Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Demoonie

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Demoonie

Opinion

 [*812]   [**452]  ANDREWS, Chief Judge.

Grange Mutual Casualty Company (Grange) appeals from the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of DeMoonie, the named insured under a homeowners insurance policy issued by Grange. Grange denied coverage, contending that DeMoonie was required to reside in the insured premises and did not at the time of the intentionally set fire, ¹ which substantially damaged the house, and that the property had been vacant for more than 30 days, precluding coverage under the policy.

 [***2]  1. Although Grange's brief specifies seven enumerations of error while only two argument headings are contained in the brief, we exercise our discretion to consider the two main arguments presented, to the degree that we discern the enumerated errors discussed. ² Finch v. Brown, 216 Ga. App. 451, 452 (454 S.E.2d 807) (1995); McHaffie v. Decatur Fed. Sav., etc., Assn., 214 Ga. App. 368, 369 (448 S.E.2d 36) (1994).

2. Grange complains of the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the issues of the residency and vacancy clauses. The trial court denied the motion, and immediate review was denied by this Court. The same grounds were raised by motions for directed verdict at trial, which were also denied. ] "'After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of [***3]  the case.' (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown Realty Assoc. v. Thomas, 193 Ga. App. 847 (1) (389 S.E.2d 505) (1989)." Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) (460 S.E.2d 812) (1995). We do, however, consider the denial of the motions for directed verdict. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 (a).

3. ] The standard for review of denial of a motion for directed verdict requires Grange to show that there was no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and "the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom," demanded the verdict sought. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50; Pendley v. Pendley, 251 Ga. 30 (1) (302 S.E.2d 554) (1983). Construing the evidence in favor of DeMoonie, the party opposing the motion for directed verdict, Mattox v. MARTA, 200 Ga. App. 697 (1) (409 S.E.2d 267) (1991), it was that DeMoonie had previously lived for a number of years with her former husband in the  [*813]  Dunbar Road residence shown on the declarations page of the policy. After divorcing him, however, she moved from Dunbar Road and began renting the house. In 1993, the Jordans rented the house for a number of months until they moved out around the third week of October 1993. DeMoonie then [***4]  attempted to rent the house "to sell." The Campbells were going to sign papers on the house on December 9, 1993, but the house burned on December 8, 1993. At that time, DeMoonie was living in a house she owned on Carolina Avenue.

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