Armstrong v. Manzo - 380 U.S. 545, 85 S. Ct. 1187 (1965)

Rule:

The due process clause requires as a minimum that the deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is an opportunity that must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

Facts:

Petitioner, R. Wright Armstrong, Jr., and his wife were divorced by a Texas court. Custody of their only child, Molly Page Armstrong, was granted to the respondent mother and the petitioner was ordered to pay a monthly sum for the child's support. The mother thereafter married respondent Salvatore E. Manzo, the stepfather, who wished to adopt his wife's daughter. Petitioner, the natural father, was still living, but the adoption was accomplished under Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 46a, § 6, upon an affidavit filed by the wife claiming that the petitioner had not supported his daughter for more than two years and the written consent of a juvenile court judge for the adoption. And although the wife knew where the petitioner lived, he was never given notice of the proceedings and found out about the adoption informally. Petitioner filed a motion seeking to have the court annul the adoption decree. A hearing was held but the court denied the petitioner's motion. The appellate court affirmed notwithstanding the petitioner's contention of deprivation of due process of law because of entry of the decree without notice. The Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case with directions that the petitioner's motion to set aside the adoption decree and consider the case anew be granted.

Issue:

1. Was there a deprivation of due process of law when the petitioner was not notified of the pendency of adoption proceedings?

2. Was the subsequent hearing on the petitioner's motion to set aside the decree served to cure its constitutional invalidity.

Answer:

1. Yes. 2. No.

Conclusion:

1. The Court held that in disposing of the first issue, it is clear that failure to give the petitioner notice of the pending adoption proceedings violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of law. Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.

2. The Court found that whatever constitutional infirmity resulted from the failure to give notice had not been cured by the hearing on the petitioner’s motion to set aside the adoption decree because the wife and stepfather had not been required to carry the burden of proving their case. Due process required that the opportunity to be heard be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.