Preface xi

PART I Major Controversies Implicating the Dominant Rule of Law Vision of Administrative Legitimacy 1

A. Controversies About Substantive Legal Limits on Agencies 1

1. The Debate About Reviving the Delegation Doctrine 1

Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987) 3

Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987) 9

Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L REV. 419 (1987) 14

Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions,1 J. LAW. ECON. & ORGAN. 81 (1985) 20

Additional Sources 27

2. Debates About the Interpretation of Statutory Authorizations of Agencies 28

a. Statutory Interpretation in General 28

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV., 1479 (1987) 29

Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989) 36

Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) 42

Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) 44

Additional Sources 53

b. Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 55

Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988) 56

Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992) 59

Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 69

Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) 71

Additional Sources 80

B. Controversies About Procedural Legal Limits on Agencies 81

1. Debates About Procedural Due Process 81

Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044 (1984) 82

Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976) 97

Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991) 108

Additional Sources 128

2. The Debate About Nonlegislative Rule Exemptions to Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Procedures 130

Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like - Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992) 131

Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992) 137

Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381 142

Additional Sources 149

3. The Debate About Alternative Dispute Resolution In Administrative Procedure 150

Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) 151

William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest - EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987) 153

Philip J. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Administrative Process, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 141 (1987) 159

Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) 161

Additional Sources 164

PART II Major Controversies Implicating Other Visions of Administrative Legitimacy 165

A. Controversies About the Instrumental Rationality of Administration In the Pursuit of Public Values 165

1. The Debate About Comprehensive Regulatory Analysis 165

Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX L. REV. 1243 (1987) 166

Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION 33 (Jan./Feb. 1981) 177

Additional Sources 183

2. The Debate About Judicial Assessment of the Rationality of Agency Decisionmaking: Hard-Look Review 184

Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985) 185

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986) 195

Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387 200

Additional Sources 208

B. Controversies About the Openness and Political Oversight of Administration In the Pursuit of a More Democratic Process 209

1. Debates About Openness In Government: Freedom of Information 209

Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION 15 (March/April 1982) 210

Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649 (1984) 211

Robert G. Vaughn, Federal Information Policy and Administrative Law, in HANDBOOK ON REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 467 (David Rosenbloom & Richard Schwartz eds., 1994) 216

Additional Sources 227

2. Debates About the Supervision of Agencies by Congress 227

a. The Legislative Veto of Administrative Action 227

Harold H. Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977) 228

E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125 234

Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984) 241

Additional Sources 243

b. Congressional Oversight of Administrative Action 245

James B. Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 KAN. L. REV. 277 (1975) 246

Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987) 247

Additional Sources 261

3. The Debate About the Supervision of Agency Rulemaking by the President 262

Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989) 263

Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L, REV. 1059 (1986) 269

Peter L. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986) 271

Charles Tiefer, The Quayle Council: "No Fingerprints" on Regulation, in THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 61 (1994) 274

Additional Sources 279

4. Debates About the Constitutional System of the Separation of Powers 281

a. The Constitutional Position of Administrative Agencies 281

Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41 282

Peter M. Shane, Independent Policy making and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1989) 296

Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUMN. L. REV. 573 (1984) 300

Additional Sources 311

b. The Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers 313

Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS: DOES IT STILL WORK? 1 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) 314

Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (1993) 321

Addtional Sources 334

Part III Other Major Controversies About the Role of Courts Implicating Competing Visions of Administrative Legitimacy 335

A. The Controversy About the Reviewability of Agency Decisionmaking 335

Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) 336

Additional Sources 344

B. The Controversy About the Plaintiff's Standing to Sue an Agency 345

Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) 347

Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article ///, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) 349

William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) 360

Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984) 363

Additional Sources 366

C. The Controversy About Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Rulings 367

Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) 368

Matthew Diller and Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law, A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990) 377

Additional Sources 381

D. The General Controversy About the Role of Courts In Administrative Law 382

Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567 (1992) 383

R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245 (1992) 392

Additional Sources 396

Part IV Competing Theoretical Perspectives on the Administrative Process 397

George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) 399

Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) 404

Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) 412

Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385 432

Additional Sources 450

Thomas O. Sargentich