Chrysafis v. Marks

Chrysafis v. Marks

Opinion

 [*2482]   [**1006]  Application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Sotomayor and by her referred to the Court granted pending disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan join, dissenting from grant of application for injunctive relief.

This order enjoins the enforcement of only Part A of the COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act (CEEFPA). 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381. That is the only relief applicants seek. See Case No. 2:21-cv-02516, ECF No. 1 at 9; Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction 7, 40. If a tenant self-certifies financial hardship, Part A of CEEFPA generally precludes a landlord from contesting that certification and denies the landlord a hearing. This scheme violates the Court’s longstanding teaching that ordinarily “no man can be a judge in his own case” consistent with [***2]  the Due Process Clause. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955); see United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 53, 114 S. Ct. 492, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1993) (due process generally requires a hearing).

This order does not enjoin the enforcement of the Tenant Safe Harbor Act (TSHA) [*2483]  , which applicants do not challenge. 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 127, §§1, 2(2)(a). Among other things, TSHA instructs New York courts to entertain a COVID-related hardship defense in eviction proceedings, assessing a tenant’s income prior to COVID, income during COVID, liquid assets, and ability to obtain government assistance. §2(2)(b). If the court finds the tenant “has suffered a financial hardship” during a statutorily-prescribed period, then it “shall [not] issue a warrant of eviction or judgment of possession.” §2(1).

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