Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court

Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court

Opinion

 [*292] 

 [**464]  CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.—Under two of California's most prominent consumer protection statutes—the unfair competition law (UCL)¹ and the false advertising law (FAL)²—the Attorney General or local prosecuting authorities may bring a civil action against a business that has allegedly engaged in an unfair, unlawful or deceptive business act or practice or false or misleading advertising and may obtain civil penalties as well as injunctive relief and restitution in such an action. In this case we must decide whether, when the government seeks civil penalties as well an injunction or other equitable remedies under those statutes, the causes of action are to be tried by the court (that is, the trial judge) or, instead, by a jury.

For more than 45 years, a uniform line of California Court of Appeal decisions has  [***717]  held that such causes of action under the UCL and the FAL are to be tried by the court rather than by a jury. In the current writ proceeding [****3]  in this case, however, the Court of Appeal, relying primarily on a decision of the United States Supreme Court applying the civil jury trial provision of the Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution—Tull v. United States (1987) 481 U.S. 412 [95 L.Ed.2d 365, 107 S.Ct. 1831] (Tull)—disagreed with the earlier line of decisions and held that the jury trial provision of the California Constitution should be interpreted to require a jury trial in any action brought under the UCL or the FAL in which the government seeks civil penalties in addition to injunctive or other equitable relief. We granted review to resolve the conflict in the Court of Appeal decisions.

For the reasons discussed hereafter, we conclude that the causes of action established by the UCL and the FAL at issue here are equitable in nature and are properly tried by the court rather than a jury. As we explain, the legislative history and underlying purpose of the statutory provisions in question demonstrate that these very broadly worded consumer protection statutes were fashioned to permit courts to utilize their traditional flexible equitable authority, tempered by judicial experience and familiarity with the treatment of analogous business practices in this and other jurisdictions, in evaluating whether a challenged business act or practice [****4]  or advertising should properly be considered impermissible under these statutory provisions.

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