Anderson v. Warner - 451 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2006)

Rule:

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, a plaintiff must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Facts:

Plaintiff Thomas Anderson and the defendant officer, Charles Warner, were each driving their vehicles toward a parade when plaintiff accidentally rear-ended the officer's vintage pickup truck. The officer went back to plaintiff's vehicle, opened the door, and began hitting plaintiff in the face and neck. When bystanders gathered, the officer told them he was a "cop" and that the bystanders should disperse. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as various state law claims. Defendants, officer and the County, moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the officer’s motion on the ground that he had not acted under color of state law. It granted the County's motion on the ground that plaintiff had not presented any evidence of a causal connection between his injuries and either the asserted deficient training and supervision or the asserted failure to investigate. Plaintiff sought review. 

Issue:

1. Under the circumstances, did the officer act under color of state law, thereby rendering the grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer an error? 
2. Was the plaintiff able to show that the alleged deficiencies in hiring, training, and supervision amounted to a policy reflecting deliberate indifference, thereby making the county liable to the plaintiff? 

Answer:

1) Yes. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The court held that the district court erred in finding that the officer was not acting under color of state law when he assaulted plaintiff. Although the officer argued that the scope of his authority as a custodial officer under Cal. Penal Code § 831.5 did not extend to the acts that he committed, the court concluded that the term "cop" was a sufficiently capacious term to include the officer's status as a custodial officer. Therefore, the officer was acting under color of state law when he invoked his law enforcement status to keep bystanders from interfering with his assault on plaintiff. As to the county entities, however, the court agreed with the district court’s judgment. The court noted that in order to hold a county liable under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the county had a policy; (3) that the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. In this case, the court held that the plaintiff did not show that the alleged deficiencies in hiring, training, and supervision amounted to a policy reflecting deliberate indifference.