Abla Abdel Baset Youssef v. Embassy of the U.A.E.

Abla Abdel Baset Youssef v. Embassy of the U.A.E.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On January 3, 2016, Plaintiff Abla Youssef was terminated from her employment with Defendant United Arab Emirates Embassy in Washington, D.C., after almost eighteen years of service. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 12.) Youssef had held two positions at the embassy during the course of her employment: beginning in 1998, she first worked as a secretary in the Human Resources Department of the Embassy's Cultural Division, and then served as an administrative officer in that same department. (See id.) Youssef brings the instant claims against the Embassy and the United Arab Emirates ("UAE" and, collectively, "Defendants"), claiming that she was terminated the day [*2]  before her 67th birthday because she was over the customary retirement age in the UAE (see id. ¶¶ 23-24), and that this termination amounted to discrimination on the basis of her age in violation of both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (see id. ¶¶ 38-42), and the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq. (see id. ¶¶ 43-47).

Before this Court at present is Defendants' motion to dismiss Youssef's complaint (see Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 30; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot."), ECF No. 30-1), which Youssef opposes (see Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. ("Pl.'s Opp'n"), ECF No. 31-1). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue, first and foremost, that this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Youssef's complaint, because the UAE and the Embassy enjoy sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., and the commercial activity exception to the FSIA does not apply to Youssef, who Defendants characterize as a UAE civil servant, insofar as she performed governmental work for the Embassy. (See Defs.' Mot. at 14-22.)¹ Defendants further maintain that Youssef has failed to state a DCHRA claim, "because at all relevant times, her workplace was located in a federal enclave[,]" such that the DCHRA is inapplicable. (Id. at 7.)

For the [*3]  reasons explained fully below, this Court disagrees with Defendants on both fronts: the Court concludes that the commercial activity exception to the FSIA applies to Youssef's employment with the Embassy, and thus that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Youssef's claims. The Court also finds that Youssef has stated a plausible claim under the DCHRA, because the federal enclave doctrine is inapplicable to the District of Columbia. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be DENIED. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.

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