Anderson v. Mergenhagen - 283 Ga. App. 546, 642 S.E.2d 105 (2007)

Rule:

Under OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1), [a] person commits the offense of stalking when he or she follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person. For the purpose of this article, the term “place or places” shall include any public or private property occupied by the victim other than the residence of the defendant. For the purposes of this article, the term “harassing and intimidating” means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear for such person's safety or the safety of a member of his or her immediate family, by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, and which serves no legitimate purpose. This Code section shall not be construed to require that an overt threat of death or bodily injury has been made.

Facts:

Maureen Anderson sued Paul Mergenhagen for stalking, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking a restraining order, damages, and fees. After both parties moved for partial summary judgment, the trial court granted Mergenhagen's motion on the invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims, but set the injunction against stalking for a bench trial. Only Anderson appealed from the trial court's order, alleging the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment on the stalking claim, in granting summary judgment to Mergenhagen on her invasion of privacy claim, and in granting Mergenhagen's motion to quash a subpoena. She did not appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Mergenhagen on her emotional distress claim. 

Issue:

Did the trial court err in denying Anderson’s motion for summary judgment on her stalking claim?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The appeals court first held that even though Mergenhagen admitted he had committed certain acts, he denied the intent required under the stalking statute. Thus, no abuse resulted in setting the case for a bench trial. Second, because Mergenhagen’s alleged repeated actions of following Anderson and taking pictures of her arose to an invasion of her privacy, summary judgment was inappropriate. Further, Georgia law did not require physical intrusion to establish a claim of invasion of privacy. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing a subpoena for Mergenhagen’s cell phone records, as said records were not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or information relevant to the intrusiveness of his behavior.