Andrewsikas v. Supreme Indus.

Andrewsikas v. Supreme Indus.

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The question before me is whether the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act" or "NRLA") preempts a union employee's state law claim that he was discharged because of his and a co-worker's complaints about workplace safety. My answer is "yes" on the undisputed facts of this case.

Plaintiff Scott Andrewsikas was a construction laborer for defendant Supreme Industries, Inc. ("Supreme"). He and another co-worker complained to the company that a foreman who was in charge of their work crew was frequently drunk while driving trucks and operating heavy machinery. As a result of these complaints, the company terminated the foreman's employment. But then it also discharged both Andrewsikas and his co-worker who had complained.

Andrewsikas filed this action under a state law—Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q—that generally prohibits [*2]  an employer from discharging an employee because of the employee's exercise of protected free speech activity. Andrewsikas claims that Supreme discharged him to retaliate for his complaints about workplace safety.

Supreme has now moved for summary judgment. According to Supreme, Andrewsikas's state law claim is subject to Garmon preemption—a rule that generally preempts a court claim that could have been presented for investigation and resolution by the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board" or "NLRB"). Because the record conclusively shows that Andrewsikas could have presented his claim to the Board and because none of the exceptions to Garmon preemption apply here, I will grant Supreme's motion for summary judgment.

Background

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