John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States

Opinion

 [*132]  [**752]  Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether a court must raise on its own the timeliness of a lawsuit filed in the Court of Federal Claims, despite the Government's waiver of the issue. We hold that the special statute of limitations governing the Court of Federal Claims requires that sua sponte consideration.

Petitioner John R. Sand & Gravel Company filed an action in the Court of [**753]  Federal Claims in May 2002. The complaint  [****5] explained that petitioner held a 50-year mining lease on certain land. And it asserted that various Environmental Protection Agency activities on that land (involving, e.g., the building and moving of various fences) amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold rights.

 [***595] The Government initially asserted that petitioner's several claims were all untimely in light of the statute providing that "[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Later, however, the Government effectively conceded that certain claims were timely. See App. 37a-39a (Government's pretrial brief). The Government subsequently won on the merits. See 62 Fed. Cl. 556, 589 (2004).

 [*133]  Petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See 457 F.3d 1345, 1346 (2006). The Government's brief said nothing about the statute of limitations, but an amicus brief called the issue to the court's attention. See id., at 1352.  The court considered itself obliged to address the limitations issue, and it held that the action was untimely.  [****6]   Id., at 1353-1360. We subsequently agreed to consider whether the Court of Appeals was right to ignore the Government's waiver and to decide the timeliness question. 550 U.S. 968, 127 S. Ct. 2877, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1151 (2007).

Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979).  Thus, the law typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.  See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1), 12(b), 15(a); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 164 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2006); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1982). Such statutes also typically permit courts to toll the limitations period in light of special equitable considerations. See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 560-561, 120 S. Ct. 1075, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (2000); Zipes, supra, at 393; see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-453 (CA7 1990).

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