Doe v. Mills

Doe v. Mills

Opinion

 [*17]  [**243]   Application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Breyer and by him referred to the Court denied.

Concur by: BARRETT

Concur

 [*18]  Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Kavanaugh joins, concurring in the denial of application for injunctive relief.

When this Court is asked to grant extraordinary relief, it considers, among other things, whether the applicant “‘is likely to succeed on the merits.’” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 173 L. Ed. 2d 550 (2009). I understand this factor to encompass not only an assessment of the underlying merits but also a discretionary judgment about whether the Court should grant review in the case. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190, 130 S. Ct. 705, 175 L. Ed. 2d 657 (2010) (per curiam); cf. Supreme Court Rule 10. Were the standard otherwise, applicants could use the emergency docket to force the Court to give a merits preview in cases that it would be unlikely to take—and to do so on a short fuse without benefit of full briefing and oral argument. In my view, this discretionary consideration counsels against a grant of extraordinary relief in this case, which is the first to address the questions presented.

Dissent by: GORSUCH

Dissent

Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Alito join, dissenting from the [***2]  denial of application for injunctive relief.

Maine has adopted a new regulation requiring certain healthcare workers to  [**244]  receive COVID-19 vaccines if they wish to keep their jobs. Unlike comparable rules in most other States, Maine’s rule contains no exemption for those whose sincerely held religious beliefs preclude them from accepting the vaccination. The applicants before us are a physician who operates a medical practice and eight other healthcare workers. No one questions that these individuals have served patients on the front line of the COVID-19 pandemic with bravery and grace for 18 months now. App. to Application for Injunctive Relief, Exh. 6, ¶8 (Complaint). Yet, with Maine’s new rule coming into effect, one of the applicants has already lost her job for refusing to betray her faith; another risks the imminent loss of his medical practice. The applicants ask us to enjoin further enforcement of Maine’s new rule as to them, at least until we can decide whether to accept their petition for certiorari. I would grant that relief.

Start with the first question confronting any injunction or stay request—whether the applicants are likely to succeed on the merits. The First Amendment protects the [***3]  exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U. S. ___, ___-___, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 201 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2018). Laws that single out sincerely held religious beliefs or conduct based on them for sanction are “doubtless . . . unconstitutional.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990). But what about other laws? Under this Court’s current jurisprudence, a law may survive First Amendment scrutiny if it is generally applicable and neutral toward religion. If the law fails either of those tests, it may yet survive but the State must satisfy strict scrutiny. To do that, the State must prove its law serves a compelling interest and employs the least restrictive means available for doing so. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 531-532, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993); Smith, 494 U. S., at 879.

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