Garner v. Buzz Finco LLC

Garner v. Buzz Finco LLC

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Timothy Garner brings this action under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) individually and on behalf of a putative class. He originally filed this action in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Winnebago County, Illinois. Dkt. 1-1. Defendants Buzz Finco LLC and Buzz Bidco LLC removed the case to this Court invoking federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Dkt. 1. Garner now moves the Court to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In support, he argues that he lacks standing to bring one of his claims in federal court, and so the Court must sever that claim and remand it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons explained below, the Court holds that [*2]  Garner's complaint does not allege an injury in fact in connection with Defendants' alleged violation of Section 15(a) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. Thus, the Court must sever and remand that claim.

Article III confines federal courts to adjudicating only cases and controversies in which a plaintiff alleges a personal stake in the outcome of the case. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203, 210 L. Ed. 2d 568 (2021). To that end, plaintiffs must allege that they have standing to bring each individual claim in federal court. Id. at 2208 (explaining that "plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek"). To determine whether a plaintiff's allegations confer Article III standing, federal courts determine whether the plaintiff has alleged an injury in fact, that is fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct, and that the relief sought is likely to redress the harm the defendant allegedly caused. Lujan v. Def's of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). The question presented in this case is whether Garner has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact. An injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is both concrete and particularized, as well as "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016). For an injury to be particularized, [*3]  it "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id.

Two types of challenges to Article III standing exist. First, a facial attack "tests whether the allegations, taken as true, support an inference that the elements of standing exist." Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1007 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009)). Second, a factual attack tests the actual existence of standing in fact, which may involve a limited evidentiary hearing. Id.; Gaetano v. United States, 994 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2021) (discussing that factual attacks may involve affidavits and documents, as well as limited evidentiary hearings). In this case, Garner brings only a facial challenge to his own standing. Indeed, his motion to remand repeatedly refers to his allegations, rather than to evidence. Dkt. 11. Thus, because Garner brings a facial challenge, the Court must accept the allegations in his state court complaint as true and determine whether those allegations plausibly allege that he has Article III standing to sue in federal court. Spuhler v. State Collection Serv., 983 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 2020).

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