An Antitrust Anthology (1996)

Preface

I. ANTITRUST PREHISTORY

Lambros E. Kotsiris, An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law, 22 INTmL LAW. 451 (1988)

Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 207 (1926)

William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Anti-trust Act 18-52 (1966)

Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism 93-105 (1988)

II. THE FORCES THAT PRODUCED A FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY

Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition 55-57, 63-72 (1955)

Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 80-87 (1992)

Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 14-20 (1988)

Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 266-95 (1990)

III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHERMAN ACT

A. The Legislative History

Report of the House Committee on Manufactures, H.R. Rep. No. 3112, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., July 30, 1888

21 CONG. REC. 2456-60 (1890)(statement of Sen. Sherman)

21 CONG. REC. 2568-70 (1890)(statement of Sen. Sherman)

21 CONG. REC. 2565-66 (statement of Sen. Stewart)

21 CONG. REC. 3151-52 (1890)(Section 2 of the Sherman Act)

B. Interpretations

Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition 225-32 (1954)

Robert H. Bork, Legislative History and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966)

Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982)

David Millon, The Sherman Act And The Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. REV. 1219 (1988)

IV. COLLUSION AND THE SHERMAN ACT

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 144 (E. Cannon, ed. 1976) (1776)

James A. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743 (1950)

Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962)

Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969)

William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1993)

V. THE RULE OF REASON AND THE PER SE RULE: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS

F. M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 317-21, 335-37 (ad ed. 1990)

Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L. REV. 165 (1988)

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984)

Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1986)

Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of Trade Analysis, 1992 J. RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1992)

VI. THE RULE OF REASON AND THE PER SE RULE: VERTICAL AGREEMENTS

A. The Resale Price Maintenance Debate

Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1960)

Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962)

Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966)

Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L. REV. 487 (1983)

William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985)

Jayma M. Meyer, Relaxation of the Per Se Mantra In The Vertical Price Fixing Arena, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 73 (1994)

B. Sylvania and Non-Price Vertical Agreements

Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981)

Robert L. Steiner, Sylvania EconomicssA Critique, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1991)

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991)

Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (1993)

C. Interbrand Vertical Restraints Of Tying and Exclusive Dealing

Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957)

Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985)

Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (1995)

Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1982)

VII. SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

A. Introduction

William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989)

B. Of Market Power and Defining Relevant Markets 229

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981)

Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1984)

Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987)

C. Defining Predatory Conduct Of Predatory Pricing and Strategic Behavior

Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981)

Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. and Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982)

Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994)

Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)

Wesley J. Liebeler, Exclusion and Efficiency, 1987 Regulation 34

VIII. THE CLAYTON ACT

A. Price Discrimination

Edward Levi, The Robinson-Patman ActsIs It in the Public Interest?, 1 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 60 (1952)

Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, The Robinson-Patman Act: A look backwards, a view forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 (1986)

B. Merger Enforcement and Policy

United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES

William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618 (1983)

U.S. Department of Justice, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, June 14,1984

U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, April 2,1992

Paul T. Denis, Advances of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Analysis of Competitive Effects, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 479 (1993)

Robert H. Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 Geo. L.J. 195 (1992)

Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995)

IX. ISSUES OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

A. Of Interstate Commerce and Antitrust Jurisdiction

Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of trust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657 (1993)

B. Of Antitrust Injury and The Role of Process

William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:, Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989)

C. Of Treble DamagessPolicy and Proof

Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993)

Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damage. WASH. L. REV. 423 (1995)

X. ANTITRUST AND IDEOLOGY

A. Putting The Modern Debate In Perspective

William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1991)

B. The Emergence of the Chicago School Paradigm and Responses to it

Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979)

Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979)

Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985)

Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1995)

Andrew I. Gavil