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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
March 10, 1992, Filed
No. 89-15377, No. 89-15402, No. 89-15452
This is a fee application by Pixley-Richards West, Inc. (Pixley) instituted as a consequence of our decision in Tingey v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., Nos. 89-15377, 89-15402, 89-15452 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1992). In our decision on the merits, we ruled that the Tingeys' entire First-Amended Complaint was preempted by ERISA 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). We thus affirmed that portion of the district court's decision dismissing some counts of the complaint, and reversed as to those counts that the district court remanded to Arizona state court. Given the posture of the appeal and the district court's mistaken preemption analysis, however, we remanded this case to the district court with instructions to give the Tingeys a final opportunity to plead an ERISA cause of action proper. Pixley now comes to us as a prevailing party on the preemption question and seeks fees pursuant to ERISA [**2] § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). We decline to award the sought-after fees.
In pertinent part, ] § 502(g)(1) provides that "in any action under this subchapter . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." We, along with most circuits, have followed the case of Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978), in our interpretation of this section of ERISA. See Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Eaves). Eaves identified a five-factor test to be considered ] in determining whether a fee award is appropriate. Courts should look to: (1) the degree of the opposing party's culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing party would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. [**3] Eaves, 587 F.2d at 465; Hummell, 634 F.2d at 453. We have also held, in Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1984), that the Eaves/Hummell five-factor test applies to both plaintiffs and defendants. See id. at 1415. We expanded the fee award analysis as to defendants particularly, however, noting that not all factors of the Eaves/Hummell test are "necessarily decisive" or "pertinent in a given case." Id. at 1416. Moreover, we required that for a fee application by an ERISA-defendant, careful consideration should be given to the seventh circuit's analysis in Marquardt v. North Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1981), by recognizing "that the Hummell factors very frequently suggest that attorney's fees should not be charged against ERISA plaintiffs." Russell, 726 F.2d at 1416.
Marquardt involved a "retired man in his sixties" who took a voluntary dismissal, with prejudice, of his suit to recover full pension benefits. 652 F.2d at 718. The court noted that Marquardt's ability to [**4] pay was an "important factor," and that it would be unjust for the district court to order him "to sacrifice even a part of his modest pension." Id. at 719. Marquardt points strongly toward a denial of the fee request. Here, Bradley and Amy Tingey have the responsibility of providing for their severely disabled son. As in Marquardt, we think it would be unjust, no matter the outcome of the Tingeys' suit now pending in the district court, to visit the Tingey family with Pixley's costs of appeal on the limited question of ERISA preemption. Therefore, factor number two of the Eaves/Hummell test counsels against awarding fees to employer/defendants where, as here, the plaintiffs are individual beneficiaries of an ERISA-qualified plan who seek no more than a recovery of what they believe, rightly or wrongly, to be their just benefits.
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958 F.2d 908 *; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3741 **; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2043; 92 Daily Journal DAR 3204
Bradley D. Tingey, husband; Amy E. Tingey, wife; Bradley D. Tingey, as guardian ad litem for Trevor F. Tingey, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massachusetts, a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellees. Bradley D. Tingey, husband; Amy E. Tingey, wife, and Bradley D. Tingey, as guardian ad litem for Trevor F. Tingey, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Bradley D. Tingey, husband; Amy E. Tingey, wife; Bradley D. Tingey, as guardian ad litem for Trevor F. Tingey, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation; Roland "Buzz" Mosher, and Jane Doe Mosher, husband and wife; John Does I through V; White Corporation; Black Corporation, Defendants, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Defendant-Appellant.
Prior History: [**1] D.C. No. CV-88-0201-CLH. D.C. No. CV-88-0201-CLH. D.C. No. CV-88-0201-CLH.
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Pensions & Benefits Law, Damages, Costs & Attorney Fees, Discretionary Fees, ERISA, Civil Litigation, General Overview