Stewart v. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP

Stewart v. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP

Opinion

 [*291] MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant law firm, brings this action for alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and New York State and City law. Defendant moves to dismiss or stay the action pending arbitration. ¹

 [*292]  It is undisputed that plaintiff, as a condition of commencing her former [**2]  employment, signed a broad arbitration agreement with defendant which provides for arbitration of "all claims or controversies . . . whether or not arising out of my employment (or its termination), that . . . I may have against the Firm . . . . The claims covered by this Agreement include, but are not limited to, claims for . . . discrimination (including, but not limited to, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, age, marital status, or medical condition, handicap or disability); claims for benefits . . . , and claims for violation of any federal, state, or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except claims excluded in the following paragraph." ² None of the exclusions is pertinent here. Accordingly, it is undisputed that the claims raised by the complaint fall within the express terms of the arbitration clause. Plaintiff nevertheless resists enforcement of the arbitration clause on several grounds.

First, plaintiff contends that the arbitration [**3]  clause is unconscionable because arbitration before the AAA, the forum selected by the clause, would be "an uneven playing field," the plaintiff "must foot half the bill," the forum is biased, the plaintiff has less time to file a claim, the opportunities for discovery are more limited, and any recovery inevitably would be smaller. These contentions are devoid of merit, especially in the context of this case. For one thing, the issue of enforceability of the clause in the first instance is for the arbitrator, as the arbitration clause explicitly provides that the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute as to whether "all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable." ³ For another, the specific contentions with respect to the fairness of the arbitral tribunal are exaggerated or spun out of whole cloth. For example, while there is a one year limitations period in the clause, there is no limitations issue in this case. ⁴ The suggestion that an arbitration clause is unconscionable because discovery either is unavailable or more limited in arbitration than in litigation is preposterous, doubly so here in light of the fact that this clause permits a deposition [**4]  on each side as a matter of right and permits the arbitrator to afford more discovery if appropriate. There is no basis for concluding that the AAA is a biased forum ⁵ and no basis for assuming that any damage recovery necessarily would be more limited there.

 [**5]  The only specific contention that has even a glimmer of support is the assertion regarding plaintiff's possible liability for costs, and even that is vastly overstated because the enforceability of the cost sharing provision as well as the amount of any award in that respect are for the arbitrator, thus demonstrating that it by no means is inevitable that plaintiff would be forced to pay any costs at all,  [*293]  much less costs in excess of her means. ⁶ [**6]  ] The assertion that the cost sharing provision per se invalidates the entire agreement is not supported either by the law of this Circuit or by the better considered authorities elsewhere. ⁷

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