Bodie v. Cricket Wireless, LLC

Bodie v. Cricket Wireless, LLC

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

LaROSE, J., Concurs with opinion.

Concur by: LaROSE

Concur

LaROSE, Judge, Concurring.

I concur in the per curiam affirmance of the trial court's nonfinal order compelling arbitration. I write separately to address what is, in my view, a consequential issue.

Marcus Bodie sued his cellular phone company, Cricket Wireless, LLC, under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), §§ 501.201-.213, Fla. Stat. (2020). In a nutshell, Mr. Bodie alleged that Cricket engaged in a bait-and-switch scheme; Cricket misleadingly advertised BridgePay, its late-payment billing option, resulting in overcharges to Mr. Bodie's account. The trial court granted Cricket's motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the parties were bound by the arbitration agreement contained in the "Terms and Conditions of Service" signed by Mr. Bodie.

The arbitration agreement contains a class-action waiver, as well as prohibition on representative actions.¹ On appeal, Mr. Bodie claims that the [*2]  prohibition on representative actions on behalf of the consuming public violates public policy and, therefore, is unenforceable. The relevant portion of the provision provides as follows:

The arbitrator may award declaratory or injunctive relief only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that party's individual claim. YOU AND CRICKET AGREE THAT EACH MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN YOUR OR ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING. Further unless both you and Cricket agree otherwise, the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding.

Mr. Bodie contends that limiting injunctive and declaratory relief solely to the aggrieved individual suing under FDUTPA prevents him from pursuing and securing relief on behalf of the larger consuming public. Consequently, he maintains, the arbitration agreement stymies FDUTPA's remedial purpose. See § 501.202(2) ("The provisions of this part shall be construed liberally to . . . protect the consuming public . . . from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.").

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