Matthys v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., Inc.

Matthys v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., Inc.

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, JOINT MOTION REGARDING DISCOVERY DISPUTE

[ECF No. 45]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Bruce Matthys ("Matthys") and Defendant Barrick Turquoise Ridge, Inc.'s ("Barrick") joint motion regarding discovery dispute. (ECF No. 45.) The discovery dispute relates to a noticed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. For the reasons discussed below, the joint motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The instant case arises out of allegations of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Nevada Revised Statute § 613.330, as well as a claim of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, in relation to Matthys's employment by Barrick at a mine site near Golconda, Nevada. (ECF No. 29.)

In accordance with this Court's discovery dispute process, the parties have filed a joint motion regarding discovery dispute regarding a noticed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (ECF No. 45.) The parties contest the appropriateness of Matthys's Second-Amended Rule 30(b)(6) deposition [*2]  notice to Barrick that covers forty topics, spanning roughly ten pages. (See ECF No. 45-3.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery." Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 140 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1998).

"The discovery process in theory should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the district court." Sali v. Corona Reg. Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). Nonetheless, a party from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking issuance of a protective order bears the burden of persuasion. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)). Such a burden is carried by demonstrating a particular need for protection supported by specific facts. Id. To that end, courts "insist[] on a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from conclusory statements," to issue a protective order. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 124 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Nev. 1989). Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient. Caesars Entertainment, 237 F.R.D. at 432. A showing that discovery may involve some inconvenience or expense is likewise insufficient to obtain a protective order. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 175 F.R.D. 554, 556 (D. Nev. 1997).

District courts possess "wide discretion to determine what constitutes a showing of good cause and to fashion a protective order that provides [*3]  the appropriate degree of protection." Swenson v. GEICO Cas. Co., 336 F.R.D. 206, 209 (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2020) (quoting Grano v. Sodexo Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020)). Where grounds for a protective order have been established, courts have a variety of options to rectify the situation, including preventing the discovery or specifying the terms on which the discovery will be conducted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (B).

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