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Lloyd v. United States

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

April 7, 2005, Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) ; May 17, 2005, Filed

No. 04-3549



BARRY, Circuit Judge

All courts of appeals to have considered the issue of whether the rule of law announced in United States v. Booker, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621, 543 U.S.    , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), applies retroactively to prisoners who were in the initial § 2255 motion stage as of the date that Booker issued have concluded that it does not. We now join those courts.


Appellant Garry D. Lloyd was charged with bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, and was convicted by a jury. When determining Lloyd's sentence, the District Court found facts, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, that had not been found by the jury,  [**2]  including (1) that Lloyd had engaged in more than minimal planning; (2) that Lloyd had caused a financial loss of more than $ 120,000 but less than $ 200,000; and (3) that Lloyd had committed an obstruction of justice. Application of the Federal Sentencing Guideline enhancements called for by these fact-findings resulted in a total offense level of 17 and, given Lloyd's criminal history category of V, a Guideline imprisonment range of forty-six to fifty-seven months. The District Court sentenced Lloyd, as relevant here, to fifty months imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. We affirmed the judgment. See United States v. Lloyd, No. 02-2394, 58 Fed. Appx. 928 (3d Cir. 2003). Lloyd did not seek a writ of certiorari, and his conviction became final on May 6, 2003.

On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The Court held that Washington State's determinate sentencing scheme, a scheme similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 2538. Blakely's reasoning was that judges [**3]  were imposing sentences that were not based solely on facts reflected in the verdict of the jury or admitted by the defendant, and were using a preponderance of the evidence standard to find the facts necessary to that imposition. Id. at 2536-39.

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407 F.3d 608 *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8699 **


Subsequent History: US Supreme Court certiorari denied by Lloyd v. United States, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6792 (U.S., Oct. 3, 2005)

Prior History:  [**1]  APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY. D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-03687. District Judge: The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas.

United States v. Lloyd, 58 Fed. Appx. 928, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2022 (2003)


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Criminal Law & Procedure, Postconviction Proceedings, Motions to Set Aside Sentence, Governments, Legislation, Statute of Limitations, Time Limitations, Sentencing, Corrections, Modifications & Reductions, Order & Timing of Petitions, Time Limitations, General Overview, Accrual Period, Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act, Procedural Defenses, Retroactivity of Decisions, Effect & Operation, Prospective Operation, Imposition of Sentence, Factors, Statutory Maximums, Sentencing Guidelines, Departures From Guidelines, Ranges