Lang v. MBank Dallas

Lang v. MBank Dallas

Opinion

 [*811]  Rhonda S. Lang sued MBank Dallas (MBank) to recover alleged compensation due her under a profit sharing plan. MBank moved for summary judgment, asserting that Lang was not eligible for compensation under the terms of the plan which required participants to be actively employed at the time of distribution. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion, and Lang appeals. In her only point of error, Lang contends that genuine issues of material fact exist, and, consequently, the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment.

] Summary judgments are only proper when the movant's evidence establishes movant's right to judgment as a matter of law. Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. 1984). The moving party must establish that there are no genuine issues of fact. McFadden v. American United Life Insurance Co., 658 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. 1983). Evidence favorable to the nonmovant is taken as true, and every reasonable inference must be indulged in the nonmovant's favor.  MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex.  [**2]  1986). All doubts concerning the existence of a material fact question are to be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment and the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Bankers Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Scott, 631 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex. App. -- Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

 [*812]  MBank hired Lang in May of 1985 as a futures and options trader. The offer was extended to Lang in the form of a letter from Philip Kenny, MBank's manager of human resources, which stated in pertinent part:

On behalf of MBank Dallas, I am pleased to extend to you an offer of employment for the position of Trader II in our Capital Markets Group at a starting annual salary of $ 35,000. You will also be eligible to participate in the incentive plan as discussed with Jim Madden.

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