Truitt v. Salisbury Bank & Trust Co.

Truitt v. Salisbury Bank & Trust Co.

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff William Gunnar Truitt ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against Defendants Salisbury Bank and Trust Company and Salisbury Bancorp, Inc. ("Defendants" or the "Bank") on or about August 21, 2018 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Dutchess County. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him and wrongfully terminated his employment due to his political activities, in violation of New York Labor Law ("N.Y.L.L.") § 201-d. (Id.) On September 14, 2018, Defendants removed this action from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 144 I, and 1446. (ECF No. 1.)

Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 21, 2020 Opinion and Order granting Defendants' motion [*2]  for summary judgment. (ECF No. 54.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background of this case, as delineated in the Court's July 21, 2020 Opinion and Order (the Court's "Opinion") granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 54.)

In short, Plaintiff began working for Defendants on February 26, 2018. In April 2018, Plaintiff announced his intent to campaign for New York State Assemblyman for District 106. Defendants rejected Plaintiff's request to serve as a New York State Assemblyman while maintaining his employment with Defendants due to the time commitment—approximately 60 business days per year—and the $80,000 salary. Defendants indicated that Plaintiff would need to decide between continuing his employment with Defendants and serving as an Assemblyman. On May 1, 2018, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendants indicating his decision to continue with his campaign and ceased working for Defendants. Plaintiff argues that Defendants presented him with an ultimatum—to resign or be terminated—which constitutes constructive discharge. Plaintiff alleges this discharge was in violation [*3]  with N.Y.L.L. § 201-d which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any employer ... to discharge from employment ... an individual ... because of ... an individual's political activities." N.Y.L.L. § 201-d. "Political activities" is defined to include "running for public office." (Id.) Plaintiff further argues that Arthur Bassin ("Bassin"), a member of the Bank's board and a financial donor to Plaintiff's political opponent, played a role in forcing the ultimatum.

On January 28, 2020, Defendants moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 47.) On July 21, 2020, this Court issued and Opinion and Order granting summary judgment on the grounds that no rational juror could conclude Plaintiff was constructively discharged. (ECF No. 52 at 20.)¹ On August 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Opinion & Order. (ECF No. 56.)

Full case includes Shepard's, Headnotes, Legal Analytics from Lex Machina, and more.