Thank You For Submiting Feedback!
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
September 14, 2020, Decided; September 14, 2020, Filed
Civil Action No. 11-2224 (KBJ)
Plaintiffs David Sickle and Matthew Elliott ("Plaintiffs") are military subcontractors who formerly maintained a sub-contractor relationship with defense contractor Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC ("Torres AES"). Plaintiffs allege that Torres AES and Scott Torres—whom Plaintiffs characterize as a "principal and owner" of Torres AES (2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 26, ¶ 4) (collectively, "Defendants")—conspired to terminate Plaintiffs' relationship with Torres AES improperly and in retaliation for Elliott's having sought workers' compensation benefits under the Defense Base Act ("DBA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55. (See 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 2, 4.) This Court dismissed Plaintiffs' initial complaint in its entirety on exhaustion and preemption grounds, see Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 10, 21, 22 (D.D.C. 2013); however the D.C. Circuit partially reversed that ruling, [*2] see Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC ("Sickle II"), 884 F.3d 338, 344, 434 U.S. App. D.C. 363 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that Elliott's contract claim and Sickle's tort and contract claims were not preempted). On remand, Plaintiffs have filed a Second Amended Complaint that repleads the claims that the Circuit panel reinstated: both Plaintiffs allege that Torres AES breached their respective contracts when it terminated their employment without proper notice (see 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31), and Sickle also claims that Defendants are liable for common law retaliatory discharge, conspiracy, and prima facie tort arising from the termination of his contract (see id. ¶¶ 21-28, 37-45).
Before this Court at present is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. (See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' 2d Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Mot."), ECF No. 27.) Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Scott Torres (see Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. ("Defs.' Mem."), ECF No. 27-1, at 15-22), and they further insist that Sickle has failed to plead a plausible claim for retaliatory discharge (see id. at 23-30), and that the amended complaint's conspiracy and prima facie tort claims are implausible (see id. at 34-36).1 With respect to the [*3] breach of contract claims, Defendants assert that the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed because the governing law does not recognize that cause of action (see id. at 30-33), and that, while Plaintiffs have stated plausible claims for general breach of contract against Torres AES, the recoverable amounts in controversy with respect to those claims fall below the $75,000 threshold for federal court jurisdiction (see id. at 33).
Full case includes Shepard's, Headnotes, Legal Analytics from Lex Machina, and more.
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167864 *; 2020 WL 5530357
DAVID SICKLE, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. TORRES ADVANCED ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS, LLC, et. al., Defendants.
Prior History: Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 10, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180045 (D.D.C., Dec. 24, 2013)
Plaintiffs', termination, personal jurisdiction, choice-of-law, contracts, tort claim, notice, contacts, second amended complaint, benefits, motion to dismiss, prima facie tort, conspiracy, retaliatory discharge, fair dealing, quotation, marks, cause of action, courts, contract claim, public policy, contractual, provisions, threshold, Shield, covenant of good faith, workers' compensation, circumstances, violate public policy, documented