Thank You For Submiting Feedback!
"Pornography" under Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3(q) is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following: (1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or (4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or (5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or (6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or display.
Indianapolis enacted an ordinance defining "pornography" as a practice that discriminated against women. "Pornography" was to be redressed through the administrative and judicial methods used for other discrimination. Indianapolis’ definition of "pornography" was considerably different from "obscenity." The ordinance did not refer to the prurient interest, to offensiveness, or to the standards of the community. Plaintiffs were distributors and readers of books, magazines, and films. Collectively plaintiffs (or their members, whose interests they represent) made, sold, or read just about every kind of material that could be affected by the ordinance. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional finding it regulated speech rather than conduct and prevented the ordinance from taking effect.
Was the Indianapolis’ ordinance unconstitutional as its definition of "pornography" is considerably different from "obscenity”?
The court of appeals affirmed and held that the ordinance did not define pornography in terms of prurient interest, offensiveness, or standards of the community and, thus, was not treated as unprotected obscenity, and the unconstitutional language of the ordinance was not severable.