showing of injury “different in kind” from that suffered by the public generally is known as the “special injury” rule.

 

For a public nuisance suit seeking an injunction or an order of abatement, plaintiffs may be: (1) a public body or agency bringing suit on behalf of the public; (2) a private party that, as above, has suffered “special injury,” i.e., injury “different in kind” from that suffered by other members of the public; or (3) the class representative(s) of a class action; or (4) one with standing to bring a “citizen” suit under state or federal law.

 

For the most part, the public nuisance remedy is enforced by a government body, such as a town, on behalf of the public. For example, a municipality might lodge a claim in public nuisance against a manufacturing facility discharging chemical effluent that is contaminating a nearby lake, killing aquatic life and precluding recreational sports and swimming.

 

Defendant's conduct may create a cause of action in public nuisance even where “neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the exercise of private property rights.” [Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).]  For example, in Burgess v. M/V Tomano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), commercial clam diggers and fishermen were permitted to pursue a public nuisance claim, premised on an off coast oil spill, even though it was “uncontroverted” that “the right to fish or to harvest clams in Maine's coastal waters is not the private right of any individual, but is a public right held by the State ‘in trust for the common benefit of the people.’"

 

[3] Special Injury Rule

 

While suits in public nuisance are usually brought by public bodies, such as a state or a political subdivision, under certain circumstances a private individual may sue in public nuisance. An individual may sue another in public nuisance where he proves that there is a substantial interference with a right common to the public, and additionally, that he has suffered special harm that differs in type or quality from that burdening the public.

 

To illustrate, in the lake contamination example above, it would not suffice for a recreational fisherman or a swimming enthusiast to bring an action in public nuisance claiming that the defendant's conduct interfered with those pursuits.  Such claims would be mere statements that the complainants suffered the same harm sustained by the community in general, with no claim that they suffered a harm different in type of quality from that of the community. On the other hand, what if our potential plaintiff owned the fishery with the contract to stock the lake with trout fingerlings on a periodic basis, and if his contract with the town was canceled because the water became polluted, his injury could be characterized as “special” as it was qualitatively different from that suffered by the community at large.

 

Regarding commercial fishing and other maritime harvesting, one court has stated, “in substantially all of those cases in which commercial fishermen using public waters have sought [nuisance] damages for the pollution or other tortuous invasion of those waters, they have been permitted to recover[,]” in that each can show “he has suffered a damage particular to him - that is, damage different in kind, rather than simply in degree, from that sustained by the public generally.” [Burgess v. M/V Tomano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973).]

 

Personal physical injury is ordinarily held to be “special injury” under public nuisance doctrine. The rational for so holding was stated by the court in Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. Mass. 1986), involving a claim by residents that defendant's introduction of toxic chemicals into groundwater caused severe personal injuries, including childhood leukemia. Finding plaintiffs could, as individuals, bring a claim in public nuisance, the court explained: “[W]hen a plaintiff has sustained ‘special or peculiar damage,’ he or she may maintain an individual action . . . Injuries to a person's health are by their nature ‘special and particular,’ and cannot properly be said to be common or public[.]” The court held further that the plaintiffs could recover compensatory damages for the special injuries suffered, including “(1) the loss in rental value of their property, if any, (2) compensation for physical injuries, and (3) upon a showing of independent personal injury, damages for emotional distress.”

 

[4] Environmental Harm

 

Public nuisance is a potentially potent claim for governmental bodies seeking to interdict generators and disposers of hazardous waste. Representative is a New York appellate court's decision in New York v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (App. 1983).  In that decision, the chemical firm had hired an independent contractor to dispose of waste, which contractor simply dumped raw wastes into lagoons directly above a major aquifer serving thousands of residents. Bringing suit based in part upon public nuisance theories, the State asserted that Schenectady created a public nuisance by the manner in which the wastes were disposed. In holding for the State, the court reasoned that Schenectady had created the public nuisance, and that further it was responsible for the actions of its independent contractor, concluding that “everyone who creates a nuisance or participates in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance are liable jointly and severally for the wrong and injury done thereby [.]”

 

[5] Economic Loss

 

What of an otherwise actionable nuisance from which plaintiff suffers economic loss, such as lost use or business down time, but no personal physical injury or property damage? The leading decision in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), involved a collision of the M/V Sea Daniel, an inbound bulk carrier, with the outbound M/V Testbank in the Gulf outlet of the Mississippi River. Containers on the Testbank containing PCP's were lost overboard.  Over 40 lawsuits were brought by local fisherman, owners of seafood restaurants, marina and boat rentals, tackle and bait shops and the like, claiming loss of business. The defendant moved for summary judgment for all claims based on economic loss unaccompanied by physical damage to property. The trial court granted the defendant's motion as to most of the shore-based businesses, but preserved the claims asserted by commercial oystermen, shrimpers, crabbers and fishermen who had made commercial use of the waters. The court found that the commercial fishing interests deserved special protection.  See also Pruitt v. Allied, 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981), arising from the damage to marine life following the defendant's discharge of Kepone into James River and Chesapeake Bay.

