Chase v. Miller

Chase v. Miller

Opinion

 [*410]  The opinion of the court was delivered, May 22d 1862, by

Woodward, J.--This is a case of contested election. It comes up to us by writ of certiorari. A motion was made and fully argued, to quash the writ on the ground that the decree of the court below is final and conclusive, and that we have no jurisdiction to review it. The first point to be considered, therefore, is our jurisdiction; for if there be any doubt on that head, we shall be more than willing to escape the constitutional question upon the record.

When the legislature committed contested elections of county officers to the Quarter Sessions, they made them judicial proceedings, and annexed all the usual and necessary incidents of judicial proceedings. Always, contested elections might come under judicial cognisance by quo warranto, but in the forms of this case  [*411]  they are purely statutory, and subject to such rules as the legislature has been pleased to prescribe. Our appellate [**17]  jurisdiction in such cases might be taken away altogether by statute, but if it has not been, it must be held to attach, as a necessary judicial incident, in the same manner in which it attaches to other records of the Courts of Quarter Sessions.

For one hundred and forty years ] the general jurisdiction of this court has been declared by statute to extend to the examination and correction of "all and all manner of error of the justices, magistrates, and courts of the Commonwealth, in the process, proceedings, judgments, and decrees, as well in criminal as in civil proceedings, * * * * and to minister justice to all persons as full and ample to all intents and purposes as the said court has heretofore had power to do under the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth." Such are part of the words of the Act of 1836. In the old Act of 22d May 1722, the powers granted were such as "the justices of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, or any of them, possessed." When, therefore, the Act of 1836 refers itself to the "heretofore" powers of the courts, the general common law powers of the three principal courts of Westminster Hall, so far as they are unimpaired by our constitutions,  [**18]  state and national, are to be understood by the reference.

This is a large charter. There is no temptation to widen it by judicial construction--the inclination of the judicial mind is rather to narrow it. But as it is a trust for the people of Pennsylvania, judges have no right, from motives of ease and convenience, to surrender, weaken, or obscure, by judicial refinements, one single one of the powers granted. The legislature may qualify them, and in a few instances have done so, as in the Justices Act of 1810, where ] the Courts of Common Pleas are empowered to issue certioraries to justices of the peace, and to give judgments thereupon, which shall be final, "and no writ of error shall issue thereon." In numerous decisions it has been held that these words oust our jurisdiction over judgments rendered by the Common Pleas on certioraris to justices of the peace. The result of the authorities touching the general subject of our appellate jurisdiction, was well stated by the present chief justice, in Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520, when he said: ] "The judicial authority of this court extends to the review and correction of all proceedings of all inferior courts, except where  [**19]   such review is expressly excluded by statute." There is a class of cases in our books which would seem to establish another exception--that of a case stated by the parties, wherein they agree to submit their disputes to the Common Pleas, without expressly reserving their right to a writ of error. The first of these cases was Fuller v. Trevoir, 8 Serge. & Rawle 529, which was an amicable reference of a pending cause to  [*412]  referees, subject to the opinion of the court on all legal points and objections. The Court of Common Pleas rendered judgment on the report of the referees, and this court held that a writ of error would not lie to that judgment, because the agreement did not provide that the case should "be considered as of the nature of a special verdict and subject to a writ of error." In Kline v. Guthart, 2 Pen. & W. 490, which was a reference under the Act of 1705, and a judgment on the award, Gibson, C. J., gave the rationale of the ground on which a writ of error is denied to such judgments. He regarded awards as in the nature of verdicts, exceptions to them as motions for a new trial, and judgments upon them as overruling such motions; and inasmuch as writs of [**20]  error never go to verdicts, nor to mere discretionary exercises of power by the courts, such records are not reviewable here. To the same effect were Wilson v. The Commonwealth, 3 Pen. & W. 531, and Berg v. Moore, 7 Pa. 94; whilst Davis v. Barr, 5 Serge. & Rawle 516, and Carr v. Wallace, 7 Watts 394, frequently cited to the same point, are not applicable to it, as any one will see who consults them. If, then, we have ] an established exception, additional to the one exception stated by the chief justice in Gosline v. Place, it is where a case is referred by agreement of parties to an auditor or referees, without an express reservation of the right of review, and the Court of common Pleas passes only on exceptions to their report. The presumption of law is, in such cases, that the parties meant to bind themselves by the award of the domestic tribunal of their own providing, and therefore we leave them bound; for, whilst consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon us, it may take it away. I need not allude to another class of cases, such as viewers of land damages and other special statutory tribunals, between whom and this court there is no recognized relation [**21]  whatever, for these do not fall within the range of the present discussion.

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