Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. - 25 Cal. 4th 826, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 (2001)

Rule:

From commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court's action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. Cal. Evid. Code §500. There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. 

Facts:

Theresa Aguilar, on behalf of herself and other consumers, filed an action for unlawful conspiracy under the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720 et seq.), against nine petroleum companies producing California Air Resources Board (CARB) gasoline for sale to consumers, for allegedly conspiring to restrict the output of CARB gasoline and to raise its price. Each company moved for summary judgment. Each company presented evidence, including declarations by officers, managers, or similar employees, stating on personal knowledge how the company made its capacity, production, and pricing decisions about CARB gasoline; asserting that it did so independently; and denying that it did so collusively with any of the other defendants. In opposition to the motion, Aguilar presented evidence of the companies' gathering and dissemination of capacity, production, and pricing information through an independently owned and operated information service and otherwise; their use of common consultants; and their execution of exchange agreements. Aguilar also presented related expert opinion evidence. The trial court granted the companies’ motions for summary judgment, but later granted Aguilar’s motion for a new trial on the ground that it had misread a federal case. The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed.

Issue:

Did the Court of Appeal err in reversing the order of the superior court granting a new trial on Aguilar's motion and directing it to grant summary judgment on the petroleum companies' motions?

Answer:

No

Conclusion:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that after the companies carried their initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the absence of any conspiracy, Aguilar failed to carry her shifted burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the presence of an unlawful conspiracy. The evidence that Aguilar did present was at best ambiguous, as were the inferences that she drew therefrom, showing or implying conduct that was at least as consistent with permissible competition by the companies as independent actors, as with unlawful conspiracy by them as colluding ones. Evidence of this sort, and related inferences, were insufficient. Aguilar was required to present evidence that tended to exclude the possibility that the companies acted independently rather than collusively, and she did not do so. The court held that Aguilar’s evidence of the companies’ possible motive, opportunity, and means for entry into an unlawful conspiracy did not amount to evidence showing such a conspiracy more likely than not. Such evidence allowed speculation about an unlawful conspiracy, but speculation is not evidence.