Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co.

Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co.

Opinion

 [*470]  MEMORANDUM¹

Plaintiff-Appellant Natalia Bruton filed a putative class action against baby food manufacturer Gerber Products Company (Gerber). Bruton alleged that labels on certain Gerber baby food products included claims about nutrient and sugar content that were impermissible under Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations incorporated into California law. The district court dismissed several of Bruton's claims, denied class certification, denied partial summary judgment for Bruton, and granted summary judgment to Gerber. [**2]  Bruton appeals, challenging the district court's orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1332(d). We reverse and remand.

1. The district court erred in dismissing Bruton's claim for unjust enrichment/quasi-contract. At the time when the district court dismissed this claim, California's case law on whether unjust enrichment could be sustained as a standalone cause of action was uncertain and inconsistent. But since then, the California Supreme Court has clarified California law, allowing an independent claim for unjust enrichment to proceed in an insurance dispute. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C., 61 Cal. 4th 988, 1000, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 599, 353 P.3d 319 (2015); see also Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal. 4th 39, 54, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 924 P.2d 996 (1996) (recognizing independent cause of action for unjust enrichment relating to real estate transaction). In light of this clarification, we reverse the district court's dismissal and remand for consideration of whether there are other grounds on which Bruton has failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment, or if that claim must proceed to resolution.

2. The district court erred when it held that the class could not be certified because it was not "ascertainable." Again, the district court's reasoning runs headlong into an inconsistent case that was decided after the district court's ruling. In Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), our court—using different [**3]  terminology for what the district court called "ascertainability"—held that there was no separate "administrative feasibility" requirement for class certification. Id. at 1123. We reverse the district court's denial of class certification and remand for further consideration of whether class certification is appropriate.

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