WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EMMETT BOONE.

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Applicant,

VS.

8 **DREYER'S GRAND ICE CREAM;** FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE 9 COMPANY,

Defendants.

Case No. ADJ3685938 (WCK 0066506) (Oakland District Office)

OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION

On November 4, 2014, we granted reconsideration of the August 14, 2014 Findings and Award wherein the WCJ found that the April 18, 2014 and May 22, 2014 utilization review decisions denying authorization for refills of certain prescriptions were invalid and awarded ongoing and timely refills of his prescriptions. This is our Decision after Reconsideration.

16 Defendant contends that the WCJ erred in awarding the medical treatment, arguing that there was no material defect and the defendant timely notified applicant's treating physician of the utilization 17 review denial. Defendant also seeks removal and contends that the WCJ's decision is not justified and 18 "constitutes significant prejudice and irreparable harm." (Petition for Reconsideration and/or Removal, 19 20 p. 3.)

We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration and/or Removal and we have reviewed the 22 record in this matter. We have not received an Answer from applicant. The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), explaining that the defendant's April 18, 24 2014 and May 22, 2014 utilization review determinations were defective both because the UR physicians were provided with an insufficient medical record, and on the grounds that notifications of the denials 26 were not provided to applicant's primary treating physician within 24 hours. The WCJ recommended that we deny reconsideration.

	As a preliminary matter, Labor Code § 5900(a) allows reconsideration only of a "final order,
	2 decision, or award." (Emphasis added.) (See also Labor Code §§ 5901-5903) A "final" order has been
	defined as one "which determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case."
	4 (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
	5 Bd. (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410, 413]; Kaiser Foundation
	6 Hospitals v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 29, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases
	661, 665].) An award of medical treatment is a final order and, accordingly, we granted reconsideration
1	rather than removal in our November 4, 2014 Order.
9	For the reasons stated below, as our Decision after Reconsideration, we will affirm the August 14,
1(2014 Findings and Award. In his Report, the WCJ summarized the relevant facts as follows:
11	"It was on April 18, 2014, that defendant issued its first and its first
12	Lidoderm patches. The UR report was addressed to be the
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15	to-peer contact, leaving a message and thereafter areaster for a peer-
16	to peer-to-peer contact again on April 18, 2014 at 12:2007 [sic] PM, again leaving a message." (Report, p. 4.)
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18	When the WCJ issued his decision, the role of the WCAB with regard to the utilization review
19	and independent medical review processes was governed by Dubon v. World Restoration, Inc. (2014) 79
20	Cal.Comp.Cases 313 (Dubon I), wherein the Appeals Board held that a UR decision is invalid if it is
21	untimely or suffers from material procedural defects that undermine the integrity of the UR decision, and
22	that if a defendant's UR is found invalid the issue of medical necessity is to be determined by the WCAB
23	based upon substantial medical evidence, with the employee having the burden of proving the treatment
24	is reasonably required. However, the Appeals Board revisited the issues addressed in <i>Dubon I</i> following
25	the defendant's Petition for Reconsideration in that case. (Dubon v. World Restoration, Inc. (Dubon II)
26	(2014) 79 Cal. Comp. Cases 1298 (Appeals Board en banc) (Dubon II).) In Dubon II the Appeals Board
27	modified the holding in <i>Dubon I</i> by affirming that a UR decision is invalid if it is untimely, but further

holding that all other disputes concerning a UR must be resolved by IMR.¹

Thus, the threshold question in this case is whether defendant's UR was untimely and invalid as described in *Dubon II* and as found by the WCJ. We agree with the WCJ that the UR was untimely and is invalid.

A defendant must comply with all of the timeliness requirements of Labor Code section 4610.² (State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Sandhagen) (2008) 44 Cal.4th 230 [73 Cal.Comp.Cases 981]; Dubon II, supra.) That is, the defendant must comply not only with the requirement to make a UR decision within the time frames specified in section 4610 but also must also comply with the requirement to communicate that decision within the specified time frames.

Section 4610(g)(3)(A) provides as follows:

"Decisions to approve, modify, delay, or deny requests by physicians for authorization prior to ... the provision of medical treatment services to employees shall be communicated to the requesting physician within 24 hours of the decision. Decisions resulting in modification, delay, or denial of all or part of the requested health care service *shall be communicated to physicians* initially by telephone or facsimile, and to the physician and employee in writing within 24 hours for concurrent review, or *within two business days of the decision for prospective review*, as prescribed by the administrative director." (Emphasis added.)

In this case, as discussed by the WCJ in his Report, it is apparent from defendant's Exhibit A,
that the April 18 utilization review decision was not communicated to Dr. Morley within 24 hours.
Accordingly, it was not a timely utilization review denial, and the WCJ appropriately determined the
issue of medical necessity based on substantial medical evidence. Therefore, we will affirm the WCJ's
decision.

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¹ En banc decisions of the Appeals Board are binding precedent on all Appeals Board panels and WCJs. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10341; City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garcia) (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 313, fn. 5 [70
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² Further statutory references are to the Labor Code.

