Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.

Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.

Opinion

 [*1781]  [**80]  PER CURIAM.

Indiana’s petition for certiorari argues that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit incorrectly invalidated two new provisions of Indiana law: the first relating to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers; and the second barring the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers. See Ind. Code §§16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(K), 16-34-3-4(a), 16-34-4-4, 16-34-4-5, 16-34-4-6, 16-34-4-7, 16-34-4-8, 16-41-16-4(d), 16-41-16-5 (2018). We reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit with respect to the first question presented, and we deny the petition with respect to the second question presented.

The first challenged provision altered the manner in which abortion providers may dispose of fetal remains. Among other changes, it excluded fetal remains from the definition of infectious and pathological waste, §§16-41-16-4(d), 16-41-16-5, thereby preventing incineration of fetal remains along with surgical byproducts. It also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, §16-34-3-4(a), which Indiana does not generally allow for human remains, §23-14-31-39(a). The law did not affect a woman’s right under existing law [***2]  “to determine the final disposition of the aborted fetus.” §16-34-3-2(a).

Respondents have never argued that Indiana’s law creates an undue burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 874, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992) (plurality opinion). Respondents have instead litigated this case on the assumption that the law does not implicate a fundamental right and is therefore subject only to ordinary rational basis review. See  [*1782] Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. of Health, 888 F. 3d 300, 307 (2018). To survive under that standard, a state law need only be “rationally related to legitimate government interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 728, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).

The Seventh Circuit found Indiana’s disposition law invalid even under this deferential test. It first held that Indiana’s stated interest in “the ‘humane and dignified disposal of human remains’” was “not . . . legitimate.” 888 F. 3d, at 309. It went on to hold that even if Indiana’s stated interest were legitimate, “it [could not] identify a rational relationship” between that interest and “the law as written,” because the law preserves a woman’s right to dispose of fetal remains however she wishes and allows for simultaneous cremation. Ibid.

Full case includes Shepard's, Headnotes, Legal Analytics from Lex Machina, and more.