Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada - 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960)

Rule:

The Federal Aviation Act was passed by Congress for the purpose of centralizing in a single authority, in one administrator, the power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the nation's airspace. The Administrator was given the authority to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing and revising from time to time: reasonable rules and regulations governing, in the interest of safety, the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen, and other employees, of air carriers; and such reasonable rules and regulations, or minimum standards, governing other practices, methods, and procedure, as the Administrator may find necessary to provide adequately for national security and safety in air commerce. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1(a), 49 U.S.C.S. § 1421(a).

Facts:

Defendant, Elwood R. Quesada, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, promulgated a regulation that would terminate airline pilots' commercial licenses at age 60. The plaintiffs, thirty-five individual pilots, their collective bargaining representative, Air Line Pilots Association, and its president, brought the present suit, for a declaratory judgment that the regulation was null and void because it was issued without holding adjudicatory hearings, and because it deprived them of property in their licenses without due process of law. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs subsequently challenged the decision.

Issue:

Was the regulation in question null and void for being issued without holding adjudicatory hearings, and for depriving plaintiffs of property without due process of law, thereby warranting the grant of plaintiffs’ motion?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the regulation was properly issued because an adjudicatory hearing applied a statute or legal standard to a given fact situation, and thus the regulation was not an adjudication that required a hearing. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction requested by plaintiffs because regulations could limit, in the public interest, the use that persons may make of their property without affording each one affected an opportunity to present evidence upon the fairness of the regulation.