Josey v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

Josey v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRE-CERTIFICATION DISCOVERY

This Court previously denied a motion for preliminary class certification and for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement that Plaintiffs Vernon Ross and Debra Josey ("Plaintiffs") filed along with their initial complaint, see Ross v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ("Ross I"), 267 F. Supp. 3d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2017), and in the wake of that determination, Plaintiffs have filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint, to provide additional details regarding the operation of Defendant Lockheed Martin's performance review process ("LM Commit") in [*2]  support of their claim that Lockheed Martin has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and also 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in a manner that can be established, and redressed, on a classwide basis. (See Second Am. Compl. ("Am. Compl."), ECF No. 34.) Plaintiffs have now also requested pre-certification discovery, ostensibly to gather additional information in support of their class claims.¹ (See Pls.' Mem. in Supp of Mot. for Class Discovery ("Pls.' Mot."), ECF No. 54, at 6, 26.)² For the reasons explained below, neither the additional details that Plaintiffs have provided in the Second Amended Complaint nor the information that Plaintiffs hope to gather prior to filing their motion for class certification is likely to assist them in making the required prima facie showing that their class action plausibly satisfies Rule 23's certification requirements. Consequently, this Court filed an Order on May 28, 2020, that DENIED Plaintiffs' discovery motion. (See Order, ECF No. 63.)

The instant Memorandum Opinion explains the reasons for that order. In short, the existence of a class action that is plausibly viable is a prerequisite to getting discovery in aid of a motion for class certification, and Plaintiffs [*3]  bear the burden of demonstrating that discovery measures are likely to produce information that substantiates their contention that they have identified a viable class action. Under the circumstances presented here, Plaintiffs cannot carry that burden, as this Court made clear in Ross I, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 197 (holding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate commonality because they did not point to a "testing procedure or other companywide evaluation method that can be charged with bias[,]" nor did they offer "[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) In other words, pre-certification discovery is not warranted because, regardless, the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint concerning the operation of Lockheed Martin's performance review process make it manifestly implausible that the 5,000 African-American Lockheed Martin employees who are members of the putative class have suffered a common injury that can either be redressed through a single remedy on a classwide basis or be proven through common questions of fact that predominate over individualized proof of injury.

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