In re: Amendment to Fla. Rule of Civ. Procedure 1.280

In re: Amendment to Fla. Rule of Civ. Procedure 1.280

Opinion

 [*459]  CORRECTED OPINION

MUÑIZ, J.

Many courts apply the "apex doctrine" to protect high-level corporate officers from the risk of abusive discovery, while still honoring opposing litigants' right to depose such persons if necessary.¹ Florida's version of the apex doctrine, developed by the district courts of appeal as a common law gloss on our rules of civil procedure, protects only high-level government officials.² On our own motion, we now amend those rules to codify the apex doctrine and to extend its protections to the private sphere.³

We begin with a brief discussion of Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Winckler, 284 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), the impetus for our decision to take up the apex doctrine now.

Suzuki came to the First District Court of Appeal on certiorari review. The issue was whether the trial court had departed from the essential requirements of law by not invoking the apex doctrine to prevent the examination of Osamu Suzuki, then his company's chairman and former chief executive officer. Id. at 1108. As the [**2]  district court correctly noted, a court departs from the essential requirements of law when it violates a clearly established principle of law. See Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1133 (Fla. 2011).

The district court described "the essence of Florida's apex doctrine" as follows:

[A]n agency head should not be subject to deposition, over objection, unless and until the opposing parties have exhausted other discovery and can demonstrate that the agency head is uniquely able to provide relevant information which cannot be obtained from other sources.

Winckler, 284 So. 3d at 1109 (quoting Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward [*460]  Cty., 810 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)).

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