Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C.

Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C.

Opinion

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This is our second pass at a climate-change case that requires us to explore the mind-numbing complexities of federal removal jurisdiction. See Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 979 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2020) ("Shell Oil"). We start by bringing the reader up to speed.³

Like other state and local governments across the country, Rhode Island claims that the Energy Companies named in our caption knew for decades that burning fossil fuels is damaging the earth's atmosphere but duped the public into buying more and more of their products (consequences be damned) — all to line their very deep pockets. See id. at 53. Seeking relief for the catastrophic [*6]  harm they supposedly have done (and will do) to its non-federal property and natural resources, Rhode Island — also like other governments elsewhere — sued the Energy Companies in state court. See id. at 53-54. And its longish complaint alleges state-law causes of action for public nuisance, strict-liability design defect, negligent design defect, negligent failure to warn, impairment of public-trust resources, and violations of the state's Environmental Rights Act.

Not eager to try this case in a Rhode Island court, the Energy Companies removed the matter to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute, the federal-question doctrine, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (just "OCSLA" from now on), the admiralty-jurisdiction statute, and the bankruptcy-removal statute. But to their disappointment, the district judge thought that none of those grounds could provide a hook on which removal could hang. See id. And so he remanded the case to state court. See id.

On the Energy Companies' appeal — in our first go-around — we concluded that we could only review the federal-officer removal ground. See id. at 58-60. And ruling that the Energy Companies had not satisfied the requirements of the [*7]  federal-officer removal statute, we affirmed the judge's remand order. See id. at 60. But on the Energy Companies' petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court (without reversing our decision on the merits) GVR'd us (short for granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded) and instructed that we give "further consideration in light of BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 209 L. Ed. 2d 631 (2021)" — a then-hot-off-the-presses opinion requiring courts of appeals to review the judge's entire remand order and consider all of the defendants' removal grounds, not just the part of the order resolving the federal-officer removal ground.⁴See Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Rhode Island, 141 S. Ct. 2666, 210 L. Ed. 2d 830 (2021) (Mem.).

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