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Deshaies v. Prudential Rochester Realty

Deshaies v. Prudential Rochester Realty

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

February 7, 2003, Decided ; February 7, 2003, Entered

CA 02-00996

Opinion

 [*1000]   [**155]  Appeal from that part of an order of Supreme Court, Monroe County (Frazee, J.), entered July 16, 2001, that denied the cross motion of defendant Cindy L. Gilchrist for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff's decedent was killed when the vehicle that she was driving collided with a vehicle driven by defendant Cindy L. Gilchrist. According to Gilchrist, her vehicle was propelled into decedent's vehicle by a vehicle driven by defendant Mary B. Cirilla, who failed to [***2]  stop at a stop sign. Supreme Court, inter alia, granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability against, inter alia, Cirilla in a separate action and in this action denied the cross motion of Gilchrist for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her. Gilchrist appeals, contending that the sole cause of the accident was Cirilla's failure to heed the stop sign. We affirm.

] It is well established that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and here the fact that Cirilla failed to stop at the stop sign is not dispositive of the issue whether Gilchrist failed to exercise reasonable care when proceeding into the intersection despite her admitted awareness that Cirilla was not going to stop at the stop sign (see Doctor v Juliana, 277 A.D.2d 1013, 716 N.Y.S.2d 196). According to the deposition testimony of Gilchrist, she saw the Cirilla vehicle before either of their vehicles entered the intersection, she never saw the Cirilla vehicle slow down, and she looked away from the [**156]  Cirilla vehicle before entering the intersection. Moreover, Gilchrist testified that she never sounded her horn or took any other evasive action before [***3]  the collision. Even assuming, arguendo, that Gilchrist met her initial burden on the cross motion, we conclude that plaintiff raised triable issues of fact whether Gilchrist was exceeding the posted speed limit and whether she "had a sufficient opportunity to take some evasive action in an effort to avoid the accident" (King v Washburn, 273 AD2d 725, 726, 710 N.Y.S.2d 185).

Present--Wisner, J.P., Hurlbutt, Scudder, Gorski and Lawton, JJ.

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302 A.D.2d 999 *; 755 N.Y.S.2d 155 **; 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1074 ***

Richard Deshaies, as Administrator of the Estate of Karen R. Deshaies, Deceased, Respondent, v. Prudential Rochester Realty, Defendant, and Cindy L. Gilchrist, Appellant.

Prior History:  [***1]  Appeal from that part of an order of Supreme Court, Monroe County (Frazee, J.), entered July 16, 2001, that denied the cross motion of defendant Cindy L. Gilchrist for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her.

CORE TERMS

cross motion, stop sign, intersection, summary judgment, evasive action, exceeding, proximate cause of the accident, driven, sufficient opportunity, triable issue of fact, posted speed limit, initial burden, miles per hour, westbound lane, right of way, speed limit, inter alia, Memorandum, deposition, collision, traveling, arguendo, traffic

Criminal Law & Procedure, Vehicular Crimes, Hit & Run Accidents, Elements, Torts, Causation, Proximate Cause, General Overview, Transportation Law, Traffic Regulation, Traffic Control Devices, Stop Signs