 

[6] Prospective Nuisance

 

A court may grant an injunction or an order of abatement to turn away the risk of future harm where the risk of harm is substantial and the harm is imminent. In Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981), the defendant operated a chemical-waste landfill above an abandoned mine, and evidence indicated that there was a possibility that pillar support failure could occur.  The state high court concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently established by a preponderance of the evidence that the chemical-waste disposal site was a nuisance both presently and prospectively.

 

§ 18.02 Trespass [400-404]

 

[A] Overview

 

Trespass protects a plaintiff's interest in the surface land itself, the earth or other material beneath the surface, and “the air space above it.” [Restatement § 158 cmt. i.]  Depending upon the seriousness of the contamination of plaintiff's land or environment, defendant may be liable in trespass where the pollution or contamination interferes with plaintiff's possessory rights in the land, the land beneath it, or the ambient air.

 

Restatement § 158 provides:

 

One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.

 

In trespass, the interest protected is the right of “exclusive possession and physical condition of land.” [Restatement § 157 et seq.]  Accordingly, a plaintiff pursuing a cause of action based on trespass must satisfy the court that he has a “possessory interest” in the property.

 

Unlike claims in nuisance that can only be pursued by one with a current possessory or beneficial use interest in a property, a claimant in a trespass suit does not have to be the property's current or immediately prospective occupant. Restatement § 157 defines “possession” in the trespass context in such a way as to include one with a reversionary interest, such as a landlord or other owner not in current possession of the land or premises, if no other person is in current possession.

 

[B] The Requirement of Intent

 

Trespass is an intentional tort, and plaintiff must prove that an alleged trespasser had the requisite mental state to commit the tort. Restatement § 8A states that the word “intent” is used in tort law “. . . to denote that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.” Thus, a hiker's unwitting intrusion onto the land of another may nonetheless be considered “intentional” in the sense that the hiker intended that his feet, step by step, advance his hike, and similarly intended that his steps would take him onto the land. [See generally § 1.01[B], [C], supra.]

 

An actor's awareness of the high degree of likelihood that a trespass will result from his activities may be proved circumstantially, as it was in Bradley v. American Smelting, 709 Wash. 2d 782 (Wash. 1985), in which a smelter's tall smokestack alone evidenced its knowledge that trespassory particulate matter could be dispersed, but not eliminated, through release high above ground. Accordingly, plaintiff need not prove that the defendant subjectively desired to trespass on the property. Plaintiff must only prove that defendant intended the act that resulted in the trespass, i.e., that defendant's act was volitional, and done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that the act would result in introduction of the substance onto plaintiff's property. [Restatement § 158 cmt. i.]  For this reason defendant may not defend an action in trespass by proving that he acted with even a reasonably mistaken belief that his actions were authorized by plaintiff, or that the property was owned by another who had given apparent consent to the intrusion. [Restatement § 164.]

 

[C] The Requisite Physical Invasion and Harm

 

In most jurisdictions, invasions of plaintiff's property that amount to trespass may also, if they interfere with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the property, be actionable in nuisance. In such circumstances, “plaintiff may have his choice” of a claim in trespass or in nuisance, “or may proceed upon both.” [Restatement § 821D cmt. e.]

 

At common law, an actionable trespass was complete upon the tangible invasion of another's property. Nuisance, in contrast, requires a showing that defendant's conduct, invasory or otherwise, constitutes a “substantial and unreasonable” interference with plaintiff's use and enjoyment. The requirement that a trespass involve invasion by a “thing” was considered and rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959), a claim involving the settling upon plaintiff's property of gaseous and particulate fluorides from defendant's aluminum smelter.

 

Rejecting defendant's claim that plaintiff's claim should fail for want of any tangible trespassory “object” or “thing,” the court answered: “[I]n this atomic age even the uneducated know the great and awful force contained in the atom and what it can do to a man's property if it is released[,]” and found that the entry of invisible gases or microscopic particles may alone constitute a trespass.  Several other courts have declined to follow Martin in this regard.

 

The invasion of plaintiff's property need not be direct, if plaintiff can prove that an intentional act of defendant resulted in the harm. Thus the causal intervention of natural conditions, such as deterioration, wind, or rain, in initiating or exacerbating the trespass will not absolve defendant of liability. [Restatement § 158 (citing examples).]

 

As in the doctrine of continuing nuisance, a polluter's failure to remove a pollutant or a contaminant from plaintiff's land may represent a “continuing” tort, a finding that can operate to relieve some of the strictures of limitations periods within which the possessor would have to bring a toxic tort claim. [Restatement § 161 cmt. b.]  

 

That the plaintiff may be entitled to an injunction or to nominal damages for a technical or minimal trespass does not resolve the question of what level of harm plaintiff must show to receive compensatory damages. The leading Alabama decision of Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979), involving the spilling of piled asphalt onto the plaintiff's property phrased the requirement in terms of “substantial” harm to the res.