Maxpower Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rohm Semiconductor, Inc. (In re Maxpower Semiconductor, Inc.)

Maxpower Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rohm Semiconductor, Inc. (In re Maxpower Semiconductor, Inc.)

Opinion

 [*1350]  ON PETITION

Reyna, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

MaxPower Semiconductor, Inc. [**2]  ("MaxPower") directly appeals the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's ("Board") determinations to institute inter partes review proceedings, which involve four MaxPower patents. MaxPower alternatively seeks a writ of mandamus to review those decisions.

 [*1351]  ] A decision to institute inter partes review proceedings, like a decision not to institute, is "nonappealable" under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). See Mylan Lab'ys Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021); In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Loughlin v. Ling, 684 F.3d 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) incorporates a finality requirement). Section 314(d)'s rule of nonappealability confirms the unavailability of jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(4)(A) to hear MaxPower's direct appeals. Section 314(d) also presents an obstacle for MaxPower in showing a clear and indisputable right to this court's immediate review of the Board's decisions necessary to grant its alternative requests for mandamus relief. Procter & Gamble, 749 F.3d at 1379.

MaxPower suggests that the collateral order doctrine warrants immediate review because its challenge implicates questions of whether the Board can institute proceedings that are subject to arbitration. ] But that doctrine only allows appeal when an order "affect[s] rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal." Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If MaxPower is truly not raising matters that are [**3]  absolutely barred from appellate review under section 314(d) (an issue we need not decide here), then MaxPower can meaningfully raise its arbitration-related challenges after the Board's final written decisions. We therefore cannot say that MaxPower has established jurisdiction to review these decisions under the collateral order doctrine. See generally Queipo v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 867 F.2d 721, 722 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding an order denying a stay in favor of arbitration is not effectively unreviewable after final judgment under the collateral order doctrine).

We likewise reject MaxPower's argument that its appeals are authorized under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). ] That provision states that an appeal may be taken from an order "refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title," "denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed," "denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration," "confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award," or "modifying, correcting, or vacating an award." The Board's decisions do not fall within any of those categories.

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