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Supreme Court of the United States
July 26, 2019, Decided
[**1170] [*1] The application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to the Court is granted. Among the reasons is that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005. The District Court’s June 28, 2019 order granting a permanent injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate when the Court enters its judgment.
Dissent by: BREYER(In Part)
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan would deny the application.
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part from grant of stay.
To warrant this stay, the Government must show not just (1) a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari and [***2] (2) a fair prospect that the Court will reverse, but also (3) “‘a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.’” Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1302, 133 S. Ct. 1, 183 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2012) (Roberts, C. J., in chambers). This case raises novel and important questions about the ability of private parties to enforce Congress’ appropriations power. I would express no other view now on the merits of those questions.
Before granting a stay, however, we must still assess the competing claims of [**1171] harm and balance the equities. Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hospital Medical & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301, 1305, 112 S. Ct. 1, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1087 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers). This Court may, and sometimes does, “tailor a stay so that it operates with respect to only ‘some portion of the proceeding.’” Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U. S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643, 650 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 173 L. Ed. 2d 550 (2009)). In my view, this is an appropriate case to do so.
Full case includes Shepard's, Headnotes, Legal Analytics from Lex Machina, and more.
140 S. Ct. 1 *; 204 L. Ed. 2d 1170 **; 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4491 ***; 88 U.S.L.W. 3019; 49 ELR 20131; 2019 WL 3369425
Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Applicants v. Sierra Club, et al.
Notice: The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version.
Subsequent History: Motion denied by Trump v. Sierra Club, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3628 (U.S., July 31, 2020)
Prior History: [***1] ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
Sierra Club v. Trump, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108933 (N.D. Cal., June 28, 2019)
irreparable harm, injunction, contracts, finalize, writ petition, appropriated, barrier, funds, begin construction, questions, terminate, chambers, border, harmed